As far as participants of mass protests are concerned, by the general belief, young people prevailed on rally on Chistyye prudy and on Bolotnaya Square on December 10. However, according to surveys by the Levada Center, middle-aged people constituted majority of participants on Sakharov Avenue on December 24, on February 4 during a procession on Yakimanka and second Bolotnaya Square rally. The youngest (18-24 years) constituted about one-fifth of those present, as well as the older age group (55 years or more ). Among the protesters people with higher education accounted for about 80% (the national average - less than a third) among them there were more men (65%), while the majority of the population - women. (Doklad: Protestnoye dvizhenie v Rossii v kontse 2011-2012, 2012)

Let us consider the financial situation of the participants of these meetings. “The predominant group in both actions were those who believed that "can afford expensive things, but buying a car causes difficulty "(40% in December and 41% in February). About a quarter of protesters (28% in December and February 24%) were able to buy a car, 5% and 3% were those who "not refuse themselves anything." In sum, these three groups accounted for 78% of the participants of the rally on Sakharov and 68% of participants in marchers. By comparison, in Moscow, they account for about half of the population (50-51%), in Russia - only about one-fifth (22%). Three poorest groups (those who "do not have enough money for buying food ", “enough money for food, but buying clothes causes difficulties "and " lack of money for food and clothing ") accounted for a total of 28% rally in December and 32% - in February. Amount of people with low income in the capital constitute about half (49%), whereas in the whole country it is the majority of the population (79%).” (Doklad: Protestnoye dvizhenie v Rossii v kontse 2011-2012, 2012) So, we can conclude that most f participants of protests in Russia in 2011 can be referred to “middle class”. Our expert, Irina Soboleva agrees with this statement: “Protests in Russia in December 2011 can be characterized as protests of the urban middle class.”

“Those who identify themselves as "democrats" (38% in December and February 30%) and "liberals" (31% and 27%) constituted the majority of participants in the considering rallies. The next largest group was "communists" (13% and 18%), "nationalists" (6% and 14%) and "Social Democrats" (10%).” (Doklad: Protestnoye dvizhenie v Rossii v kontse 2011-2012, 2012)

The main source of information about the rallies for protesters was the Internet (70%). (Volkov, Protestnoye Dvizheniye v Rossii v kontse 2011 -2012: istoki, dinamika, resultaty, 2012) Information about the protests was spread through Live Journal, Twitter and Facebook.

The wave of protests induced different reaction of current government and authority. Russian president (prime-minister at that time) Vladimir Putin positively assessed the fact that young and active people openly express their point of view on processes occurring on the country. But at the same time, claiming that people participated in protest actions for money he called into question autonomic character of the protest public: "I know that students were paid some money - well, that is good if they could earn something," he said. (Vladimir Putin Mocks and Dismisses Protesters, 2011) “Vladimir Putin also accused the United States of being behind protests over the results of Russia's parliamentary elections. Mr. Putin said US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton "set the tone for some opposition activists". She "gave them a signal, they heard this signal and started active work", he said.” (Russia PM Vladimir Putin accuses US over poll protests, 2011)

Commenting on the question of fair or unfair elections he claimed that opposition in any country will always say that the elections were not fair. Besides, opposition claimed that Mr. Putin's party had stolen 13 million votes. But Mr. Putin refuted such criticism and made it clear there would be no rerun of the election, a key opposition demand. (Vladimir Putin Mocks and Dismisses Protesters, 2011)

The Russian president, Dmitry Medvedev, has proposed a host of liberal reforms in an apparent attempt to appease anti-government protesters. Medvedev called for the reinstatement of gubernatorial elections, an easing of political party registration rules and the creation of a public TV channel. (Dmitry Medvedev Proposes Electoral Reforms, 2011)

The head of presidential administration Sergei Ivanov gave positive assessment of protests: "Protests demonstrated existence of freedom of speech in Russia." A spokesman for Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, Dmitry Peskov, said that the government has heard the people's opinion, but: "The majority of Russians continues to support Vladimir Putin as a politician and a presidential candidate." According to Peskov, the people who took part in protests are an important part of society, but they are the minority. (Miting na Prospekte Sakharova Reaktsiya Vlasti, 2011)

The head of Chechnya, Ramzan Kadyrov called the organizers of protests as “enemies of people”. "Who are they? 30 thousand people decide for more than 100 million people. Those who organized the protests are the enemies of Russia, I guess”. - Kadyrov said. (Kadyrov: Organizatory Protestov - vragi Rossii, 2011).

Russian Prosecutor General Yuri Chaika, in an interview to "Rossiyskaya Gazeta" said the rallies for fair elections held in December 2011, were sponsored from abroad. "It is unacceptable that individuals are using people as a tool to achieve their political goals ", - Chaika said, responding to a question about his attitude to the protests. "The money for the protests come from sources that are outside Russia," - said the prosecutor general. However, he did not specify concrete examples of such actions. (Chaika Schel Mitingi za Chestniye Vybory Proplachennymi, 2012)

As far as international reaction, according to White House spokesman Jay Carney, anti-government protests staged in Russia over the weekend are a “positive sign” for democracy in the former Soviet republic. “The demonstrations that occurred in Moscow and in many other Russian cities last Saturday, Dec. 10 represent a very positive sign to all those who support the democratic process”. (Angry Facebook Backlash After Medvedev Announces Russia Election Inquiry, 2011)

The central Russian TV channels almost have not covered the first mass protest rallies that took place in Moscow. The only federal TV station to mention the protests before 10 December was the independent, but not broadcast widely, Ren TV. Unlike the main federal channels, few Russians can see it outside large urban areas. (Protests barely seen on Russian TV, 2011) Further protest actions including the meetings on December 10, Dec. 24, 2011, February 4, 2012 were covered broader. However, journalists emphasized on a well-organized police work, and the demands of the protesters were described incompletely. All rallies in support of the "United Russia" party were covered in detail. (Protests barely seen on Russian TV, 2011)

Western media covered the protests extensively starting on 5 December. Initial coverage by Fox News used footage of the 2011 Athens riots, showing palm trees, people throwing Molotov cocktails at police, and a sign in Greek which Fox later claimed was an error and subsequently removed the report from its site. (Fox News Uses Athens Riots Footage for Russian Protests, 2011)

Different types of protest actions took place during protests in Russia in 2011-2015 from traditional rallies and marches to quite creative public actions.

“Occupy Abay” protest action is one of the newest for Russians and creative type of protest action and of expressing opinion. "OccupyAbay" protest camp, named by analogy with the protest movement Occupy Wall Street in the United States, located on Chistoprudnyi bulvar from 9 to May 16, 2012 at the monument to Kazakh poet Abai Kunanbayev. This protest action had no one leader and was consisted of different types of groups: liberals, democrats, nationalists, writers, journalists and etc. Number of participants in the camp constantly varies from a few dozen people at night up to several hundred during the day and three to five thousand in the evenings. (Volkov, Occupy Abay ulichnyi protestnyi lager v Moskve v maye 2012 glazami ego uchastnikov, 2014) Its rise mainly resulted reaction to a crackdown of protest action on May 6, 2012 by the police and the subsequent mass detention of its members. As a result, hundreds of people protested the arbitrary and refused to leave the streets. (Volkov, Occupy Abay ulichnyi protestnyi lager v Moskve v maye 2012 glazami ego uchastnikov, 2014)

Another interesting type of protest action which draws our attention is “Great White Circle”. The "Great White Circle" action was held on the Garden Ring on 26 February, 2012. Opposition supporters lined up in a human chain on the inner side of the highway. (Vybory 2012, 2012) According to estimates of the police, 11 thousand people took part in the action. At the same time, a number of participants said that they were able to close the Garden Ring, which requires 34 thousand people. (Aktsiya Beliy Krug Zavershilas, 2012)

Moreover, white motor rallies (which involved cars with white balls, labels, ribbons) were carried out in different cities. For example, opposition politicians (Ponomarev, S. Udaltsov, D. Gudkov) organized "White Flow" from Siberia to Moscow. (Avtoprobeg Belyi Potok Startoval Iz Krasnoyarska 27 Avgusta , 2012) Activists visited 50 cities and organized opposition rallies there. The action was in the form of meetings with civil society activists, who are in the regions. The main aim can be formulated as communication with opposition activists in the regions and sharing ideas on further actions. Usually, from 20 to 200 people came to the meetings. Activists advised with these participants on how better organize the protests, encouraged them to create regional electoral committees, call them to Moscow to participate in mass rallies. (Chlen Politsoveta "Solidarnosti" Mikhail Shneider: "Dvizhuschuyu Silu Protesta Sostavlyaet Kreativnyi Class", 2012)

Reconstructing “troubling message”, we consider this to be publication of election results, which cause a wave of discontent and anger. Moreover, results of the election called into question the principle of changing power through elections. According to our expert Irina Soboleva from Columbia University in the City of New York, the trigger of protests in Russia is falsification of the election results. Her colleague, Denis Volkov from Levada center also considers election fraud as a key event led to mass protests in Russia in 2011.

As far as protest publics' self-organization, it managed to organize itself for quite short period of time. According to some sources, for less than a week the amount of participants grew from 10000 people to 150000 people. This public organized itself without any participation of state structures or civil society organizations. Moreover, according to expert Oleg Zhuravlev, “paradoxically, the condition of unity and consolidation of the protest public was its rejection of the political and ideological self-determination. People wanted the different fractions of the protests to stay together, because in this they saw the strength of the protest”.

“As for public spaces, where the protest publics produced its discourse, there were some problems with online spaces for discussing because Russian authorities tried to prevent fast spreading of news about the protests and opposition had less opportunities to discuss protests and explain their view of the alternative world behind the wide audience. What played an important positive role, was media support from part of `official media', which created and aired a number of public appeals from opinion-makers to join the protests.” (Belyaeva N., 2014) Nevertheless, meetings, demonstrations and “OccupyAbay” and “White Circle” initiatives are public places where protest publics produced and shared their discourse.

“Discourse exchange was limited, as it mostly happened only during public meetings themselves, when amazing number of participants were creating their own slogans, which expressed both their identity, their concerns, their claims to authorities and their `visions of the future', which were mostly remarkably creative, but either individual presentations or manifestations of small issue-group identity and demands.” (Belyaeva N., 2014)

Protest public was quite creative and managed to organize a number of actions which aimed to represent the poetic message of the alternative world. We consider “White Ring” action being the unique action, when thousands of people with white ribbons and other white stuff joined hands around Boulevard Ring in Moscow manifesting for fair elections. It was rather a flash mob than a protest action and participants had no need to coordinate the action with authorities.

Chapter 3. Political Changes in Russia and Turkey: Growth of Authoritarian Tendencies and Appearance of New Democratic Practices.

3.1 Political Changes in Turkey

In this chapter protest publics influence on political changes will be analyzed. We propose to divide changes that happened in the country into situational changes, policy changes and constitutional changes.

Can Irmak Ozinair: “Regime became even more authoritarian than it was before the protests. There is intention to change the constitution, but these changes towards strengthen of Erdogan's personal power. Some pro-government politicians claim that last elections was democratic as president was elected by public. I do not think that this point proves democratic character of the Turkish system as it proves that there is no political pluralism in Turkey.”

Some political changes have happened in Turkey since the beginning of Gezi Park protests, although there were not so significant as, for instance, in Egypt.

For example, presidential and local elections were held in Turkey in 2014. Recep Tayip Erdogan won presidential elections with the 51,79% (Cumhurbaюkanlэрэ seзim sonuзlarэ, 2014) of votes, his opponents Ekmeleddin Insanoglu and Selahattin Demirtas took 38,44% and 9,76% respectively (Cumhurbaюkanlэрэ seзim sonuзlarэ, 2014). As far as local election, results are the following: AKP -42.87%. (Turkish Elections, 2014)CHP - 26, 34%; MHP - 17.82%.Peoples' Democratic Party - 6,29%.AKP even gained more voters in comparison with 2009. (Turkish Elections, 2014)

Figure 2. Results of local elections in Turkey by regions (2014) (Turkish Elections, 2014)

Kudryashova: “Society receives information that such actions are possible. But in terms of influence on the political system ... If we take index of democracy it shows that Turkey still take place among incomplete democracies. They remain in the upper third of the group of hybrid modes.”

As far as the changing of constitution that mention expert, Turkish president Tayyip Erdogan said forging a new constitution after a parliamentary election (2015) would be a priority for Turkey. There is an intention to create an executive presidency. (Turkish president Erdogan calls for new constitution ) Consequently, Erdogan's power will be subsequently expanded.

There were certain institutional changes after the protest, although they were caused not by the protests themselves, but by a corruption scandal when the government changed significantly. (Turkey Rocked by Corruption Scandal, 2013) The 2013 corruption scandal in Turkey refers to an ongoing criminal investigation that involves several key people in the Turkish government; most people involved being members of the ruling Justice and Development Party. In a speech to the press Prime Minister announced the reshuffle of 10 members of his cabinet in light of the scandal, saying that the reshuffle was to replace the three ministers who had resigned earlier in the day and others who were planning mayoral runs in the local elections in March 2014.

Moreover, Dilara Peker reported that “from those days to today, the police have gained wider authority and power on people”. “Turkey's parliament passed a piece of legislation, a bill that broadens police powers and increases penalties for people participating in unauthorized demonstrations. Under the bill, the police will be permitted to use firearms against demonstrators who are armed with firebombs or other injurious or similar weapons. They will also be able to detain people for up to 48 hours to uphold public order. Protesters wearing masks or partly covering their faces will face up to five years in prison if they are deemed to be spreading “propaganda for a terrorist organization”. (Turkish parliament expands police powers and cracks down on demonstrations, 2015)“Among the most problematic elements of such measures is a revision to the Anti-Terror Law (Article 7/2), which provides for a three to five-year prison sentence for anyone “who conceals or partially conceals their face during a demonstration or public assembly that turns into propaganda for a terrorist organization.” (NGO Law Monitor: Turkey, 2015)

“The bill will also allow the police to pursue some investigations without authorization from prosecutors and judges, raising fears or the arbitrary use of power without judicial oversight. Opponents say that the bill breaches the separation of powers between the legislative, executive and judicial branches and that it could create the basis for turning Turkey into a police state”. (Turkish parliament expands police powers and cracks down on demonstrations, 2015) Moreover this bill limits the wright on freedom of association.

Along with it, another researcher Altung Yalcintas reported that “after Gezi, an ongoing process of political restructuring took place. First and most importantly, the project of building a convention center and shopping mall in place of Gezi Park and a mosque in Taksim Square was shelved. Bьlent Arэnз, a government spokesperson, officially apologized for the destruction and terror that the police forces exercised against the environmentalist occupiers of Gezi Park on 28 May. The parliament decided to withdraw a legal charter granting permission to the government to transform many forests around Istanbul into residential areas. While protests spread to 67 cities around the country mentioned channels CNN Tьrk airs its now-infamous penguin documentary, but later NTV and CNN Turk, two of the most popular television news networks, also accepted their faulty policy of broadcasting. NTV History, a magazine of popular history, owned by NTV group, was shut down after its special issue on the Gezi protests and social movements in Anatolia since Byzantine times”. (Yalcintas A., 2015)

Nevertheless, Ankara has continued to adopt new legislation in an attempt to legitimize online surveillance and control, alongside 18 other countries, the Freedom House report finds. Turkey's Law No. 5651 on regulation of the internet was amended in February 2014, with the changes including greater liability for hosting and access providers, and greater scope to block websites. Two months later, Turkey also amended the law on the National Intelligence Organization, giving it new powers to obtain information and electronic data from public bodies, private companies, and individuals without a court order. (Turkey report, 2014)

International indexes, such as Freedom house reflects all the above mentioned changes. The rate of civil liberties declined from 3 in 2012 to 4 in 2013. The rate of laws and regulations that influence media content and legal environment is 21 in 2013 (in 2012 was 22). Political pressures and controls on media content also worsened from 22 (2013) to 24 (2013). Freedom of press significantly dropped from 56 in 2012 to 62 in 2013 and Turkey entered into the category “not free”. The rate of freedom on the Internet declined for 46 in 2012 to 49 in 2013. (Freedom on the Net Turkey, 2013) According to BTI Political Transformation index Turkey's democracy status declined from 7.65 in 2011 to 7.55 in 2014. (Transformation Index BTI 2016, 2016) Economists Index of democracy declined from 5.76 in 2012 to 5.12 in 2014. The rate of civil liberties significantly declined to 2.94 in 2015 from 4.12 in 2012 reaching 3.82 in 2013 and 3.53 in 2014. The rate of electoral and pluralism and the rate of functioning of government also declined from 7.92 in 2012 to 6.67 in 2014 and from 6.79 in 2012 to 5.36 in 2014 respectively. (The Economist Itelligence Unit, 2016)

Indeed, Erdoрan was the authority whom Gezi protesters wanted to debunk. The protesters have been successful in that respect, as the protests undermined the legitimacy of Erdoрan. He is now less respected in world politics as a direct result of the Gezi demonstrations. However, the majority of Gezi protesters did not aim to establish a new authority; as a consequence, the debunked AKP remained the ruling party and won two of the next elections. Albeit it dramatically transformed its political agenda and is now run by a lower profile and less charismatic leader, Ahmet Davutoрlu, the AKP is still in office. Nevertheless, the Gezi protesters did not give up hope and kept fighting. (Yalcintas A., 2015)

“ Mr Erdogan's election as president in 2014 poses a new threat to Turkey's democratic institutions. According to the constitution, the president is supposed to be an apolitical and largely ceremonial figure. Mr Erdogan is, decidedly, neither of those things. During his first term, Turkey was within reaching distance of the “flawed democracy” category. That is no longer the case following the downward lurch in its score in 2014. It remains a long way from the “authoritarian regime” category, but the current momentum in that direction is a cause for grave concern.” (The Economist Itelligence Unit, 2016)

In spite of that, we cannot ignore countertendencies - the emergence of alternative media and emergence of practices of civic participation. Most of them were founded on the basis of “park forums” that appeared during the Gezi park protests. The most influential and successful example of democratic practices is Цy ve Цtesi (“Vote and Beyond”) organization, which mobilized 60,000 volunteers to monitor polling stations during the 1 November 2015 parliamentary election. It is a non-partisan citizens' group monitoring electoral practice in Turkey. The main aims of the organization are to promote participation to the elections, increase awareness about the candidates and ensure transparency in observering of ballot count in the elections. (Oy ve Otesi, 2015) The organization monitored local elections in March 2014, state presidency elections in 2014, general elections on June, 7 2015.

Consequently, after the Gezi park protests Turkey experienced situational changes, policy changes and institutional changes. Situational changes: falling of Erdogan's international image due to corruption scandal and strengthening of power of ruling elites and Erdogan in person because of a range of legislative acts that was adopted after the protests. Policy changes: substantial changes in the media policy, censorship and restrictions on the Internet. Institutional changes: taking into account Erdogan's influence we may make a conclusion that Turkey in fact is changing its form of governance from parliamentary to presidential republic. Another institutional change that was caused also by a range of legislative acts is limitation of civil liberties.

The Gezi Party was founded in October 2013 inspired by summer protests. It is an environmentalist party.

Turkish American Gezi Platform (TAGP) is a non-profit organization founded by an independent group of individuals inspired by Gezi Park protests. The aim of TAGP is to unite and organize the Turkish American community around a set of core values, and promote these values through public events, such as seminars, lectures, art exhibits, forums, discussion groups, etc. (Turkish American Gezi Platform, 2016)

The “Occupy CHP movement” initiated just after Gezi by the CHP youth, aimed at restructuring the party through “Gezi principles,” did not work, as the party's core group was not able to translate new forms of organization into its structure. The deputies who supported the resistances and social movements were not placed at the top of candidate lists, giving an image of a CHP detached from the resistances. (From Gezi Park to Turkey's Transformed Political Landscape, 2015) On 30 March 2014, a loose constellation of young members and sympathizers for the CHP declared an internal rebellion against their party. Disillusioned by the failed promises of internal reform after the Gezi protests, the final straw was the failure of the party to promote young and progressive candidates, and the following electoral defeats. (Donatella della Porta, Jonas Bergan Draege, Daniela Chironi, 2016)

The United June Movement is inspired by the June uprising of 2013 and founded on the principles of equality, freedom, democracy, solidarity and socialism. 

Civil initiatives such as #OccupyCHP, Oy ve Цtesi and others are particularly significant as they seem to reflect a desire by younger generations to engage with politics. Instead of remaining apathetic in face of an outdated political system that excludes them, they are actively intervening to modify it. (Inceoglu, 2014)

3.2 Political Changes in Russia

I this paragraph we will analyze political changes that had happened after or during the protests in Russia. According to one of the interviewed experts Oleg Zhuravlev, “protests in Russia influenced the policy of the state: it has become more repressive. However, today other factors are important: the economic crisis, the discontent of the business elite by Putin regime, Western pressure on Russia as a result of the annexation of Crimea and the participation of Russian troops in the civil war in Ukraine”. Denis Volkov, sociologist from Levada center, considers that “protests lead to the strengthening of authoritarian tendencies in Russian policy. The parliament took a number of laws aimed at strengthening of control over the independent actions. Nevertheless, authorities, to some extent, made some steps to satisfy protests' demands.”

On December 22, President Dmitry Medvedev commented on the protests in his annual address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation: "I hear those who talk about the need for change, and understand them." The President said that he proposes "a comprehensive reform of our political system":

· transition to the election of regional governors by direct vote of the inhabitants of the regions;

· the introduction of a simplified procedure for registration of political parties (on the application of 500 people, representing not less than 50 per cent of the regions of the country);

· remove the need to collect signatures for elections to the State Duma and regional legislatures;

· reduction in the number of signatures required to participate in the presidential elections to 300 thousand, and for candidates from non-represented in the State Duma parties - up to 100 thousand;

· the introduction of proportional representation for 225 districts for the State Duma (but not offered half of the deputies elected by majoritarian single-mandate constituencies);

· change the order of the formation of the Central and regional election commissions with the expansion of their representation in political parties;

· redistribution of powers and budgetary resources in favor of the regions and municipalities, increasing the sources of income of the regional and local budgets (up to 1 trillion rubles);

· creation of public television.

According to political scientist Irina Soboleva, “from the formal point of view, government has made concessions.” The ruling elite constantly put emphasis on the fact that the laws that meet the requirements of the protesters were taken. But if we consider each "liberal" law, it will be obvious that these laws, on the contrary, to "tighten the screws". Therefore, I believe that despite the fact that the authorities have declared a desire to compromise with the protesters, in fact legislature, especially in the field of holding mass demonstrations or actions were tightened. Moreover, if we consider the political system as a whole, there was strengthening of authoritarian tendencies.” Freedom House assessment of political rights in Russia proves Irina Soboleva's statement as the rate declined from 5,5 in 2011 to 6 in 2012 and out Russia into the category “not free”. (Freedom in the World. Russia, 2015)

Several steps on tightening of legislation in the media field, Internet and electronic payments, activities and funding of NGOs, holding rallies, actions of volunteers and independent observers, the laws on libel, insulting the feelings of believers, propaganda of homosexuals and etc. had been taken.

On June 9, 2012 a law on rallies came into force, toughening penalties for violations of the rules of the protest actions. So, for meetings of participants (individuals) the minimum fine will be from 20 to 300 thousand rubles, and for organizations - up to 1 million rubles. Based on this law, the government received the right to refuse to carry out meetings if the organizer of the planned rally made earlier administrative violations in the course of public events. Thus, a significant part of the opposition activist was deprived of the opportunity to declare public events.

On July 13, 2012, the State Duma adopted amendments to the "On Noncommercial Organizations" law. In accordance with this law, a number of Russian non-profit organizations (NPOs) received the status of a foreign agent. The law was strongly criticized by civil society organizations and foreign press and leaders. For instance, The Economist argues that the use of the term "foreign agent" is an attempt by the Russian government to take control of civil activity in the Russian society. For this purpose, according to the magazine, the independent non-governmental organizations received the stigma of "foreign agents"/ (Vladimir Putin's Crackdown on Opponents, Protesters and Activist Groups May be a Sign of Fragility as much as of Strength, 2013)

In 2012 a law allowing closing the site with child porn, extremism, drug propaganda or appeals to suicide without the court, came into force. However, critics of the law say that the real reasons lie in the fact that government is trying to establish political censorship. According to the Freedom House, in 2012, the Internet in Russia has held 31 out of 60 countries in terms of freedom of speech, and entered into the category of "partly free". (Freedom in the World. Russia, 2015) The level of political pressure and controls over media worsened and constituted 32 in 2012 (33 was in 2011).

Moreover, in February 1, 2014 act giving the right for the Prosecutor General's request without a court to block any sites, calling for riots and other "extremist materials" came into force. So, a number of independent online resources and blogs have been blocked under the new law, the most famous of them: Kasparov.Ru, Grani.Ru, Daily journal and blog of Alexei Navalny. (Roskomnadzor zablockiroval dostup k portalam "Grani.ru", "Kasparov.ru", "Ezhednevnomu zhurnalu" i JJ Navalnogo, 2014) According to freedom house, the level of limits on content on the Internet dropped from 16 in 2009 to 18 in 2012.

Another law considered to violate human rights in Russia is a law banning "propaganda of nontraditional sexual relations" among minors, which was passed on June 11, 2013 in the State Duma. Human Rights Watch argues that since the adoption in 2013 of the federal law banning gay propaganda attacks on the Russian LGBT community became more frequent.

One of the controversial documents adopted after protests became the document introduced amendments to article 148 of the Criminal Code - the responsibility for obstructing the exercise of the right to freedom of conscience and religion. New amendments envisage penalties of up to three years in prison for public actions, expressing clear disrespect for society and committed in order to insult the religious feelings of believers, including places of worship, and the worship of other religious ceremonies. Also, new document imposes fines of up to 500 thousand rubles, and the mandatory corrective work. (Zakon o nakazanii za oskorbleniye chuvstv veruyuschikh podpisan presidentom, 2013)

The suppression of all kinds of independent initiatives and a propaganda campaign against the opposition was launched. The judicial prepetition of political opponents of the regime started: trials on participants in the protests on May 6, girls from the Pussy Riot group, Alexei Navalny and Sergei Udaltsov, Taisia Osipova, a failed freeing-of Mikhail Khodorkovsky and Platon Lebedev, Alexey Kozlov, deprivation of deputy mandate to Gennady Gudkov, the resignation of management and change of format of several independent media and so on.

As for support of government and president, on the president elections in March, 2012 Vladimir Putin took 63,6 % of votes that is on 8% less than on the elections in 2004. Gennadiy Zyuganov, the chairman of communist party took 17,18 % of votes (17,72% on the previous elections). 7,98% of voters gave their voice to Mikhail Prokhorov, 6.22% to Vladimir Zhirinovsky (Liberal-democratic party) and 3.85% to Sergey Mironov (“Spravedlivaya Rossiya”). While candidate from Spravedlivaya Rossiya managed to improve his result comparing with the previous elections when he gained 0.75%, Vladimir Zherinovskiy from LDPR lost almost 3% of votes (last result - 9.35%).

As far as support rating of Vladimir Putin, in December, 2011 63% of respondents supported him, it is the minimum rate for the whole period of conducting research. During the 2012, the rate was fluctuating between 63% and 67%. At the beginning of 2014 the rate grew rapidly and reached 82% in April, 2014. (Assesment of Situation in the Coutry, 2015)

Table 4. Approval of Putin