It is important to assess the literature that addresses the following key terms which are used throughout the thesis: `populism', `populist nationalism', `nationalism' and `national identity'.

Populism is the concept which requires the most attention. Populism is a notoriously difficult concept to define and is often used without a settled theoretical framework (Deegan-Krause & Haughton, 2009). This has led to criticism that the term populism is so imprecise, and, is applied to describe such a wide variety of social phenomena, that, in the end, it becomes a meaningless word (Serhan, 2020).The debate over its meaning is not a modern problem and similarly occupied academics throughout the 20th century (To Define Populism, 1968). An exact definition of populism may be impractical due to the vast number of different national and historic contexts in which the word has been implemented.

However, there is a `consensus conception of populism' in which, `at least, three core components that can be viewed as common denominators' for the analysis of populism exist (Woods, 2014, p.2). Those three categories are as follows:

populism always refers to the people and justifies its actions by appealing to and identifying with the people; it is rooted in anti-elite feelings; and it considers the people as a monolithic group without internal differences except for some very specific categories who are subject to an exclusion strategy. (Jдgers and Walgrave 2007, as cited in Woods, 2014, p.3).

For the purposes of the thesis, those three core components provide a rough guide for the understanding of populism. However, this definition does not describe populism's relationship with ideology or democracy and authoritarianism.

Ernesto Laclau's `On Populist Reason' provides an explanatory framework which can accommodate for the existence of populism in both democratic and authoritarian societies (Laclau, 2005). Some writers, such as Levitsky and Loxton argue that populism, `the election of a personalistic outsider who mobilizes voters' (Levitsky & Loxton, 2013, p.107) is inherently connected with and acts as a catalyst for authoritarianism. However, Laclau proposes that populism is fundamentally `the construction of a chain of equivalences out of a dispersion of fragmented demands, and their unification around popular positions operating as empty signifiers, is not totalitarian but the very condition for the construction of a collective will which, in many cases, can be profoundly democratic' (Laclau, 2005, p.166). He acknowledges that `some populist movements can be totalitarian' but populism should not be conflated with totalitarianism (ibid.). As the thesis compares a democracy and an authoritarian regime, it was important to establish an understanding of populism in which it can exist in both.

Carl Schmitt's Concept of the Political corroborated Laclau's view. Schmitt's theory depicts the political world as inherently conflictual and antagonistic, and, in its purest form, can be reduced down to the friend-enemy distinction (Schmitt, 1996, p.27). Schmitt's work, in turn, is rooted in Thomas Hobbe's vision of the state of nature in Leviathan; `during the time men live without a common Power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called Warre; and such a warre as is of every man against every man' (Hobbes, 1968, p.185). This view of politics suggests a divisive and hostile `us' and `them' can come into existence in any society, irrespective of the political structure, if it is without a `common Power'.

Another issue that arises when trying to apply the term populism is that it `does not come intrinsically from one side of the political spectrum or the other' (Calhoun, 2017, p.63), existing in both left-wing and right-wing politics. Francis Fukuyama's book, `Identity: contemporary identity politics and the struggle for recognition' (Fukuyama, 2018) addresses this point. It is true that populism can emerge from any political direction and is sometimes not even described as a political position at all, but as a discursive practice (Kelly, 2018). However, there is an unmistakable global pattern, whereby populism has given expression to right wing politics more often than not. That does not exclude its existence on the left, but it simply has not been as prevalent.

Fukuyama explains the rise in right-wing populism in terms of dignity, for which he refers to the Greek concept of Thymos; `the part of the soul that craves dignity' (Fukuyama, 2018, p.9). While modern democracies offer a `minimal degree of equal respect, embodied in individual rights, the rule of law, and franchise. What this does not guarantee is that people in a democracy will be equally respected in practice' (ibid.). The lack of `respect' afforded between citizens existing in a democracy drives a populist affirmation for recognition. As Thymos is a universal and human condition, it opens up the possibility for cross-country comparison. As Fukuyama notes:

Many of those who voted for Donald Trump remembered a better time in the past when their place in their own societies was more secure and hoped through their actions to “make America great again.” While distant in time and place, the feelings among Putin's supporters over the arrogance and contempt of Western elites were similar to those experienced by rural voters in the United States who felt that the urban bicoastal elites and their media allies were similarly ignoring them and their problems. (Fukuyama, 2018, p.17).

His work also provides an answer for a curious feature of contemporary populist movements; if socio-economic inequality is rising and populists are so preoccupied with elites and identifying themselves with ordinary people, why, then, are they so rarely left-wing? Fukuyama suggests, focusing solely on economic incentives for human conduct does not offer an explanation for this. Instead, it overlooks an important driver of human behaviour, the desire for dignity and recognition, which, in turn, is given expression by right-wing populism. Fukuyama identifies this particular ideological pattern in contemporary populism. Subsequently, the thesis tries to establish an additional pattern between right-wing populism and the disinformation of virtual politics.

The `consensus' definition of populism given above, specifies one of the key characteristics of populism, as it being `rooted in anti-elite feelings'. While this is certainly the case, it does prove to be too broad. In both Russian and British politics, the presence of elites within populist movements are visible. Whether it be public-school educated Conservatives in Britain, or the political-economic elite in Russia. The thesis places an emphasis on which elites are defined and constructed as being in opposition to `the people'.

If populism is inherently un-ideological, we can only understand how it determines who the elites are, by accompanying it with a qualifying word. In order for populism to be successful, it is required to associate itself with a provisional ideology (Mudde, 2004). Populism, in this light, can be regarded as `a rhetorical strategy to help achieve ideological goals' (Miller-Idriss, 2019, p.18). The thesis reflects the insufficient clarity of the word `populist' and turns it into an adjective, referring instead to `populist nationalism'. This allows us to address the discourse of the populist movement as distinctly ideological and endow populism with a political meaning. Populist nationalism still pitches the ordinary people against the elite, but rather than only focusing on an internal elite, they identify a foreign elite and threat - this can be another nation or a multinational organisation, such as the European Union (EU) or the United Nations (UN) (ibid., p.21). The ordinary people are then understood in national terms, either ethnic or civic, in opposition to a foreign entity (Fox & Miller-Idriss, 2008). For example, when `nationalists advocating Brexit or Eurosceptic nationalist movements in Europe [they] not only position the EU as the corrupt elite but position the pure people in nativist ways' (Miller-Idriss, 2018, p.21).

it is questionable if Russia has populist characteristics in the first place (Busygina, 2019). Oliker argues that `anti-elite and anti-corruption campaigns, and popular feeling, are fundamentally different in Russia, where corruption is simply more accepted as part and parcel of the system, than in Europe', in addition Putin was anointed by his predecessor Yeltsin, rather than coming to power on a populist platform (Oliker, 2017, p.16). This, she argues, is sufficient evidence to reject the description of Putin's regime as populist. However, she does not acknowledge that in Putin's early presidency, much of his popularity was rooted in his supposed cleansing of the oligarchs, a clear appeal to anti-elitist sentiments.

Furthermore, by accompanying populism with nationalism we can describe Putin as defining the Russian people in opposition to the West. The search for external enemies is also a `widely acknowledged feature of populism' (Ambrosetti, 2018, p.133). In other words, nationalism influences Russian populism, so that, `there is an externalisation of the “elites”, which, in some cases, are identified with the wealthy and powerful states making up the category of the “West”' (ibid., p.134). Oliker's narrow focus on populism as only a reaction to internal elites means she overlooks important characteristics of Putin's ideology. Incorporating nationalism into our understanding of populism justified the description of Putin's regime as populist in the thesis. Furthermore, It also allows us to compare Britain and Russia, as in both cases they divide the political territory between “us” and “them”, but, significantly the “them” is a foreign entity.

It also seems to me that we can add to this discussion, by considering the inevitable contradiction which populism runs into - that of populist governments. Populist movements are not a perpetual opposition and if they are successful, then they often find themselves in government. In this case, the representatives of so-called ordinary people have suddenly become the elite. In order to maintain the “us” and “them” divide which powers populism, a new “them” has to be found. Typically, this can be done by identifying foreign enemies or internal fifth columns (which represent the interest of foreign enemies). Putin's regime seems to follow this trajectory, at the beginning the enemies of the state were presented as internal in the form of Chechens and oligarchs. After establishing government, new enemies were located in former Soviet countries and the West.

Nationalism is another nebulous concept. However, Ernest Gellner provides a succinct definition, that nationalism is `primarily a political principle which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent' (Gellner, 1983, p.1). While Gellner's explanation helps to simplify a difficult idea and clarify the internal dynamics of nationalism, it fails to address the relationship between nations. Nationalists also believe that `the nation is culturally and historically distinctive and therefore possesses moral authority to exist as a separate territorial and political entity. (Harris, 2009, p.6). The major threats to this are typically other foreign entities which may infringe on the nation's exclusive territory or migrants who may alter the cultural distinctiveness from within. This explains the fixation with sovereignty and immigration typically held by nationalists. It also provides an answer to the populist question of who `the people' are - those who have a cultural or ethnic attachment to this `separate and political entity'.

However, Gellner's definition does not explain what constitutes the `national unit' - are individuals required to inherit membership or can it be adopted? Kolstш & Blakkisrud focus this issue of identity onto Russia specifically. They discuss the difference between ethnic and civic forms of identity, which is reflected in the linguistic distinction russkii and rosisski. Rossiski describes a `civic identity intended to encompass everyone residing within the borders of the new state'. Russkii, on the other hand, refers to a `traditional ethno-cultural core' (Kolstш and Blakkisrud, 2016, pp.249-250). They are able to demonstrate how competing forms of identification create a loose sense of nationhood for many Russians. This is an essential observation for the thesis, as it proposes that populist nationalism can provide a fixed and seemingly stable identity for many Russians, by identifying themselves in contrast to a common enemy.

Kumar sheds light on difficulties in reconciling ethnic and civic notions of identity in Britain (Kumar, 2006). His focus is specifically on the problems of English national identity, as it conflicts with British national identity, which has civic connotations (Kumar, 2006, p.428). This has been described as a plausible explanation for the disproportionate amount of Eurosceptics in England relative to Britain (Henderson, 2016). This also opened up the possibility of comparison between Russia and Britain, because it suggested in both countries a weak sense of identity could lead to a political disdain towards foreign entities, given fullest expression by populist nationalism.

Gellner's work is complemented by Anderson's `Imagined communities: reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism' (Anderson, 2006) and Hobsbawm's `The invention of Tradition' (Hobsbawm, 1983). All three of them explicitly connect the emergence of nations, as an accepted reality of a social and political order, with modernity. In doing so, they are able to demonstrate the artificial nature of nations and, consequently, nationalism. Anderson focuses on the inability for all people within a nation to physically meet each other or gain an accurate image of what their fellow countrymen are like. This leads to what he calls an `imagined community' where the nation is a result of the collective imagination of its inhabitants (Anderson, 2006). Hobsbawm points to a different aspect of the artificiality in the creation of nations and nationalism - the invention of traditions. The book charts a number of traditions which appear to be ancient and deeply woven into the fabric of the national spirit, but were, in fact, often created recently and by venal entrepreneurs (Hobsbawm, 1983). As the thesis explores, this understanding of nations and nationalism as essentially constructed concepts expose them to exploitation by political manipulators.

National identity is a strong form of political attachment which provides a framework for individuals to understand themselves and others. In its simplest terms it can be defined as, `a sense of belonging to and being a member of a geopolitical entity' (Verdugo & Milne, 2016, p.3). McCrone and Bechhofer, when surveying the United Kingdom found that: `from interviews with Scots who migrate to England, and English-born people who come to live in Scotland, that their country of origin, where they were born and brought up, confers on them a powerful sense of who they are' (McCrone & Bechhofer, 2015, p.6). While some sceptics may think national identity is an outdated and unimportant concept, it still seems to be a significant driver in human behaviour and political association. In other words, in spite of the work of Gellner, Anderson and Hobsbawm to demonstrate the artificiality of nations, this is not necessarily indicative of how people feel about nations.

Smith argues that `a sense of national identity provides a powerful means of defining and locating individual selves in the world, through the prism of the collective personality and its distinctive culture' (Smith, 1991, p.17). This is an important understanding of national identity for the thesis. That it is essentially a form of association that facilitates both unification between members who think they share a national identity and dissociation with those who they think do not.

Three dominant views of national identity exist in the research: essentialist, constructivist and civic citizenship (Verdugo & Milne, 2016, p.4). Essentialists view national identity as fixed, whereas constructivists posit that `that dominant groups create, manipulate, and dismantle identities for their specific gains' (ibid.). The constructivist analysis of national identity is adopted for the thesis. Firstly, because it recognises that identities can be reimagined and reconstituted; something which seems particularly clear when we look at Russian cultural transitions, from Peter the Great, to Bolshevism, and, into the post-Soviet era. Secondly, they are in close alliance with postmodernists due to their inclination towards relativism (Prawat, 1996). As virtual politics can be regarded as a postmodern interpretation of an authoritarian regime, it required a post-modern or constructivist notion of national identity in order to form a coherent argument. If national identities were fixed, as essentialists would suggest, the scope for manipulating them would be reduced to a minimum.

Wilson's work on virtual politics forms the backbone of the thesis. `Virtual politics: faking democracy in the post-Soviet world' (Wilson, 2005) provides the most detailed account of the methods and techniques employed by political technologists, which the thesis uses to support its central theory. In the introduction, Wilson explains that the key to virtual politics is that `authority is invented' (Wilson, 2005, p.16). This is an important feature of the thesis, as it felt necessary to attempt to connect virtual politics with an ideology which is also predicated on invention - nationalism. The book recognises the significance of enemies and the need for internal cohesion in virtual politics. However, it does not systematically attach virtual politics to an ideology. The thesis attempts to demonstrate that virtual politics operates within an ideological framework, namely, that of populist nationalism. Theoretical considerations are therefore applied to the research already carried out by Wilson.

In a later publication, `Ukraine crisis: what it means for the West', Wilson describes political technology and many of the features of virtual politics in detail in chapter 2 (Wilson, 2014). This was vital for the research, because it updates the different uses of dramaturgiiya which had been used in the intervening nine years since `Virtual politics: faking democracy in the post-Soviet world'. Without this, it would not have been possible to observe a significant pattern within the dramaturgiiya, which then underpins much of the thesis. Furthermore, the chapter reflects the changing nature of virtual politics, in which dramaturgiiya becomes a more prominent feature of political technology. Primarily, this is because there is no substantial opposition to the Putin regime, so the `organisational technologies' (Wilson, 2005, p.66) of day-to-day campaigning became less significant. The article `Is Russian Politics Still Virtual?' (Wilson, 2015) further charts the development of political technology in Russia, paying attention to more recent targets of political manipulation.

Pomerantsev's work complements Wilsons. In `Nothing Is True And Everything Is Possible' (Pomerantsev, 2015), he goes into detail on the illusory quality of Russian politics. He also has a detailed account of Vladislav Surkov and provides interesting insight. Both Pomerantsev and Wilson have interviews with political technologists in their books, which provide useful primary source accounts of the architects of virtual politics. However, the book is discernibly journalistic and therefore sometimes superficial in its analysis. For example, he spends a lot of time focusing on the lives of individuals, such as business woman Yana Yakovleva, but gives little evidence to suggest why or how her experience may be representative of Russian society and politics more generally (Pomerantsev, 2015, pp.93-123).

A later publication of his, `This Is Not Propaganda: Adventures in the War Against Reality' (Pomerantsev, 2019) is particularly insightful with regards to the new methods of political manipulation available on social media and newfound techniques for disinformation. An interview with Thomas Borwick, the chief technology officer for Vote Leave, proved to be a valuable example of the use of social media in Britain (Pomerantsev, 2019, p.211-214). Pomerantsev also makes the connection between Russian politics and developments in the West, although the focus on Britain is relatively limited.

However, he misunderstands the role of ideology in both Russian and Western politics. This leads to him assuming the concept of `the people' is more malleable than it is. For example, he claims that Labour's defeat (albeit a surprisingly close contest) to the Conservatives in the 2017 General Election acts as another example of `the people' being reorganised. This time, around the slogan `For the Many not the Few' (Pomernatsev, 2019, p.214).

He makes this claim without analysis of the opposition which the Labour party faced, widely considered to have run a particularly dismal campaign (Beckett, 2017). In 2019, the year the book was published, the very same Labour party, with a similar campaign for social justice, were heavily defeated by Boris Johnson's populist nationalist Conservative party, who were promising to enact the referendum result. This suggests that `the people' had not changed that much at all since the 2016 referendum. If Pomerantsev had analysed the significance of ideology as a constituent part of the deceptive politics now present in the West, he may not have been so quick to assume `the people' could be reconstituted and reassembled into any ideological shape, on the basis of slogans and social media targeting alone.

This section has looked to define the key terms which are hereafter applied throughout the thesis and provided justification for the use of the term populist nationalist in particular. The most relevant pieces of literature for the thesis have been reviewed. However, as it is predominantly a theoretical piece of work, it was most important to define the key terms as they are applied to the empirical research undertaken by others.

Methodology