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NATIONAL RESEASRCH UNIVERSITY - HIGHER SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS

UNIVERSITY OF KENT

The US-Russian Relationship during the Obama Presidency: Understanding the failure of Reset

Field of Study 41.04.05 International Relations

Maxim V. Bratersky

Moscow, Russia 2019

Table of Contents

Abstract

Preface

Introduction

Chapter 1: Literature Review

Chapter 2: The Illusion of RESET

2.1 - Establishing the Obama Doctrine

2.2 - The Skeptical Russian Reaction to RESET

2.3 - Implementing RESET

2.4 - 2010, the year of US-Russian realignment

Chapter 3: The Deterioration of the US-Russian Relationship and the End of RESET

3.1 - Putin returns to Power

3.2 - The Role of Values and the Magnitsky Act

3.3 - Conflicting Understandings of RESET

3.4 - The Arab Spring

Chapter 4: Crisis and Point of No Return

4.1. - The Ukrainian Crisis

4.2 - The Aftermath of the Ukrainian Crisis

Conclusion

Bibliography

Abstract

Since 2014, theUS-Russian relationship is an impasse. In an effort to comprehend the reasons and factors responsible for this period often labelled as the`New Cold War', this dissertation provides an analysis of US-Russian relations during the period of the Obama Presidency (2009-2017). Organised chronologically, this paper portrays how both Western and Russian research have identified ideals, values, and national interests, as key componentsof the relationship's evolution during this period. Furthermore, this study aims to establish responsibility for the failure of RESET, as the Russian and Western narratives are yet to reach a consensus on the matter. Ultimately, the results of this paper attribute the failure of the reset policy to American interventionism and supremacism, Putin's neo-imperialist aspirations, conflicting interests, and antagonistic political systems. putin magnitsky act

Preface

This dissertation will concentrate on an essential issue of contemporary international relations and contemporary international security; the relationship between the Russian Federation and the United States. For the most part of the 20th century, the US-Soviet relationship was without a doubt the primary defining constituent of the international system. During the Cold War, global security and geopolitics were highly dependent on the two superpowers' relationship, rendering the fluctuations and variations of the latter relationship between Detente and Containment; responsible for both periods of relative global prosperity, and periods of global tension or armed conflicts. Today, approximately thirty years after the conclusion of the Cold War, the international system is no longer bi-polar, but increasingly multi-polar and globalised. Consequently, the relationship between the Russian Federation - the designated inheritor of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (Tregubova et al., 2019) - and the United States, is undoubtedly not as decisive to the international system and international security as it once was. Despite its diminished impact, the relationship between Moscow and Washington remains nonetheless significant. As this study will demonstrate, the observed deterioration of the relationship during the Obama Presidency, conjugated to the absence of hope for improvements in the foreseeable future, causes the relationship to re-become a threat to international security. Therefore, the degraded relationship will - and already has to some extent - once again be considered, nay dominate, the security policies of smaller and less powerful states that are politically and geographically associated to the United States and the Russian Federation.

In its attempt to account for the degradation of the US-Russian relationship during the Obama Presidency, this paper will provide both the Russian and American perspectives on fundamental aspects of the relationship, whilst following a chronological timeline in a way that best portrays the evolution of the relationship. This study is written by a french graduate student, meaning the analysis provided is not embedded within a pro-Russian or pro-American narrative. It aims to be conducted from an emotionally detached point of view.

Introduction

The US-Russian relationship is by nature convoluted, arduous and sophisticated. When one attempts to comprehend and analyse this relationship, one should fully incorporate the significance of the weight of history. Indeed, the contemporary relationship between the United States and the Russian Federation is, some would argue, nothing but a product of history. Therefore, this relationship is complex due to the fact that the history between both nations has been punctuated by half a century of conflict and opposition. The Cold War, despite having ended approximately thirty years ago, continues to cast its shadow on the US-Russian relationship of today. Moreover, considering the substantial impact of the Cold War on the contemporary relationship between the United States and Russia, one must recognise the importance of the events that lead to, and statuated the conclusion of the Cold War; as these events have paved the way to the post-Cold War relationship. Almost systematically in times of war and conflict, belligerents produce and then attempt to normalise, a subjective narrative of the events. The Cold War was characterised by the opposition of two ideological factions, therefore two contradictory narratives were produced. Upon the conclusion of the Cold War, both sides shared conflicting narratives not only concerning the Cold War itself, but also on the way the Cold War was terminated. As a result, despite the end of the prolonged conflict between the USSR and the West, a new disagreement arose, albeit a minor one compared to the Cold War. The contradictions in the narratives which explained the end of the Cold War were however not without consequences. Indeed, the post-Cold War relationship between the Russian Federation and the United States would be affected by this disagreement.

The disagreement was as follows, on one hand, the United States announced themselves as victors, therefore deeming their ideology to have prevailed over the one of the Soviet Union, meaning it had revealed itself more competent in regards to politics, economics, military and social welfare amongst other aspects (this part is effectively true). This opinion was materialised and voiced by President George H.W. Bush during his last state of the union address in 1992 (G.H.W. Bush, 1992), and allowed the United States to proclaim themselves as leader of a unipolar international system. On the other hand, the elites of the soon to be dissolved Soviet Union along with Westerners such as Jack Matlock (US ambassador to the Soviet Union from 1987 to 1991) and Stephen Cohen (Professor emeritus at Princeton University), argued that the Cold War ended two years prior to the disintegration of the USSR and that it was Gorbachev's actions and not Western military pressure that had vanquished communism (J. Matlock, 2010: 4-6). As a result, Russia was not defeated, rather it was a common victory over communism (J. Matlock, 2010: 4-6; S. Cohen, 2009: 160). This narrative naturally did not endorse the idea that the United States were victors, and therefore, the newly founded Russian Federation did not support the idea that the post-Cold War international system was unipolar and should be entirely based on American values and institutions.

The conflicting narratives made way to different understandings as to how the post-Cold War international system should function. The Russian Federation felt entitled to have a say in the matter, whilst Washington ultimately dismissed the Russian ideas and propositions, as for one they did not suit the national interests of the United States, and most importantly could be disregarded without engendering too serious repercussions. As a consequence, the United States declared the world to be unipolar and affirmed that western values were to be normalised globally as they were superior to other values. Such an international system would reveal itself to benefit American interests. Works such as Huntington's Clash of Civilisations were produced and popularised, as many believed that wars and conflicts would only be generated by cultural, ideological or religious differences, rather than by interest and greed. The Russian narrative was dismissed and described as revisionist, meaning the US-Russian relationship already included conflictual elements despite the overall (but short-lived) positivism that surrounded the eminent transformation of the Russian state to a free market economy. However, Russian elites were so keen on integrating what they thought would turn out to be a reconceptualised and remodeled West, that they forced themselves to overlook the United States' dismissive attitude towards their newly founded federation.

Jumping ahead, the US-Russian relationship is today in crisis. Whereas some politicians and academics have warned or affirmed that the relationship has evolved into a `New Cold War' (M. Rubio cited by M. Ryan, 2015; R. Legvold, 2016; J. L. Black, 2016), others - more meticulously - have recognised that certain elements of the Cold War have returned, without going as far as to validate the return of the Cold War (Sakwa, 2019; D. Trenin, 2014) The latter, consequently acknowledged the revival of the East-West divide, but maintained that tensions were not strong enough to be characterised as a New Cold War. However, the debate remains open and strongly subject to interpretation. Most importantly, the debate is without grave consequences, whether or not one decides to define this renewed confrontation as a new cold war, does not change the overarching fact that opposition between Russia and the US has emerged once more. This opposition is systematic and characterised by the fact that both sides regard each other as adversaries and malevolent actors (Carter, 2015), meaning they continuously aim to undermine and weaken each other. On many issues, both countries calculate their national interests in opposition to each other (e.g. Syria, Venezuela, Ukraine), and both countries utilise their media apparatus to decredibilise and demonise each other (Suslov, 2019). Moreover, both the Russian Federation and the United States perceive themselves to be on the right side of history as they are convinced that they will prevail. On one hand, the US is emboldened by the fragility of the Russian economy, the fact that Russia has no real allies, the Russian fear of China, and their expectations regarding a future rise of tensions between Russia and China. On the other hand, Moscow remains confident that the US cannot sustainably endure a double confrontation with China and Russia, that the international system is becoming more pluralist and diverse, whilst traditional American allies such as Germany and France, are having trouble to support the US in all of their decisions. Altogether, the US-Russian relationship is visibly in an impasse.

As stated in the preface, this dissertation will not focus on whether or not the contemporary relationship between the Russian Federation and the United States should be qualified as a New Cold War, but rather, it will concentrate on how the relationship has evolved to the point of no return. In order to fully comprehend how and why the Moscow-Washington axis displays irreconcilable differences, analysing and accounting for the US-Russian relationship during the Obama Presidency (2009 to 2017) is essential. As we will observe, the period between 2009 and 2017 can be identified as the last of the three cycles that have characterised the post-Cold War US-Russian relationship (E. Rummer & R. Sokolsky, 2019). Each of these cycles displays three phases. The first phase is one of realignment and rapprochement, the second is defined by a deterioration of the relationship, and the third phase is systematically symbolised by a crisis (D. Suslov, 2019). Whereas the first cycle took place between 1991 and 1999, the second cycle occurred between the early 2000s and 2008.

The first cycle's opening phase was materialised by the attempt to establish a partnership in the early 1990s, the Russian shift to a market-based economy, the declarations of independence of former Soviet Republics, START 1 and Boris Yeltsin's visit to Washington in 1992(E. Rummer & R. Sokolsky, 2019; D. Suslov, 2019). The second phase included the process associated with the NATO enlargement to the Visegrad Group, the failed American assistance to Russia in the latter's effort to transform its society and economy, as well as the 1993 Russian constitutional crisis (E. Rummer & R. Sokolsky, 2019; D. Suslov). Finally, the third phase essentially revolved around the war in Yugoslavia. Events such as the Kosovo airport incident, Russia's exclusion of the peacemaking process, and American unilateralism all culminated in an existential crisis (E. Rummer & R. Sokolsky, 2019; D. Suslov, 2019).

The second cycle was, as stated previously, symmetrical to the first. It was composed of a first phase which itself included the adoption of a unified agenda between Moscow and Washington to wage war on terrorism following 9/11, the Slovenian bilateral summit of 2001, and amongst others a rapprochement between Russia and NATO under the `20 formula' (E. Rummer & R. Sokolsky, 2019; D. Suslov, 2019).The second cycle was once again one of degradation and was materialised by the consequences of the failed attempt to create a sustainable alliance. NATO's 2004 enlargement made a great dent in Russia's hopes to be seen and accepted as a member of the West, whilst the rise of Authoritarianism in Russia deeply concerned the United States(E. Rummer & R. Sokolsky, 2019; D. Suslov, 2019). Finally, the controversial invasion of Iraq in 2003 stuatuated the beginning of a new crisis between Washington and Moscow, as Russian elites were profoundly shocked by the US' persistence to act with a complete misdemeanor of international laws (E. Rummer & R. Sokolsky, 2019; D. Suslov, 2019).The crisis lasted until Obama was inaugurated President, and liberated Russia to act as they wished in relation to their sphere of influence. The Georgian war ensued but to Moscow's frustration, Kosovo declared independence with American support. If Obama had not initiated RESET, other conflicts could have erupted, as both the United States and the Russian Federation were conducting Realist influenced policies, meaning none would back out from pursuing their national interests until forced to. For the first time since the Cold War, nuclear tensions in Europe arose, as President Bush wished to orchestrate the implementation of a nuclear defense shield in Europe, therefore bypassing the passed agreements which stipulated that no such systems were to operate in Eastern Europe.

As previously stated, the third cycle took place between 2009 and 2017, in other words, the Obama Presidency. The reason why this third cycle is more significant than its two predecessors, relates to the fact that it did not engender a fourth cycle, meaning the US-Russian relationship has remained in crisis ever since. The aim of this dissertation is, therefore, to account for the US-Russian relationship during the years Obama was in office, to comprehend why the relationship has stagnated to the point of no return ever since, and most importantly to establish responsibility for the failure of RESET . To do so, this paper will portray both narratives concerning this period, whilst focusing not only on the events but also on the factors that shape US-Russian relations. These factors include national interests, power distribution, domestic politics, values, ideals and foreign policy identity.

Chapter 1: Literature Review

The literature on the US-Russian relationship is extensive due to the importance and impacts it has on the international system. Going through every aspect of the relationship is not crucial to this study, therefore some subjects and contentious areas of debate must be overlooked. Indeed, the two major academic disputes that are crucial to this dissertation concern the nature of the US-Relationship, and the responsibility of RESET's failure.

First of all, the study and theorisation of international relations has always been dominated by certain schools of thought. These schools are often in opposition with one another and, therefore, often convey very different analyses of events and phenomenons. Consequently, it comes as no surprise that the nature of the US-Russian relationship is subject to debate, and can be portrayed through different prisms (M. Brecher, 2016: 131). For this study, the theories of Liberalism and Realism are the most consequential. One on hand, Liberals and Neoliberals argue that the animosity between the Russian Federation and the United States, is primarily due to conflicting values and ideals (G. Hart & D.K. Simes, 2009); whilst on the other hand, Realists and Neorealists convey a more pragmatic approach, as they believe that both countries are in confrontation due to the fact that their national interests are antinomic (A. Stent, 2020; D. Trenin, 2020). Consequently, Liberals believe that the US-Russian relationship will remain confrontational, as long as both countries are composed of different political systems, and are directed by opposing values and ideals. Realists, consider that the relationship is non-linear and characterised by an evolving nature. Indeed, they argue that US-Russian relations are impacted by circumstance, as the geopolitical context of the international system defines and modulates their respective national interests; meaning that the relationship evolves in correlation to the fluctuation of the international system. Both schools dominate the study of the Washington-Moscow axis and will therefore be represented throughout this article.

Moving on, when establishing responsibility for the failure of the reset policy implemented by Obama, two major points of views dominate the literature. On one hand, the Western narrative blames President Putin and the Russian Federation for the current situation of the US-Russian relationship (Mauldin et al., 2014; Mearsheimer, 2014: 77, G. Allison, 2017; N. Gvosdev, 2016; Obama, 2014) On the other, the pro-Russian narrative conveys the idea that American supremacism and interventionism is to be blamed for the breakdown of US-Russian relations (Suslov, 2019; D. Volkov, 2015).

This study aims to address and portray the different approaches to the US-Russian relationship, and will attempt in its conclusion to establish the strength and validity of each claim. At first glance however, it seems that conflicting values, opposed interests, American supremacism and interventionism, and Vladimir Putin's imperialist aspirations have all contributed to the deterioration of the US-Russian relationship.

Chapter 2: The Illusion of RESET

2.1 - Establishing the Obama Doctrine

In 2008, a young and progressive Barack Obama ran for Presidency. During the campaign that opposed him to Republican senator John McCain, the Russian question was raised during a debate during the two. When both candidates were asked whether or not Reagan's designation of the former Soviet Union as the `evil empire' still applied to modern Russia, McCain responded with a calculated `maybe'; whereas Obama, who despite having edged closer to his opponent's hard-line stance since the war in Georgia, only conceded that Russia exhibited `evil behaviour' in the latter conflict (B. Obama cited by Deutsche Welle, 2008). Such a moment, summarises how both candidates felt about the US-Russian relationship. Whilst McCain believed that the situation was unsalvageable and Russian institutions were not to be trusted (J. L. Black, 2016:154), Obama affirmed his discontent vis a vis Moscow, without nonetheless condemning the possibility of improvement. As a result, it was relatively clear that both Moscovite elites (Deutsche Welle, 2008) and Russians in general (C. Sweeney, 2008) favored an outcome in which Obama would be inaugurated President in early 2009. As often, an opinion despite being widely shared is rarely unanimous. In this case, certain Russian elites favored McCain as they deemed him more predictable due to his realist aspirations (A. Tsyganov, 2012).

In January 2009, Obama was sworn into office, approximately half a year after the Russian invasion of Georgia. The 44th President of the United States inherited a country in crisis, both economically and politically. Indeed, the impacts of the 2008 economic crisis were predicted to shadow his four years in office, whilst the unilateral foreign policies of President Bush (Feith & Cropsey, 2012), had deeply deteriorated the American image abroad. In view of this, the Obama administration soon adopted a new approach to the US foreign policy, among which the US-Russian relationship. The majority of the policies implemented by the new administration often were in strong contrast with the ones carried out by their Republican predecessors. As a result, at the Munich conference of February 2009, Vice-President Joe Biden declared that the last few years had witnessed a `dangerous drift' between Russia and NATO, before concluding that it was now the time to `press the reset button and to revisit the many areas where we can and should be working together with Russia' (J. Biden, 2009). By initiating dialogue and by proposing cooperation on certain issues, the Obama administration was applying the basics of what many conflict experts analyse to be the best approach to manage or resolve a conflict (J. A. Schellenberg, 1996:150). In this case, the American and Russian national interests were paralleled in matters of counter-terrorism and nuclear weapons reductions. Biden in the attempt to legitimise the newly founded approach and further convince the American public opinion, then affirmed that `the United States and Russia can disagree and still work together where our interests coincide. And they coincide in many places' (J. Biden, 2009). Biden's speech in Munich marked the starting point of RESET.

To understand the reasons behind the administration's wish to improve US-Russian relations, one must consider the geopolitical context of 2009 and the main direction in which Obama wished to direct his Presidency. First of all, Obama recognised that the wars of Afghanistan and Iraq, the allegations of torture and the overall supremacist foreign policies implemented by his predecessor, had engendered devastating effects on the American image. Consequently, the priority was made to revamp the American image abroad (D. Chollet, 2016: Chapter 3), and most importantly recentralise ideals and values in the decision making processes. The Obama Doctrine, in Drezner's opinion and rather consensually, consisted of abandoning foreign policies that had proven themselves to be ineffective, unpopular or damaging, in order to focus on more pressing issues, with policies that were more likely to be successful (D. Drezner, 2011). Drezner argued that Obama's approach to foreign policy was influenced by french essayist Montesquieu, whose main line of thought could be `crudely' resumed to `useless conflicts weaken necessary conflicts' (Drezner, 2011). In this case, the US-Russian conflict is seen as damaging and useless, when taking into consideration the results it is producing. Consequently, the previous approach to the conflict should be discarded in its entirety, and replaced by a new and adapted one. Dionne conveyed the thought that the Obama Doctrine `was a form of realism, unafraid to deploy American power, but mindful that its use must be tempered by practical limits and a dose of self-awareness' (E. Dionne, 2009. His analysis fits the Obama administration's approach to the US-Russian relationship. Indeed, Obama and his advisors' awareness of the practical limits of the situation, has influenced them to rightly overlook the logic in favor of a prolonged conflict, as they were themselves trumped by the logic of a renewed relationship.

Let us not forget that Obama's mission is to pursue American national interests. In order to pursue the latter, the best strategic approach must be adopted. However, this approach is defined and shaped by what the commander in chief has already designated to be the American national interests. Here, Obama's definition of American interests highly differs with his predecessor's definition, as a result, his strategy differs too.

2.2 - The Skeptical Russian Reaction to RESET

Following Biden's declarations in Munich, the Russian reaction was a tempered and restricted one. Indeed, Moscow favored the idea of a rapprochement but needed significant guarantees before going forward with RESET. In the past, it was Russia under Putin's incentive who had provoked a realignment with the United States (V. Isachenkov, 2017), therefore this situation was unprecedented. The Medvedev and Putin tandem recognised that RESET made sense for both parties, as they, of course, understood how cooperation between the two states would serve Russian interests, but also American interests. The American interest for a reset of the relationship was obvious to the Russians. Indeed, Obama had announced during his election campaign that he wished to prioritise certain issues in matters of foreign policy if he acceded to the White House. These issues were central to the Obama administration, and as we will see, near impossible to resolve without the help of the Russian government. First of all, Obama announced that he would invest himself in achieving `a world without nuclear weapons' whilst visiting Prague (Obama, 2009). In order for disarmament to go forward, it was paramount that a certain level of cooperation was established with Moscow. Obama's speech in Prague was a risky one, as at that point in time, he had received no guarantees from the Russian government. Secondly, Obama announced early in his Presidency that he wished to carry out a responsible withdrawal of American troops from Iraq and Afghanistan. In order to initiate a withdrawal, the United States desperately needed to inverse the momentum to their advantage, as the Taliban were gaining the upper hand. Russia's involvement in the conflict would without a doubt facilitate the region's stabilisation, as accessible Russian airspace would reveal itself to be a strategic advantage to the United States. Furthermore, the Russian Federation shared the interests of the United States on the matter, as stabilising the Middle East could materialise in a decrease in opium production in Afghanistan, and ultimately, help to resolve the issue of heroin addiction among the young Russian population. Moreover, stabilising Iraq and Afghanistan could only benefit Russia due to its geographical proximity to these countries. Finally, Obama had declared his intention to resolve the issue associated with the nuclearisation of Iran. Until then, the United States was failing to force Teheran into a form of cooperation on its nuclear program, and the situation had only gone from bad to worse. On that matter, the Russian Federation could once more act as a much-needed ally, as its voice could reassure the Iranian government and engender concessions from both parties. In summary, Moscow felt that the surprising and sudden shift of the American position to their regard, heavily coincided with the newly established foreign policy Obama wished to conduct. In addition to realising they were needed by the American States if the latter was to achieve the targets it had recently set itself in matters of foreign policy, the Russian elites recognised they had much to gain from a renewed partnership.

Despite comprehending the logic behind a US-Russian realignment, Moscow remained skeptical of American intentions, and as a result, was slow to undertake concrete steps. In July 2009, Barack Obama, having realised that Medvedev and his Prime Minister needed insurances, landed in Moscow prior to the G8 summit of L'Aquila, thereby including Russia in his European tour. During this three-day state visit, aspects of RESET were discussed and refined in order to be implemented without further delay. At the heart of the bilateral summit's agenda were the time-pressed negotiations of a dearly needed successor to the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT), due to expire in December 2009. The negotiations between both Presidents had already commenced in April 2009 successfully, as they had jointly declared that `a new, comprehensive, legally binding agreement on reducing and limiting strategic offensive weapons' had been signed following the London G20 summit (Obama and Medvedev, 2009 cited in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, 2010: 397). In Moscow, a Joint Understanding was signed, it guaranteed that further negotiations would ensue whilst acting as a `guide to the remainder of the negotiations' (Joint Understanding for the START Follow-on Treaty, 2009). As both delegations discussed disarmament, the Iranian situation was raised and significant advancements were made. Moreover, another joint statement concerning Afghanistan was published. The latter stipulated that both governments had vowed to work together within the NATO-Russia Council and the Russian-US Counter-Terrorism Working Group, to coordinate efforts to counter drug trafficking and to stabilise and democratise the country (Joint Statement by President Obama and President Medvedev concerning Afghanistan, 2009). Finally, a bilateral agreement was concluded and stipulated that the United States could operate within the Russian territory to transport personnel and equipment for Coalition forces (US-Russia Military Transit Agreement, 2009).

2.3 - Implementing RESET

Regardless of the positivity triggered by this bilateral summit, implementing RESET was not an easy process. According to Dmitry Suslov, `Russia was not rushing to fulfill all the United States' wishes' (D. Suslov, 2019), as it did not deem that cooperation with Washington was essential within an increasingly multipolar international system. To cooperate with the West was no longer a value in itself, Russia now wanted compensation for every step they would make towards the Americans. As of such, the nuclear arms reduction negotiations were gradual and arduous, as both sides threatened to back off from the negotiation table several times. Moreover, there were rumors that Obama and Medvedev had been heard shouting at each other over the phone (Suslov, 2019). Concerning Afghanistan, the US-Military's first flight within the Russian airspace was made in 2010, six months after both Presidents had issued the joint statement on Afghanistan. This shows how long it took to finalise the details necessary to materialise the agreement. Finally, when the International Atomic Energy Agency discovered that Iran had a hidden nuclear facility, Russia blocked new sanctions on Iran, despite knowing that the United States and the remainder of the international system, were well within their rights to impose such sanctions. In exchange for Russian cooperation, Obama made significant concessions. To begin with, the Obama administration utterly modified the United States' foreign policy on the Post-Soviet space, thereby recognising Russia's legitimacy to exercise certain control within its own sphere of influence. The change was materialised by several factors. Firsty, the United States ceased to address the possibility of Ukrainian and Georgian NATO memberships, and consequently stalled all processes of integration. Secondly, Obama canceled the plans of his predecessor to deploy strategic missile defense systems in Poland, as well as radar stations in Romania. Thirdly, the 44th President of the United States accepted the consequences associated with regime change in Ukraine. When Viktor Yanukovych was elected President of Ukraine in February 2009, no efforts were made by American agencies to block or mitigate the pro-Russian policies he implemented. Furthermore, not a single critic was formulated by the American Presidency on the actions carried out by the newly elected Ukrainian President. Under Yanukovych, Ukraine dismantled almost everything that was implemented as a consequence to the Orange Revolution, and re-became a pro-Russian nation. American inaction vis a vis this course of events, convinced the Russian executives that the US were finally accepting a regain of Russian influence within Post-Soviet space. Fourthly, the Americans did not respond to the Kyrgyz Revolution of 2010, who many believe to have been instigated by the Russian Federation in order to oust Kurmanbek Bakiyev, due to his intentions to extend the agreement allowing American troops to station within Kyrgyzstan (S. Tisdall, 2010:1). If such claims are authentic, Obama and his administration, who have been criticised for their inertia following the coup, really did take upon themselves in order to facilitate US-Russian realignment. As Drezner claimed, maybe Obama was really under the influence of Montesquieu and his belief that `unnecessary conflicts weaken necessary conflicts' (Drezner, 2011).

Finally, the United States made it known that they wished to discuss and cooperate on the issues on which both parties agreed, whilst ignoring the issues upon which both parties disagreed. Michael McFaul's declaration mirrored this approach to the relationship, as he stated that both sides had to `agree to disagree' in certain areas, so that cooperation could resume in other areas (M. McFaul quoted by A. Malloy, 2013). At this point, it was clear that the United States was going through great lengths to convince Moscow of its genuine intentions. However, the Russian Federation remained skeptical, as in its opinion all the steps taken by Obama were not concessions, but absolutely necessary procedures in order to de-escalate the conflict caused by Bush (Suslov, 2019). Russia felt that the US should not be excessively rewarded for correcting its past mistakes, despite recognising that Obama had decided to respect the Russian sphere of influence. Consequently, cooperation with the United States was made possible by Obama from the Russian point of view, but nonetheless, Moscow believed it had every right to be cautious and request for more than the Obama administration had originally planned to concede.

2.4 - 2010, the year of US-Russian realignment

In 2010, Obama's efforts were finally rewarded at their fair value. As a result, 2010 is recognised by many academics and observers to have been the `breakthrough' year in US-Russian relations ((Indyk, Lieberthal & O'Hanlon, 2012; B. Lo, 2015; F. Hill & C. Gaddy, 2013). Subsequently, 2010 is one of the three best years of the US-Russian relationship along with 1992 and 2002. Each of these three calendar years, represent the conclusion of a period of realignment and rapprochement between the two countries. However, matters systematically deteriorated following these phases of improvement. Nonetheless, all three main components of RESET were enacted in 2010. Firstly, and as implied above, cooperation on Afghanistan was established in the aim to put pressure on the Taliban, in an overall effort to stabilize the country before a scheduled and responsible withdrawal could take place. Secondly, the New Start III treaty was signed by Obama and Medvedev in March, thereby guaranteeing nuclear disarmament. The signature took place in Prague, which was highly symbolic, due to the fact that Obama had given his famous speech on a nuclear arms free world in Prague. Many argue the implementation to be the most significant material outcome of RESET. Not only did it ensure nuclear reduction until 2021, it allowed the following global Treaty of Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons conference to be a success. Thirdly, Russia and the United States agreed on a new round of United Nations sanctions against Iran in 2010. This fourth round of sanctions dearly affected Iran and later forced them into signing the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (2015), more commonly known as the Iran nuclear deal. The sanctions hit Iran due to the fact they were multilateral (BBC. 2019), and were not only of an economic nature. Furthermore, 2010 paved the way to Russian WTO membership. Whereas Russia only became a formal member in 2011 after eighteen years of talks (BBC, 2011), most of the inclusion process took place in 2010. Indeed 2010 was the year where Georgia, under alleged US pressure (G. Kasparov, 2015: chapter 8), agreed to negotiate with Russia, in order to allow the latter to join the World Trade Organisation. Moreover, Medvedev visited the United States in the summer of 2010, this visit included a trip to the Silicon Valley and was instrumental in establishing links between American and Russian companies. Not only was RESET political, it was now becoming economic. In addition, Obama also officially recognised several Chechen organisations and leaders as international terrorists. the Obama administration reversed the sanctions imposed by Bush jr. on Russia following the Russian recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and even drafted a letter to the intention of Medevedev in order to inform the latter that the issues surrounding the two disputed territories were not an obstacle to further cooperation between Russia and the US. At last but not at least, the United States and Russia enacted the reestablishment of relations between Russia and NATO, giving suite to a successful Russia-NATO summit in November 2010.

Both supporters and critics of RESET within the US analytical and political communities often regard nuclear reduction as the key justification for US-Russian realignment. According to Obama's supporters, the entire aspiration of Obama's Russian policy was to enable nuclear arms reduction, in order to edge closer to a world without nuclear weapons. The same supporters deem RESET to have been successful as the objectives behind this whole approach had been met (Indyk, Lieberthal & O'Hanlon, 2012:29). Critics on the other hand argued that the Obama administration had been blinded by their nuclear objectives, and therefore accepted non advantageous deals with the Russians (Brookes, 2009). Finally, other observers within the United States reject the idea that RESET was solely motivated by nuclear arms reduction, and regarded cooperation on Afghanistan to be as crucial as the New START treaty (B. Lo, 2015:169) Ultimately, there remained a strong consensus among Americans that RESET was basically successful (Indyk, Lieberthal & O'Hanlon, 2012:29). As for the Russians, RESET is seen as a positive era, due to the fact both countries treated each other with respect and most importantly recognised each other's national interests (Suslov, 2019).

Chapter 3: The Deterioration of the US-Russian Relationship and the End of RESET

Now that this paper has portrayed the processes involved in resetting the US-Russian relationship, it is in a position to introduce the events that have caused the failure of RESET, in the aim to establish the responsibility of RESET's failure. Whereas it is unanimously agreed amongst academicians and observers that the United States, and more particularly Obama and his administration, have initiated RESET (A. Stent, 2015:vii; V. Birchfield & A. Young, 2017:56; S. Pifer, 2015: 111; L. Harding & M. Weaver, 2009); it remains unclear and disputed whether the Russian Federation or the United States, are to be blamed for the deterioration and breakdown of US-Russian relations. In order to provide a thorough and comprehensive account of the matter, this paper will go through the events that have damaged US-Russian relations, before accounting for the literature related to these events. Before going any further, one must realise how subjective the literature is. Consequently, this paper aims to provide both the Russian and Western perspectives, before conveying an exhaustive analysis that encompasses both conflicting points of views.

3.1 - Putin returns to Power

First of all, it is important to emphasise that when President Obama initiated RESET, young and liberal Medvedev was his Russian counterpart. Obama nurtured many hopes in Medvedev partly due to the latter's ideological aspirations. Indeed, in addition to the obvious natural synergy between both men, Medvedev was seen by Washingtonian elites as the man who could put Russia back on the liberal and democratic track. Whilst being more moderate than Putin, he did not embody Russian imperialist aspirations nor did he have a past associated with the KGB, an organisation whose primary focus had been to undermine the United States and the West by any means available. Moreover, Medvedev, unlike Putin, did not play a key role in the prior crisis between the United States and the Russian Federation, and therefore, was not discredited in the eyes of the American public opinion. As a consequence, Obama and his team obviously favored a future in which the man who had served under Putin ever since 1990 and the Leningrad City Council, would break free and assert his own dominance on the Russian Presidency. Despite Obama's hopes, Medvedev stayed loyal to the man who had brought him in from St Petersburg in 1999. In late 2011 he announced that he would not run for President in 2012. Therefore, by early 2012, it had been made clear that power in Moscow was mainly held by Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin, and that the US-Russian relationship would `become frostier' (F. Hill & C. Gaddy, 2013).

Amidst the Russian presidential elections, when Moscow was the scene of anti-Putin demonstrations (also referred to as the Snow Revolution) in late 2011 and early 2012, Secretary of State Clinton vocalised her support for the protesters by stating that the reasons for which they were protesting were legitimate, ultimately initiating the deterioration of US-Russian relations. The protests were mainly motivated by the flawed legislative elections of December 2011 and the upcoming Presidential elections that would see Putin return to power. Putin, in reaction, publicly declared that the protests Moscow was experiencing were the sole fault of Hillary Clinton, who had directly endorsed, nay encouraged Russian dissent vis a vis the Presidency (Putin, cited by M. Elder, 2011). Whereas Clinton's description of the election as `dishonest and unfair' was in all fairness true (Clinton cited by Herszenhorn, 2011), the Secretary of State effectively dragged the US-Russian relationship three years backwards. Oxford graduate and foreign policy expert Bobo Lo, argues that this declaration was calculated, meaning Clinton was aware of the impacts it would engender. He states that the `values gap' between US and Russian policymakers had widened to the point that any friendly relationships could not endure (B. Lo, 2015:175). In the eyes of Obama, Putin was to be blamed for the deterioration of the relationship due to his authoritarian policies, and Russia had become increasingly irrelevant as Putin was an illegitimate leader (Mauldin et al., 2014)

From then on, the more popular narrative in the West was logically to blame not only Russia, but Putin himself for the breakdown of RESET and all the chaos that ensued (Mauldin et al., 2014; Mearsheimer, 2014: 77, G. Allison, 2017; N. Gvosdev, 2016). In a calculated process to discredit Putin in the eyes of the Western public, the majority of Western media outlets, followed suit and condemned Putin from the start, arguing that firstly, he should not have returned to the Presidency, and secondly, that Russia would soon experience a period of instability (K. Lally for The Washington Post, 2012; The Economist, 2012) Whereas, it is undeniably true that in the case Putin hadn't reclaimed the Presidency, the course of events may have been altered severely, one cannot simply blame an individual for reclaiming power when the constitution he must abide to allows it. On the other hand, one can blame the individual's actions when he returned to power. As a consequence, many scholars blame Putin for his accusations concerning Hillary Clinton's involvement in the Snow Revolution, for expelling American USAID from Russia, and most importantly for making Russia more authoritarian and less democratic (J. Smith & A. Twardowski, 2017:5). Whereas it is obvious how claiming Hillary Clinton is responsible for the anti-Putin protests, and how expelling American institutions from Russia would affect the US-Russian relationship, it is less apparent why a Russian drift towards authoritarianism would threaten reset. Indeed, the United States has often overlooked the degree to which a country is democratic when carrying out diplomacy (T. Carpenter & M. Innocent, 2015). Nonetheless, the Western narrative often encompasses all three of these factors when justifying why Putin is guilty of deteriorating the US-Russian relationship.

From the Russian point of view, Putin's return to the Kremlin and the Snow Revolution would not have deteriorated the US-Russian relationship, if it had not been for the United States' reaction and involvement. Consensually, the Russian narrative underlines how the American reaction to Putin's return to the Presidency was ill advised, out of order and profoundly counter productive. Until then, never had Russian officials openly criticised the outcome of a US Presidential election since the end of the Cold War, as they deemed American domestic politics to be none of their concern; therefore the Russian point of view argues that Russian domestic affairs should not have been the subject of involvement from the Obama administration. Moreover, according to American policy makers, reset was supposedly an approach to the US-Russian relation which aimed to engender cooperation on matters on which both states could find common interests, whilst avoiding topics that could generate tension. However, when criticising Putin's election in 2012 and qualifying the Russian elections as a hoax, the Obama administration clearly went against the principles it had established. Despite the fact that some argue that this was due to a `values gap' (B. Lo, 2015:175), the fact is that the Obama administration willingly went against the rules they had set for themselves and Russia.

On this matter, the blame ultimately falls on both parties. Whilst the United States should not have meddled in and commented on Russian domestic politics, Putin could have been more measured when responding to the Obama administration. For the sake of RESET, both parties should not have made the issue public by commenting on the facts and portraying their point of views in the media. However, as childish as this argument may be, one must underline the fact that the American side did initiate tensions. Altogether, the responsibility for the deterioration of RESET falls mainly on three protagonists, Hillary Clinton, Vladimir Putin and Barack Obama.

3.2 - The Role of Values and the Magnitsky Act

Values then went on to play an even greater role in the deterioration of US-Russian relations. Following Russia's ascension to the World Trade Organisation, one last step was needed in order for both countries to finally be able to trade with one another under the standards of the WTO. Indeed, an old piece of legislation from 1974 prevented the United States from conducting trade commonly with the Russian Federation. The Jackson Vanik Amendment of 1974, stipulated that countries who restricted freedom of emigration and other human rights could only enjoy restricted trade with the US. This law was passed during the Cold War to the intention of the USSR (amongst others), as a response to the Soviet emigration head tax, which rendered the emigration of Soviet jews to Israel very complicated. Putin had lobbied Congress and President Bush to annul this law in the early 2000s, or like other countries beforehand, to exempt Russia from it. In 2011, Obama undertook measures in order to repeal the Jackson Vanik Amendment, but had to do so through a Russo-sceptic House of Representatives who had recently been conquered by the Republicans. The United States democratic system being as it is, the initial law conceived by Obama did not mirror the bill that passed through Congress.

Nonetheless, in December 2012, the Accountability Act was signed into law by Obama. This law effectively repealed the Jackson Vanik Amendment for the Russian Federation, thereby granting Russia the capacity to trade normally with the United States, but also introduced a very consequential precedent. The Accountability Act was also referred to as the Magnitsky Act, in reference to a Russian tax accountant who had exposed a tax scandal back in Russia. Magnitsky, had then been detained and deprived of basic human rights before dying whilst in captivity. The legislation was double-faced, as in addition to repealing the Amendment of 1974, it also punished Russian officials responsible for the death of Magnitsky. The Act targeted several high ranking Russian officials by prohibiting them entry to the United States and usage of the American banking system. Consequently, the United States had passed into legislation anti-Russian measures which openly and officially discredited Russian institutions, within a law that was initially supposed to materialise the reset of relations by encouraging trade. Despite not being the architect of this law, Obama ratified it regardless of Putin's complaints and warnings, as he was mainly concerned with trade (Suslov, 2019). Ultimately, the US-Russian relationship had once again been deteriorated on the basis of values. However, if one is pragmatic, one understands that the United States Congress did not genuinely act on moral grounds, as the US had often disregarded human rights when it was arranging. Nowadays, numerous evidence is at anyone's disposal to validate this fact (Snowden, Wikileaks, etc.), thereby raising the question; why did the American Congress make the Accountability Act so double-faced?