An education reform strengthening Islamic elements and courses in public primary and high schools was adopted by the parliament in 2012, with Erdoрan saying that he wanted to foster a "pious generation." (Turkish protesters have long list of complaints, 2014) A new system allocating students to schools based on geographic proximity and final exam scores, which saw up to 40,000 students, including non-Muslims, allocated against their will to religious Imam Hatip-style schools, where Sunni-based religious classes are mandatory. (Turkey education reforms fuel controversy, 2014)

Additionally, the Turkish parliament has approved controversial legislation to restrict the sale and advertising of alcohol. The law bans the sale of alcohol in shops between 22:00 and 06:00 and bans producers from sponsoring events. Some critics say: "This is not a struggle against the ills of alcohol but an attempt to redesign the society according to their [AK party] beliefs and lifestyle." (Turkey to ban late-night sales of alcohol , 2013)

These data corresponds to experts' assessment. Expert from Ankara university Can Irmak Ozinair reported the following: “A range of adopted laws, example: alcohol ban law, strengthen authoritarian character of the present power. Overislamisation of the country undermines principles of Ataturk, on which the Turkish Republic was founded. Alcohol ban: The regulation prohibits alcoholic sold after 22:00, was staked to protect public health. However, the government's conservative stance and the prime minister personally the use of words such as “drunkards”, “alcoholics” created a strong belief that this is an intervention into the personal lifestyle. Prime Minister Erdogan's words about “at least three children”, anti-abortion words, characterizing cesarean section as an international conspiracy led to the response of women's movement, feminists, socialists and other different opposition groups”. In the context of such laws it is important to mention that traditionally the paternalistic state of Turkey did exist, but at the same time there was another trend for the europization, and before the AKP came to power it should be noticed that Turkey struggled to follow secular European way which led to the shaping of elite. There was also a decade of conservative republican development with its own values, system of education, manpower training. (Bayram, 2010) So, because of the above mentioned steps AKP was actively criticized and described in some media as Islamist party. In the Western press, when the AK Party administration - the ruling party of the Turkish Republic - is being named, most of the time Islamic, Islamist, mildly Islamist, Islamic-oriented, Islamic-based or with an Islamic agenda, and similar language is being used. (AKP explains charter changes, slams foreign descriptions, 2010). But AKP is criticized not by the majority of the population but by its minority - citizens who live mostly on the western part of the country. Traditionally the European part of the country is supposed to be more modernized and closer to European values, than central and eastern parts. Even the central part of the country is less economically developed the following map proves this statement.



Figure 3. Per capita income by province in 2011 in Turkey

Those in the darkest red have an income over US$ 14,000, while those in the lightest yellow have an income below US$ 4,000.

The following map shows results of parliamentary elections by region in Turkey in 2009. As far as we can judge from the map, the European regions mainly vote for Republican's People Party, which can be described as Kemalist and social-democratic political party, while the central Anatoly preferred AKP with more Islamists rhetoric.

Figure 4. Results of local elections in Turkey by regions (2009). (Turkish Elections, 2014)

Generally speaking, political factors played a crucial role in further political changes in Turkey. Economic growth after the financial crisis of 2008 was replaced by a slowdown in economic growth together with the strengthen of Islamist rhetoric of the ruling party and a cleavage between traditionalists and modernists led to dissatisfaction of the part of Turkish people with situation with civil rights, freedom of expression and freedom of mass-media.

Factors that lead to political changes in Turkey:

1) Dominance of the Justice and Development Party and Recep Erdogan;

2) High level of corruption;

3) The cleavage between traditionalists and modernists;

4) Decreasing of economic indexes.

4.2 Factors of Political Changes in Russia

The next step is to consider economic situation in Russia as a factor that may cause an emergence of protest publics' activities and further political changes in the country.

“Russia has undergone significant changes since the collapse of the Soviet Union, moving from a centrally planned economy towards a more market-based system. Both economic growth and reform have stalled in recent years, however, Russia remains a predominantly statist economy with a high concentration of wealth. Russia is one of the world's leading producers of oil and natural gas, and is also a top exporter of metals such as steel and primary aluminum. Russia's reliance on commodity exports makes it vulnerable to boom and bust cycles that follow the volatile swings in global prices”. (CIA The World Factbook, 2015)

“The economy, which had averaged 7% growth during 1998-2008 as oil prices rose rapidly, has seen diminishing growth rates since that time due to the exhaustion of Russia's commodity-based growth model.

A combination of falling oil prices, international sanctions, and structural limitations pushed Russia into a deep recession in 2015, with the GDP falling by close to 4%. Most economists expect this downturn will continue through 2016”. (CIA The World Factbook, 2015)

The World Bank data shows that during the 2000th Russia experienced fast economic growth. The GDP per capita in Russia was last recorded at 6843.91 US dollars in 2014. The GDP per capita in Russia is equivalent to 54 percent of the world's average. GDP per capita in Russia averaged 5084.55 USD from 1989 until 2014, reaching an all time high of 6922.79 USD in 2013 and a record low of 3282.86 USD in 1998. (Trading Economics, 2015)

Annual percentage growth of Russia's GDP fluctuated from 10% to 5, 25% during the 2000 - 2008 periods: 2000 - 10%, 2003 - 7.30%, 2005 - 6.38%, 2008 - 5.25%. In 2009 the rate significantly dropped and constituted - -7.82%. In 2010 GDP growth reached 4.50% and in next 4 years it became slightly shrinking: 2011 - 4.26%, 2012 - 3.41%, 2013 - 1.34%, 2014 - 0.64%. “In 2015 the Russian economy began its difficult adjustment to the severe global oil-price shock and the imposition of economic sanctions in 2014. The impact of these twin shocks drove Russia's economy in to a deep recession, which reached its nadir in the second quarter of 2015”. (Bank, 2016)

Gini index in Russia was last measured at 40.11 in 2009. Gini index has risen from 37,5 in 1999 to 40,1 in 2009.

Table 12. Gini index in Russia

Unemployment rate in Russia was recorded at 6.0 percent in March of 2016, up from 5.8 percent in the previous three months and above market expectations of 5.9 percent. It was the highest rate since January of 2013, as the number of unemployed people increased by 138 thousand to 4.56 million while economically active increased by 0.2 million to 76.1 million (52 percent of population). Unemployment rate in Russia averaged 7.86 percent from 1993 until 2016, reaching an all time high of 14.10 percent in February of 1999 and a record low of 4.80 percent in August of 2014. (Trading Economics, 2015)



Table 13. Russia Unemployment Rate

But situation with the distribution of income/consumption by quintile is much more complicated. In 1999 poorest 20% of population had 6,2% of national income/consumption, next quintile - 11%, next - 16%, next - 22,8% and the richest 20% had 44,1%. In 2011 the situation was like 5,9% - 10,2% - 14,6% - 21,5% - 47,8%. (The Wold Bank Open Data, 2016) Moreover, according to World Bank data, the number of poor people in Russia (those, who live less than 5$ per day ) has declined from 74,7 million in 1999 to 17,1 million in 2009.

Natalia Zubarevich in her “four Russias” concept (firstly published exactly in the period of rise of the protest movement, December, 2011), after that more detailed in many articles and open lectures, pointed out that “exactly in the biggest cities this middle class of “angry citizens” is concentrated”. “Russia-1” consists of “citizens of the big cities-centers; they are united by the higher level of life, education… using of Internet”. “The transformation of the social structure of the big cities, emergence of the city middle class is an obvious factor” (I. Klimov…).“This movement and those movements that were in other countries - it was an economic factor but not connected with people's loss of something or sharp decline of their wellbeing. But it was connected with the rather high level of this well-being”. (Gerasimov, V; Zaytsev, D, 2015) So, even a slight an increase of middle class may be considered as a factor of further political changes.

Inflation rate in Russia averaged 137.42 percent from 1991 until 2016, reaching an all time high of 2333.30 percent in December of 1992 and a record low of 3.60 percent in April of 2012. (Trading Economics, 2015) From 2001 to 2006 inflation rate was decreasing steadily. It raised significantly in 2008 and was diminishing till 2013, than the rate again jumped to 11.36 percent.

Table 13. Russia Inflation Rate

This paragraph is devoted to analyzing of political factors that may lead to political changes and protest publics' uprising in Russia.

“After taking office in 2000 Vladimir Putin moved quickly to reduce the influence of the legislature, tame the business community and the news media, and strengthen the FSB. He considerably altered the composition of the ruling elite through an influx of personnel from the security and military services. Overall, Putin garnered enormous personal popularity by overseeing a gradual increase in the standard of living for most of the population; the improvements were driven largely by an oil and gas boom and economic reforms that had followed a 1998 financial crisis.” (Freedom in the World. Russia, 2015) Putin introduced legislative changes in 2004 that eliminated direct gubernatorial elections in favor of presidential appointments, citing a need to unify the country in the face of terrorist violence. The government also began a crackdown on democracy-promotion groups and other nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), especially those receiving foreign funding. (Freedom in the World. Russia, 2015)

“Moreover, according to Freedom House December Russia is not an electoral democracy, 2007 parliamentary elections were heavily manipulated and gave the ruling United Russia party 315 of the 450 Duma seats. In the 2008 presidential election, state dominance of the media was on full display, debate was absent, and incumbent Vladimir Putin was able to pass the office to his handpicked successor, Dmitry Medvedev.” (Freedom in the World. Russia, 2015)

“The announcement in September 2011 that the Prime Minister, Vladimir Putin, would seek to return to the presidency (a post that he occupied in 2000-08) was a retrograde and cynical step. It marked a decisive step in Russia's long-running slide towards outright authoritarianism. The decision made a mockery of the institution of the presidency and the electoral process. It exposed the Medvedev presidency as a charade used by Mr. Putin to stay in power.” (Democracy Index 2013, 2013)

“Putin had changed titles in 2008 to avoid violating the constitutional ban on serving more than two consecutive terms as president. Heavy manipulation of State Duma elections in early December barely preserved United Russia's majority in the lower house of parliament, as voters apparently sought to punish the ruling party by casting ballots for three Kremlin-approved opposition groups.” (Freedom in the World. Russia, 2015)

Another political feature of political regime in Russia is dominance of one party United Russia. United Russia is a ruling party from 2003 until present days. Beginning with the 2007 elections, all Duma seats were elected on the basis of party-list proportional representation. Parties must gain at least 7 percent of the vote to enter the Duma. Furthermore, parties cannot form electoral coalitions, and would-be parties must have at least 40,000 members (as of January 2010 - a symbolic reduction from 50,000) and organizations in half of the federation's 83 administrative units to register. (The Russian Electoral System, 2007)This factor, along with some others, makes it extremely difficult for opposition parties to win seats in the parliament.

By Transparency international, the level of corruption in Russia was steadily uprising from 147 in 2008 to 119 in 2015 reaching 143 in 2011. “Polling data from the Levada Center indicate that nearly 80 percent of Russians consider corruption to be a major problem and believe it is much worse than 10 years ago. Prosecutor General Yury Chaika claimed in 2010 that the average bribe had increased by a third in the past year, from approximately $770 to $1,000.” In April 2011, Medvedev ordered all government officials to leave any positions they held on the boards of state-owned companies. Despite the formal change, however, the state still has extensive control over these important and lucrative firms. In May, the president signed new laws raising the fines for bribe taking to as much as 100 times the amount of the bribe, but such anticorruption laws are selectively enforced and have had little impact. (Freedom in the World. Russia, 2015)

Moreover, Russia has troubles in field of civil liberties and freedom of speech. “A law enacted in 2006 handed bureaucrats wide discretion in monitoring and shutting down NGOs, which the authorities used to target organizations critical of official policy. In another sign that safe avenues for dissent were disappearing, an assassin murdered investigative journalist Anna Politkovskaya in October of that year. She had frequently criticized the Kremlin's ongoing military campaign in Chechnya and the excesses of Russian troops in the region.” (Freedom in the World. Russia, 2015) Freedom house assess Russia as “not free” and the rate of freedom is steadily decreasing year on year.

Additionally, Oleg Zhuravlev derived following problems that currently exist in Russia: “depoliticization of the population, the absence of institutions of the public sphere, the lack of grass-roots political parties and the monopoly of pocket parties to participate in the Parliament, the absence of feedback mechanisms with the state, weak labor unions, the inability to relate personal problems with social and social problems with political.” World Values Survey proves his words: only 2% of respondents in 2011 participated in labor unions, 0,5% are active members of political party, 33% of respondents are interested in politics, 12% participated in peaceful demonstrations. Only 2 % have ever joined in boycotts and 11% participated in signing some petition. 64% (46% in 2006) of respondents suppose that government should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for something and only around 10% sure that people should take responsibility to provide for themselves. (Online Data Analysis, 2015) Therefore, Russian people are not ready to be actively involved in politics and actively participate in different forms of civic engagement. This factor may be a crucial factor in political changes that occurred after protests, specifically, strengthening of authoritarian tendencies.

At the same time, as it was mentioned earlier, Vladimir Putin had the lowest level of support in 2011 for the whole period of the research only 63% of respondents supported him. According to World Value Survey, less than 50% of people trust to the government and 26% have confidence in political parties, 47% of respondents have confidence in parliament. Only 13.6% are confident in their financial situation of household (16% in 2006) and 29.6% are satisfied with their life (Online Data Analysis, 2015) and only 32% are confident in police and 33% in courts. As a result, people do recognize that there are problems in some social spheres in Russian, but there are very few of those who are ready for actions and struggling for better life.

There is a number of political, cultural, social and economic factors that influenced on the political changes happened after protest in Russia and Turkey. For both Russia and Turkey they are quite similar.

Factors that lead to political changes in Russia:

1) Dominance of the United Russia and one leader;

2) High level of corruption;

3) Depolitization of the biggest part of the population;

4) Slight growth in the middle class and its concentration in big cities;

5) Fast economic growth in 2000s followed by slowdown in economic growth.

To sum up, as far as Russia is concerned, economy in Russia is strongly depended on oil and gas prices. Experienced fast economic growth due to high level of oil prices at the beginning of 2000s Russia's economy entered into deep economic crises in 2008. Slightly recovered after the crises starting from 2010 the economic situation in Russia became worsening due to European sanctions and low oil prices. As a result, the level of inequality significantly increased. Economic factor did not directly influence on the political changes in the country but after the crises of 2008 people started to feel their selves less protected and, consequently, in the government and country's leader. At the same time, the emergence of urban middle class during the 2000s, more intelligent and educated people intended to play more important role in politics, also may impact on political changes and emergence of protest publics in Russia. At the same time, according to social surveys, most of Russians are not willing for active involvement in political life of the country and change situation in social spheres for better and for the last fifteen years the situation hadn't changed. Therefore, strong leader Vladimir Putin and the ruling party United Russia since the beginning of the 2000s have gained a great power. So, corruption, depolitization of population, limitation of civil liberties, dominance of one party and one leader led to further political changes in Russia.

Economic situation in Turkey can't be called as desperate; therefore, most of experts agree that economic factor was not crucial for political changes. In spite of the fact, slowdown in the economy after the 2008 inevitably had an impact on the society's mood. As in Russia, political, social and cultural factors are more important for analyzing political changes. The traditional cleavage between modernists and traditionalists has always been a milestone in country's inner problems. Strong power of Erdogan, his Islamic rhetoric together with high level of corruption, limitation of freedoms caused discontent of the minority of population who are inclined to liberal and European values that in last century were imposed on Turkish population by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. Having not enough power Turkish protesters as Russian protest publics formally did not managed to change significantly political situation in the country but Gezi park spirit was not ignored by people. Consequently, a range of new local civil society organizations, practice and initiatives emerged in both Russia and Turkey.

4.3 Actors of political changes in Russia and Turkey

Along with factors a number of actors also influenced on political changes in the countries.

“The AKP is no exception but one of many political actors in Turkey that claim or have claimed to strive for a new political culture, albeit little changes. Turkey's political culture is associated with authoritarian political actors: a strong state that engages in top-down, paternalistic relations with its citizens, and even a deep state, a strong role of the military that often resorted to violence, and a `national identity' and its heavy rejection, political interactions based on conflict, not consensus, and a weak and/or politicized civil society.”

AKP is relatively new political actor in Turkish policy (as compared to opposition party CHP) was founded in 2001 and after 2002 it continuously increased its share of the vote and came to power for a third term as a single party with 49.7 per cent of the vote. It has developed from the tradition of Islamism, but has officially abandoned this ideology in favor of "conservative democracy. The party is the largest in Turkey, and has a majority in parliament with 316 members. Its leader, Ahmet Davutoрlu, is Prime Minister, (he resigned as AKP leader and Prime Minister on 5 May 2016) while former party leader Recep Tayyip Erdoрan is President. The party defines itself as conservative-democratic and implements neoliberal policies while criticizing its main opponent, the CHP, as being outdated, state-centric and elitist. The AKP situated itself as a proactive policymaker which shares a common cultural and religious background with the masses and claims to be shifting the balance of politics from the center (state ideology of Kemalism and the CHP and the bureaucratic institutions of the state and the military) to the periphery which basically all those segments of society that are not in the center.” (Kьзьkali, 2015)

“The Republican People's Party (Turkish: Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi or CHP) is the oldest political party in the Republic of Turkey. On September 9, 1923 People's Party officially declared itself as a political organization and on October 29, 1923 announced the Republican regime by this distancing itself, also Turkey, from non-partisan democracy. On 10 November 1924, the People's Party renamed itself to "Republican People's Party" (CHP) as Turkey moved into a one-party period.” (Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi-CHP), 2015)The CHP usually draw much of their support from secular and liberal religious voters with a stable electorate from voters of big cities, coastal regions, professional middle-class, and minority groups such as Alevis. (Sinan Ciddia, Berk Esen, 2014)

Recep Erdogan came to power in 2002, a year after the formation of the AK Party. He spent 11 years as Turkey's prime minister before becoming the country's first directly-elected president in August 2014. (Recep Tayyip Erdogan: Turkey's ruthless president, 2016) While Erdogan always says about himself as Islamist, from the very beginning of its activities as head of government he said that is not going to move away from the secular principles that underlie the modern Turkish state system. (Erdogan, Recep Tayyip, 2016) In spite of the fact the president in Turkey have mostly ceremonial role, in fact, Erdogan is still the main politician, who takes decisions in Turkey. Erdogan has been criticized for his politicization of the media, violation of freedoms and strengthening of authoritarian tendencies especially after the 2013 protests. The opposition CHP alleged that over 1,863 journalists lost their jobs due to their anti-government views in 12 years of AKP rule. (1,863 Turkish journalists fired during AKP rule, opposition report says, 2014) Erdogan is very influential politician in Turkey (he gained 52% of vote on last presidential elections), nevertheless, his rating among ordinary people dropped significantly for the past several years.

Recep Erdogan and AKP are supported by the part of population which live mostly in the central and East Anatolia. That can be explained by the fact that traditionally people in these parts of the country are more religious and conservative. People, who are committed to Islamic values constitutes another important actor in Turkish political arena.

On the contrary, the population of the European part of Anatolia, including such huge cities as Istanbul and Izmir, supports CHP and Kemalism values. This part of the country is traditionally more European and significantly differs from the central and East Anatolia, including the capital city of Turkey - Ankara. Mostly this people are from middle and upper-middle classes such as white-collar workers, retired generals, government bureaucrats, academics, college students, left-leaning intellectuals and labor unions.

In this part of the paragraph we will analyze important actors in political sphere in Russia. One of them is United Russia. It shares some powers over policy-making, patronage distribution, and political appointments, and uses privileged access to state resources to maintain its position in power. This final point is important, for, in contrast to democracies that are governed by one party over long periods of time, dominant parties place a priori restrictions on the ability of opposition forces to compete and win. Since its founding in 2001, United Russia has come to exhibit the characteristics of a dominant party. (Reuter) The party's electorate includes a substantial share of state employees, pensioners and military personnel, who are dependent on the state for their livelihood. Sixty-four percent of United Russia supporters are female. According to researchers, this could be because women place a great value on stability. In the run-up to the 2011 Duma elections, it was reported that support for United Russia was growing among young people. (Seven parties, one virtually certain outcome, 2011)

Vladimir Putin, who in December 2011 was on the post of the Prime Ministry, is an important actor of further political changes. Concentrating great power in Russia, he is one of most powerful people in the world and the one, who takes political decisions in Russia. According to Human Rights Watch since May 2012, when Vladimir Putin was reelected as president, Russia has enacted many restrictive laws, started inspections of nongovernmental organizations, harassed, intimidated, and imprisoned political activists, and started to restrict critics. The new laws include the so-called “foreign agents” law, which is widely regarded as overbroad by including Russian human rights organizations which receive some international grant funding, the treason law, and the assembly law which penalizes many expressions of dissent. (Crackdown on Russia's Civil Society after Putin's Return to the Presidency, 2013)

Opposition to the Putin's regime is another important factor in political changes. Under “opposition” we mean different movements, political parties and personalities, who actively express their mostly negative attitude to current political regime and political, economic and social policies. Among them are: liberals, communists, LGBT, anarchists. Falsifications on elections in December 2011 push them to create new ideas for changing Russian society for the better. Some of them founded new civil society initiatives for monitoring different spheres of society (RosVybory, Сitizen Observer, RosZhKH and etc.)

To sum up, aforementioned actors along with political, economic, social and cultural factors influenced on situational, policy and institutional changes in Russia and Turkey. Both Turkey and Russia among actors have strong leaders and one dominant ruling party which are main policymakers in the countries. Unlike Russia, Turkey has quite strong one opposition party - CHP - in political life of the country, which year on year gain more votes on parliament elections. On the contrary, there is no united opposition in Russia, which may compete with United Russia party.



Conclusion

Analyzing protest publics in Russia and Turkey and researching their impact on political changes in these countries some possible conclusion can be made. In the beginning of this research we posed a research question based on the problem characterized protest publics' role as a driver of political changes in authoritarian regimes; the question was how protest publics in authoritarian regimes managed to influence on political changes in countries. Research goal was to define the role of protest publics in the mechanism of political changes in authoritarian regimes.

Considering theories that could be used for analyzing of protests in Russia and Turkey we made a conclusion that concept of protest publics is more appropriate. During the research by recognizing the troubling message, investigating kind of organization of the public, explore the public places where discourse has been produced and evaluation of creativity of the poetic message of the world we found out that protests in Turkey and Russia can be considered as protest publics.

Figure 5 gives a diagrammatic representation of the role of Protest Publics in the mechanism of political changes in Turkey in 2013 and 2015. Such factors as slowdown in the Turkish economy after crises of 2008, high level of corruption, Islamic rhetoric of Recep Erdogan and, as a result, tightening of cleavage between traditionalists and modernists led to rising of protests and further political changes in Turkish society. Moreover together with factors, protest publics and other actors such as Justice and Development party, Recep Erdogan, conservative intellectuals



Figure 5. Case of Turkey. (Anufriev A.I., Zaytsev D.G., 2016)

and liberal intellectuals lead to the following political changes in Turkey: the strengthening of authoritarian tendencies, falling of Erdogan's international image due to corruption scandal and strengthening of power of ruling elites and Erdogan in person; limitation of civil liberties. Taking into account Erdogan's influence we may make a conclusion that Turkey in fact is changing its form of governance from parliamentary to presidential republic. Nevertheless, it is also led to appearance of social organizations and civil society initiatives aimed at protecting human rights and civil liberties.

The next figure gives a representation of the role of protest publics in the mechanism of political changes in Russia in 2011 and 2015. The following factors led to the political changes and emergence of protest publics in Russia: dominance of the United Russia and one leader, high level of corruption, depolitization of the biggest part of the population; slight growth in the middle class and its concentration in big cities, fast economic growth in 2000s followed by slowdown in economic growth. Along with factors, such actors as Vladimir Putin, the ruling party United Russia, opposition to the current regime (liberals, LGBT, communists anarchists caused strengthening of power of Vladimir Putin and the ruling party, emergence of new local and social initiatives and organizations, a number of



Figure 5. Case of Russia

prosecutions against journalists, opposition leaders and participants of protests, changing of electoral legislation, strengthening of legislation in the field of media and Internet, functioning of NGOs, new limitations in the field of civil rights (freedom of assembly and freedom of speech).

Having strong leaders and dominant parties Russia and Turkey are countries with quite similar political environment. Analyzing actors, factors of political changes and political changes itself in two countries we can assume that Protest Publics in Turkey is very similar to the one in Russia - in both cases publics becomes a kind of democratic “innovator”. Behind the general tendency of strengthening of authoritarian regimes we founded unique social phenomenon of rising of civil society activity and developing of new democratic practices. So, protest publics' actions may lead not only to democratization but also to strengthening authoritarian regime. Nevertheless, even there it creates the contra-tendency of accumulation democratic practices.



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