Civil protests in modern Ukraine: comparing multiple cleavages before and after protests of 2013-2014

b. Social-economic status

Variables in the Equation
		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Step 1a	economic1			9,434	2	,009
	Low	,719	,306	5,522	1	,019	2,052
	Middle	,367	,286	1,649	1	,199	1,443
	Constant	-,412	,281	2,145	1	,143	,663
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: economic1.

Comparing to holders of a wealth economic status, representatives which dedicate themselves to a low class income group are 2 times more disagreed with the state of affairs after the “Euromaidan” in December 2014.

4. “Center-periphery” cleavage

Ethinicity and general disagreement with the state of affairs
		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Step 1a	ethnicity1			45,005	2	,000
	Minority	-,177	,273	,417	1	,518	,838
	Ukrainian	-1,052	,196	28,879	1	,000	,349
	Constant	,910	,190	22,999	1	,000	2,485
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: ethnicity1.

Comparing to Russians, Ukrainian people are less disagreed with the current state of affairs. In other words, Ukrainians after the “Euromaidan” are 2.8 times more agreed with the country development than Russians.

5. Generation cleavage

Age and general dissatisfaction
		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Step 1a	Age			9,954	5	,077
	18-29	,021	,153	,019	1	,892	1,021
	30-39	,216	,159	1,838	1	,175	1,241
	40-49	,073	,162	,202	1	,653	1,076
	50-59	,270	,160	2,847	1	,092	1,311
	60-69	-,191	,177	1,157	1	,282	,826
	Constant	-,106	,120	,779	1	,377	,900
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: age.

Results of the logistic regression on the age and general dissatisfaction have proved themselves to be statistically insignificant.

6. Education cleavage

Education and general disagreement
		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Step 1a	Edulevel			15,645	3	,001
	lower secondary	-,118	,186	,401	1	,526	,889
	Upper secondary general	,400	,117	11,621	1	,001	1,492
	secondary special	,254	,110	5,303	1	,021	1,289
	Constant	-,210	,078	7,166	1	,007	,811
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: edulevel.

Respondents with upper secondary general education are more likely to be dissatisfied with current state of affairs than holders of secondary special education in December 2014. Comparing to holders of a higher education, holders of upper secondary general education and secondary special are more disagreed with the current state of affairs.

7. Gender cleavages

Variables in the Equation
		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Step 1a	Men	-,073	,090	,668	1	,414	,929
	Constant	,008	,060	,019	1	,891	1,008
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: sex.

The results of logistic regression have proved themselves to be statistically insignificant.

8.Globalization cleavages

European integration and general disagreement
		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Step 1a	europe1			225,959	2	,000
	Else	-1,086	,144	56,617	1	,000	,338
	Yes	-1,877	,127	217,689	1	,000	,153
	Constant	1,247	,110	128,845	1	,000	3,479
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: europe1.

Comparing to those, who refuse that Ukraine should enter the European Union, the probability that those who do not refuse will disagree with the current state of affairs is 6,5 higher. In other words, those, who “vote” for Ukraine integration into the European Union, are more likely to be disagreed with the current state of affairs on Ukraine.

9. Language cleavage

Variables in the Equation
		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Step 1a	Language			40,721	2	,000
	Ukrainian	-,614	,096	40,659	1	,000	,541
	Russian-Ukrainian	-,274	,146	3,535	1	,060	,760
	Constant	,280	,068	16,858	1	,000	1,324
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: language.

Comparing to the Russian-speakers, the probability that Ukrainian speaker disagree with the current state of affairs is less. In other words, Ukrainian speaker is more agreed with the current state of affairs after the “Euromaidan”.

10. Historic-geographical cleavages

Historical regions and general disagreement
		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Step 1a	Historic			105,000	11	,000
	Galicia	-,116	,235	,242	1	,623	,891
	Volin'	-,302	,284	1,125	1	,289	,740
	Bessarabia	-,206	,363	,322	1	,571	,814
	Carpathian Rus'	-,176	,348	,255	1	,614	,839
	Dnieper	-,172	,224	,594	1	,441	,842
	Podolia	-,669	,242	7,645	1	,006	,512
	Polisia	,013	,324	,002	1	,968	1,013
	Zaporozhia	,264	,226	1,363	1	,243	1,302
	Sloboda	1,166	,283	16,983	1	,000	3,210
	Donbas	,624	,223	7,815	1	,005	1,867
	Budzhak and Yedisan	,868	,283	9,387	1	,002	2,382
	Constant	-,136	,192	,503	1	,478	,872
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: historic.

Comparing to Novorossia (contemporary Nikolayev and Kherson oblasti, Odessa), citizens of historical regions of Podolia (modern Vinnitsyia and Khmelnytskyi regions) are less disagreed with the current state of affairs, or agreed more in 1.95 times. Inhabitans of Sloboda area (modern Kharkiv oblast) are 3,210 times more probably would disagree on the current state of affairs after the Revolution of Dignity; inhabitance of Budzhak and Yedisan (modern Odessa oblast') are more likely to be disagree in 2.382 times The citizens of Donbas ( contemporary Donetsk and Luhansk regions) are more likely to disagree in 1.867 times.

11. State- church cleavages

Religion and general disagreement
		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Step 1a	Religion			72,798	11	,000
	Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Kyiv Patriarchate)	-,837	,205	16,714	1	,000	,433
	Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate)	-,008	,221	,001	1	,970	,992
	Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church	,889	,529	2,820	1	,093	2,432
	Greek Catholic Church	-,944	,262	12,980	1	,000	,389
	The Roman Catholic Church	,210	,701	,089	1	,765	1,233
	Protestant Christian churches	-1,023	,534	3,667	1	,056	,360
	The Muslim	20,764	26717,353	,000	1	,999	1,042E9
	Another confession	-1,301	,835	2,426	1	,119	,272
	The believer, but do not belong to any denomination	-,419	,210	3,978	1	,046	,658
	Another answer	-,417	,486	,739	1	,390	,659
	Nullifidian	,036	,254	,020	1	,888	1,036
	Constant	,439	,190	5,346	1	,021	1,551
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: religion.

The believers of Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Kyiv Patriarchate), Greek Catholic Church and those, who consider themselves as believers, but do not belong to any denomination, are less likely to be disagreed with the current state of affairs after the Euromaidan or, in other words, are more agreed.

2. Empirical evidence: readiness to participate in civil protests and civil actions after the “Euromaidan”

1. Regional cleavages

Macroregions

Regions and readiness to participate in protests
		B	S.E.	Wald	Df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Step 1a	macroregion			44,030	3	,000
	West	,911	,165	30,516	1	,000	2,488
	Central	,110	,171	,418	1	,518	1,117
	Southern	,560	,172	10,609	1	,001	1,750
	Constant	-1,742	,132	174,825	1	,000	,175
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: macroregion.

Comparing to the Eastern Ukraine, after the Revolution of Dignity, Western Ukrainians are in 2.488 times more ready to participate in protests and Southern Ukrainians are in 1.750 times more ready to take action than Eastern Ukraine.

2. “Urban-rural” cleavage

Urban-rural and the readiness to protest
		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Step 1a	urban(1)	,319	,115	7,635	1	,006	1,376
	Constant	-1,430	,068	445,007	1	,000	,239
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: urban.

According to the results of logistic regression, comparing to the urban area inhabitant, the probability of an urban citizen to agree to take part in civil protests or civil actions is 1.376 higher.

3. “Owner-worker” cleavage

a. “Business owner- not business owner” cleavage

Business ownership and agreement to protest
		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Step 1a	work1(1)	-,266	,216	1,510	1	,219	,767
	Constant	-1,077	,209	26,663	1	,000	,340
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: work1.

According to the logistic regression results, business owners and individual entrepreneurs are less ready to participate in the protests after the Revolution of 2013-2014 than holders of other professions.

b. Social economic status

Social economic status and agreement to protest
		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Step 1a	economic1			20,272	2	,000
	Low	-1,394	,342	16,603	1	,000	,248
	Middle	-,671	,294	5,186	1	,023	,511
	Constant	-,610	,288	4,477	1	,034	,543
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: economic1.

Comparing to respondents of a wealth class, there is a probability that holders of a low and middle class are less ready to participate in protests. In other words, holders of a wealth class are more ready to participate in civil protests, while low income class is 4 times less ready and the middle class is 1.95 less ready.

4. “Center-periphery” cleavage

Ethnicity and readiness to participate in protests
		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Step 1a	ethnicity1			6,606	2	,037
	Minority	-,063	,353	,032	1	,858	,939
	Ukrainian	,446	,246	3,288	1	,070	1,562
	Constant	-1,719	,239	51,674	1	,000	,179
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: ethnicity1.

The logistic regression results on the ethnicity and readiness to participate has shown no statistical significance.

5. Generation cleavage



Age and readiness to participate
		B	S.E.	Wald	Df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Step 1a	Age			22,843	5	,000
	18-29	,745	,218	11,694	1	,001	2,107
	30-39	,894	,221	16,279	1	,000	2,444
	40-49	,992	,223	19,788	1	,000	2,697
	50-59	,626	,228	7,532	1	,006	1,870
	60-69	,624	,246	6,431	1	,011	1,866
	Constant	-2,024	,185	119,944	1	,000	,132
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: age.

There is a higher possibility that 30-39 age group representative and 40-49 age group are more likely to participate in protests than 50-59 age group and 60-69, and 18-29, though slightly.

6. Education cleavage

Education and readiness to participate in protests
		B	S.E.	Wald	Df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Step 1a	Edulevel			9,762	3	,021
	lower secondary	-,477	,241	3,933	1	,047	,621
	Upper secondary general	-,409	,145	7,907	1	,005	,665
	secondary special	-,184	,131	1,967	1	,161	,832
	Constant	-1,129	,091	155,345	1	,000	,323
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: edulevel.

Comparing to respondents with higher education, the results of logistic regression show that the possibility of that a lower secondary education holder or upper secondary general education holder will agree to participate in protests is lower.

7. Gender cleavages

Gender and readiness to participate
		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Step 1a	Man	,244	,110	4,945	1	,026	1,276
	Constant	-1,440	,076	354,673	1	,000	,237
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: sex.

In comparison with women, men are more likely to agree to participate in protests.

8. Globalization cleavages

European integration and readiness to participate in protests
		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Step 1a	europe1			74,539	2	,000
	Else	-,558	,202	7,593	1	,006	,573
	Yes	,763	,143	28,424	1	,000	2,145
	Constant	-1,691	,126	179,986	1	,000	,184
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: europe1.

Comparing to those respondents , who do not support the Ukrainian entrance in Europe, those who are agree with the European integration, are 2.145 more likely to participate in protests.

9. Language cleavages

Language and readiness to participate
		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Step 1a	Language			33,204	2	,000
	Ukrainian	,386	,115	11,300	1	,001	1,471
	Russian-ukranian	-,869	,240	13,090	1	,000	,419
	Constant	-1,435	,086	281,206	1	,000	,238
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: language.

In comparison to Russian speakers, Ukrainian speakers are 1.471 more likely to participate in protests. Those respondents, who speak in Russian -Ukrainian are less likely participate in protests than Russian speakers and Ukrainian speakers.

10. Historic-geographical cleavage



Historic geographical cleavage and agreement to participate in protests
		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Step 1a	Historic			106,702	11	,000
	Galicia	,435	,269	2,615	1	,106	1,545
	Volin'	,875	,308	8,077	1	,004	2,399
	Bessarabia	-20,002	6106,256	,000	1	,997	,000
	Carpathian Rus'	1,764	,375	22,131	1	,000	5,835
	Dnieper	-,583	,279	4,378	1	,036	,558
	Podolia	,096	,276	,121	1	,728	1,101
	Polisia	-1,604	,604	7,048	1	,008	,201
	Zaporozhia	-,275	,274	1,008	1	,315	,760
	Sloboda	-,923	,371	6,187	1	,013	,397
	Donbas	-,423	,272	2,429	1	,119	,655
	Budzhak and Yedisan	,263	,314	,705	1	,401	1,301
	Constant	-1,201	,228	27,848	1	,000	,301
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: historic.

Comparing to Novorossia (modern Nikolayev and Kherson regions), Volin' region(Volhyn and Rivne oblasti) is 2.39 times more likely to participate in civil protests and actions. The highest possibility of agreement to participate is dedicated to Carpathian Rus' region (modern Zakarpattia oblast). Comparing to Novorossia, Polisia region and Sloboda regions are less likely to agree to participate in protests.

Religion cleavages

Variables in the Equation
		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Step 1a	Religion			25,322	11	,008
	Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Kyiv Patriarchate)	,995	,335	8,840	1	,003	2,704
	Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate)	1,115	,347	10,333	1	,001	3,049
	Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church	1,310	,555	5,566	1	,018	3,705
	Greek Catholic Church	1,370	,376	13,281	1	,000	3,934
	The Roman Catholic Church	2,461	,719	11,710	1	,001	11,720
	Protestant Christian churches	1,300	,628	4,280	1	,039	3,668
	The Muslim	-18,904	26717,353	,000	1	,999	,000
	Another confession	,466	1,125	,172	1	,679	1,594
	The believer, but do not belong to any denomination	,973	,340	8,174	1	,004	2,645
	Another answer	,919	,644	2,038	1	,153	2,507
	Nullifidian	,469	,400	1,372	1	,241	1,598
	Constant	-2,299	,322	51,069	1	,000	,100
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: religion.

According to the results of logistic regression, the highest probability towards participation in the civil actions and protests belongs to the the Roman Catholic Church believers. A less, but significantly high probability to participate is among the Greek Catholic Church believers. A relatively equal chance of agreement to participate is found among Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Kyiv Patriarchate), Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) and those respondents, who consider themselves a believer, but do not belong to any denomination.

Results: after the protests

We have tested multiple cleavages onto the data samples after the “Euromaidan” protests by building binary logistic regressions.

Regarding the question of general disagreement with the current state of affairs, regional cleavage testing has revealed a cleavage among Western, Central, Southern and Eastern Ukraine. After the events of 2013, in comparison to the Eastern Ukraine, Western Ukrainians are more agreed the state of affairs in Ukraine. Central Ukraine is the most satisfied region. The least satisfied region is Southern Ukraine.

The existence of the classic Lipset and Rokkan “Owner-worker” cleavage has been proved by the gap between owners of business general agreement with the current situation, where business owners are more dissatisfied with the state of affairs than holders of other professions. Social-economic status cleavage has revealed that the low class income group is more disagreed with the state of affairs than holders of a wealth economic status.

“Center-periphery” cleavage test has proved its existence by the difference in attitudes if Russian and Ukrainian ethnical groups: in other words, Ukrainians after the “Euromaidan” are 2.8 times more agreed with the country development than Russians.

Education cleavage exists in a division between holders of upper secondary general education and secondary special, who are more disagreed with the current state of affairs than holders of higher education.

Considering the question of European integration, the globalization cleavage exists in the dependence of those, who “vote” for Ukraine integration into the European Union and their most probable disagreement with the current state of affairs on Ukraine.

Language cleavage is proven by the division of Ukrainian and Russian speakers, where the Ukrainian speaker in comparison to Russian speaker is more agreed with the current state of affairs after the “Euromaidan”.

Historic-geographical cleavages line lies in the division on current Kharkiv oblast, which disagrees the most, modern Odessa oblast', modern Vinnitsyia and Khmelnytskyi regions, and contemporary Donetsk and Luhansk regions.

The religion cleavage line revealed more agreed groups, which are the believers of Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Kyiv Patriarchate), Greek Catholic Church and those, who consider themselves as believers, but do not belong to any denomination.

Considering the question of a readiness to participate in civil protests and actions after “Euromaidan”, the regional cleavage has been proven by the divisions between the Eastern Ukraine and Western Ukrainians, who are more ready to participate in protests; and Southern Ukrainians who are also ready to take action more than Eastern Ukraine.

“Urban-rural” cleavage and its subsequence towards after-protest agreement to take action resulted in the higher probability of an urban citizen take part in civil protests in contrast to rural area inhabitant.

“Owner-worker” cleavage is represented by the result that business owners and individual entrepreneurs are less ready to participate in the protests after the Revolution of 2013-2014 than holders of other professions.

Social economical status cleavage exists in the differences between wealth class, which is more ready to participate in civil protests than low income and middle class.

Generation cleavage defines a 30-39 age group and 40-49 age group as a more agreed to participate in protests than 50-59 age group and 60-69.

Gender cleavage exists in a form of men's higher capacity of participating in protests, rather than women.

The European integration related results has shown a connection between the agreement to enter the European Union and readiness to participate in protests, which supports the globalization cleavage existence.

The language division is represented by the Russian-speaking-Ukraine-speaking line, where those respondents, who speak in Russian -Ukrainian are less likely participate in protests than Russian speakers and Ukrainian speakers.

The historic geographical cleavage followed the line of historical areas past: Volin' region(Volhyn and Rivne oblast') is more likely to participate in civil protests and actions. The highest possibility of agreement to participate is dedicated to Carpathian Rus' region (modern Zakarpattia oblast).

Religion cleavages are concentrated among the Roman Catholic Church believers, whose protest potential is significant, Greek Catholic Church believers, Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Kyiv Patriarchate) and Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate).



3.3 Multiple cleavages before and after “Euromaidan”: comparative perspective

Attempting to find out, were there any changes in cleavages structure, there is a need to list limitations we face towards the complex and fulfilled comparison conducting: the data received for regressions and interpretations is not uniform, including such differences as a number of cases and statistical insignificance of regression results. What can be done is catching the main trends and tendencies, in order to create a basis for further topic development and elaboration.

Regional cleavages have proved themselves to exist in Ukrainian society both before and after the events of our interest. Considering the general disagreement, regional cleavages in the Ukrainian society on the edge of “Euromaidan” didn't prove themselves to be significant within this particular data sample, however, the data showed that in comparison to the Eastern Ukraine, the citizens of Central Ukraine were more satisfied with the state of affairs. The regional cleavages after “Euromaidan” appeared to be more statistically significant, as citizens of Southern Ukraine agreed more with the state of affairs, than citizens of West and Central Ukraine, while the latest is less agreed among the West and Southern Ukraine. The change in the structure is represented by Central Ukraine, which has become less disagreed after the civil protests of 2013-2014.

Regarding the question of the protest potential and Ukraine regional structure, Western Ukraine has proved itself to be the most ready to participate in protests, both before and after “Euromaidan”. Thus, the protest potential in this region was saved during and after the protests.

The “classic” S.M.Lipset and S.Rokkan cleavage of “owner-worker” was proved to be an existing and significant one. Business owners and individual entrepreneurs were 2.29 times more agreed with the general state of affairs in Ukraine on the edge of “Euromaidan” protests. The data on the aftermath of protests has shown that business owners after the Revolution of 2013 are more dissatisfied with the state of affairs than holders of other professions. In our opinion, the possible explanation for this shift is an economical instability and economic parameters worsening after the Revolution.

The socio-economic status cleavage has not changed. Before the “Euromaidan” representatives of a rich class were 2,98 times more satisfied or agreed with the current state of affairs than representatives of lower class. After the Revolution, representatives which dedicate themselves to a low class income group are 2 times more disagreed with the state of affairs after the “Euromaidan” in December 2014.

Education cleavage has proved itself to be a stable one: before and after the protests, the dependence is the following: the higher education respondent holds, more general agreement he or she has towards the state of affairs.

The generation cleavage also remained stable. Both before protests and after, the most protest-oriented age groups are 30-39 and 40-49. The gender cleavage showed a permanency: according to the results of logistic regression, men are more likely to participate in protests than women are.

The globalization cleavage also remained the same: those, who agree with the Ukraine integration into Europe, are more likely to agree to participate in civil protest and civil actions. Language cleavage showed the same results before and after “Euromaidan”: comparing to Russian speakers, Ukrainian speakers are ready to participate in civil protests more.

Summing up the above analysis, there are grounds to say that the cleavages structure of after-protest Ukraine has not significantly changed in contrast to the pre-Euromaidan situation.

Conclusion

This research aimed at testing the multiple cleavages theory within the Ukrainian case and analyzing the role of the protests and the Revolution of Dignity in the cleavages changes.

Attempting to analyse the cleavages structure of modern Ukraine, the theoretical overview of multiple cleavages theory was given. We have followed its development and evolution to formulate an empirical strategy for the theory of cleavages application. Despite of being permanently questioned, though adapted, the “classic” cleavages theory, proposed by S.M.Lipset and S.Rokkan is still being a theoretical framework, which obtains a high explanatory power. Enriched by a numerous scholars, a multiple cleavages framework includes the following lines, which were adapted in accordance to Ukrainian case and tested within this research: regional cleavages, “urban-rural” cleavage, “owner-worker” cleavage, “center-periphery” cleavage, “church- state” cleavage, generation and education cleavages, cleavages connected with globalization and Europeanization and historic-geographical cleavages.

Considering the Ukrainian civil protests as a crucial event for understanding the population attitudes structure, the second chapter resulted in the analysis of main causes and consequences of the events, known as “Euromaidan” or the Revolution of Dignity.

The third and the main chapter aimed to test the multiple cleavages theory empirically. The results of logistic regressions has revealed the existence of cleavages in the Ukrainian society on the edge of protests of 2013-2014.

More or less, all the cleavages chosen for the analysis appear with different depth and power in the context of pre- and after-protest Ukraine, considering the attitudes towards general disagreement with the state of affairs in the country and the readiness to participate in the civil protests or actions. The multiple cleavages theory, based on “classic” Lipset and Rokkan one is applicable on Ukraine's case and has many dimensions for further research.

Regional cleavages in modern Ukraine are represented by the disperancies between regions, with the main accent on high disagreement and high protest potential of Western Ukraine. “Urban- rural” cleavage has no significant divisions; however, the results show that urban population is more likely to participate in protests. The class cleavage or “owner-worker” cleavage has a controversial character and supposedly was changed after the revolution: by November 2013 business owners were generally satisfied with the state of affairs, and as for December 2014 they are less satisfied than other professions holders. The “center-periphery” cleavage hardly works, though, holders of Ukrainian ethnicity are more ready to participate in protests. The “church- state” cleavage, is represented by the cleavage between the Greek Catholic church believers and Kiev Patriarchy and other religions. Globalization cleavage is supported by the results of logistic regressions: those, who support the European integration, are more ready to participate in protests. Linguistic cleavage has proved itself as a not very significant one.

The substance of historic-geographical cleavages is still being estimated. In our opinion, the limitations of data and methodological issues can prevent this cleavage from being fully analyzed. However, the preliminary results showed the existing historic geographic cleavage, for the lines of territories which were not under the Russian Empire rule, which were, and which had Austria-Hungary history. Thus, the protest potential within the historical areas known as “deeply Ukrainian” is higher.

Answering the main research question, we can postulate that, considering the there is no statistical evidence to claim that cleavages, existing on the edge of civil protests were changed after the Revolution. In our opinion, it can be explained by the fact that the consequences of the protests, despite of some positive tendencies, still have not manifested themselves due to a numerous reasons, including the continuous political and social crisis, worsened by the military conflict.

Further analysis will show, whether the cleavages structure in Ukraine is “frozen” or the reason is just a short period of time passed from the Revolution of Dignity. From our point of view, high research potential can be given to this topic and future investigation on the basis of this research can provide us with more substantial evidence.



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