Russian foreign policy in 2010s: rationalism and structural constraints

After successful withdrawal from Georgia, a newly elected president Dmitry Medvedev unveiled what would be later known as “Medvedev Doctrine”, which included several points, including “primacy of international law, multipolarity, non-isolationism, privileged Russian interest in near abroad”, and, more importantly, “willingness to protect Russian citizens wherever they may be”. The controversy of the doctrine stems from the previous Russian conviction to follow the rules instead of bending them like its' Western colleagues did. And now Russia, like the U.S. established itself from the position of force, which was extremely dangerous in the multipolar world Russia was trying to build at the same time. Although necessary from the security standpoint, intervention in Georgia had shown the strategic price of international use of force only supported by its' Belarussian counterpart Lukashenko, saying that

“Russia acted wisely, calmly, and beautifully”

A final straw: Ukraine and open confrontation.

There was no such thing closer to a geopolitical nightmare for Russian Federation than to lose Ukraine from its' involvement in the CIS. Although the events in 1990s had already shown how hard it was to accept its' sovereignty, the Ukraine emerged as an independent state. Although this paper finds reasoning not only in the absence of a viable deterrent, it was central in the evolution of bilateral relations between Russia and Ukraine prior to the “Orange revolution” of 2003 during a stand-off between Russian-backed Viktor Yanukovych and pro-Western Viktor Yuschenko, having resulted in a success of the latter (Huseynov, 2017).

Domestic politics, however, reminded the post-Soviet scenario, with oligarchs dominating both political and economic sphere, resulting in Yuschenko's decreased popularity by the end of his term. Consequently, he was not successful in the re-election, with Yanukovych emerging as a new president in 2010. Political course of the new president drastically differed from his predecessor; one of the more vital changes was related to new Law on Foreign and Domestic Policy that legitimized “non-aligned status in international sphere <…> and prohibited the participation in military alliances”, virtually making accession to NATO impossible (Law of Ukraine: About the fundamentals of domestic and foreign policy, 2010). It was in stark contrast to the Fundamentals of National Security Law, which previously declared accession to NATO as a “key foreign policy goal” earlier in 2003 (Kuzio, 2012). This amendment virtually resorted Ukraine to turn Eastward and seek closer cooperation with Russian Federation, since it remained a centerpiece in transition of Russian gas to Western European markets; despite recurring gas crises in 2006 and 2009, “more than 80% of Russian gas exports went through it, representing about 56% of Gazprom's total profits”, making Ukraine the most significant hydrocarbon transit country in the world (Balmaceda, 2013). Still, Yanukovych was reluctant to be completely withdrawn from European politics and remained in contention up to 2013, when he refused to sign The EU-Ukraine Association Agreement that was offered by the European counterpart. It aimed to replace the old Partnership and Cooperation Agreement and included a comprehensive integrational package, including the provisions for a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area, the Association Agreement (essentially a removal of trade barriers and quotas in bilateral trade, and also Ukrainian accession to various EU-funded programs) (Samokhvalov, 2015). The widespread protest resulted in the ouster of the president. Interestingly, a proclaimed interference of the U.S. and its' active support for “Euromaidan” and the formation of “post-Yanukovych” government became clear in the leaked telephone conversation (Huseynov, 2017). In it Assistant Secretary Victoria Nuland and US ambassador to Ukraine, Geoffrey Pyatt discussed the skills of the Ukrainian opposition leaders and agreed on Arseniy Yatsenyuk being a more suitable candidate to lead the government. The dilemma of the Russia government was obvious: either allow pro-Western Ukrainian government to completely turn towards NATO or to gamble and intervene in order to prevent it.

Before resorting to the events that led to the annexation of Crimea, and turn towards the reasoning of the Kremlin that led the events to unfold in a way they did. In the neo-realist camp there is a significant contradiction in understanding the reasoning of Russia and the West. Whereas Mearsheimer (2014) argued that the whole reason of the crisis was that “two sides operated with different playbooks”, Huseynov (2017) attributed Western foreign policy to the accordance with the realist principles, in spite of European and American governments not acknowledging the fact. In relation to the foreign policy outcomes, however, the motivation of states is inferior to the outcomes - and it is possible to argue that the U.S. response to the Al-Qaeda was bombings was inadequate, but still followed the neo-realist logic of pursuing zero-sum gains. In that states, both Russia and the U.S. are not that different if compared in that sense; both reacted to national security threats by acting in the manner of bending the rules due to state survival issues. And the nature of an external threat can be mitigated if a response to an event of unprecedented importance is equally unlawful, but both claim it falls within the category of international law.

In the case of Crimea, for instance, Zadorozhnii (2016) mentions several legal presumptions of complete Russian lawfulness in relation both to the “integration” of Crimean and denunciation of coup d'etat that removed Yanukovych from power. For instance, in refutation of Russian claim that the ouster was deeply unconstitutional in nature, Zadorozhnii stated that on a deal “On the settlement of the political crisis” that provided for re-instatement of Ukrainian Constitution and provision for the Constitutional reform” was officially signed by the president, and the day after he fled to Russia. In the former case, justifying its actions with respect to Crimea, Russia itself notes that “the right to self-determination may be exercised in three situations: within the colonial context, under foreign occupation and in most extreme situations” (p. 54). But none of the allegedly “extreme situations” did occur: there was no “outright armed attack” by the parent state which justified the referendum. Legally, the annexation stands on the same grounds as Kosovo bombardment or invasion of Iraq - it simply reinstates the fact that for each state institutions (including the UN Charter, for example or international law in general) exist so long as a survival of the state is not in danger; as soon as the converse happens, history presents a huge empirical record of why both democratic and undemocratic states alike pursue the goals by employing all methods available (Mearsheimer, 1993). In that sense, Russian pragmatism is no different to American unilateralism.

What was the result of the Ukrainian crisis so far? The fact that status quo endured for a significant amount of time, one can suggest that the situation is beneficial for both adversaries. On the one side of the argument, Huseynov (2017) claims that it can be interpreted as a “great victory for the West” since the crisis actually prevented Ukraine completely falling into the Russian orbit. From the other side of the argument, Karaganov (2017) suggests that Russian foreign policy was “victorious in general” because American sanctions had hardly altered Russian activity and accession of Ukraine into either EU or NATO is impossible as long as Donetsk and Lugansk are separated. But both can agree that neo-realism as a way to perceive international relations and conflict in particular is not going anywhere and will remain influential so long as sovereign states are moving on the global chessboard.

Conclusion

The paper aimed to find structural explanation for resurgence of Russian foreign policy pragmatism in 2010s. Structural constraints, such as unilateral policy of the U.S., NATO enlargement, lack of multilateral arms agreements and foreign energy supply were found to significantly influence foreign policy outcomes of Russian Federation. Enduring lack of dialogue and resurgent neo-containment resulted in 1) Russian isolation during the period of 1991-1999, whereas 2) more assertive Russian foreign policy were connected to economic resurgence and “Bush doctrine”, as well as NATO enlargement. In turn 3) “inclusion” of Crimea and conflicts in South Osetia and Abkhazia were a result of both failure of soft balancing and disruptive policies in the Russian near abroad.

References

1. Lamont, C., Harst, J., & Gaenssmantel, F. (2016). Non-western encounters with democratization. London: Routledge.

a. Cheibub, J., Gandhi, J., & Vreeland, J. (2009). Democracy and dictatorship revisited. Public Choice, 143(1-2), 67-101.

2. Hudson, V., 2005. Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor-Specific Theory and the Ground of International Relations. Foreign Policy Analysis, 1(1), pp.1-30.

3. Jervis, R., 2017. Perception and Misperception in International Politics. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Pres.

4. Rosenau, J., 1969. International Politics and Foreign Policy. New York: Free Press.

5. Snyder, R., Bruck, H. and Sapin, B., 1954. Decision-Making as An Approach To The Study Of International Politics. Princeton: Princeton University.

6. Wolfers, A., 1975. Discord And Collaboration. Baltimore.

a. Vladimir Zhirovsky, Poslednii brosok na yug (Moscow: LDP 1993), p. 64, cited in Jacob W. Kipp, The Zhirinovsky Threat', Foreign Affairs 73/3 (May/June 1994) p. 78.

7. Zbigniew Brzezinski, `The Premature Partnership', Foreign Affairs 73/2 (March/ April 1994)

8. Wyacheslav Nikonov, `Panorama XX1 veka', Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn 6, 2001, p. 14.

9. Grigory Yavlinsky, `Russia's Phony Capitalism', Foreign Affairs 77/3 (May/June 1998)

10. Cited in Larry Elliot, `Ignore Moscow at your peril, warns Chubais', The Guardian, 4 Feb. 1997.

11. Williams, Michael C. (01/06/2000). "From Alliance to Security Community: NATO, Russia, and the Power of Identity". Millennium (0305-8298), 29 (2), p. 357.

12. Michael Mandlebaum `Preserving the New Peace: The Case Against NATO Expansion', Foreign Affairs 74, no. 3 (1995): 9-23

13. John Mearsheimer, `Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War', International Security 14, no. 4 (1990):5-56;

14. Olga Kryshtanovskaya and Stephen White, ``Putin's Militocracy,'' Post-Soviet Affairs, 2003, 19(4): 289-306

15. Ian Bremmer, ``Who's in Charge in the Kremlin?'' World Policy Journal, Win 2005-2006

16. Ian Bremmer and Samuel Charap, ``The Siloviki in Putin's Russia: Who They Are and What They Want,'' Washington Quarterly, Win 2006-2007

17. John F. Mearsheimer, “The Case for a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent,” Foreign

18. Affairs 72 (Summer 1993)

19. Monaghan, A. (2012). The vertikal: Power and authority in Russia. International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), 88(1), 1-16.

20. Yavlinsky, G. (2001). Ten Years After the Soviet Breakup: Going Backwards. Journal of Democracy 12(4), 79-86.

21. E McWhinney,'The US-British Invasion of Iraq and the United Nations Charter Prohibition of the Use of Force: The Paradox of Unintended Consequences' (2003)

22. Tomasz Iwanek, "The 2003 Invasion of Iraq: How the System Failed," Journal of Conflict and Security Law 15, no. 1 (2010): 89-116

23. John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, “An Unnecessary War” Foreign Policy, No. 134 (Jan. - Feb., 2003), pp. 50-59

24. Dmitrii Trenin, “Russia Redefines Itself and Its Relations with the West”, The Washington Quarterly, Volume 30, Number 2, Spring 2007, pp. 95-105

25. Natalya Byanova and Andrei Litvinov, “Russian Pogrom against the Oligarchs,” Gazeta, December 24, 2003

26. Edward; Elkind, Jonathan (2009). "Where East Meets West: European Gas and Ukrainian Reality" (PDF). The Washington Quarterly. Center for Strategic and International Studies. 32 (1): 77-92.

27. Herring, Eric (2000). "From Rambouillet to the Kosovo Accords: NATO'S War against Serbia and Its Aftermath" (PDF). The International Journal of Human Rights. 4 (3-4): 224-245

28. Эpek, P. (2007). “The role of oil and gas in Kazakhstan's foreign policy: Looking east or west?” Europe-Asia Studies, 59(7)

29. Mearsheimer, J. J. (2014). Why the Ukraine crisis is the west's fault: The liberal delusions that provoked Putin. Foreign Affairs, 93(5), 77-89.

30. Casier, T. (2016). From logic of competition to conflict: Understanding the dynamics of EU-Russia relations. Contemporary Politics: Russia, the West, and the Ukraine Crisis, 22(3), 376-394

31. U.S. Withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. (2002). Arms Control Today, 32(1), 21-21. Diesen, G., & Keane, C. (2017). The two-tiered division of Ukraine: Historical narratives in nation-building and region-building

32. DUNMIRE, P. L. (2009). '9/11 changed everything': On intertextual analysis of the Bush doctrine. Discourse & Society, 20(2), 195-222

33. Muzalevsky, R. (2009). The war in Georgia and its aftermath: Russian national security and implications for the west. Review of International Law & Politics, 5(19), 109-130.

34. Hamel-Green, M. (2005). Regional initiatives on nuclear- and WMD-free zones. Geneva: UNIDIR.

35. Balmaceda, M. The Politics of Energy Dependency: Ukraine, Belarus, and Lithuania Between Domestic Oligarchs and Russian Pressure (Studies in Comparative Political Economy and Public Policy). University of Toronto Press.

36. George Khutsishvili, Challenges to Peace-building: Managing Spoilers During Conflict Resolution, ed. E. Newman and 0. Richmond (New York: United Nations University Press, 2006), p. 296

37. Eric Marat, CSTO Summit Disappoints Moscow, Unites Central Asia, EDM, 12 September 2008.

38. Kuzio, T. (2012). Russianization of Ukrainian national security policy under viktor yanukovych. The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 25(4), 558-581

39. Samokhvalov, V. (2015). Ukraine between Russia and the European union: Triangle revisited. Europe-Asia Studies, 67(9), 1371-1393

40. Huseynov, V. (2017). Revisiting the Ukraine crisis: realist reflections on causes and consequences. CES Working Papers - Volume IX, Issue 4

41. Rosner, K. (2006). Gazprom and the Russian state. London, England: Institute for the Analysis of Global Security (IAGS).

42. Walt, S. (2010). Taming American power. New York: W.W. Norton.

43. Wegren, S., & Herspring, D. (2010). After Putin's Russia. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.

44. Trenin, D. (2003). The end of Eurasia. Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

45. Primakov, E., & Rosenthal, F. (2005). Russian crossroads. New Haven: Yale University Press.

46. Czerewacz-Filipowicz, K., & Konopelko, A. Regional Integration Processes in the Commonwealth of Independent States.

47. Mearsheimer, J. (1994). The false promise of international institutions. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies.

48. Lo, B. (2010). Vladimir Putin and the evolution of Russian foreign policy. Milton Keynes UK: Ligthning Source UK Lts.

49. Dellecker, A., & Gomart, T. (2011). Russian energy security and foreign policy. New York: Routledge.

50. Mankoff, J. (2012). Russian foreign policy. Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.

51. Merezhko, O. (2015). Crimea's Annexation by Russia - Contradictions of the New Russian Doctrine of International Law.

52. Kagarlitsky, B. (2002). Russia under Yeltsin and Putin. London: Pluto Press.

53. Fawn, R. (2003). Realignments in Russian foreign policy. London: Frank Cass.

Abstract

The objective of the research paper is to highlight the influence of exogenous neo-realist factor over foreign policy outcomes, and to contrast them with endogenous characteristics of the state, which are presumed to be inferior. Research paper focuses on the Russian Federation and its' foreign policy since the dissolution of the Soviet Union and aims to prove that rationality and calculation in IR is superior to the internal structure of the actor and consistent with neo-realist theoretical concepts, such as balancing, zero-sum gains and security. Methodology is predominantly qualitative, but game theory is used in order to illustrate the process of decision making, alternative choices and the strategy chosen; Cold War historical comparisons are also used in order to show that neo-realist logic holds in any historical environment. Test hypothesis yields that endogenous factors, which include regime type, membership in international organizations, socially constructed institutions, are relevant, but not necessary in order to predict actions in international arena. The structure of the IR is reinforced by the actors, the heterogeneity of which still allows to make coherent, calculated predictions over outcomes.

Размещено на Allbest.ru