Identity factors in the making of Baltic states’ foreign policy course in 1991-2014

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Identity factors in the making of Baltic states' foreign policy course in 1991-2014

Andrei Valodzkin,

Ph.D (History), AssociateProfessor Institute of History of the National Academy of Sciences of Belarus,

Minsk, Belarus



Abstract

Foreign policies of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in post-Soviet decades have been prominent for their continuity and consistency. Since identity is usually considered as one of the major factors of consistency and continuity of politics, the goal was set to examine the role of different identity factors in formation offoreign policies of the three Baltic states in the periodfrom international recognition of their independence in August 1991 to the Ukrainian Crisis of spring 2014 in European politics.

The analysis of literature and sources suggests some assumptions on how identity-related factors influenced foreign policies of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, They could be summarized in a hypothesis that making of the Baltic foreign policies was deeply influenced by “ethnocratic ” nature of political regimes, establishedin Baltic states, ideological constructs based on their historical memories and memory politics as well as geopolitical identities of being “small states” and being influenced by the “Baltic unity” idea.

Examining of these assumptions allows to conclude that effects of some identity factors, like ethnic identities, are often overestimated, while others really played very important, sometimes decisive, role in developments of major foreign policy vectors of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. The deterioration of their relations with Russia in the period under review was largelydetermined by ideological constructs of legal state continuity and Soviet occupation deeply rooted in the XX century historical memories of Baltic states. While Western vectors of their foreign policies and first of all their relations with the USA developed in line with the logic of securitization based on self-perception of Baltic political elites of being “small states ”.

Keywords:Baltic states; foreign policy;historical memories; national identity; geopolitical identities



Андрій Володькін,

канд. іст. наук, доц.

Інститут історії Національної академії наук Білорусі,

Мінск, Білорусь

ФАКТОРИ ІДЕНТИЧНОСТІ У ФОРМУВАННІ ЗОВНІШНЬОПОЛІТИЧНОГО КУРСУ ДЕРЖАВ БАЛТІЇ У 1991-2014 РР.

Анотація. Зовнішня політика Естонії, Латвії та Литви в пострадянські десятиліття відрізнялася безперервністю та послідовністю. Оскільки ідентичність зазвичай розглядається як один із головних чинників послідовності та безперервності політики, було поставлено за мету дослідити роль різних чинників ідентичності у формуванні зовнішньої політики трьох балтійських держав у період від міжнародного визнання їх незалежності у серпні 1991 року до Української кризи весни 2014 року в європейській політиці. foreign policy estonia latvia lithuania

Аналіз літератури та джерел висуває деякі припущення щодо того, як фактори, пов'язані з ідентичністю, впливали на зовнішню політику Естонії, Латвії та Литви. Їх можна підсумувати у гіпотезі про те, що на формування балтійськоїзовнішньої політики глибоко вплинула «етнократична» природа політичних режимів, створених в країнах Балтії, ідеологічні конструкції, засновані на їхній історичній пам'яті та політиці пам'яті, а також геополітична ідентичність «малих держав» і ідея «балтійської єдності».

Вивчення цих припущень дозволяє зробити висновок, що вплив одних факторів ідентичності, наприклад етнічної ідентичності, часто переоцінюється, тоді як інші дійсно відігравали дуже важливу, іноді вирішальну роль у розвитку основних зовнішньополітичних векторів Естонії, Латвії та Литви. Погіршення їхніх стосунків з Росією в досліджуваний період значною мірою зумовлювалося ідеологічними конструктами правової спадкоємності держави та радянської окупації, які глибоко вкорінені в історичних спогадах країн БалтіїХХ століття. Тоді як західні вектори їхньої зовнішньої політики і насамперед відносини з США розвивалися відповідно до логіки сек 'юритизації, заснованої на самосприйнятті балтійськими політичними елітами своїх країн як "малих держав”.

Ключові слова:країни Балтії; зовнішня політика; історичні спогади; національна ідентичність; геополітичні ідентичності



Introduction

Historical retrospective of foreign policies of the three Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania since restoration of their independence reveals a very remarkable consistency and continuity of their major foreign policy vectors. It could be found either in their strong commitment to Euro-Atlantic integration or in long- lasting complex contradictions in their relations with Russia, sometimes described as a “small Cold War” [29]. Both these tendencies could be traced back as far as early 1990s. And such a consistency is even more remarkable if compared with flexible and often occasional foreign policies of the neighboring Eastern European states of the same period - the states which shared with Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania at least half a century of common past within the Soviet system (if not to deepen further in pre-modern history). So why have Baltic foreign policies been so different from those of their Eastern European post-Soviet neighbors?

The most likely explanation of this lays in the field of identity studies. Or more exactly in discovering and analyzing the influences of identity-related factors on developments of Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian foreign policy over the three postSoviet decades. To support such a view there could be brought some quotations of prominent scholars in the field of foreign policy analysis and international relations theory which clearly link continuity in foreign policy to identity factors. For instance Wendt conceptualizes identity as “relatively stable, role specific understandings and expectations about self” [32, p. 397]. According to Hopf identities are so important because they “strongly imply a particular set of interests o r preferences in respect of choice of action” [19, p. 175]. Flockhart describes identity as “the agent's understanding of self, its place in the social world and its relations with others”. And continues, that an “understanding of `self' is always dependent on an `other' for its constitution and, although relatively stable, is a condition that is always in a process of reconstitution and is always supported by a narrative to ensure biographical continuity that makes any changes seem natural” [17, p. 87].

So all these scholars underline that identity is a crucial factor in maintaining continuity of state policies, because it is considered more stable and deeply rooted than interests. And the impact of identity is especially visible in the field of foreign policy, where decision-making on interactions with “others” takes place. Its most evident effect is prescribing of certain roles and images in state policies to external actors that paves the way for dividing them in categories of “friends”, “enemies” etc. And since such role-prescribing is very characteristic of Baltic foreign policies of post-Soviet decades, identity factors seem to be very likely reasons fortheir continuity in this period.

But the topic of contemporary identities formation in the Baltic stateswith all its variety and complexity is definitely a subject of another research and lays beyond the focusof this paper.Since this is not an identity study, but the onededicated to the history of foreign policies of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, itspurpose is to discover and analyze the impact of identity-based ideological constructs on developments ofsome directions of Baltic foreign policies and theirdynamics over the historical period under review. This period covers almost a quarter of century: starting from the international recognition of Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian independence from the USSR in the end of August 1991 and up to the international crisis in Europe of spring 2014, often mentioned in literature as the Ukrainian Crisis, that changed the whole security environment in the Europe's East and paved the way for a rapid securitization of Baltic foreign policies.



Historiography review

Due topopularity of constructivistapproach in theory of international relations and foreign policy analysis,interconnections between identity and foreign policy have become a recurring topic of studies since 1990s (see, e.g.,Wendt [32]; Hopf[19]; Neumann [26]; Hansen and Waever[14] etc.Since chronologically rise of interest to identity studies coincided with growing attention to transitionstates of the Europe's East,these countries often appeared in focus of such works[16; 25; 27]. In his comparative study Fawn examined and discussed the role of ideology and national identity in foreign policies of six post-communist states from both Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and post-Soviet regions (although Estonia was the only Baltic state included in this survey).His main conclusion was that since ideology of Marxism-Leninism collapsed in post-communist states, it was quickly replaced with revived nationalism and “the year 1989 responded to 1789 with the end of official political state ideologies and the rebirth of nationalism”[16,p. 36]. Also the importance of engagement in integration to Western institutions, first of all the EU and NATO, wasemphasized since this process madesome post-communist states to revise and moderate their initial nationalistic policies and to develop them in line with more inclusive civic forms of nationalism corresponding “to the values of Europe” [16, p. 36].

As for studies of the Baltic states' foreign policies, security issues still prevail there over identity-related. Yet there isalready a number of publications focused onsome identity aspects in foreign policies of these states. First of all the collective work prepared by Berg and Ehin. The authors contributing to that volume (Morozov, Kasekamp,Malksoo, Jakniunaite etc.) concentrated on how the Baltic states' integration into the EU influenced dynamics of identity-based issues in the most troublesome and antagonistic direction of their foreign policies -relations with Russia. Baltic-Russian relations in 1990s - 2000sbrought a very vivid example of clashing identities. As the editors point out in the first chapter “continuously poor state of Baltic-Russian relations can be explained by the fact that the national identity constructions of the Baltic states and Russia, together with the historical narratives they are based on, are incompatible and (...) include truth claims that are mutually exclusive”[20,p. 9].

Unlike Fawn, they describe the role of European integration as a very controversial one, since “contrary to what was expected, EU membership appears to have added new conflict dimensions and expanded the arenas of contestation. Europeanization has not helped the parties to `put the past behind them,' as optimistic end-of-history scenarios foresaw.” ” [20, p. 1]. Most chapters of the book address the issues of memory politics in Russia and Baltic states, including Baltic-Russian “memory wars”, as well as competition between them for support to their particular “national” visions of XX century history and historical claims to each other on the EU level. Despite some controversies and differences in opinions of its contributors, the main purpose of that volume could be summarized as drawing attention to the crucial role that antagonistic interpretations of not so distant past still do play in Baltic-Russian relations.

Also there should be mentionedthe article of Fabrikant on contemporary national identity in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania[15]. Her vast sociological study based on public opinion surveypresents broad analysis of a number of parameters indicating attitudes of inhabitants of these three countries and significance that they attribute to different criteria of national identity (such as national language, statehood etc.).Provisions of this paper are very instrumental in debates on“ethnocratic” tendencies in Baltic domestic and foreign policies as they contribute a lot to understanding of the balance between civic and ethnocultural elements in contemporary national identities of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. And these aspects have direct impact on Baltic foreign policies formation since national ideologies in these states provide a solid long-lasting base for political elites and public consensus on major foreign policy priorities and strategies. Besides Fabrikant's work contributes to understandingof the complex topic of alleged mistreatment of the Russian-speaking minorities in Latvia and Estoniaand their alleged disloyalty to these states that have formed the core of Baltic-Russian conflict almost since the very restoration of Baltic independence.

The collective monograph of Galbreath, Lamoreauxand Lasas on developments of Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian foreign policies in the first four years after their joining the EUalso points out the importance of “ideational factors” for foreign policy formation in Baltic states. The authors put in this category “determinants that underlie the perceptions of action, power and size, such as histor y, identity and rhetoric”[18,p. 14]. However, the main focus of this work is still on the role of structure and agents in formation of Baltic foreign policieswhile ideational factors largely remain in the background.Besides it is interesting to note that such an important characteristic for policy-making in Baltic states, as “small state” approach is largely considered within the category of instrumental factors, whichthe authors define as “those forming a pa rt of the traditional rational approach to international relations” and setagainst the ideational factors [18, p. 15].

Thispoint is challenged by Berziunaswho analyzes the impact of such factors as being a “small state” and being situated between Russia an d the West on the national foreign policy discourse of Lithuania[13,p. 5]. He investigates the role of these factors, traditionally considered as “geopolitical” and therefore constituting part of the rational realist approach, form the new, ideational perspective - as laying the ideological basis for Lithuanian foreign policy. Berziunasreveals that throughout the Lithuanian history similar actions by Russia and Western powers often met very different response from Lithuania and concludes, that such a situation could be attributed to the overall threat perceptions established in Lithuanian political discourse with deeply rooted images of the “enemy” to the East and “allies” to the West and seeking for an influential patron on international arena arising from selfperception as a small state with very limited resources[13, p. 8].

Apart fromBerziunas the role of identity in making of Lithuanian foreign policy studiedKarpaviciute. She mostly focused on the role of national identity in the evolution of Lithuanian foreign policy and made some interesting observationsaboutits developments in 1990s- early 2010s and the role of national identity in changing its agenda. According to Karpaviciutethe main dichotomy of “we” and “the other” developed over this period in Lithuanian foreign policy from simplified opposition “Lithuania (with the West) vs. Russia” to more complex structure involving different levels of identity (national, regional, European) and different forms of interaction on international arena [22].

Conducted analysis of literature and sources suggests some assumptions on how identity-related factors influenced foreign policies of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. They could be summarized in a hypothesis that making of the Baltic foreign policies was deeply influenced by: 1) “ethnocratic” nature of Baltic states; 2) ideological constructs based on their historical memories and memory politics; 3) geopolitical identities of being “small states”. In the context of geopolitical identities there could be also considered the role of the “Baltic unity” idea, discussed in works ofButkus[11] and Jurkynas[21]. The following chapter of the article is aimed at examining these hypothesis.

Results and discussion

Ethnic relationsand foreign policiesof Baltic states.To describe the extent to which ethnic identities can influence political system,political scientists developed terms “ethnocracy” and “ethnic democracy”. Although both of them have been used long before the restoration of Baltic independence, since the mid 1990s they have been applied to describe politics of Baltic states more often than of any other European state. First of all this happens due to persistent efforts by Russian and Russophone authors from Estonia and Latvia to draw particular attention to the fact that since the early 1990s substantial parts of Russophone minorities in these two countries (namely settlers of the Soviet period) have been excluded from political processbecause Estonian and Latvian governments denied to grant them citizenship rights automatically and introduced rather long procedures of naturalization instead [see e.g.; 3; 5; 6]. These authors define such policies as “ethnocracy” and often characterize them as the initial source of long-lasting deterioration in Baltic-Russian relations.Some Western scholars also recognize ethnically exclusive nature of political regimes established in Estonia and Latvia, but attribute to them milder definition of “ethnic democracy” [see e.g.:28].

From the first glance this situation can be viewed as a sign of a deep ethnic conflict in two Baltic states. But upon closer examination it does not fit into the classic definitions of ethnic conflict. First of all because sinceLatvian and Estonian independence there has never been documented any violence on ethnic or cultural ground - all the protests and clashes had political reasons, mostly related to official politics of memory (like the so called “Bronze Night” in Tallinn in April 2007). Second,political exclusion was based not on purely ethnic grounds - since, at least formally, the reasons for denying a person automatical citizenship right was not his or her ethnicity, but the period when this person settled in Latvia and Estonia. Therefore it affected not the whole Russophone communities of these two states but only those who settled there in the period of Soviet rule (which national ideologies of all the three Baltic states clearly proclaim illegal) irrespective of the person's ethnicity.

Third we shall pay attention to citizenship politics of the last Baltic state - Lithuania, that was completely different from Latvian and Estonian- Lithuania granted its citizenship to all permanent residents of the country living on its territory on the moment of independence restoration. Of course to some extent this difference could be explained by historical background. As Auers noted in his monograph,Latvian and Estonian national movements faced in XIX - early XX centuries serious opposition from small but powerful minority of Baltic Germans[10, pp. 12-14]. And fast increasing over the Soviet period Russophone communities evoked in their national movements on the edge of 1980s - 1990s old fears of powerful disloyal minorities having support from a strong neighboring state.But this was not the case in Lithuaniasince it has never been dominated by a minority of foreign origin. Although to some extent a role of “disloyal minority” there was played bypolonized local nobility of late XIX - early XX centuries which in disputes between Lithuanian and Polish national movements often took Polish side,thus paving the way for the long Vilnius/Wilnaconflict between Lithuania and Poland.

Yet the decisive factors in choosing one or another policy on citizenship were nothistorical differences or repercussions of old ethnic conflicts in the region, but pragmatic calculations of new political elites based simply on the share of Russophone minorities in the total population of each republic.Due to specific policies of Lithuanian communist authorities during the Soviet rule, the number of Russians increased just slightly and never exceeded 10 % of the entire population of this republic - so they remained only the second largest minority after Lithuanian Poles [5, pp. 257-258; 9].While in the rest two Baltic countries number of Russophones multiplied and by the end of Soviet rule constituted almost 1/3 of the entire population in Estonia and more than 40 % in Latvia [4, p. 17].

The popularview that national identities in Baltic states strictly follow the classic model of ethnic nationalism is also challenged byFabrikant, whoreflectsin her study that in contemporary Baltic states some traditionally ethnic markers, such as language, have transformed in mass consciousness from original indicators of belonging to certain ethnocultural community to symbolic markers of political loyalty to the national statehood. Therefore: “In today's Baltics, the model of ethnic nationalism may resonate with some preconceived ideas and expectations, but not necessarily reflect the current state of affairs, especially at the less articulated level of mass consciousness” [15, p. 308]. Fabrikant argues that in contemporary Baltic states “loyalty and willingness to stay in the country” is considered much more important than “preservation of the so-called ethnic purity” and therefore “the institutional criteria for national identity should come to matter more than cultural ones” [15, p. 310].

Yet public opinion surveys in Baltic states of the second half of 1990s and the first half of 2000s reveal clear discrepancies between respondents representing title nations and Russophone minorities regarding their attitudes to such major foreign policy issues as NATO and EU accession or relations with Russia- the former expressed much greater supportto official positions of their respective state on these issues than the latter[2, pp. 38-39[. However these surveysalso demonstrated dramatic fluctuations in public support to those foreign policy priorities. And this brings us to the conclusion that it was not consensus among general public, but among politicalelite thatmade possible such a remarkable continuity in Baltic foreign policies. Such a conclusion is supported by argumentation of Vilpisauskas, who remarks, that before the EU accession major foreign policy issues in Baltic states remained almost entirely the “affairs of political elites”, which were reluctant to bring them for broad public debates, but instead rather preferred to reach quick consensus among themselves[31 ].

So, to summarize, there is no evidence that ethnicfactors played any substantial role in making of Baltic foreign policies during the period under review. Even such issues as exclusion of some part of Russophone minorities in Latvia and Estonia from political life of these countries, that provoked very negative reaction from Russia and indeed contributed a lot to deterioration of Baltic-Russian relations, have been rather caused by ideological factors, such as memory politics and national history narratives of new political elitesof Baltic states, than by any ethnic prejudices of general public.

The role of historical memories and memory politics. Historical traumas of the XX century, such as loosing independence in 1940 and subsequent periods of Soviet, German and once again Soviet rule, caused great importance of historical memories and narratives for making of national ideologies of Lithuania, Latvia and Estoniain the post-Soviet period - the ideologies that formed the basis for broad and lasting consensus of Baltic political elites on major strategic goals of their s tates' domestic and foreign policies. And the mostimportant ideological constructs there have been the principle of state legal continuity and the concept (in wording of Simonyan [8] and Vorotnikov [2] - “doctrine”) of Soviet occupation.

The roots of the state legal continuity principle can be traced back to the works ofB. Meissner and D. Loeberof1950s - 1960s.Their student, Latvian emigrant E. Levits (the President of Latvia since 2019), brought their ideas in late 1980s to Baltic Popular Fronts[12]. Supporters of this principle pay very much attention to the date of 23 August 1939, when the so called Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was signed between the USSR and Nazi Germany with secret protocols to it, prescribing German and Soviet zones of interest in Eastern Europe, that paved the way for subsequent Soviet annexation of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. And since both signing of these secret protocols and thesubsequent annexation were declared violating fundamental principles of international law and therefore illegal, the conclusion was made that de jure Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania continued their existence as sovereign states[24]. So the movements for national independence of these three republics of the late 1980s didn't need to create their national statehood anew - just to restore the one there had already existed in the Interwar period.

This principle soon became dominating in the Baltic movements for national independence. Already in spring of 1990 Supreme Councils of all the three Baltic republics adopted Acts on the State Sovereignty where fully in line with the principle of state legal continuity emphasized that they are restoring their prewar statehood, not creating it anew. Implementation of such a model had important consequencesfor both their domestic and foreign policies. First of all, as Van Elsuwege points out, rhetoric of continued statehood was actively used by Baltic diplomats and politicians since the beginning of 1990s to persuade Western policy-makers that Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania belong to the CEE region like Poland and other states of the dismissed

Warsaw Pact, but not to the post-Soviet space like other republics of the former USSR[30, p. 102]. This symbolic act had obvious political benefits: already in January 1992 the EU moved Baltic states from the area of its TACIS program, aimed to limited assistance to post-Soviet states, to the PHARE program, designed for strong support of the CEE countries transition. And this step helped Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania to be included later into the EU Eastern enlargement process (while none of post-Soviet states, even such actively aspiring as Ukraine and Georgia, have managed to achieve this goal so far).

The principle of state legal continuity implied not just regaining of independence, but also restoring state institutions and legislation, that existed in Baltic states in prewar period, including continuity of citizenship.The most consistent here was Latvia.In 1993 it restored its prewar Constitution of 1922 and in 1994 adopted on this basis the Law on Citizenship. Estonia in 1992 adopted on a referendum new Constitution, but it contained some references to the Constitution of 1938. Besides Estonia restored parts of its prewar legislation including the Law on Citizenship of 1938 [4, p. 19]. So both in Latvia and Estonia citizenship was granted automatically only to those residents, who were citizens of the prewar republics and to their direct descendants.

Therefore implementation of the principle of state legal continuity on the issue of citizenship, that affected large portion of Russophone population of Latvia and Estonia was much more responsible for worsening of their relations with Russia than any ethnic contradictions within these states.Though Lithuanian example again challenges the inevitability of such policy, since Lithuania also declared the principle of state legal continuity, but did not extend it to the issues of citizenship.

The concept of Soviet occupation is closely linked to the principle of state legal continuity. Its primary purpose could be summarized as explaining the nature of a half a century break in the history of independent national statehood of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania from the view of their contemporary national ideologies. Another aims are to glorify national resistance and to create the pantheon of national heroes that is very important for maintaining any national myth. The institutionalization of this concept in Baltic stateshas taken the formof creating museums and memorials of occupation and establishing special commissions for assessment of damages from Soviet occupation in each state.

As for foreign policy effects of this concept, since the very beginning it has strongly determined Baltic policies vis-а-vis Russia. Already at the first meeting with Russian President B. Yeltsin, V. Landsbergis, who at that moment was the head of the Lithuanian Supreme Council, advanced claims for compensation from Russia, as the USSR successor state, for the damages of Soviet occupation in Lithuania. And political leaders of Estonia and Latvia followed him soon with similar claims [5, p. 99]. But much more important than those claims was that the concept of Soviet occupation directly challenged fundamental Russian historical memory concepts regarding the role of Soviet Union in the World War II(WW II) and opened the way for a series of “memory wars” between Baltic states and Russia in 1990s - 2000s.

Another foreign policy effect of this concept implementation were efforts of Baltic politicians to play more active role in the making of European memory politics through promotion of their national historical narratives in European structures.They triedto make European institutions to condemn the crimes of communism in Europe and to equate the historical assessments of both Nazi and communist totalitarian regimes.These efforts were particularly persistent in the first years after Baltic accession to the EU, especially after the Russian-Georgian war of 2008 marked a Russian turn to more offensive foreign policy. In 2005 - 2009 they resulted in adoption of some OSCE and European Parliament resolutions supporting such a vision of memory politics.

Yet paying too much efforts to glorifying participants of their anti-Soviet resistance resulted for Baltic states in unexpected challenge to their European aspirations. The vast rehabilitation of all those, suffered from the prosecution of Soviet authorities, regardless of the reasons for such a prosecution, that took place in the first years of regained Baltic independence provoked accusations from international Jewish organizations, such as the Simon Wiesenthal Center and its famous activist E. Zuroff,as some of those rehabilitated persons, honored as national heroes,appeared to be active collaborators with Nazis during the WW II, who participatedinHolocaust on the territory of Baltic states.

Especially acute this issue was for Lithuania, where such a collaborationhad taken much greater scale than in Latvia and Estonia. Therefore during his visit to Israel in 1995 Lithuanian President A. Brazauskashad to repeatedly apologize for mass participation of Lithuanians in crimes of Holocaust and to pledge that all the guilty ones will be prosecuted [7, p. 146; 1, pp. 472-480]. A. Azubalis(former chair of the Foreign affairs committee of the Lithuanian parliament and Foreign Minister of Lithuania in 2010-2012)remarked during a personal communication with the author (Vilnius, October 3, 2019) that in times of negotiations on the EU accession Western diplomats informally suggested Baltic politicians to be more compliant with claims of Jewish organizations and avoid any accusations of denial their share of guilty for Holocaust, if they want to move faster to the EU membership. This made Baltic political elites to realize that integration into Western community had its costs, implying serious revision of some national myths which contradict the values of community.

Geopolitical identities and Baltic foreign policies.ln this paper the term “geopolitics” is considered solely from identity perspective - as a set of selfperceptions of political subject about its own role in the international system, relations with “others”and locating images of its “friends” and “enemies” on the map. From all such self-perceptions most relevant to the Baltic states are the “small states” identity and the idea of “Baltic unity”.

The category of “small states” is usually considered in terms of security and balance of power which is characteristic of political realism. In such terms this factor in the context of Baltic foreign policies considered Galbreath, Lasas and Lamoreaux[18; 23]. But thisview is challenged byBerziьnas, who argues that: “a number of characteristic historical examples, however, suggest that neither the size of a state or its population nor other material resources predetermine the state's ability to ensure its own security” [13: p. 8]. Therefore small state identity according to him rests on the “intersubjective perception of self'. Regarding collective identity of Lithuanian foreign policy decision-makers there are distinguishedtwo main markers of their small state identity: recognition of self as small, weak and defenseless, inevitably requiring a strong ally to guarantee security and perception of the presence of a menacing other from whom an ally has to defend. Then Berziьnas gives three examples of foreign policy decisions based on these two narratives: Lithuanian joining NATO (only a strong ally can guarantee country's security vis-а-vis great and dangerous Russia); the decision to support the USA in the lraq war (Lithuania must unconditionally support its key allies as its security completely depends on them); Lithuanian striving for a leadership in the region (although Lithuania is weak and defenseless, it's still a pro-active country and is able to offer something to its American ally) [13, p. 19]. Although he considers solely Lithuanian situation, this conclusions and examples are equally appropriate for Estonian and Latvian cases. So distinguishing a small state identity of policy-makers in all the three states provides a broad framework for explaining all their major foreign policy steps in Western direction and the lasting “securitization” of their Western policies.

As for the idea of Baltic unity, its development started in the beginning of XX century simultaneously with national ideas of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania and often by the same figures - J. Tonisson, K. R. Pusta etc. (Butkus 2008). Over the 1920s - 1930s there took place a series of multilateral negotiations on this issue. But a moderate success in the form of rather loose trilateral defence alliance known as the Baltic Entente was achieved only in 1934.But surprisingly, as Z. Butkus remarks,

Soviet times made Lithuanians, Latvians and Estonians closer to each other than ever before - especially during the struggle for restoration of their independence, when Popular Fronts of three Baltic nations closely cooperated with each other and coordinated their activities. The years of seeking international recognition (1990- 1991) were also a period of intensive institutionalization of trilateral Baltic cooperation - there were established such bodies as the Baltic Council and Baltic Assembly. Later in the mid 1990s they were followed by several projects of trilateral Baltic defencecooperation(BALTBAT, BALTRON, BALTDEFCOL etc.).

Also the idea of Baltic unity developed as an external stereotype. For instance, the EU simultaneously recognized independence of all the three states, then included them all to the PHARE program, concluded together Trade and Cooperation Agreements, European Agreements on Association etc. [see:30]. While the U.S. presidents during their visits abroad in 1990s - early 2000s never met with their colleagues from Baltic states one by one -all the meetings were held in multilateral format with all the heads of Baltic states simultaneously. The first President of postSoviet Lithuania A. Brazauskas argues in his memoirs that American leaders applied this practice so as “not to provoke unnecessary competition between immature Baltic democracies” for the role of priority U.S. ally in the region [1, p. 453]. Though it seems more likely that both EU and U.S. policies in this respect were causedby deeply rooted perceptions of Baltic states as a single “triune” political entity speaking in one voice and having the same goals.

But whether this idea really had such decisive influence on foreign policies of Baltic states? Apart from the above-mentioned trilateral institutions there were very few examples of using the rhetoric of Baltic unity in the foreign policy discourse of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania during the historical period under review. First it was used in the mid 1990s in several political declarations to express joint commitment of the three states to integration into major Western international institutions. Next, after decision of the EU summit in Luxemburg to divide candidate countries in two groups and to include Estonia to the group of priority first wave candidates, while Latvia and Lithuania were left in second group with unclear accession perspectives, Estonian foreign minister (and future president of the country) T. H. Ilvesin his famous speech in Stockholm in December 1999 justified this decision,claiming that unlike Latvia and Lithuania Estonia belongs to Nordic, not Baltic states. And finally rhetoric of Baltic unity was used twice to discourage Baltic leaders from attending anniversary Victory parades in Moscow. First in 1995Estonian President L. Meri accused Lithuanian President A. Brazauskas of betraying the Baltic unity for his plans to visit parade in Moscow instead of London. Supported by Lithuanian conservatives he succeed in discouraging Brazauskas from this step [7, pp. 151-152]. Then in 2005 the same accusations were advanced against Latvian President V. Vike-Freiberga. But unlike Brazauskas she didn't retreat and on the co ntrary declared, that there is no more any particular Baltic unity, since Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia are sovereign nations and should pursue their own policies [6,p. 97].

Conclusions

To summarize, the impact of identity factors on developments of the Baltic states' foreign policies during the period under reviewwas very complex and controversial. Importance of some of them (e.g. ethnic identity and ethnocratic tendencies) is often exaggerated, while others really played decisive role in development of some dimensions in Baltic foreign policies and defining their prevailing trends.

For instance historical memories and memory politics of Baltic states played decisive role in determining conflicts in their relations with Russia through ideological constructs of state legal continuity and of the Soviet occupation which respectively provided the basis for exclusion of a large portion of Russophone population of Latvia and Estonia from legal political process, thus infuriating Moscow, and for long-term clash of Baltic and Russian historical narratives of the World War II which play fundamental role in contemporary national ideologies of both sides.

As for the Western vectors of Baltic foreign policies, their developments could be explained on the basis of geopolitical identities of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania - their self-perception as “small states”, vulnerable and defenseless in face of the enormous threat from the East and therefore needing a strong ally to protect them. Of course such a protection must have its costs and Baltic political elites understand them as unconditional political loyalty to their protector on the international arena. Such a scheme is very characteristic of the Baltic relations with the USA where this “small states” identity definitely plays a crucial role. But European vector of Baltic foreign policies is much more complex - “small states” identity obviously has some influence on it but is only one of numerous factors, determining Baltic policies in this direction.

Finally some words should be said about the role of the “Baltic unity” idea based on inspiring myth about three small but brave nations successfully fighting together for their freedom against huge Soviet empire. Emerged from close trilateral Baltic cooperation during struggle for independence from the USSR on the edge of 1980s-1990s, this concept soon became an external stereotype deeply rooted in EU and U.S. policies towards Baltic states. While in Baltic states themselves since gaining their independence attractiveness of the idea of “Baltic brotherhood” has been weakening and has been used by political leaders very selectively.



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