Russian foreign policy in 2010s: rationalism and structural constraints

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FEDERAL STATE AUTONOMOUS EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTION

FOR HIGHER PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION

NATIONAL RESEARCH UNIVERSITY HIGHER SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS

Faculty of World Economy and International Affairs

Bachelor's thesis

Russian foreign policy in 2010 s: rationalism and structural constraints

Parunkov Mikhail Alekseevich

Moscow, 2020

Foreign policy analysis is a branch of a wider International Relations field that acts both as a separate, yet highly theoretically resembling of the latter, set of concepts and tools to produce viable estimates of what is likely to happen in an international arena. It is especially relevant if a researcher focuses on a qualitative single-case study instead of large-n generalization. Having established that knowledge about social events can be derived objectively, this paper intends to address a question about the logic of foreign policy decisions made by Russian Federation, in particular exogenous factors that explain its' seemingly regime-bound behavior.

Essentially, this paper aims at bridging the gap between structural theories and their practical implementation, yielding a theoretically comprehensive, practical answer. Speaking from epistemological perspective, the analysis will largely focus on neo-realist theories and such variables as power politics (balance of power) and zero-sum gains. Ergo both prime and test hypothesis are as follows: exogenous factors can explain foreign policy notwithstanding the regime type of the actor, Russian Federation in this case.

The central question of the paper poses itself as a generalized specific explanation - if test hypothesis is proven to be valid, and foreign policy can indeed be explained by exogenous factors - then it can generally be applied to other cases globally. However, as long as there is no connection between independent and dependent variable, null hypothesis (that foreign policy outcomes are not concurrent with exogenous factors, or are explained alternatively) holds true.

What distinguishes the paper is its' relatively heavy focus on a certain case study. All the antecedent variables, i.e. the regime type, international institutions, and socially constructed identities are to maintain explanatory power if null hypothesis is to hold. This yields a possibility of forecasting what changes are likely to come; how Russian policies are to be analyzed, and, more importantly, the proposition that foreign policy decisions scale according to the magnitude of exogenous variables. The magnitude here refers to the amount of utility a state receives if a certain strategy is implemented; it is clear that a foreign policy, being supposedly rational and calculated, is constructed from the best possible options available, which, in turn, correspond to structural constraints, such as balancing.

This approach definitely cannot be called revolutionary, but it is effective: it can be argued that neo-realism as a branch of IR was heavily criticized for not having encompassed the complexity of the world and thus should not be considered as a predictive tool. Yet the central argument of the paper is that the complexity itself usually drives down to power politics and survival of the state, not absolute gains through cooperation. The latter is indeed possible and present, but is always backed up by domestic benefits the strategy can yield, which will also be shown from the empirical evidence in the 21st century. The key to understand is that both democratic and quasi-democratic states have to adequately respond to external conditions through utility-calculation, and being democratic does not mean acting in such fashion (meaning respect sovereignty, promote dominance of international law, etc.) in international arena.

The roadmap to answer the question should be well-structured and heavily reliant on theoretical basis of neo-realist ontology because in order to make a more general theory objective there is a need to know what it constitutes.

Idiosyncrasy of Foreign Policy Analysis

FPA as a discipline primarily evolves around individual decision-makers empowered to act by the state rather than strategic constraints that states themselves face in an international arena. Therefore, an ontological tension between two seemingly distinct levels of analysis inevitably emerges: there is a need to reconcile actor-centered FPA with structure-bound neo-realism. In fact, two of them can perfectly adjust to one another, given that the strategies each individual chooses to enact will always be aimed at solidifying a position of a state, which usually comes down to zero-sum relationship. FPA scholars tend to prioritize individuals when it comes down to the agent-structure problem, but, obviously, those have to be aware of `anarchic society' in order to act. Still, conditions outside the stare are partial to the final outcome: there is a need to consider a handful of influences.

In looking below the state-level, Snyder et al (2002) primarily suggest to `look at the decision-making as versus foreign policy outcomes'. In this case, one needs to look at the bureaucracy itself as a major driver of foreign policy, `spheres of competence, information flow <…>' as Snyder et al believe. In turn, Rosenau in Hudson (2005) focuses attention on the `actor-specific' theory that does not only cover the complexities of the modern world, but also integrates information at several levels of analysis: ranging from individual leaders to the international system in order to understanding foreign policy. As with Snyder et al, the best explanations would be `multilevel and multiclausal', integrating information from a variety of social science knowledge systems. Overall, without significant attention to the particularities of human beings that comprise the state, any attempt to analyze or predict foreign policy will fall short, since individual decision-makers are arguably as powerful as structural constraints.

Despite a significant amount of attention to individual decision-making, it is also important to understand how exactly the decisions are made. For instance, the idea of the `groupthink' - social dynamic within a small group of decision-makers, directly relates to the quality and cohesiveness of foreign policy outcomes, when individuals view themselves not as distinctive units, but, predominantly, members of the same group (Janis in Hart, 1991). In fact, so far the attention devoted to the individual has been profound. Nevertheless, a decision-maker rarely acts unilaterally as long as one considers non-authoritarian states, which has a profound impact over public policy. Janis outlines three characteristics that define groupthink: `overestimation of the group', `close-mindedness' and `pressures towards uniformity' (p. 260). Aforementioned characteristics inevitably lead to the less rational outcomes because whilst individuals have to act as a collective body, the pressures towards unanimity mount high, resulting in `Gross Omissions in Survey of Alternatives' (p.261). Consequently, the following question arises: can zero-sum nature of international relations inevitably lead to groupthink? Can the question of state-survival in terms of geopolitics create unanimous decisions when it is required?

These questions were partially addressed by Jervis (1971) in his fundamental study of perception in international politics. Primarily, Jervis suggests, there is a need to distinguish between “psychological milieu” (perception of the actor) and the “operational milieu” (outside environment) (p. 106). Not considering a psychological side of the problem, it would be correct to make an assumption that every state should react similarly to every objective change in external environment. Obviously, Jervis outlines the simplicity of the proposition by resorting to empirical evidence from the 20th century: ranging from the origins of the First World War to the fall of the Soviet Union. A very powerful suggestion related to the conflict prone period was as follows: In extreme cases one can specify with some certainty “an indicator of the that all decision-makers will recognize” - for instance nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 - and one can be relatively certain that the actors will react. But even then it was impossible to assume the states' response around the globe would have converged - and indeed it was the case at the time (p. 113). Yet the question posed by this research paper hinders at relatively the same proposition by Wolfers, which presented an analogy with people trapped within a burning house, struggling to get out. “Surely, therefore, for an explanation of the rush for the exits, there is no need to analyze the individual decisions that produced it”, Wolfers (1961) suggests. The analogy is especially relevant to the foreign policy outcomes of a state, where groupthink is powerful and reinforced by external constrains that present a picture of a threat so obvious, the decisions become uniform and, more importantly, in line with zero-sum relations in an international arena. In that sense, endogenous variables within each particular state hinge to make any difference or are inferior to exogenous variables that are to be presented.

Neo-realist agenda in FPA

An attempt to present a clear and cohesive explanation of outcomes in international politics have, without a doubt, been one of the major goals of a cohort of thinkers: starting from the implications of Thucydides, Clauzewits, Kant, and Rousseau, it hinged on the idea of anarchy, or the lack of overarching authority in inter-state relations, that guided social contract thinkers on assumptions later used by Waltz as a foundation of neo-realism as an approach.

Steadfastness of the “third image” revolves around a very simple proposition. Notably, “there is a constant possibility of conflict in a world, in which there are two or more states each setting to promote a set of interests and having no agency above them upon which they can rely for protection” (Waltz, 1971, p. 227). The image is simple, yet powerful, and is a first attempt to conceptualize structural constraints as such, including already mentioned zero-sum gains, balance of power and anarchy. Since it is mentioned as “the third”, the first two is approached as instrumental, yet inferior in explanatory power. For instance, the “first” being essentially a tenant of classical realism of Hobbesian nature: “wars result from selfishness, from misdirected aggressive impulses, from stupidity of men”. Whether an optimist, believing that the vices of humanity can be cured by changing social and political institutions within a state, or a pessimist, to whom human nature is a foregone conclusion of brutality, a supporter of the image would effectively suggest that states are war-prone because of citizens that comprise them. Consequently, balance of power and zero-sum gains are a favorable condition so long as it prevents “tigers from tearing each other apart” (p. 20). Even though the events of world history cannot be separated from the actors who made them, even though one can easily blame unwanted or terrible events on the viciousness of men, Waltz brilliantly uses Durkheim as a refutation of a social method, quoting that “the psychological factor is too general to predetermine the course of social phenomena <…> and since it does not call for one social form over another, it cannot explain them” (p. 28). Historically speaking, Waltz suggests that human nature may indeed have caused the World War in 1914, but at the same time it enforced reconciliation in 1918. Clearly, under different conditions men behave differently, which leads to the impossibility of using classical realism to explain events on the international arena or to find recurring patterns; to do so would simply mean using two sides of the coin at the same exact time: pessimist incline at the notion that struggles for power are inherent and cannot be cured, and optimists would say that under certain conditions (state survival, for example) usage of force is justified.

The second image, however, pinpoints that “the internal organization of states is key to understanding the recurrence of conflict” (p. 81). Here Waltz suggests that vigorous foreign policy may well be a result of an internal strife or defects in the domestic government, presumably an autocratic one. Again, a choice of institutional changes is examined through the lens of key political thinkers, such as Marx and his ownership of the means of production, Kantian principles of abstract rights and the relatively modern Wilsonianism in its' self-determination as a righteous struggle. For each solution there is a need of universalization, meaning that either class struggle is eliminated or human rights are widespread in order to achieve peace. Given that this paper advances a structural explanation of foreign policy outcomes, Waltzian criticism of inter-state solution is also useful. From the liberal standpoint, by allowing each individual to embrace freedom as a main driver of economic, political and personal development, “the very vices of men contribute to the progress of society” (p. 88), here meaning greed in advancing an enterprise. And laissez-faire, in turn, is achievable as long as society self-regulates domestically. Resorting to Adam Smith and the minimal interventionism of state in domestic markets, it is impossible to draw parallels with international arena, where “policemen are soldiers that act alone: soldiers are policemen that act in concert” (Spenser in Waltz, p. 97). Thus the argument over the harmony of interests that liberals apply both domestically and internationally becomes obsolete. Irrationality of states presents itself when, for example, war is deemed to be unprofitable, but still recurs.

Maintenance of peace in an international environment was also a dilemma: in general, intervention or non-intervention also split the opinion in the liberal camp, especially given the turbulence and imperial division of late XVIII-early XIX century. Non-interventionist liberals are rather inactive when it comes down to conflict-prevention, Waltz even says idealists believe that “history is on the side of the angels” (p. 113), which is especially dangerous in a turbulent international arena. In turn, so-called active liberalism, meaning the promotion of democratic agenda advances the ideas of Kant in a form of democratic peace theory, which again suggest that democracy as an endemic factor of the state tends to prevent conflict rather than embrace the struggle. In a sense, an interventionist state acts “both as a jury and an executioner”, which is a very resounding proposition that makes international relations even more chaotic and unpredictable (p. 115). Not only does it infringe on the national sovereignty under the presupposition of liberalization, but also brings cultural element into the mix, making liberalization extremely complicated and imbalanced. In general, the criticism of liberalism as a solution for conflict in each of two forms is summarized by Waltz in the following statement: either in the form of aggressive/passive liberalism or human nature one can find a predisposition towards perfection in conflicting units, and, since perfection in both cases is impossible, “the liberal system can only produce an approximation to world peace” (p. 119). It is true that bad states are war-prone, but the opposite proposition can hardly be farther from the ingenuity as well. History of American interventionism in Iran to topple the popularly elected government of Mohammad Mossadegh in 1953, or support for the notorious “freedom fighters” in Nicaragua and other contra-communist dominoes, especially under Reagan administration in 1980s, is a drastic difference from what liberal theorists hoped to achieve. Even though interventionism can be explained in terms of bipolarity, national sovereignty presumes a monopoly of a state in domestic matters, and to say that geopolitical interests of a given state (despite its' inclination towards liberalism) are superior to internal regimes is a mistake.

What is then the explanation of the conflict in the international relations, so long as the first two images are neglected? How can one avoid reductionism and still come up with an explanation that is simple, yet encompassing enough to include not only the economic, but also political events that shape the current modern world? In his later work, Waltz (1979) suggests that “systemic approach that involves not only <…> properties and interconnections of variables, but also the way in which they are organized” is necessary. Consequently, it will be safe to assume that if the organization of units affects their behavior and their interactions, then outcomes cannot be accurately predicted by knowing only endemic (economic, regime type, etc.) factors within an actor. Indeed, the argument is part of a lifelong discussion in social sciences regarding the structure/agent theory, its' exact line of reasoning. Waltz presumes that structure does determine the actions of the actors; more so, they become subject to it - and structural theories tend to explain not only the normal equilibrium between the actors, but also changes from one system to another. For example, the unilateral moment of the United States after the dissolution of the Soviet Union marked the evolution from bipolarity to unipolarity, serious changes in the system itself.

The necessity of structural theories is also explained by the recurrent patterns, in which foreign policy outcomes are concurrent, even though inside-out theories predict the difference due to endemic factors. “If an indicated condition, Waltz presumes, have caused a given war, one must wonder what accounts for the repetition of war even as their causes vary” (p. 67). So what is the definition of essential parts of neo-realism? Firstly, an international system is defined by structure and of interacting parts (states, predominantly), and definition of the structure requires “ignoring the interaction between units and focusing on how they stand in relation to each other” (p. 81). The system itself is usually defined by the “great powers”, according to which smaller or relatively less powerful states are organized. The changes in relative capability of the states come from arrangements within domestic structure, but both have notable similarities, such as:

“Ordering principles;

The character of the units;

The distribution of capabilities”. (p. 89)

However, the difference between the two structures comes from the order and hierarchy in the former, where function of the branches is law-based, and relatively anarchic disposition of units in an international arena. Given that this paper is mostly concerned with international arena, ordering principles of the state require one simple prerequisite - survival. This characteristic is inherent and obvious from domestic politics of the regime survival and extends to the international arena, where states may choose to be dominant regionally, globally or want to be left alone - all of that becomes a part of the foreign policy so long as actors exist and act according to the structural constraints. In relation to the character of the units, Waltz assumes sovereign states as major international actors so long as “the structure of international politics is defined in terms of them”, despite the fact of globalization bringing increased influence to international organizations or other supranational bodies. Finally, the distribution of capabilities results in Realpolitik - a way to strengthen the state and its' interests in an anarchic environment. R'aison d'etat, being stimulated by an absence of supranational authority, logically results in assumptions described by the balance of power, “maintenance of the system stability without destroying the multiplicity of elements composing it” (p. 121). This continuous process of balancing or bandwagoning is zero-sum in its' essence - each state, by carefully weighting economic, political, military advantages and disadvantages, acts in order to maximize its' own benefit in a number of spheres. Moreover, this process is critical in understanding the role of the structure, given that it distinguishes more powerful states as agenda-setters, whereas less powerful ones seem to be more reactionary in nature. The notion of power itself cannot be homogenous. For instance, Kissinger (1972) observed that “military muscle does not guarantee political influence <…> economic giants can be militarily weak and military strength sometimes cannot obscure economic weakness”, so to assess how capable a state actually is, needs to consider numerous factors, such as “size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, stability of the political system and military power. The logic of international relations presumes that “weaker states tend to flock to the losing side” in order to counter-balance the threat that usually comes from the more powerful actor or a group of them.

From that one can understand or study external constraints states have to consider, but to predict how democratic or non-democratic actor would react requires careful consideration of domestic factors. Russian foreign policy under president Vladimir Putin seems to be of interest for many reasons, including its' role connecting both Asia and Europe. Arguably, structural constraints justify the so-called turn to the East during Putin's second term in power, giving Russia a pivotal Role in Eurasian politics. Endemic factors cannot fully explain usage of force in South Osetia or annexation of Crimea, and the logic of utility maximization rationalizes it. Still, to predict or analyze foreign policy outcomes in close future proximity there is a need not only to place Russia within the modern international structure, but also to analyze its' domestic features that also play a decisive role on the grand chessboard.

Methodology

To be clear and concise, I believe it is convenient to star research design with re-stating the key components of the paper and what it tries to prove (see Table 1).

Table 1. Causality chain.

From Table 1. we can acknowledge that a huge part of the hypothesis-testing will be connected to qualitative research, namely working with primary sources that define what exogenous variables actually are; selection of the most important steps Russian Federation has taken since 1999. For easier conceptualization of regime types this paper would relate to Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2009) Cheibub, J., Gandhi, J., & Vreeland, J. (2009). Democracy and dictatorship revisited. Public Choice, 143(1-2), 67-101. doi: 10.1007/s11127-009-9491-2, whose work aims at presenting contrasting criteria for democracies and dictatorships. Once the relevant data had been gathered, Lamont (2015) Lamont, C., Harst, J., & Gaenssmantel, F. (2016). Non-western encounters with democratization. London: Routledge. advises to look for key words and to establish patterns that relate to the prime hypothesis. For instance, we can look at how independent variable caused dependent variables to appear, i.e. how structural constraints pushed the annexation of Crimea, or the South Osetian proxy.

The quantitative research design should be determined by the scope and case-selection for the large/small-n samples (n here stands for the number of countries we are looking at in order to determine patterns). So as to prove a test-hypothesis it is of primary importance to, firstly, prove that exogenous factors hold for small-n and, secondly, to prove that the causality, i.e. that the prime hypothesis applies for large-n as well, meaning that all states despite IV-1, IV-2 are constrained by the same security and utility-maximization factors.

The quantitative research design should be determined by the scope and case-selection for the large/small-n samples (n here stands for the number of countries we are looking at in order to determine patterns). So as to prove a test-hypothesis it is of primary importance to, firstly, spot more general trends in terms of foreign policy outcomes being a result of exogenous variables; and, secondly, to prove that the causality, i.e. that pragmatism applies to Russian foreign policy as well. It is possible here to presume that for an independent variable to cause a dependent variable, a change in the independent variable must have preceded a change in the dependent variable, which will become evident later on.

Still, Barakso, Shabet, and Shaffner (2013) Barakso, M., Sabet, D., & Schaffner, B. (2013). Understanding Political Science Research Methods. Hoboken: Taylor and Francis. warn of the inconsistencies of the large-n observational studies. For example, if we want to avoid sampling error it is necessary to select testing group as big as possible because bigger sample size allows for higher possibility to avoid bias. Since reverse-causality here is not an issue, we still need to account for other things that can change a dependent variable. Having finished with the examples that show correlation between variables and causality chain from independent to dependent one, the paper will move on to its' original prime hypothesis - structural constraints that affected Russian foreign policy outcomes in 2010s.

The use of short-n sampling is justified in terms of theoretical sophistication of the question. When we move to observe patterns not in global, but in smaller unit of analysis, political evidence is not enough to explain status quo - now we are in need of ontological neo-realist background to create a link between structure and agency.

Expected outcomes depend heavily on the availability of empirical evidence to support either prime/test hypothesis or null hypothesis.

In the former case, the logical outcomes are as follows:

Structural factors have the explanatory power to analyze foreign policy outcomes, whereas endogenous factors are negligible.

So long as the test/prime hypothesis holds, foreign policy actions of Russian Federation have a been a rational, calculated response rather than a series of unconventional actions by an authoritarian state. Consequently, zero-sum gains and power politics have left an actor no choice but to turn to “integrate” Crimea and engage in a military operation in South Osetia. For that matter, foreign policy outcomes can be analyzed independently from endogenous factors inside the state. These factors, including regime type, membership in international institutions or “accepted” constructivist ideas or institutions, therefore, can be neglected in large-n studies by having little or no explanatory power in certain cases.

A simplification of that magnitude cannot possibly present a view concise enough to predict further outcomes in their entirety: the authors criticizing neo-realism have noted precisely that. Balance of power, however captivating and everlasting, remains a milestone in geopolitics, but must be surrounded by IV-1, IV-2, although less in importance and weight. Still, in the pivotal moments the logic of realism holds true (Brzezinski, 1986).

In the latter case,

Exogenous factors retain value, but cannot be used as a sole explanation of particular outcomes.

So long as the null hypothesis holds true, structural elements are endemic, but the complexity of the system makes balance of power incapable of explaining particular outcomes, such as:

Russian energy policy in the CACR is pursuant towards absolute gains

“Integration” of Crimea is a matter of internal regime survival, not geopolitical stance of Ukraine towards European Union;

Conflict in South Osetia as a proactive, not a defensive

Chapter 1. Boris Yeltsin and the early heritage of 1990 s

1.1 Domestic structure and its' factors in 1990-1999

As structural theories have already underlined, in order to understand the reaction of states, it is vital to pinpoint the internal characteristics, including economic and military conditions, stability of the political system, size of population and territory. Historically speaking, the Russia under Vladimir Putin and its' activity in the early 2000s has been a direct consequence of events that happened during the period of 1990-1999, probably one of the toughest recoveries a state has faced in a modern history. There are several important implications to consider for the events that unfolded in the 2010s because, as this paper would try to show, they will be a direct, yet distant, consequences of both domestic and international structural changes that occurred in the Russian Federation during this time of struggle.

In fact, the events in the early 1990s were not only complicated and chaotic, but also directly linked to incompatibility of Soviet economic, political and social heritage to a rapidly globalizing world. Kagarlitsky (2002) rightly pinpointed the fact that the general concept of reforms “presumes respect for existing institutions, and a minimization of violence <…> and what took place in Russia was totally different”. There was neither respect for institutions in the period after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991-1993, nor a desire to bring them with less damage done to the general population. There is no secret in saying that the legitimacy of political executive stems from the nationwide support, especially after the disintegration of Supreme Soviet. The political vacuum rapidly needed to be filled threatened the organizational structure of Russian Federation, having raised the questions of secession and state sovereignty, as well as the internal structure of the federation based on a new Constitution.

To say that the years of 1990-1999 brought something even seemingly resembling progress would be a mistake. In the span of ten years the country has faced unprecedented economic collapse matched only by the other members of previously powerful Warsaw Pact. In 1999, Kagarlitsky suggests, it was calculated that in the best circumstances, “simply to regain the level of 1990, the last `pre-Yeltsin' year, would take at least a decade” (p. 4). Between 1991 and 1998 overall agricultural and industrial production was shortened by a half. Even in the relatively prosperous oil industry that used to generate supply used by the satellite states of Eastern Europe, output was down by almost a half as well. Capital investment in 1996 was a quarter of what the Gorbachev's economy recorder in 1990 level, even though the Soviet economy was already suffering from an investment shortage. Consequently, the population experienced a sharp fall, the result both of increased death rates and of declining numbers of births, economic hardship and devaluation of the ruble. The demographic decline in total to by the end of the Yeltsin's first presidency in 1996 was far worse than the 1918-1921 period of Civil War, totaling the number of 3.4 million people.

More importantly, Yavlinsky (1998) pinpoints the lack of basic institutions that allowed for stable development and redistribution of income, much alike of the Latin American states in the 1980s, stating that

“The new ruling elite is neither democratic nor communist, neither conservative nor liberal, but merely rapaciously greedy” (p. 69)

The most important outcome for Russian state after the process of privatization had speeded up was a formation of “oligarchs” - an extremely reach and powerful group that controlled more than a half of the Russian economy. More so, this distinctive group exerted significant political influence by making certain president Yeltsin was re-elected for his second term, allegedly spending more than 500$ million for the electoral campaign and straining media coverage of his opponents (Fish, 2005). It became even more dangerous because of the Cold War remnants that now could be used as business assets - nuclear weapons that remained after the arms race and literally left for the highest bidder to purchase. Consequently, American policies of silent approval were not beneficial at all to a country struggling from within, and only derailed the possibility of the Russian government to create favorable economic conditions, while the majority of the Russian population suffered. The goal of countering the influence of oligarchs will later become one of the priorities of Vladimir Putin, but to increase the welfare of the citizens despite the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development ranking Russia as the most corrupt major economy in the world would take years.

Overall, the transition from command to market economy was extremely painful, yet necessary. In fact, during this turbulent domestic period the fate of all future Russian development both domestically and internationally will be decided. Certainly, it did affect the initial objectives of Russian foreign policy in 1990s because the failure of the Soviet Empire completely changed the picture of Eurasian politics.

Who governs? Roots of foreign policy decision-making

The processes during state-building in a democratic country usually involve a basic rule of separation of powers to introduce checks-and-balances in order to avoid political malpractice. Nevertheless, in the case of Russian Federation this was simply not a priority in early 1990s. And it is really not only the fault of the Yeltsin's government, the hands of which were full without considering an independent thinking in the sphere of foreign policy.

Although the country resembled a democracy from the Constitutional standpoint, de facto foreign policy decision-making had become increasingly centralized during Yeltsin's first and second terms. For instance, before becoming the first foreign minister in 1991, Andrey Kozyrev had already dismissed a number of high-ranking officials including all the deputy ministers that were left from his Soviet predecessor. And even those who remained fiercely opposed his initial struggle for positive-sum relationship with the West (Mankoff, 2009). Decades of hierarchic decision-making also proved to be a heavy toll in a country with no significant political institutions. The rapidity of newly emerging power centers, increased political weight of the military-industrial complex, the Ministry of Defense, large businesses and regional leaders within the country had significantly decreased the capability of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). Lo (2003) has a beautiful quotation to describe the status quo around foreign policy in Yeltsin's Russia: exogenous neorealistic rationality policy

“We can identify a growing number of actors and institutions; we can get a look in on some of the mechanisms of decision-making; and we can from time to time make the link between cause and effect. But who counts, who does what, and how they do it, continue to be difficult questions for which, in many cases, there are either no or only unsatisfactory answers” (p. 32)

Thus, if the importance of MFA can be judged in terms of its' bureaucratic significance, other bodies need to be assessed as well. For instance, the Security Council closely resembled its' American counterpart of NSC and also varied accordingly to the trust the chairman could establish with Yeltsin himself (Mancoff, 2009). In fact, Yeltsin's Kremlin was not effective at bridging the gap of the Security Council, Foreign Ministry, Defense Ministry, and a number of temporary bureaucratic bodies, such as the Foreign Policy Council created and later abolished by Yeltsin himself due to its' inefficiency.

A notable shift occurred with the departure of west-oriented Andrey Kozyrev, who was heavily criticized for his inability to represent strength and failing to secure both integration into the West and any significant economic help for crumbling Russian economy. The arrival of Yevgeny Primakov, a centrist figure that was capable of encompassing ideas of most of the notable elites at the time signified a more confrontational stance. His policy It sought to establish Russia as one of the leading states in the international system that was adequate to its' permanent position within UNSC and to limit the in?uence of the United States in the area of the former Soviet Union. Primakov (2004) in his memoirs himself later stated that the guiding principle of “derzhavnost'” allowed to generate a consensus between a collision of different interests. The role of the state was now a primary concern, and consolidation of elites around the idea of sought-for Russian primacy in near-abroad, equality with the U.S. as a most notable great power of the time became certain. This centrist approach will characterize Russian foreign policy for the following decades, and Kozyrev-Primakov duet is the only period in modern Russian history, in which one can talk of relatively dualist decision-making between the President and Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The future political decisions will become more and more centralized, as Vladimir Putin will consolidate his power during his first term.

1.2 Creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the upsurge of nationalism reinforced the willingness of the states to push for independence and define their stance in the world that in a matter of days turned from multipolarity to the unprecedented unipolar moment of the United States. Still, the nature of the bilateral relations with East European and Baltic states was defined by the painful 40-year experience of Soviet “buffer policies” to counter-balance the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. When this “iron curtain” was suddenly lifted, the geopolitical situation in Eurasian peninsula was drastically different.

In 1991 the position of newly established Russian Federation was unclear: even though it possessed a stockpile of conventional and nuclear weapons, there was a need to reconsider the way bilateral relations with the two closest neighbors - Belarus and Ukraine, are to be conducted. In 1991, following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, 12 independent republics established the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) organization, while the remaining three former Baltic Soviet republics, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, chose a pro-Western Euro-Atlantic vector. From the strategic perspective, security, being the central concern of every state, Russia was no different. It became necessary to build a new system of references and international relations at the levels of both the region and the entire world. For that reason, the Russian Federation initialized integration-oriented activities in its' near abroad. Consequently, the creation of CIS serves a number of purposes:

Maintaining a sphere of influence;

Securing outputs for Russian suppliers;

Political and economic control;

Support for the multipolarity

Since Russian activity can no longer be literally enforced on its' neighbors, rapprochement from economic and political perspective becomes a way of balancing by securing a number of objectives, which is reinforced by the historic and regional proximity (citation). Consequently, for other members, organization cannot bring more harm than utility as long as they remain rational utility-maximizers. For some states, there is simply no alternative to integration, since they are lacking either economic resources they do not possess (oil, gas) or remain in a need of security from rising Islamic fundamentalism. There is a limited choice here: either there could be an alliance with a more powerful state (bandwagoning) (Waltz 1979), or a balancing of relations, the aim of which is to gain benefits in the spheres of security and the economy in exchange for political loyalty or, finally, a hidden (a symbolic protest) or open (an assertion) resistance to the leading player. Therefore, given the economic turmoil and uncertain political future, an extensive historic heritage, the CIS constitutes a rational option for many states in the region. It is also important to remember that all the Post-Soviet independent republics faced the same economic conditions as Russia did, which also limited a number of available options. Thus, CIS brings the following:

Prevention of local conflicts and security matters (Central Asia);

Infrastructure and supply of raw materials (Belarus);

Unified energy system

Common transport infrastructure

Common technical standarts

A system of certification and qualification of goods

Currency links (Shiskov, 2007)

Russian market without trade barriers (Kazakhstan);

Russian economic aid;

The agreement itself does not presume stagnation. Conversely, all the member countries understood that integration is a long, tenuous process with optimistic future. That is why the plans concerning the scope of actions and activities of the Commonwealth of Independent States presumed a movement towards economic and political union. The main objectives of the Agreement Establishing the CIS were:

“the pursuit of common foreign policy by all states, the creation of common economic space and a common communication system, the pursuit of common migration policy, the fight against crime, and environmental protection” (Charter of the Commonwealth of Independent States, 1995).

Union State of Russia and Belarus - absolute or relative advantage?

Moreover, one of the notable integration initiatives within CIS was the Union State of Russia and Belarus (USRB). With the post-Soviet region being a foreign policy priority, Yeltsin's goal was to establish Russian Federation as a regional agenda-setter by establishing a clear transit for Russian gas to Kaliningrad and then European markets. Given the geographic position of Belarus and its' willingness to reciprocate (in a 1991 referendum to keep the Soviet Union in its' reformed state 83% of Belarusians voted in favor (International Relations Portal, 2013)), it was a perfect partner to in mutually beneficial enterprise. From the perspective of Republic of Belarus, the closer cooperation with Russia would ease the process of price reduction in natural resources and privileged position in terms of financial assistance. Both Mieczyslaw Grib (Lukashenko's predecessor) and Lukashenko himself, however, emphasized political gains of the USRB, hoping to strengthen the international position of Belarus via Collective Security Treaty and, more importantly, as Czerewacz-Filipowicz and Konopenko (2017) suggest, “to bring about the possibility of steering not only the policy of Belarus but also Russia”. The situation will later take an unexpected turn with Yeltsin stepping down in 1999, ironically in the same year in which the Treaty of the creation of the Union State was signed in Moscow.

Moreover, after having consolidated his power, Lukashenko more eagerly entered into initiatives that would be especially beneficial to Belarus. For instance, mutual cooperation in the field of defense, with several joint military maneuvers, Russian military bases within Belarussian borders and, more importantly, collaboration between munitions manufacturers with Belarussian companies acting as intermediaries and bringing additional budget revenue (Czerewacz-Filipowicz and Konopenko, 2017).

Vladimir Putin, in turn, will reverse the trend by giving a concrete proposition to Lukashenko, which involved the merger between two countries. For Putin at the time, Belarus was closer to Russia than Dagestan or South Osetia. As an incentive, Aleksander Lukashenko was offered the position of Vice-President of Russia, and Belarus itself would be, at most, an autonomous republic (East European Democratic Centre, 2013). Certainly, this proposition was rejected for several reasons, including Lukashenko's inability to be subject to any authority, both domestically and internationally. Thus, retaining sovereignty in this case outweighed economic advantages and left room for maneuver, especially given that the process of integration stumbled during Putin's first presidential term.

Russian Federation and the West - promise of rapprochement or endured competition?

The fall of the Soviet Union was not only a shock in its' domestic environment, it also caught by surprise its' biggest Cold War opponent, the rivalry of which prolonged for decades. A central question was in need of an answer, and a quick one. What is the right way to treat newly established Russian Federation? As a defeated enemy, a new geopolitical competitor or a probable democratic partner in the Eastern hemisphere - the choice that would likely determine the future of the region. Yeltsin himself was quite clear on his own priorities, having said that Russia “considers the USA and other western countries not only as partners but also as allies. Moscow shares the main western values, which are the primacy of human rights, freedom, rule of law and high morality.”

Brzezinski (1994) at the time argued that “Russia can be either an empire or a democracy, but it cannot be both”, which is why the goal of the Clinton administration, the scholar suggested, was to support Yeltsin at all costs despite the clear tendency towards authoritarianism. For example, the handling of the Constitutional crisis in 1993 was notable, but the outcomes of nationalists under Vladimir Zhirinovsky gaining significant electoral support were far worse. Zhirinovsky advocated dumping nuclear waste in the Baltic and advancing Russia's border so far south that Russians could “wash their boots in the warm waters of the Indian Ocean and forever change to summer uniforms” (Zhirinovsky, 1993).

So what went wrong after the early “liberal” period of new Russia in 1991-1996? And are there any notable structural constraints in play? The two main causes of stronger anti-Western feeling in the second half of the 1990s were a combination of domestic and international structure change. Domestic factors included the continuation of a severe economic crisis, “shock therapy”, combined with frustration at the lack of economic assistance from the West. For various reasons, the “Marshall plan” for Russia, more expected by the Russian government elite than promised by the West, did not happen (Fawn, 2003). In addition, economic conditions have been considerably exacerbated by the default on loans in August 1998, followed by devaluation of the ruble. Second, in the international arena, several steps by the West, including plans for NATO extension as well as continuous bombing of Yugoslavia increased support for the militant nationalists inside the Russian political establishment. To them these steps proved that the West was selfish and militant, and a “natural enemy” of Russia, further downgrading the possibility of cooperation through mutual interest (Nikonov, 2001). In this sense, the case of Kosovo is particularly interesting because, from the structural standpoint, it was analogous to the notorious “first domino” effect championed by Eisenhower that ruled the policy of deterrence and roll-back during the Cold War, when it was the American side that feared aggressive regime expansion. This time, however, while the West did not take Russia, or the UN, or international law into consideration, it was the Russian side that felt increasingly worried about the consequences of these two events.

It is noteworthy that even the liberal part of political establishment was not happy with the policies NATO embraced. Grigory Yavlinsky, leader of the liberal Yabloko alliance and a known pro-Westerner, commented in 1998:

“Talk that this is a different NATO, a NATO that is no longer a military alliance, is ridiculous. It is like saying that the hulking thing advancing toward your garden is not a tank because it is painted pink, carries flowers, and plays cheerful music. It does not matter how you dress it up; a pink tank is still a tank.” (p. 77)

And Anatoly Chubais, at the time a proponent of market-inclined reforms, also commented on the issue, saying that it was

“the biggest mistake made in Western foreign policy for 50 years” (1997).

The reason one has to stress this particular event is quite simple: by continuously expanding (which in itself broke the guarantees of Western leaders given to Mikhail Gorbachev after German unification) eastward, member states showed to Russian authorities that they did not believe in Russia becoming a Western-style democracy and still represented a threat. Probably for Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic a difference of perception was the key to approve of it, since for the former Soviet-affiliated republics Partnership for Peace was a part of early evolving theory of NATO as “security community”, not only a military alliance. (Williams, 2000). The notion of alliance not crumbling in the first place is a significant limitation of the neo-realist agenda; through the shared norms, rules and identities NATO has survived its' initial goal of collective security and, for the member states, started to become a way for broader integration into European community. Nevertheless, perception is the double-edged sword: each international actor can perceive an alliance (NATO does not cease to be one) as beneficial or, conversely, as a threat to its' external security. Sadly, for Russia the latter was an obvious case and arguments against it were staggering. For instance, Mandelbaum (1995), even before its' expansion in 1999 had understood the consequences of it. The argument of spreading the democracy was best achieved by economic aid and incentives for cooperation, not an organization with military roots. Still, if the goal was to institutionalize democracy, why a rejection of Russian veto powers within the Partnership for Peace? Moreover, Ukraine, which had also opposed the expansion, was left isolated. And the goal of the Clinton and Bush administrations was to relinquish WMDs in Ukraine, which was not made easier by the move. This “neo-containment”, if analyzed carefully, was a source of pre-Putin Russian pragmatism in foreign policy, being reinforced even more by the civil war in Yugoslavia. Critically,