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The Appendix

a)The sources

As the sources for the content-analysis we used official candidate's programs, published at the official web-sites of the candidates or their parties. Among them are:

· "The Russian choice" program by Sergey Baburin from baburin2018.ru

· "The 100 steps" program by Vladimir Zhirinovsky from ldpr.ru

· "The 20 steps" program by Pavel Grudinin from CPRF.ru

· "The road towards the future" program by Grigory Yavlinsky from 2018.yavlinsky.ru

· "The 10 Stalin strikes" program by Maxim Suraykin from komros.info

· "The 123 hard steps" program by Ksenia Sobczak from sobchakprotovvseh.ru

· "The growth strategy" program by Boris Titov from boristitov2018.ru

· The Aleksey Navalny's program from 2018.navalny.com

The most of the programs are presented in the text form, except the Boris Titov's one, which has a form of presentation. Most of the programs posses the laconic and clear program structure, however there are additional rhetoric declarations connected with the programs of Sergey Baburin, Grigory Yavlinsky and Maksim Suraykin.

As the sources for the debate content-analysis we will use the video recordings of the two public debates with Vladimir Solovyev, translated on "Russia-1" the central channel, devoted to two fundamental issues:

· The representative issues of the economy and the financial policy of Russia (01/03/2018)

· The international policy, global threats and the sanctions (14.03/2018)

b)The units of the analysis

The units of the program content analysis would be:

· If there are no discrepancies within the program paragraph- the program paragraph itself.

· If there are the discrepancies within the program paragraph and, despite the unity of the plot, there are qualitative difference within the program paragraph- the logical part of the paragraph.

· If the program paragraph is too broad and declarative or too partial and non-representative- several similar program paragraphs.

· If there are no exact program paragraphs in a massive textual excerpt of the text- the certain except itself and the program paragraphs, which could be deducted within it.

The units of the debate content analysis would be:

· The logical part of the speech, which connects a pack of the critical estimations, value & ideological declarations or obvious program paragraphs.

· An act or the words, which represents the strong attitude towards some problem, ideology or the position of another candidate.

· An act of interaction with another candidate

c)The algorithm for the cleavage table calculation

The calculation of the program statements, belonging to that or another dimension, problem or orientation would be made in a such way:

· Firstly, using the methodological scheme, we detect the list of the problems, which are consisted in the certain program statement or another unit of the analysis. We also delete the dimensions, that had been touched from the initial full list of the examined dimensions in the particular row of the table.

· Secondly, the articulated position of the candidate on the certain problem is formulated in the conventional way in the problems&alternatives row.

· Thirdly, every time when the problem is mentioned in the program, the single number (1) is added to next to its formulation. All the single numbers for the single problem are summed up. However, if the problem is mentioned within the opposite position for the cleavage alternatives, it's single number is not summed up, but is subtracted from the general number.

· Finally, we make the ranging of the problems according to the score they had gained. The problems, which finally had gained less than two single numbers, are ignored and not mentioned.

Among the demands, which are mentioned, we try to sort the most articulated within the program, unconventional from the point of view of the current status-quo and significant in a case of their implementation within the current political system, political course and regime. The samples of the conventional formulations for the value&ideological row taken from the particular part of the methodological scheme.

d)The results of the cleavage table calculation

Table 18

Candidate	Dimensions ignored	Problems &Alternatives	Demands	Value & Ideological Orientations
Sergey Baburin	Center and periphery	Protectionism-5 Left social-5 Ethnocentrism-4	Resignation of D.Medvedev cabinet Stop of the financial optimization of the social programs Tough protectionist measures against the migrants Orientation on the (non-equal) integration with the Asian countries	Traditionalism (soviet-imperial synthesis) Russian ethnocentrism
Vladimir Zhirinovsky	-	Protectionism-7 Right economic-6 Ethnocentrism-5 Left social-4 State culture-2 Unitarism-2	Russian transformation to the unitarian state Duma control over the government Reduction of the taxes, extra privileges and guarantees for businessmen and house owners Constitution paragraph about the supreme status of Russian ethnos Death penalty for the brutal crimes, amnesty for all other Nationalization of the trade companies, limitation of the currency exchange	Ethnical Russian nationalism Populism (right-left mix)
Pavel Grudinin	International policy Ethnical	Left social-5 Left economic-4 Protectionism-3	Nationalization of the big business Exit from WTO, increase of the state interventionism into the economy Classical welfare state revival Limitation of the president's power by Duma	Non-articulated (national left)
Grigory Yavlinsky	-	Democracy-12 Peaceful policy-7 Prowestern policy-5 Free trade-5 Right economic-4 National policy-3 Right social-3 Decentralization-3 Isolationism-2 Free culture-2 Federalism-2	Withdraw of troops from Ukraine and Syria, rejection of the imperial policy and shift to the peaceful cooperation on the international field Rejection of the soviet imperial identity Transition to the market-social state Mass transfer of the free land and houses in the private property The disposable compensation tax for the previously privatized enterprises Extra subsidies for the regions and the provinces Increase of the transparency and accountability of the governance	Non-articulated (liberalism) Modernization ideology Prowestern orientation
Maxim Suraykin	Ethnical	Autocracy-10 Left social-9 Left economic-6 State culture-5 Protectionism-4 Secular-2 Expansionism-2	State of emergency declaration, monopolization of the governance, repressions against the political and business elites The restoration of the USSR, soviet state structure, communist ideology, adoption of the new soviet constitution Nationalization of all the property, except the personnel one and the small business enterprises Introduction of the fixed-prices policy Introduction of the censorship and the criminal justice for the ideological dissent Introduction of the death penalty, toughening of the criminal punishment	Communism (socialism, Marxism-Stalinism) Soviet identity
Ksenia Sobczak		Democracy-24 Right economic-8 Federalism-7 Peaceful policy-6 Decentralization-5 Prowestern policy-3 Free culture-3 Right social-2 Secular-2	Transition to the parliament rule The new federal treaty with the redistribution of more budget and political power towards the regions Economic liberalization, privatization of the state corporations Market-oriented social reforms, decrease of the administrative load Liquidation of the state infrastructure of the monopoly over the national culture, dissolution of the Ministries of Culture and Education Adoption of the EU standards in the economy and the administrative practice Peace with Ukraina and new referendum in Crimea Economic integration with the EU
Boris Titov	Culture and religion Ethnical	Right economic-12 Right social-5 Peaceful policy-2 Free trade-2 Democracy-2	Sustained growth policy Moderate economic liberalization and judiciary reform Innovation adoption policy Economic integration	Non-articulated Modernization ideology
Aleksey Navalny	-	Right economic-10 Democracy-7 Federalism-5 Peaceful policy-3 Free trade-3	Decrease of the official stuff, withdraw business from the administrative control, dissolution of the control departments Demonopolization of the economy, privatization of the state corporations Creation of the National Welfare Fund to accumulate the commodity rent taxes, the disposable compensation tax for the previously privatized enterprises Transition from the classical social state to the addressed social help, fixation of the property rights on the pension accounts and the % of GDP quotas of the compulsory social spending Ratification of the UN anticorruption convention, creation of the Anticorruption department, lustration Liberalization of the criminal justice, the security services and the judiciary reforms Restoration of the developed federalism model Political liberalization, the increase of Duma power

e) The algorithm for the type of the opposition table calculation:

To count the range and the median for the presidential candidates we need firstly to count the number of the program statements (or another units of the analysis), which consist of the attributes, that marks the certain opposition type, according to the particular methodological scheme. Then, we should count and mark with the particular color:

· The range for the particular candidate is defined as the categories, which type of opposition grades are more than the sum of all the candidate's type of opposition grades, divided on five (5). The categories between the particular categories are also included in the range.

· The median is calculated by the consisted mutual substation of the particular candidate's scores of the opposite type of opposition categories from each other. The least category, which score hadn't been substrate entirely, is the median. After the particular calculation, needed for the first type-of-opposition table, we can count the % scores for the second and then mark them: With the green color, if they are 66% or more for the doubled categories and 33% or more for the single. With the yellow color, if they are more than 33% for the doubled categories and 17% or more for the single

· With the red color, if they are less than 33% for the doubled categories and less than 17% for the single

For the third type of opposition table we should chose between "Yes", "Practically Yes", "Practically No" and "No", and then mark "Yes" with the green color, "No" with the red color, and other two type of answers- with the yellow one.

f) The results of the kind-of-opposition tables calculation

Table 19

Candidate	Principal opposition marks	Classical opposition marks	Personal opposition marks	Semi-opposition marks	Non-opposition marks
Sergey Baburin	0.5	2.5	3	5	5
Vladimir Zhirinovsky	2	8.5	10	18	21
Pavel Grudinin	2	8.5	5	6	8
Grigory Yavlinsky	12	17.5	9	9.5	5
Maxim Suraykin	9	11	5	5	3
Ksenia Sobczak	26	29	20	18	16
Boris Titov	0	7	2	7	19.5
Aleksey Navalny	23	26	6	7	4.5

Table 20

Candidate	% of principal and classic opposition marks	% of semi- and non-opposition marks	% of only principal opposition marks
Sergey Baburin	19%	63%	3%
Vladimir Zhirinovsky	18%	66%	3%
Pavel Grudinin	36%	47%	7%
Grigory Yavlinsky	56%	27%	23%
Maxim Suraykin	61%	24%	27%
Ksenia Sobczak	50%	31%	24%
Boris Titov	20%	73%	0%
Aleksey Navalny	74%	17%	35%



Table 21

Candidate	Vladimir Putin is the rival	International problems are induced by the international policy itself	Current Russia is a country of the law and socio-economic injustice
Sergey Baburin	No	No	Practically Yes
Vladimir Zhirinovsky	No	No	Practically No
Pavel Grudinin	Practically No	No	Practically Yes
Grigory Yavlinsky	Practically Yes	Yes	Practically No
Maxim Suraykin	Practically Yes	Practically No	Yes
Ksenia Sobczak	Practically No	Yes	Practically Yes
Boris Titov	No	No	No
Aleksey Navalny	Yes	Yes	Yes

g)The results of the political debate calculation

1)The economical and financial policy debates:

Table 22

Candidate	Critics in the address of Vladimir Putin	Principal critics of the incumbent	Instrumental critics of the incumbent	Support of the incumbent's policy and its correlation towards more soft and flexible	Support of the incumbent's policy and its correlation towards more hard and rigid
Sergey Baburin	1	1	1	0	2
Vladimir Zhirinovsky	0	0	2	3	2
Pavel Grudinin	0	4	1	0	0
Grigory Yavlinsky	2	1	3	1	0
Maxim Suraykin	0	3	0	0	0
Ksenia Sobczak	1	4	2	0	0
Boris Titov	0,5	0	3	2	0

Table 23

Candidate	Distinctions in the dimensions and problems mentioned	Distinctions in the demands and the alternatives protected	Distinctions in the level of the oppositional radicalism	Objects of the soft critics between the opponents	Objects of the tough critics between the opponents
Sergey Baburin	-	-	Critics in address of Vladimir Putin	Pavel Grudinin Ksenia Sobjak	-
Vladimir Zhirinovsky	-	Left economical	-	Sergey Baburin Pavel Grudinin Maxim Suraykin Boris Titov	-
Pavel Grudinin	The Political and of the Internal policy dimensions are mentioned	-	-	Maxim Suraykin Sergey Baburin Grigory Yavlinsky	-
Grigory Yavlinsky	-	Left social	-	-	-
Maxim Suraykin	-	-	-	Ksenia Sobjak Boris Titov Grigory Yavlinsky	-
Ksenia Sobczak	-	Left social	-	Vladimir Zhirinovsky Maxim Suraykin Pavel Grudinin	-
Boris Titov	-	-	-	Maxim Suraykin	-

2)The International policy debates:

Table 24

Candidates	Critics in theaddress of Vladimir Putin	Principal critics of the incumbent	Instrumental critics of the incumbent	Support of the incumbent's policy and its correlation towards more soft and flexible	Support of the incumbent's policy and its correlation towards more hard and rigid
Sergey Baburin	0	2(not for the issue)	1.5 2(not for the issue)	1	1
Vladimir Zhirinovsky	0	0	1 1 (not for the issue)	0	6
Pavel Grudinin	2(not for the issue)	1.5 1(not of the issue)	1 1 (not for the issue)	2	3
Grigory Yavlinsky	1.5	1.5	5	3	0
Maxim Suraykin	0	2 (not for the issue)	1	0	3
Ksenia Sobczak	1 1(not for the issue)	3	3	1	0
Boris Titov	0	0	1	2	3

Table 25

Candidates	Distinctions in the dimensions and problems mentioned	Distinctions in the demands and the alternatives protected	Distinctions in the level of the oppositional radicalism	Objects of the soft critics between the opponents	Objects of the tough critics between the opponents
Sergey Baburin	The Political dimension is mentioned	Restoration of the political structures of the Union State (USSR)	More of the critics, less of the demands	Vladimir Zhirinovsky Pavel Grudinin Ksenia Sobczak	Ksenia Sobczak
Vladimir Zhirinovsky	-	Military policy Antiwestern orientation	-	-	Grigory Yavlinsky Ksenia Sobczak
Pavel Grudinin	The International policy and the Ethnical dimensions are mentioned	Antiwestern orientation	-	-	Ksenia Sobczak
Grigory Yavlinsky	-	-	-	-	-
Maxim Suraykin	-	-	-	-	Ksenia Sobczak
Ksenia Sobczak	-	-	-	Pavel Grudinin	Vladimir Zhirinovsky Maxim Suraykin Pavel Grudinin
Boris Titov	-	Antiwestern orientation	-	-	Ksenia Sobczak

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