Russian foreign policy in 2010s: rationalism and structural constraints

“All the modifications in Europe's security arrangements from 1987 to the present, the net effect of which has been dramatically to reduce Russian power, have occurred with Russian consent. NATO expansion would mark a departure from that pattern” (Karaganov in Mandelbaum, 1995).

Consequently, a neo-realist answer to its' criticism concerning the survival of NATO will not ontologically contradict to its' foundation stones. Waltz (1979) himself claimed that neo-realism is not all-encompassing as an approach, and signifies not only the domestic characteristics of a state, but also the position in relation to the great powers an actor finds itself in. In this case, the configuration for the system of international relations in 1999 is as follows: ordering principles of the system were unipolar with the U.S. as a dominant force, character of the units in the region of our interest was of, essentially, a collective security treaty with no clear goals but to constrain Russia if it chooses to threaten actors in Eastern Europe, and distribution of both military and economic capabilities was not in the Russia favor as well. Moreover, so long as Russia was “a voice, not a veto” in the Permanent Joint Council (PJC), it effectively became excluded from the actual decision-making in the area it previously considered not as its' own backyard, but definitely a near abroad. Even though Mearsheimer (1990) “Back to the Future” argument did not work, the table to decide the whereabouts of European security was set without a Russian say, which would later prove to be a grave mistake.

To add insult to injury, the conflict in Kosovo was a severe blow to the already shattering trust between Russia and the West. Interestingly enough, Smith in Fawn (2002) had pinpointed that the initial reaction of withdrawal from PJC was a “limited disruption”, not a total severance of bilateral NATO-Russian bodies. Yeltsin was not able to react more critically because he feared to lose so much needed monetary assistance from the International Monetary Fund. The fear of being completely isolated from the European security was also looming large, so the official response was that of “readiness to continue working closely with NATO members <…> in pursuit of a diplomatic settlement” Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 26 March 1999: CDPSP 51/12 (1999) p. 3.. Still, Russian delegation refused to sign the Rambouillet Agreement that led to significant autonomy of Kosovo and placed a number of demands on the Serbian side in the notorious Appendix B, including “NATO personnel being immune from any offences <…> having an exceptional exercise of jurisdiction”, and, more importantly, “enjoying free and unrestricted passage on the FRY (Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) territory”. Eric (2000) even mentioned that the conditions of the 1914 Austro-Hungarian ultimatum were “lenient” in comparison with the Rambouillet Agreement and Henry Kissinger stated that “it was a provocation, an excuse to start bombing” Daily Telegraph, 28 June 1999.

Surprisingly, the trend will not be reversed even when president Vladimir Putin enters his first term after Yeltsin's sudden resignation. In fact, at first the president was willing to intensify the PJC talks by answering the question of joining the alliance “why not?”, re-stating the thesis that cooperation is possible as long as two entities remain equal. Tensions that arose shortly after would be even more detrimental than the conflict in Kosovo and enlargement of NATO in 1999, resulting in a deep confrontation between the would-be partners in European security matters. A major concern for Russian authorities had been both the unilateral military action of an alliance, the origins of which were deeply rooted within the infrastructure of the Cold War, and non-confirmation with the rules of the game provided by both United Nations Security Council and United Nations Charter; A precedent of such kind would be dangerous not only within European security matters, but also globally. Sergey Lavrov expressed Russian concerns in the following way:

“What was in the balance now was law and lawlessness; of either reaffirming the commitments of one's people to the United Nations Charter, or tolerating a situation where gross force was the norm.”

But illegality of such a resolution was not an only concern: resorting to force in such a culturally heterogeneous country would not bring any significant changes and violence was likely to escalate even more.

1.3 Nuclear proliferation or failed mutual deterrence? The case of Ukraine

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, a huge nuclear arsenal of approximately 4.000 missiles ended up on the territory of newly established Ukraine. After its' declaration of sovereignty, Ukrainian officials decided to renege on nuclear weapons by transferring them to Russia, which was vital for Clinton government, representatives of henceforth believing that Eurasian region would be more stable as long as Russia remains the sole nuclear power. The transition and ratification of the NPT (Non-Proliferation Treaty) did occur in 1994, but the question for Eastern European security was if the region could have been safer with Ukraine maintaining its' nuclear capability as a deterrent in case of resurgence of Russian imperialism. Mearsheimer (1993), who originally believed that Ukraine would not give the weaponry up, presented a clear neo-realist logic of why nuclear deterrence between middle and major power prevents usage of conventional weapons rather than forces uncontrolled proliferation. The best recipe for peace, he suggested, was

“for all the great powers - including Germany and Ukraine - to secure nuclear deterrents and for all the minor powers to be non-nuclear” (p. 51)

Even though Mearsheimer was wrong to assume that Ukraine would keep the nuclear warheads, his caution about its' implication for the security of the country was spot on, and thus gave another example on how effective the theory of deterrence is. Essentially, a concept of structural deterrence cannot be separated from the Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD), which implies that “parity relations with high war costs are peaceful and <…> assymetric power relationships are associated with crisis and war” (Zagare and Kilgour, 2000). Consequently, so long as a state can retaliate after being attacked using nuclear weapons and inflict significant damage on the aggressor - the possibility of war is extremely low. Moreover, deterrence becomes effective only in condition of threat being credible (one is willing to deploy force) and capable (one actually has a capability to do so) (Schelling, 1981). Again, with its' relatively easy implications, classical structural deterrence is not all-encompassing and did record empirical failures, but the majority of failures “are traceable to the absence of retaliatory threat that hurts enough”, meaning that mutual deterrence breaks down when one side in a conflict situation believes that aggression will result in a net-gain, “even if the other side resists or fights back” (Zagare and Kilgour, 2000). Unfortunately, this would prove to be right in case of relations between Russia and Ukraine not only having an obvious military power imbalance, but numerous reinforcing features. Russians and Ukrainians had significant historical tensions, especially during the Cold War (Diesen and Keane, 2017). The concept of Ukrainian self-identity was a troublesome thing to accept by Russian authorities in the first place; control over the Black Fleet and Crimea had been an ongoing security discussion. In retrospect, Ukraine could not build a conventional deterrent - it was both extremely expensive and useless because Russian conventional superiority was overwhelming. So far the decision to ratify the NPT from the rational perspective was not ideal for Kuchma administration - effectively, it did sacrifice national security guarantees for presumption of global security. Despite the fact that the warheads were now under the joint command of newly created Combined Strategic Forces, Russian reconfirmation of Ukrainian integrity would equate to promises of Northern Alliance. This stance of permanent neutrality, although involved in CIS mechanism of re-integration, was enough as long as the internal bureaucracy remained pro-Russian, and further historical developments would show this could not continue forever.

The most serious drawback of the mutual deterrence was, of course, the reaction of the Russian side if the weapons were kept intact. In this case, a state with the third nuclear military potential in the world would emerge right at the border of Russia, and the consequences of that were to be far-reaching. However, the essence of it rightly mentioned by Mearsheimer (1993) was that the weapons had little or no offensive capability due to Russian ABM (Anti-Ballistic missiles) capacity, and would simply act as a deterrent. It all rested on another right assumption that the bilateral relations between Russia and Ukraine were to worsen inevitably, with or without nuclear weapons. In fact, even at the early stages of Ukrainian sovereignty, there were numerous warnings regarding its' future: Grillot (1997) mentions the claims that “setting up a zone of stability and security in Eastern Europe <…> and Ukraine being a major European state” made both by the President Kravchuk and the Defense Minister Morozov. The goal was to become a regional, if not central power in upcoming years. This ambitious task was hardly achievable in the short-run because numerous Russian officials reportedly described Ukraine's independence as “transitional” and went so far as to warn European governments not to open embassies in Kiev (Grillot, 1997). Moreover, the disagreement regarding the allegiance of Black Sea Fleet, the importance of which to Russia can be hardly overestimated, Ukrainian oil and gas debt did not add to positive-sum relations between the two either.

Overall, Brzezinski (1994) rightly put Ukraine as a “pivotal state in a global chessboard”. For him, Russian domination in the post-Soviet space was inevitable, but the ambitions for its' creation laid directly within Ukrainian borders: its' sovereignty was the key of whether Russia, having gained accessed to the Black Sea, could potentially influence European affairs. Prior to the fall of the Soviet Union, the Black Sea was the point of departure for the projection of Russian naval power into the Mediterranean and beyond, and by the end of the decade Russia was left with a small coastal strip on the Black Sea and with an unresolved debate with Ukraine over basing rights in Crimea, while observing, with “evident irritation”, joint NATO-Ukrainian military maneuvers and a growing Turkish influence in the Black Sea region - also suspecting the latter in indirect support for Chechen resistance. Turkey and Chechnya. (1996). New York Times

1.4 Neo-realist outcomes: Russia on the crossroads

In this extremely painful decade of 1990-1999 Russian Federation was emerging as a weakened, yet definitely regional power in European affairs. A handful of emerging states has needed a tailored bilateral foreign policy: for some, like Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, perception of Russia for a foreseeable future would always be associated with buffer policies of the U.S.S.R during the Cold War, thus their obvious inclination towards European integration. While allowing some states inevitably following out of its' orbit, Russia had established a regional alliance of states relatively closer in terms of economic and historical proximity - the CIS. Struggles in its' domestic structure, including polarization of elites, staggering levels of corruption, first Chechen war crippling its' influence in the security matters of the previous near-abroad, had forced Russia to accept bombardment of Kosovo in order to keep Yeltsin's government intact. However, the way things had unfolded would prove detrimental in the long run: by supporting personalities rather than institution-building, the West did maintain Yeltsin's grasp on the legislature. On the other side of the argument, it backfired when his notable counterparts, including Anatoly Chubais, Viktor Chernomyrdin, Yegor Gaidar and others have continued pushing cloaked liberal reforms. Despite the fact that they did establish a market economy, the “shock therapy” did not redistribute income effectively, resulting in a huge chunk of previously government-owned assets falling in the hands of a few “oligarchs”, making them both wealthy and powerful. Consequently, the stage was set for larger political confrontation because one could not possibly keep Russia out from European security matters, while the latter insisted for cooperation and dialogue.

In addition, the policy of “geopolitical pluralism” elected by the West, which was supposed to democratize post-Soviet space by keeping good neighbor policies of non-interventionism, was controversial to the processes happening within the country (Brzezinski, 1994). Vladimir Lukin, the first Russian ambassador in the U.S., pinpointed the situation Russia found itself in as the new millennia encroached:

“We find ourselves to be not so much between modern Europe and backward Asia, but rather occupying some strange middle space between two “Europes” interview In Rossiyskaya Gazeta, January 12,1992

In the long-run, this position within regional structure could not possibly suffice a country that powerful. The stage was clearly bound for conflict, and historic opportunity of rapprochement between Russia and the West was severely damaged, but not totally destroyed. The following decade would be central in deciding whether there will be cooperation based on mutual respect or a prolonged suspicious stance in a multipolar world, which definitely had not become safer.

Chapter 2. A new Russian identity: pragmatism of Vladimir Putin

Russian foreign policy revised: from cooperation to pragmatism

Resignation of the first president of Russian Federation Boris Yeltsin on the last day of 1999 marked a symbolic turn for the state as a whole - Vladimir Putin, the image of whom would be associated with renewed Russian strength, had won the election. Given that the role of the president as a strongman always entailed final authority, this understanding was to be reinforced in the years 2000-2008. This image was not needed solely because of disintegrated domestic economy and struggling electorate - internationally, Russian position remained largely unresolved and in need of a strategy that could both secure economic recovery and geopolitical security interests. At the time, many prominent international relations scholars have cast grave doubts on the future of Russian democratic institutes that were not developed during the first ten years of its' existence (Fish, 2005). Certainly, to call the presidential election of 2000 as quasi-democratic would be a severe underestimation - here, an election night speech by Union of Rightist Forces leader Sergey Kirienko is particularly instructive. While acknowledging that there might be problems related to the democracy under Vladimir Putin, Kirienko stressed that the main thing was that economic policy would be liberal, which in the long run meant redistribution of income through oil revenues (Kagarlitsky, 2002). More importantly, state sovereignty was still in question. The devastating conflict in Chechnya continued as an embarrassment of previous administration and the armed forces in particular, whereas oligarchs that supported Yeltsin's second term were acting as an independent political force.

2.1 Strategies compared: Russia and the United States

Officially, “Conception of Russian Foreign Policy” signed by the president in 2000 enumerated several important priorities to consider. There were several important features that differed from the same document that was in effect since 1993:

“Russia is striving towards multipolar structure of international relations, priority of law and <…> the importance of mechanisms in United Nations Security Council, of which it is a permanent member;

Russia will be a firm proponent of regional and global integration, denuclearization and non-proliferation;

Use of force under the UN Charter is not legitimate and threatens the stability of the international system;

Constructive cooperation with NATO can be accomplished only with mutual respect and binding obligations”

(Conception of Russian Foreign Policy, 1993)

Respectively, the National Security Strategy of the United States (NSS) 2002 mentions the following:

“The United States must defend liberty and justice <…> no nation is exempt from them;

“When openings arrive, we can encourage change;

United States must start from these core beliefs and look outward for possibilities to expand liberty;

United States must identify and destroy the threat before it reaches our borders” (NSS, 2002)

It is not hard to see that even those exempts demonstrate a significant difference between the priorities of the two, different means of acquiring the goals. Although the NSS of 2002 was influenced by the events of 9/11 and later would be known as the “Bush doctrine” (Dunmire, 2009), the tendency towards preemptive action under the anti-terrorist presumption would prove to be both counterproductive and, in the case of Iraqi invasion to topple Saddam Hussein, illegal. The goal of expanding this zone of liberal peace as a universal value would in the majority of cases undermine sovereignty, which was unacceptable to Russia and to many prominent US allies. As the world was increasingly moving towards multipolarity, American interventionism will be one of the last straws that eventually pushed Kremlin towards pragmatism rather than idealism.

2.2 Domestic structure and its' features in 2000-2008

Economically, the second decade had shown a significant progress. By 2007, domestic economy grew at 7% annual rate, size of the economy increased from $200 billion to $1.3 trillion, while Russia's per capita GDP quadrupled to nearly $7,000, and about 20 million people had been lifted out of poverty. Russia's middle class now constituted about 25 percent of the population (Palmaceda, 2013). During 2000- 2005, the average Russian saw a 26 percent annual growth in income, in comparison with average 10% of the Chinese economy. Direct foreign investments to the Russian economy had skyrocketed, making it the first in the world among developing economies. Although much of the economic recovery was due to high oil prices, the government continued to work to reduce a reliance on energy exports. In early 2008, for example, industrial production rose an annual 9.2 percent, but a lack of democratic institutions limited its' diversification (Tsygankov in Fawn, 2004).

In relation to the domestic structure, by the end of the fourth Duma term in 2007, the nature of political decision-making was individualized in many aspects. For example, the effect of Yeltsin's 1993 Constitution on the executive branch significantly shifted presidential powers. Consequently, the legislature, and specifically the lower house (Duma), has been damaged the most since the consolidation of power (Fawn, 2004). For all its' controversy and corruption, it was nevertheless able to play a prominent role in political life due to a number of parties represented - from Gennadiy Zuganov's Communist Party to Vladimir Zhirinovsky and his “Liberal-Democrats”. In the period of the third Duma (2000-2003), however, a loyal majority was created in order to control and ensure the passage of legislation proposed by the president - beginning from the parliamentary alliance Unity and then the party United Russia (Remington in Wegren et al, 2009). Thus, during the first term of his presidency, ability of the lower house of legislature to influence proceedings was much reduced - and nowhere more so than in foreign policy.

Logically, Putin's emergence as publicly popular leader and his working majority in the Duma have effectively neutered Russian politics, and few “people's deputies” were now inclined to fight over issues in which they have little direct political or personal interest. Thus, already weakened legislative branch, especially its' relation to foreign policy decision-making, had not been effective in acting independently. Whereas under Yeltsin the Duma constituted a constraining influence that undermined effective policy-making, these days it performs more as a “loyal opposition” at the service of the President (Fish, 2005). And the trend continued not only within State Duma in Moscow, but in regional parliaments as well. For example, numerous legislative blocks were invoked in order to divide and divert opposing regional parties, and increasing pressure for regional politicians to affiliate with United Russia prevented oligarchs of gaining a foothold in regional parliaments (Remington in Wegren et al, 2009). Likewise, the upper house has never played a major role in the making of foreign policy. The permanent members of the Federation Council were appointed by the regional governors and legislators as a result of the reform in 2000, subject to the increasingly powerful presidential administration. Although the system remained semi-presidential constitutionally, in reality the powers of the president by 2003 were hardly constrained, and the reason for that consolidation of power lies in the turmoil of 1990s, especially the emergence and political influence of oligarchs, each with the goals of his own. But fighting the oligarchs without any democratic institutions or the rule of law is a rather arduous task, warned Yavlinsky (2001):

“That is why President Putin's struggle with the oligarchs is not a battle against oligarchy in principle. No one man, even if he is president, can conquer oligarchy; like corruption, oligarchy can be conquered only by civil society.” (p. 75).

Even though the goal of this paper is not to assess choices made by the president during the stall of the liberalization package since 2004 - tragedy in Beslan was a symbolic corner stone of it - it is imperative to understand that the “vertical of power” established through polpreds or pinpointing rather than electing governors of districts can and would be detrimental to possible resurgence of democratic institutions in the nearest future (Monaghan, 2012). The power within a state is not counted solely in a number of soldiers or SS-20s - it is the constant economic growth, more importantly, diversified growth. If it was not a centerpiece of legislation in 2001-2004 because there were more important matters at hand, negligence of this problem would be even more troubling than a possible isolation from the European affairs.

End of the unipolarity: Russian Federation on the crossroads

The unprecedented decade between 1991 and 2001 marked an event never before seen in modern history. Not solely American state as a whole - an American way of life was triumphant in the age of nuclear stalemate. The U.S. enjoyed both economic and military preponderance in global affairs. But the way it related to Russian Federation in particular was detrimental. In fact, the willingness of American administration to “go alone” was the feature of Bush sr. administration, whether it related to the International Court of Justice or Kyoto Protocol (Walt, 2006). The events of the 9/11 only exacerbated the tendencies already clearly visible. As a result of the deadliest attack on the American soil, Bush famously proclaimed that “every nation, in every region now has a decision to make <…> either you are with us or you are with the terrorists” Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People, Washington, DC, September 20, 2001. The event sent shockwaves across the globe, and the initial Russian reaction was nothing but cooperative. President Vladimir Putin had called an emergency meeting of security officials and said he supported a tough response to the “barbaric acts” New York Times. New York City; Washington (Dc). September 12, 2001. Thus, after September 11th the role of solidarity with the United States in the fight against international terrorism was solidified, emphasizing Russia's civilizational affinity with the West. Interestingly, Fawn (2004) quotes the experience of Grigoriy Yavlinsky, who was one of the few summoned officials to the closed security meeting in Kremlin to decide the role of Russia in the newly established war on terror. He recalled that the majority of those presented advised to enact either some form of balancing or neutrality, and only two (including himself) advocated supporting the U.S. At the end of the meeting Putin declared that Russia would support the American response unconditionally. More importantly, Vladimir Putin also explicitly rejected seeking any kind of quid pro quo, such as loans or investment in the Russian economy. At the same time Duma members did the mechanical work to communicate a lengthy list of the tasks that were supposed to intensify cooperation between two states even more: accelerated and preferential accession to the WTO and removal of the Jackson-Vanik amendment - originally linked to the Soviet Union and the treatment of minorities directly related to the MFN (Most-Favored Nation) - that prevented balanced international trade between two countries.

Although the invasion of Afghanistan was tacitly supported as a part of a “tough response”, operation in Iraq was drastically different. Under international law and UN Charter in particular, the use of force is always illegal, except when it relates either to legitimate right of self-defense or United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSC). The argument for invasion was based on two premises: first, the breach of the previous UNSC Resolution 1441: adopted as a result of Iraq to comply with disarmament actions related not only to the weapons of mass destruction, but prohibited missiles construction, purchase of armaments and failure to compensate economic losses of Kuwait suffered in the Gulf War. Interestingly, McWhinney (2002) denoted that the U.S. and the U.K. government tried to change the UNSC 1441 Resolution “explicitly authorizing the use of force against Iraq, but failed to do so”. Instead, the resolution clearly stated that it is the UNSC, not the individual states that will take necessary steps for the application of resolutions because it was not the U.S. that coordinated the cease-fire, originally the resolution was between Iraq and UNSC.

Second, the argument of “preemptive” or “anticipatory” self-defense that is basically a reaction to an imminent attack that did not happen, but inevitably would (Iwanek, 2009). Still, there are several conditions, under which the use of force is legal: “the threat is unavoidable, direct (aimed at the state in question), and imminent (bound to happen in hours or days, not months and years)” (Nabati in Iwanek, 2009). In the case of Iraq, preemptive self-defense was viewed with the lens of Bush doctrine, which is contradictory in itself. For instance, under the NSS 2000 the government of Saddam Hussein was viewed to have Al-Qaeda links and possessing stockpiles of WMDs, despite the Iraqi government allowing on-site inspection. These assumptions would later prove to be wrong, and the legal understanding of the US unilateral actions would disappear.

To understand strategic implications of the U.S. unilateralism, one needs to assess all of the dangers to international society, especially in the age of nuclear weaponry, if a single economically and militarily dominant country starts bending the rules of international conduct. Despite the fact that throughout Bush administration promotion of liberalism taking rather an aggressive force, it could not possibly erode sovereignty of states, even with the “good intention”. Neo-realist logic suggests that counterbalancing in the long run would be inevitable, the only question is when, where, and how.

Mearsheimer and Walt (2003) have argued that the war itself was unnecessary in the first place. A rational approach, even if Iraqi government did possess nuclear weapons, would to be to carefully deter a threat rather than to intervene. In relation to its' previous offensive against Kuwait in 1990, Saddam Hussein carefully considered his options, by first and foremost trying to understand how the U.S. would have reacted. It turned out that The U.S. State Department had earlier told Saddam that Washington had “no special defense or security commitments to Kuwait.” Retrieved from: https://msuweb.montclair.edu/~furrg/glaspie Consequently, it turned out that United States may not have intended to give Iraq a green light, but that “is effectively what it did” (Mearsheimer and Walt, 2003). Instead, the rational decision would have been to resort to the logic of mutual deterrence because if one carefully analyzed previous Iraqi behaviour, it would become clear that deterrence effectively succeeded at least two times earlier. Firstly, despite the fact the Iraqi forces did use SCUD (Russian R-11 and R-19 respectively) missiles during the Gulf War, biological or chemical weapons were not used against the coalition forces that were inflicting significant damage on the Iraqi military. The argument from senior officials, including Deputy Prime Minister and the head of former military intelligence was as follows: Bush Sr. administration warned that it would retaliate immediately if WMDs were used, which is deterrence in itself - a fear of a deterrent both credible and capable. Secondly, in 1994 Iraq mobilized the remaining forces close to the border of Kuwait in order to modify UNSCOM weapons inspection regime (Mearsheimer and Walt, 2003). But as soon as the UN issued a new warning and the U.S. mobilized its' troops in Kuwait, Saddam Hussein quickly backed down. Given that there is a successful history of Iraqi compliance, previous evidence of using nuclear weapons within the country against the Kurds becomes obsolete; ironically, it was the U.S. under Reagan administration that supported the actions in 1980s as a notorious support for “freedom fighters” across the globe.

Overall, invasion of Iraq was another significant strategic mistake of the U.S., threatening not only to destabilize the Middle Eastern affairs, but also setting a dangerous precedent of acting unilaterally and using force at the same time. Not surprisingly, it contradicted the goals of Russian foreign policy as well, which represents another domino to fall in an already large pack of mutual misunderstanding, distrust and pragmatism. It is vital to understand that, while for the Bush administration the U.S. actions in an international arena are to be viewed as absolute gains promotion, whereas in reality they are viewed by other states essentially as zero-sum. On the one hand, when George W. Bush says that he was

“Amazed that there is such misunderstanding of what our country is about <…> we've got to do a better job of making our cause”

(Bush in Walt, 2006, p. 47)

Vladimir Putin in turn responds that

“Here in Russia we believe, just as president Jacques Chirac believes, that the future architecture of international security must be multipolar <…> the world will be predictable and stable only if it is multipolar” Putin comments on current events, Moscow ITAR-TASS, February 9, 2003

It is not hard to see the obvious: although Russia did not at the time fall within the “axis of evil” category, the resistance and turn to pragmatic foreign policy in one way or another was inevitable - with increased U.S. unilateralism a serious backlash was only a matter of time - and place. The official response of Russian Federation may had been tacit, but the events to follow in its' near abroad would change the bilateral relations from stagnation to resentment.

Russian energy policy - pragmatism over idealism

Even in the beginning of Vladimir Putin's first term energy policy, especially export of oil and gas to European markets, was one of the major economic drivers that allowed economic recovery in 2000 - 2007. International business in that sphere, however inseparable it is form theory of international relations, cannot function properly without political decision-making on the highest level. Pragmatic as every business is, it allowed to keep energy-bound Belarus and Ukraine tightly within the Commonwealth of Independent States and served as an anchor in European affairs, some of the states there heavily dependent on energy imports. Trenin (2007) even called Russian Federation “Russia Inc.”, meaning that its' foreign policy had been connected to securing new markets, and securing them fast. The inheritance of major government-owned corporations like Gazprom or Rosneft, with top Kremlin staffers and senior ministers sitting on the boards, is extensive when it comes to where, with what price, and when to export. Trenin (2007) assumed that

“Russia is sovereign at last and fiercely independent, no longer a poor ward of the West, and on the way to becoming a power on par with others” (p. 97)

Indeed, following high oil prices Russia had ascertained itself as a powerful regional actor - and with its' renewed strength was simply impossible to ignore. Consequently, when it comes to foreign energy policy the equation is simple: you either have oil and gas within your territory or you are looking to import. Vis-à-vis European Union, Russian pragmatism stems from dealing with individual states rather than entity as a whole. It was vital to keep stable business connections with Germany, France, Italy and other EU members that are relatively outstanding economically and are in need of imports. The structure of ownership limited the independence of big business following the renowned Yukos case with Mikhail Khodorkovsky - the richest of the oligarchs - charged with the tax evasion (Byanova and Litvinov, 2003). Thus, the narrowness of ownership and its' close affiliation with the government made an industry a very strong political and economic “carrot”. With it, Russia could effectively keep states within their orbit by selling with a cheaper price to loyal CIS members that integrated with it instead of the EU. On the other side, it was a no less a painful “stick”: the most notable example at the time was Naftogaz scandal in Ukraine in 2006, when Gazprom claimed that Ukrainian company was not paying a fair share at the same time diverting European supplies to its' own needs. As a result, Russia completely cut-off gas supply, reaching an agreement three days after (Edward, 2009). Geo-economics in that sense is not that different from geopolitics: despite the fact near-abroad is still de-facto abroad, Russia largely views it as a preferential economic area, in which it enjoys “comparative advantage over third-party competitors” (Trenin, 2007). From the neo-realist standpoint, oil serves as an alternative to nuclear weapons when it comes to economic balancing; in fact, it can be even more detrimental to countries with increased demand. For example, by cutting off supplies to Ukraine more than 10 European states saw a drop in supply of gas by roughly 20% (in Croatia and Serbia it amounted for 100%). Retrieved from: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4574630.stm By alleviating price and using short-term contracts, Gazprom effectively controls more than 50% supply in the CIS area and 20% percent in Europe (Edward, 2009). The grand strategy is as easy as it is pragmatic: Rosner (2006) claims that

“Gazprom and the state have no vested interest in allowing alternative natural gas export routes from the CIS to develop that obviate the Gazexport system and the Russian Federation in general.” (p. 20)

The way that Russian strife for sovereignty links with energy policy independence is also illustrated with the fact is that Russia had never ratified the European Energy Charter (EEC) with its Transit Protocol. It simply means that no third party has an access to Russian pipelines or other parts of transportation networks. Certainly, the EU would continue bargaining with Russia regarding this matter, but the possibility of success is extremely low. Interestingly, the quid pro quo agreement offered by the European partners offered an entrance to its' deregulating internal market for energy in return for Russian acceptance of third party access (Rosner and Elletson, 2006). Still, the only thing the EU has received is more Gazprom gas and hence increased dependence on Russian imports, which in itself a symbol of rational mindset - monopoly on transportation channels is too important strategically to gamble with it; the same goes with de-monopolization of Gazprom and Gazexport - none to happen in any foreseeable future.

The clashes of interest result from the obvious European negligence to be dependent on Russian gas imports. For instance, in 2006 EU had proclaimed its' willingness to diversify the energy supply by looking towards Central Asia and Caspian region in particular (CACR) (Umbach in Dellecker and Gomart, 2011) - a result of German EU presidency, without a doubt - that came as a strategic challenge to Russian oil industry.

CACR itself is the grand chessboard of “petropolitics” - a region where interests of the EU, Russia and China meet - and cause unprecedented clash of interests. The reason for that is simple: Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan together combine for 48% of global oil reserves and 8% of gas respectively (Umbach in Dellecker and Gomart, 2011). Destabilization of the region is not only linked to the complexity of borders and the legal division of the Caspian Sea, in which Russia, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan reached an agreement of collective administration in 2003, but also disagreements over the potential export routes (with Russia, of course), political uprisings, increased authoritarianism and political unrest in both Central Asian and Caucasian states (Trenin, 2007). Oil and gas is equally important to a realist and a liberal; thus, when two international players with opposing interests collide in the same region, pragmatism is inevitable.

The role of Peoples Republic of China (PRC) in CACR can be hardly underestimated as well. Blank (2006) emphasizes the importance of energy imports of PRC as being a “strategically vulnerable resource”. Unsurprisingly, the gap between domestic supply and demand grows every year, respectively following the growth of the economy. Thus, energy for PRC is both an economic, political and security matter. The CACR is not only within its' geographic proximity; Umbach in Dellecker and Gomart suggest that the “potential vulnerability of shipping routes through the Indian Ocean to the U.S. Navy” is another reason for the strategic importance of the Caspian Sea. At the same time China clearly did not want to find itself in the position of the EU. Being significantly dependent on Russian oil imports was not strategically acceptable partially because of the Sino-Soviet split in 1970s. and Chinese strive for self-sufficiency. In turn, Russia could not be happy with increasing Chinese influence in its' own backyard, which led to careful counterbalancing via Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) established earlier in 2003, the Charter of which presumed “a goal of reaching political and military stability in the region through multipolarity. In the end, the SCO served as another balancing tool against the U.S. encroachment in region, which would not be beneficial to Russia and China. The complexity of relations in the region is only intensified by “multi-vector” foreign policy of Central Asian states and Kazakhstan in particular, the pragmatic rule of oil revenue for whom is as important as it is for bigger powers; in its' essence it means having good relations with everyone who has a demand (Ýpek, 2007).

2007 - A point of no return. From pragmatism towards assertiveness.

The year 2007 was a turning point for both the Russian-EU relations in general, and zero-sum Russian stance in CACR in particular. Firstly, European Community Regional Strategy Paper for Assistance to Central Asia issued in 2007 presumed both regional and “Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs)” that were viewed as undermining Russian transportation monopoly in the region, threatening to encourage Central Asian states to integrate closer with the EU. The most dangerous project, however, was the Nabucco gas pipeline project, the EU's equivalent for “South Corridor” (Umbach in Dellecker and Gomart, 2011). Not only would it start in 2009, but also completely bypass Russian territory running from Azerbaijan via Georgia to Turkey and from there to Austria via Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary. Consequently, counterbalancing measures were deployed as Gazprom announced a new “South Stream” project of underwater pipeline in the Baltic Sea via Italy and then to Greece and Austria - notably in the same month as Regional Strategy Paper was proclaimed. Despite the project being twice the cost of the EU's Nabucco, it was an important power of a larger pragmatic strategy to intensify energy cooperation and pipeline projects with individual European and CACR states in 2007 in order to undermine more cohesive Regional Strategy of the EU.

Similarly, even more game-changing events were happening in NATO-Russian relations that would signify additional resentment and misunderstanding. Symbolic Munich speech of Vladimir Putin delineated several worries that Kremlin had associated with the U.S. unilateralism and a state of international relations in general; it is necessary to look at how it affected further policy-planning in the key areas of Russian interest. Apart from the U.S. foreign policy there were numerous areas that, figuratively speaking, filled a jar and pushed Russia towards proactive foreign policy. Firstly, Vladimir Putin mentioned “the pitiable condition of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe” (CFE Treaty), that followed order with a bitter sweet of another wave of NATO expansion in 2004, including Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. The reasoning for that was not only “NATO's complete reluctance in ratifying the document since 1999”, but, additionally, “activity of <…> armed forces in the flank zones” and “flexible frontline American bases our borders”.19 Despite the fact that WMDs are always in the equation when it comes to security and deterrence, the importance of conventional forces cannot be underestimated. Although the CFE Treaty can be viewed as an end of bipolarity and the Warsaw Pact in particular, its' symbolic value was what kept an important channel of cooperation between Kremlin and the White House. According to the treaty itself, the mutually respected ceiling of, for instance, “20.000 tanks and 2.000 attack helicopters” was what Russia always wanted: a Treaty that puts equal provisions for two sides. Unfortunately, this line of cooperation was also damaged, and could have been understood by Vladimir Putin as another side of neo-containment, renewed fear of Russian aggression.

Nevertheless, the major reason for Russian withdrawal from the CFE Treaty comes from much earlier decision of Bush administration to stop the U.S. membership in the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) in 2002 - another remnant of the Cold War rapprochement (Arms Control, 2010). The logic of it was simple: by restricting ABM deployment in two areas (one to protect the capital, another to defend Inter Continental Ballistic Missile launchers (ICBMs)), Soviet Union and the U.S., thus left “the penetration capability of the others retaliatory missile forces unchallenged”. It effectively prevented the possibility of the nuclear exchange by providing technical assurance of the MAD, and, in combination with START-II (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) had given a legal ground of non-proliferation. However, after the events of 9/11 the danger of a renewed arms race loomed large. Failure of the ABM Treaty was only a part of American unwillingness to support non-proliferation; in fact, during United Nations General Assembly Session in 2002, the U.S. supported “only 32 out of 52 arms control and disarmament resolutions passed by substantial or overwhelming majorities” when it came to conventional weaponry and in case of WMDs “the proportion was even lower: 7 out of 20 widely supported initiatives” (Hamel-Green, 2005). Not only the American side was not willing to support disarmament, it also explicitly stated its' desire to “test and deploy the ABM systems <…> outside the United States”, meaning numerous installations of ABMs in the NATO territory (Arms Control, 2010). As a result, Russian side had withdrawn from the START-II, that limited the amount of MIRVs (Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicles) on ICBMs - basically a technology that would allow one warhead to strike several targets at once.

What these sequence of events accomplished was potentially dangerous not only for European security, but also development of new nuclear warheads that are capable to bypass ABMs that were no longer limited, as well middle powers developing WMDs of their own - a fear that was looming large after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the reason for NPT (Non-proliferation Treaty) as a consequence. Vladimir Putin famously reiterated, stating that

“<…> no one feels safe! Because no one can feel that international law is like a stone wall that will protect them”19

Inevitability of Reaction.

Aforementioned events in 2000-2007 had not created a stage that allowed for cooperation. Both the U.S. and Russian Federation had not been able to understand or to trust each other. Structurally, the allegory of spreading democracy closer and closer to Russian borders presented more questions than answers, and American unilateralism, having been tolerated by Yeltsin's Russia, would no longer be applicable to Vladimir Putin and his vision on multilateral international order and centrality of regulatory bodies, such as UNSC or United Nations General Assembly. The logic of great power politics was as relevant as it could be. Russian foreign policy re-awakening was evident, but to regard it a revisionist power would have been a mistake. In transition from regional to central stance, Russia had shown a tremendous restraint in hardly receiving any reciprocation from the West, watching the increased re-armament probability, having been subject to the rules of the game, whereas its' counterparts successfully broke them. But patience also had its' limits that ended in Georgia

Chapter 3. Crossing the boundary: Russian Federation retaliates

Failure of soft balancing? Case of Georgia

In order to understand Russian intervention in Abkhazia and South Osetia correctly, one needs to firstly assess a situation from a geopolitical standpoint and only then take a look at regional perspective. Historically, the sovereignty of Georgia had been problematic since the dissolution of the Soviet Union and 1994 in particular, when Abkhazia officially declared independence from Georgian government with South Osetia following suit 2 years later (Khutsishvili, 2009). From that moment on, the conflict largely remained frozen with the presence of the Joint Peacekeeping Forces (JPKF), equally drawn from all sides of the debate. However, after the “Rose Revolution” in Georgia in 2003, newly elected president Saakashvili pledged to renew Georgian identity by incorporating the provinces and embarking on a pro-Western course that was not in line with the Kremlin's thinking. Fundamentally, the problem with Saakashvili was in part that he came to power without Kremlin support, in part that he attempted to end the frozen conflicts that served as a Western ouster, but mostly that he and his supporters saw Georgia as an aspiring outpost of the West. The grave structural picture for the Russian authorities began to unfold: it looked as if they were being encircled by an alliance, the aim of which they could not explain rationally.

In addition, the relations between Georgia and NATO were developing from both sides: Mearsheimer (2014) concluded that not only Georgian unilateralism in Russian near abroad was not possible to accept, it was the NATO 2008 Summit in Bucharest that raised the question of the actual consideration of membership granted to both Georgia and Ukraine, the latter being also influenced by the same scenario of the “Orange Revolution”. In fact, the Summit Declaration explicitly mentioned that “that these countries will become members of NATO”, whereas reaction of Kremlin was of Georgian accession “being a direct threat to Russian security” (Mearsheimer, 2014). It was evident that Kremlin could have foreseen this as a possibility, thus increasingly integrating Abkhazia and South Osetia by giving their citizens Russian passports in order to internationalize the conflict on the one hand, and make the Georgian accession into NATO impossible on the other (new members are accepted so long as they do not have territorial disputes) (Mankoff, 2009). Nevertheless, a point of no return came in August 2008, when Georgia attacked Russian peacekeepers and launched heavy attacks on South Osetia, forcing Russia to proceed with substantial coercion - the first international military operation in decades. Although indeed showing Georgian resolve, it was not the first time Mikheil Saakashvili tried to resume sovereignty: firstly, Tbilisi sponsored a presidential vote in those parts of South Ossetia, which had a majority of ethnic Georgians to put pro-integrationist parties in power, and then arrested four Russian officers with espionage charges in 2006 (Mankoff, 2009).

Despite being a center of a renewed geopolitical contention, Georgia also had an important economic purpose as well. Umbach in Dellecker and Gomart (2011) argued that one of the overlooked aims for the Kremlin during and even before the war was to “discredit Georgia's role as an important transit state, thereby reinforcing its own supply and transit monopoly from the CACR”. However, the reaction of the European states in that matter were opposite of what Kremlin initially wanted to achieve: after the hostilities had ended a “strategic cooperation conference” in Azerbaijan backed by the U.S. and the E.U. and the majority of Central Asian states occurred, emphasizing support for the Nabucco pipeline. Apart from the economic consequences, geopolitical results of the invasion were largely negative. For instance, neither China, nor Central Asian states, nor Kazakhstan with its' multi-vector policies had recognized independence of Abkhazia and South Osetia, stemming from the fact that Russia, like the U.S. or NATO acted rather unilaterally and “expected their approval postfactum” (Marat, 2008). In that sense geopolitics had played a bad joke with Kremlin; although Chinese officials understood the real cause of the “defensive action”, it was impossible for them recognize both of them as independent in order not to encourage secessionism - precisely the same logic that Russia applied when it did not recognize Kosovo as an independent state.