American exceptionalism and its impact on presidents’ foreign policy
History of the term and its definitions. Summary of inceptional, missional and national exceptionalism. Traditionalist summary and foreign policy implications. The troubling, healthy and neutral erosion of exceptionalism. Foreign policy implications.
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The clearest implication of Krauthammer's view of exceptionalism is its reach to foreign policy. He strongly holds to the idea that the United States should have an outsized influence on world affairs due to its inherent goodness, though he does not explicitly state that the United States is any more moral than other nations. He simply refutes the claim of progressives that the United States is somehow unworthy to lead because of its checkered past. Upholding the inherent morality of the nation, Krauthammer and others are easily vindicated by the comparison of American history to the histories of other nations. Krauthammer and others do not believe social stains such as slavery negate the otherwise beneficent nature of the United States. Many other nations have not had the general emphasis on individual rights, for example, that the United States has championed. Therefore, the United States should be able to powerfully impose its moral virtue on other nations.
More importantly, the United States currently holds the choice whether or not to deteriorate in its power and moral stronghold, and Krauthammer believes the choice is easy. He fears the power of the liberal Left's belief that the United States should absorb guilt for its national flaws, such as racial inequality. Instead, he suggests, the nation must reassert itself as a proper leader of the world, not a fearful giant. Indeed, this kind of move will allow the United States to strengthen its economy and preserve its dynamism at home. To do otherwise is to deny the basis of human nature, he claims. “The international arena remains a Hobbesian state of nature in which countries naturally strive for power…Inevitably, an inversion of power relations will occur.” Ibid. For Krauthammer, national and world safety requires that this inversion tips in favor of the United States.
Richard Lowry and Ramesh Ponnuru (2010) label the United States exceptional in its freedom, individualism, democracy, and openness. Richard Lowry and Ramesh Ponnuru, “An Exceptional Debate--The Obama administration's assault on American identity,” National Review (March 2010). Exceptionalism itself, they argue, is a combination of aspects including liberty, equality, individualism, populism, laissez-faire economics, religiosity, and approval of military protection. Lowry and Ponnuru and Seymour Martin Lipset, 2010. They follow the thread of exceptionalism through American history, declaring its foundations and culture different from the Puritans' English ancestors' foundations. Acknowledging that the United States is imperfect, however, Lowry and Ponnuru press on toward encouraging exceptionalism to bring about righteous change rather than “effacing” exceptional character. Fearful about Obama's lack of American pride and the resulting cultural impact, they compare his actions to the Founders' intentions and to the direction of European nations. Lowry and Ponnuru conclude that the United States is a unique nation whose characteristics must be preserved.
James Bennett (2010) highlights the tension between the definitions of American exceptionalism held by the political Right and Left: pride in national characteristics versus particular national guilt, respectively. Bennett claims that any version of exceptionalism must “have predictive value, and be subject to negation by identification of contrary evidence.” James C. Bennett, “Exceptional Down to the Bone: Anatomizing the origins of the American character,” National Review (June 2010). He studies American marriage, inheritance passage, and the behaviors of adult children to determine the distinctiveness of the United States. Though he draws on some similarities between the United States and other English-speaking countries, Bennett cites Turner's frontier thesis as well as David Hackett Fischer's theory of American containment as evidence for exceptionalism. Fischer, paraphrased by Bennett, argues, “all the ingredients that made Americans what they are today were present when the first colonists left the British Isles… what the Americans brought to the wilderness was at least as important as what they found there.” Ibid. Therefore, Fischer joins Boorstin and others who claim that the traits necessary for the United States' particular development were embedded in the land when the Puritans arrived. Ibid.
While Bennett's evidence seems to be very conducive to making the inceptional case for American exceptionalism, I conclude that his analysis also has national emphasis for the following reasons. First, “other countries, because of their cultural roots, are simply better at socialism than we are.” Ibid. This is a distinguishing aspect of the United States, as most other democratic societies have had strong socialist parties, which have shaped their political culture. Second, he argues that exceptionalism is primarily a cultural phenomenon that works itself out in legal traditions, not vice versa. Bennett concludes with this claim: “America is really exceptional, which means that not everyone can be like us and we should not expect them to be.” Ibid. In his discussion, Bennett seems to bridge the gap between the inceptional and national emphases of American exceptionalism's disputed definition.
3.3.1 Summary of National Exceptionalism
The national exceptionalists agree that the United States has been shaped by its deep values and characteristics. These exceptionalists believe that the deep shaping the United States has undergone is of a different sort than any other nationalism. It is positive, forward-looking, and based on virtue as opposed to ancient rivalry. It lacks negative sentiment and fuel often found in socialist systems, which explains the absence of strong socialist movement throughout American history. Instead, liberty, democracy, and freedom are championed as the highest rights that every human should possess. In all this, the U.S. cannot be considered more “moral” than any other country, but it is nonetheless important to assert this undeniable American virtue.
Some go so far as to say that the United States understands good and evil well enough to place itself on the side of the good and right while recognizing the evil of other nations in the world. However, this is a somewhat extreme version of national exceptionalism and is not stated by many.
3.4 Traditionalist Summary and Foreign Policy Implications
Exceptionalism from a traditional perspective is the idea that the United States is different from all other nations, but not necessarily better. Traditional exceptionalists generally agree that the United States is unique and cannot lose this quality, no matter what the country does; it will always be wholly incomparable to other nations. Though traditional exceptionalists emphasize different facets of the United States' exceptionalism, they see the United States as perpetually unique and believe there are particular implications for foreign policy.
American traditionalist foreign policy's leeway given to the President differs based on the interpretation of the evidence for American exceptionalism. Inceptional exceptionalism, for instance, finds that the United States' founding and core characteristics are the results of such uncommon and unique events that they cannot be replicated, even--perhaps especially--by intentional manipulation. It is impossible to recreate the formulation of another nation like the United States with its traditional Puritan heritage and vast stretches of largely uninhabited land. The inceptional view of American exceptionalism would compel a politician to restrict his actions to those outside other nations' internal affairs, even in the wake of political upheaval. New and reforming nations cannot replicate the conditions which have made the United States special.
By contrast, some strains of missional exceptionalist foreign policy allow the U.S. to reach farther than it could if people did not believe in its moral high ground or indisputable uniqueness. These missional exceptionalists, for example, are compelled to urge direct, often messianic, action towards other nations. This policy may allow the United States to impose its will on other countries, but only for their own good. American security may also be a motivation to impose American values and traditions on other nations. Other missional exceptionalists, however, believe that the Founding Fathers encouraged aloofness from international affairs in order that the United States would simply provide an example to the world, not a heavy, intimidating hand in nations' affairs.
National exceptionalism leads scholars to argue for the United States' global leadership due to its success and beneficent core values. Though there is an indisputable claim to this leadership, there is not a straight path to direct intervention in other nations. Nationalists likely hold the middle ground between inceptional and missional exceptionalists in their foreign policy. The United States is a good and exceptional nation with particular characteristics that have allowed it to prosper and grow almost uninhibited. However, without a particular moral high ground to interfere in other nations' affairs, the U.S. must remain a strong supporter of liberty, freedom, and democracy, but it does not have legitimate claim to force them upon others.
It cannot be overstated that the definitions of American exceptionalism are crucial to determining which foreign policy actions are within the United States' proper bounds. Nevertheless, even some who agree on the source of the U.S.'s exceptionalism are unable to agree completely on the foreign policy actions that should result from their view.4. Erosionists
“If Americans don't believe `we're the greatest country ever,' we won't be for much longer.”
Andrew Ferguson Andrew Ferguson, “What's So Great About America,” The Weekly Standard, November 15, 2010.
For whatever reason, erosionists are much less likely to clearly define American exceptionalism than traditionalists. Erosionists generally hold that the United States is exceptional but is capable of losing this status and is perhaps in the process of doing so. My label “erosionist” is appropriate because these thinkers believe that the uniqueness of the United States is fading because of national actions. They do often believe exceptionalism resulted from the same qualities that the traditionalists cite, including Puritan influence, egalitarian society, and the availability of land, but they believe these are being eroded, leaving the United States less than exceptional as a result. Erosionists also refuse to claim that the U.S. is superior to other nations, whereas some traditionalists are willing to assert American superiority. Within this category there are three variations: the belief that the loss of exceptional status is troubling, healthy, or neutral. Each of these has particular implications for foreign policy.
4.1 The Troubling Erosion of Exceptionalism
Thomas Friedman and Michael Mandelbaum (2011) are erosionists who propose practical steps to uphold their version of American exceptionalism but whose maintenance is in question if the nation is not proactive in retaining it. They define American exceptionalism as the conglomeration of the following: the United States' unique history in comparison to the development of most European nations, especially in the absence of a concrete social structure and in the presence of vast available land; its basis on ideology; and its attractiveness to diverse immigrants. Thomas L. Friedman and Michael Mandelbaum, “America Really Was That Great,” Foreign Policy (November 2011). Their take on the term, used in a political sense, gives it an emotional nature in its “celebratory” use and in the United States' abundant power, wealth, opportunity, and freedom. Ibid.
However, Freidman and Mandelbaum argue that the cost of exceptionalism is high in this age when globalization, technology, national deficits, and energy concerns threaten the status quo. The American role in the world is crucial to the continued stability of global economics and peace. They caution, though, that “America does not now have in place the policies needed to master [its problems]” or accomplish [its] ideals. Ibid. To set the stage for their assessment of the continued exceptionalism of the United States, Friedman and Mandelbaum cite three American failures: the educational system, national deficits, and reliance on fossil fuels. Failure to provide students with the skills to land well-paying jobs, inability to responsibly respond to financial crises, and refusal to transition to more sustainable energy sources are eroding the condition of exceptionalism that the authors argue is so crucial. They point to an underlying failure of self-inspection in that America has not asked itself “What world are we living in, and what do we need to do to thrive in it?” Ibid. For them, a belief in and continuance of American exceptionalism is the key to a thriving nation.
Therefore, Friedman and Mandelbaum offer solutions to combat the erosion of exceptionalism. Tools to effect growth and continued stability include individual creativity, flexibility, accountability, and the opportunities to fail as well as succeed. They urge the bolstering of the distinctly successful American military machine but say the American economy must be a particular priority. When the economy is functioning properly because of its structure and oversight, Friedman and Mandelbaum say the United States is, at its best, able to offer the business-friendly climate of “the world's most attractive launching pad.” Ibid. Seeing these seeds of a great capacity for growth, the authors are cautiously optimistic that the United States will rise to meet the challenges of the twenty-first century and remain a nation different from others. If not, the world cannot become “better…than any alternative we can envision.” Ibid. Arguing that many nations benefit from American stability and ascendancy, Friedman and Mandelbaum claim the world has a stake in keeping the United States exceptional.
Andrew Ferguson (2011) demonstrates that American exceptionalism, believed by most Americans, is an uncommon global dogma. Using the story of Senator Marco Rubio (FL-R), Ferguson says this is because, “properly applied it has brought freedom and prosperity to more people, and more kinds of people, than any other.” Ferguson, “What's So Great.” Rubio's parents fled Cuba's oppressive regime and settled in the United States, finding that its “political, social, and economic arrangements [are] unlike any other[s] in history.” Ibid. Today their son holds in one of the most powerful positions in the country, perfectly concluding their story with a full experience of the American Dream. Ferguson worries, however, that Americans have overused the term “exceptionalism,” which cannot stand unless given proper care and upheld as the prioritized belief in unique traditional characteristics. He eerily predicts, “If Americans don't believe `we're the greatest country ever,' we won't be for much longer.” Ibid.
Drawing on the distinct ideology of America, Roger Cohen (2009) finds his voice in reviewing Hodgson's work The Myth of American Exceptionalism. Cohen finds that the United States is a unique nation because it was “born as an idea,” Roger Cohen, “America Unmasked,” The New York Times, April 24, 2009. and he defines exceptionalism as many of the missional and inceptional traditionalists do: The U.S. “has a special mission to further the moral and political emancipation of the world.” Ibid. Hodgson identifies the availability of habitable land as unique, though he counters the idea that the United States was vastly different from much of Europe in 1776. The traditional values of the United States are praised as proper and good in the world, but our treatment of them in recent years is another story.
Cohen and Hodgson agree that America's ideological heritage and mission does not give it the right to claim superiority. Hodgson goes further in saying that the United States has recently abused its good qualities in exchange for “hubris and self-interest.” Ibid. While Cohen is reviewing the work of Hodgson, an equalist (see chapter 5), Cohen is an erosionist because he rejects Hodgson's notion that the United States should become just like any other nation in the world. Instead, Cohen justifies its uniqueness in its openness, hardworking people, and individualism, while admitting a recent downturn in exceptional status. Cohen claims that Americans must not be “bombastic” in asserting power, especially with their track record of “exceptionally” high prison rates and social inequality. However, it is important that the U.S. continues to assert itself as a world leader, though not for any reasons of moral superiority.
Analyzing power to a greater extent, Joseph Nye defines exceptionalism through the lens of American power. For him, American exceptionalism is the ability to powerfully lead the world with a leadership resting on economic productivity, a stable society, military might, national humility, international openness, and global consideration. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., The Paradox of American Power (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 170-171. Each of these is necessary for the United States to maintain its position as a global leader.
While the United States usually interacts with the world through traditional military might, Nye offers the alternative of “soft power,” which is a nonaggressive form of dominance through diplomacy. Ibid., 152. Soft power does not seek to bulldoze other nations for the sake of American security the way hard power does in its use of the military. In this way, soft power makes the United States more attractive to other nations and more adaptable to cooperation. Recognizing the world transformation due to globalization, Nye supports joining international organizations as a part of soft power. In this, he hopes that the world will not reject the advancement of the United States if done through this channel. The U.S. can accumulate soft power in many ways, including being aware of and taking part in alleviating international humanitarian violations. Ibid., 149.
Through these steps, Nye admits that the U.S. is an exceptional nation, but its national security should not be its highest value. Instead, acknowledgement of other nations' virtues and the humility to cooperate--especially economically--will, perhaps ironically, help to promote the current power of the United States. Dominique Moisi puts it well in Nye's work: “The global age has not changed the fact that nothing in the world can be done without the United States. And the multiplicity of new actors means that there is very little the United States can achieve alone.” Ibid., 169. Nye confidently claims that “the United States is well placed to remain the leading power in world politics well into the twenty-first century” provided that the economy and society remain stable along with a new outlook on the world that acknowledges the merits of cooperation. Ibid., 170-171. However, in the face of globalization, he predicts that “number one ain't gonna be what it used to be.” Ibid., 170-171.
4.1.1 Summary of Troubling Erosion
The erosionists who find the lessening of American exceptionalism troubling do so because they are concerned about the security and power of the United States. They are understandably concerned about the downturn in American exceptionalism and its falling global position. They believe the United States' projected image has been tarnished, which is an ominous precursor to an accompanying decline in power and safety. These erosionists argue for a strengthening of the U.S. image in foreign minds and a willingness to unabashedly stand upon what has made the country great.
4.2 The Healthy Erosion of Exceptionalism
Other erosionists argue that exceptionalism was once held by the United States, though it is receding today, and this is a very good turn. The United States has been “on top” for too long and has forgotten how it got to its place. These erosionists see the erosion of the exceptional idea as beneficial for the United States, which must be kept in check, and for other nations, which desire to be recognized as legitimate powers.
David Forsythe (2007) briefly analyzes President Reagan, an influential modern proponent of American exceptionalism, who believed the United States had a unique role to play in leading the world and notably used early American theology in articulating this belief. Forsythe departs from Reagan, accepting the definition of exceptionalism as “divinely blessed uniqueness” but considering the idea misguided, misinformed, and overly proud in view of the glaring flaws in U.S. history. Slavery, for instance, is an inexcusable blemish on the American character, and the country is therefore not to be counted as special or especially good. Many traditional exceptionalists, Forsythe observes, are unhelpfully and improperly undaunted by a history so stained.
This national pride often translates into unilateral American foreign policy. Forsythe examines the strengths and weaknesses of the American tendency toward isolationism. He claims that Presidents Reagan and George W. Bush tried to bring about a worldwide “Pax Americana,” which ultimately failed and caused trouble for the nations they attempted to change. Bush's invasion of Iraq is no doubt at the forefront of Forsythe's mind in this assessment. The United States has almost always favored a unilateral foreign policy over any requirement to join international organizations that would chip away at sovereignty, he says. David P. Forsythe, “Exploring American Exceptionalism, Parts I-II,” The Globalist (July 17-18, 2007). Forsythe favors a multilateral approach to world affairs, not an isolationist or unilateral one. He rejoices in the “comfort” brought by “inescapable” world events that force traditionally exceptionalist Presidents to revert to international negotiation and hopes this trend continues to harness American exceptionalist tendencies in world affairs. However, Forsythe fears a decline in American superiority due to his perception of the United States' inability to cope with an increasingly globalized world.
Citing American power à la Nye, Andrew Bacevich (2008) argues that American exceptionalism, which rises and falls with the American attitude, is waning today and may soon come to its proper end. Bacevich seems to equate exceptionalism with isolationism, defining both as the inward-focused “looking out for number one” attitude of Americans. Identifying military power, especially post-WWII prowess, as the driving force for exceptionalist claims, Andrew J. Bacevich, The Limits of Power: The End of American Exceptionalism (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2008). Bacevich attempts to explain the surprise of the September 11 attacks by highlighting the ironic posture of the United States: “When it came to defending vital American interests, asserting control over the imperial periphery took precedence over guarding the nation's own perimeter.” Ibid., 3. The U.S. was so focused on remaining a “superpower” that it neglected to fortify its internal structure to protect itself from seemingly impotent enemies. Further reflected in post-9/11 attitudes, Bacevich says that, though the terrorist attack shook the nation, most Americans' increased patriotism went only as far as was convenient. This patriotism was “one that emphasized the display of bumper stickers in preference to shouldering a rucksack.” Ibid., 63.
Claiming that the United States faces three crises--economic and cultural, political, and military--Bacevich warns that the United States' dependency on other nations is leading it down an unsafe path. Ibid., 7. His evidence includes American dependence on oil suppliers in the Middle East and on goods suppliers like China--all to feed insatiable American consumerism. Bacevich also claims that the United States' advanced military power has allowed it to do whatever it wants, but this will not last. He asserts that the superpower status of the country is not accurate any longer, and that “Americans have yet to realize they have forfeited command of their own destiny.” Ibid., 65. According to Bacevich, American consumerism and an undue focus on military power are exceptionalism's downfall. However, this is a good thing in the current age, when the United States must view the world and itself realistically--in light of September 11--not with a clouded assessment of superiority.
Also detecting this false sense of superiority, David Morris (2011) attempts to unravel the fact and fiction surrounding Americans' claims of exceptionalism. He specifically targets the rhetoric of popular conservative political figures--and potential Presidents--like Mike Huckabee, Newt Gingrich, and Sarah Palin. Morris disagrees with their judgments of the United States' inherent goodness and “superiority,” instead asserting that the nation has been the recipient of good and not a caretaker of it. He states that his exceptionalism is not the possession of good qualities that characterize the U.S., but the idea that the country has “exceptionally” squandered its resources and luck's advantages, thereby “creating a value system singularly antagonistic to the changes needed when those advantages disappeared.” David Morris, “The Truth About American Exceptionalism,” OntheCommons.org.
Morris specifically argues that America's wealth, immigrants, geographic isolation, and natural resources have given it a high platform, but they alone cannot bestow uniqueness. Adding charts (derived from unknown data) at the end of his article titled “The Truth About American Exceptionalism,” Morris attempts to show the reader that the United States is exceptional in only negative ways. Every chart shows the U.S. in a far “worse” position than the rest of the developed nations pictured in categories like “% of Children Living in Poverty,” “Murders Per 100,000 Population,” “Multiplier of CEO Pay to Average Worker Pay,” and “% of Total Income Received by Richest 0.1%.” Ibid. Morris obviously takes issue with the United States' status in these areas and, like many others, claims that this country is “exceptional” because of its drastic failure to deal with these “problems.”
He calls the United States “exceptional,” but he is unable to call it “good” because, while at one time it contained bountiful resources, the country has neglected its proper use of these and continues to develop a culture of unequal, self-seeking citizens. Americans cannot claim uniqueness or a special role in the world, Morris says, because we are simply “lucky.” He says that an exceptional status is undeserved given the way in which the United States is overly self-concerned even while it contains some of the greatest economic inequality, unemployment rates, and infant mortality rates among industrialized nations. Ibid. Morris seems to claim that, to accurately call one's nation exceptional, it must be perfect.
T. David Gordon (2011), a professor of religion, finds no problem acknowledging some of the unique early qualities of the United States, but he cautions against ignoring the good of other nations in light of these. He combats the theory of American exceptionalism on two grounds: secular and religious. From a secular position, Gordon asserts that the United States has indeed enjoyed unparalleled privileges wrought by its use of available land, human resources, and economic and political freedoms. Ibid. However, he disagrees with the notion that these are uniquely American or results of American ingenuity. Rather, Gordon explains the heritage of American ideals as coming from European, especially Reformational, ancestors. He cautions Americans against believing in ideological exceptionality because of the tendency to overlook America's allies in pursuit of high ideals, though perhaps they have not achieved the extent of success the United States has enjoyed.
Gordon argues that the idea of American exceptionalism is flawed in that the United States did not accomplish its success “on purpose,” nor has it accomplished it perfectly. Many countries are on a path toward good ideals, and the United States “only made slow, incremental steps in the direction of `free-er-dom;' and it is self-aggrandizing and naive folly either to deny this past or to insist that other nations do instantly what it took us two centuries to achieve.” Ibid. In addition, it is impossible to recreate the ways in which the United States has been able to succeed, nor can they be actively preserved. Gordon says, “In the secular sense of the term, there really is little that could be done to become exceptional. The only senses in which we were exceptionally bountiful (almost limitless natural and human resources) cannot be reproduced now.” Ibid. Furthermore, Gordon claims that the United States has historically engaged in immoral and unexceptional behavior, including the acceptance of slavery through the nineteenth century and modern dependence on foreign oil suppliers.
From a religious perspective, Gordon says people who claim the United States is God's chosen nation must remember that God specifically and openly called the nation of Israel to be his chosen people. To claim that the United States has some religious significance or divine duty is to improperly attribute God's favor to a geopolitical nation, Gordon states. T. David Gordon, “Taking Exception to American Exceptionalism” (paper presented at “America: Still the Last Best Hope?” conference at Grove City College, Grove City, Pennsylvania, April 7-8, 2011). He even goes as far as to claim attaching God's name and significance to the United States, its pledge, or money is a breach of the third commandment's instruction not to vainly use the name of the LORD: “[It is wrong to] place the holy Name of God on something as mundane, mercenary, and mendacious as currency.” Ibid.
Gordon is an erosionist who believes that both God's explicit favor and originality are missing in the United States, negating claims of exceptionality. In addition, for Gordon, the success the United States has experienced can only be described as “relatively” exceptional, not absolutely so. The United States must not miss the fact that other nations have also striven to create good and moral societies, and it is not of America's own doing that she has accomplished more than others to date. Therefore, America has little to offer in the way of patent exceptionalism, and it is best for American Christians to promote “free-er-dom” as opposed to claiming or acting as though the United States has already succeeded in accomplishing absolute freedom.
4.2.1 Summary of Healthy Erosion
These erosionists who believe the erosion of exceptionalism is healthy see the United States in need of a realistic approach that recognizes the necessity of international cooperation and a scaling back of the assertion of exceptionality. Most agree on the importance of getting American affairs in order at home before demanding that other nations follow suit. These erosionists cannot overlook the United States' history of racial oppression, high crime rate, and stark economic inequality, and therefore cannot give the U.S. grounds for asserting global exceptionality.
4.3 The Neutral Erosion of Exceptionalism
A third group of erosionists holds that the United States had good characteristics once, but those are since over and unable to be replicated, which “is what it is.” Some of these erosionists caution the United States to be careful in its approach to the world, but overall, this group simply paints a picture of the way things are today.
Harold Hongju Koh defines American exceptionalism using four human rights aspects of the ideology: distinctive rights, differing labels, a “flying buttress” mentality, and American double standards. Harold Hongju Koh, “On American Exceptionalism,” Faculty Scholarship Series, Paper 1778 (October 2003). First, he claims that, due to the United States' particular history, some rights associated with classical liberalism have been given more attention in this country than in Europe or Asia. Ibid. Koh particularly references nondiscrimination policies and First Amendment free speech rights. These rights are not totally different from other world values, nor are nations around the world constrained to hold to all values held by others. Therefore, it has been easy for the United States to “get away with” holding a unique set of laws.
Second, Koh is perturbed by the American use of different labels for human rights violations than in most of the world. However, this is not a deep concern; it is simply another example of the way in which Americans like to be different (as in the insistence on retaining the imperial system of measurement over the metric system). Koh points out that the American system of federalism allows various definitions of torture, for example, because of the fifty different states and their individual reporting methods and statistics.
Third, Koh observes the facet of American exceptionalism known as the “flying buttress” mentality in which the United States waxes poetic about human rights and certainly supports them, but only from the sidelines. Many international treaties and resolutions heralded by the United States are left unsigned by the nation, a behavior some pejoratively call “exemptionalism.” Michael Ignatieff, ed., “American Exceptionalism and Human Rights” (Princeton University Press, 2005), 4. Meanwhile, the United States, on the whole, follows the protocol set forth in these treaties. This somewhat illogical behavior by America can be explained by its desire to remain free, with “unfettered sovereignty,” at least on the outside. Koh, “On American Exceptionalism,” 1485.
Most importantly, Koh finds that the United States enforces a double standard of human rights. He argues this is detrimental to an American claim of moral high ground as justification for world leadership as well as its “unsullied” reputation as a “good guy.” Using examples of hypocrisy like ignoring Geneva Convention protocol for prisoners in Guantanamo and insisting on initiating self-defense measures, Koh provides justification for his dislike of the American double standard on human rights. (The reader will note that these “hypocritical” actions are, on the whole, effected against non-citizens, not American citizens, in which case some would argue these actions are not hypocrisy at all). However, Koh makes a point of emphasizing the success of active American leadership in expanding human rights, and this, he argues, does make it exceptional:
To this day, the United States remains the only superpower capable, and at times willing, to commit real resources and make real sacrifices to build, sustain, and drive an international system committed to international law, democracy, and the promotion of human rights. Ibid., 1487.
The way in which the U.S. cares for its citizens is also an argument for its global leadership, Harold Hongju Koh, “On America's Double Standard: the Good and Bad Faces of Exceptionalism,” The American Prospect (October 2004). but Koh cautions against the ruinous nature of the double standard. According to Koh, the United States' unique status is not necessarily one of which to be proud in human rights terms, but it does have the capability and the spirit to contribute beneficially to the promotion of expanded human freedoms.
Andrew Koht and Bruce Stokes (2006) explicitly state that their survey-based study of American exceptionalism takes a value-neutral stance and intends to suggest no sense of superiority, but only the “distinctiveness” of the United States. Andrew Koht and Bruce Stokes, America Against the World (New York: Times Books, 2006), 8. Defining exceptionalism as the way in which American attitudes and values differ from others, they study American influence in the world as well as the change in the nation's popularity over time. They claim that anti-Americanism is “deeper” and “qualitatively different than in the past,” especially since the Vietnam War. Ibid., xviii-xix. The fact that people around the world do not believe the United States is different and even see the country in a negative light raises a question about American exceptionalism as simply shortsighted American pride. If everyone else sees the United States one way and its inhabitants see it differently, could this not be a case of national pride rather than fact? Koht and Stokes also find that many nations around the world see the events of 9/11 as good for the world in that they shattered Americans' perception of invulnerability. Koht and Stokes pinpoint anger and fear of United States' invasions, its people and government, and its unbalanced share of global power as sources of anti-Americanism.
Though they do not say whether a decline in American exceptionalism is good or bad, Koht and Stokes provide a picture of a unilateral United States that is disliked by much of the world because of its unrivaled power. This is a change from earlier decades when the U.S. was thanked for assisting other nations in their economic and regional problems. Now, the world would like American foreign policy to consist of monetary help with no strings attached--military or otherwise. In addition, the outlook would be a humble one fully conscious of the vulnerability exposed by terrorists on September 11.
Seymour Martin Lipset, one of the foremost scholars in the field of American exceptionalism, seems to be a neutral observer of the phenomenon. His book entitled American Exceptionalism: A Double-Edged Sword (1996) typifies the confusion surrounding the claim of uniqueness. He makes the fundamental claim that the United States' exceptionalism is necessarily derived only in comparison to other nations, and those chosen for study can drastically affect the outcome of the comparison. Seymour Martin Lipset, “American Exceptionalism Reaffirmed,” in Is America Different? A New Look at American Exceptionalism, ed. Byron E. Shafer, et. al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 1-2. He demonstrates this in studying the areas of politics, sociology, ideology, and philanthropy, all of which show that the United States is distinct from other nations. Canada, the British equivalent of the United States, is Lipset's example of choice for a closer comparison because America developed apart from the European traditions of a strong central government, group solidarity, and elitism, which continue to mark Canadian interactions. Ibid., 36.
Most notably, Lipset cites the United States' lack of a strong socialist party as an indication of its exceptionalism. Echoing Hartz's point and proving Lovestone's “American exceptionalism” theory of communism correct, he posits with Gary Marks that perhaps “Americanism” as a creed replaced what socialism could have become in the U.S. They reference Leon Samson, a socialist living in the early twentieth century:
When we examine the meaning of Americanism, we discover that Americanism is to the American not a tradition or a territory, not what France is to a Frenchman or England to an Englishman, but a doctrine--what socialism is to a socialist. Seymour Martin Lipset and Gary Marks, It Didn't Happen Here: Why Socialism Failed in the United States (New York: W.W. Norton Company, Inc., 2000), 30.
Indeed, socialism was unable to permeate American society the way Stalin and others had hoped due to the formidable barrier of traditional self-protecting American ideology.
Though Lipset demonstrates some American uniqueness, he explicitly claims that the United States is not in any way better than other nations. Instead, he must conclude that the United States is less exceptional than enigmatic in its ability to simultaneously house extraordinarily favorable opportunities alongside startling statistics on poverty and crime. In his book American Exceptionalism: A Double-Edged Sword, he claims that, though this country has some of the best opportunities for education and advancement, a distinct and enduring portion of the population has been unable to successfully take advantage of these opportunities. Lipset, American Exceptionalism, 26. Almost every aspect of exceptionalism is combated by its effects, which are less than desirable for Lipset. Therefore the nation cannot be labeled exceptional in a good sense. Overall, Lipset takes a neutral stance on whether or not exceptionalism is good or bad in the United States.
4.3.1 Summary of Neutral Erosion
Those who see a decline in American exceptionalism may be neutral observers of a phenomenon. These erosionists are careful to point out the good qualities of the United States but also see a growing trend of anti-Americanism and are also disturbed by the injustices carried out domestically. Their work warns Americans to judge carefully whether or not exceptionalism continues to be true and whether or not this is a good theory at all.
4.4 Erosionist Summary and Foreign Policy Implications
Erosionists are a distinct group in that they acknowledge the unique qualities of the United States which have brought the country to its privileged place, but are quick to point out that times are changing. The America of 2012 is certainly a different beast from the America of 1860 or even 1945. The U.S. may have been different from other nations at one time, but it has since lost this status. Some erosionists are ashamed of the way the United States has “squandered” its wealth and resources, while others are disturbed that the term American exceptionalism is used pejoratively or not at all.
Erosionists concerned about the reduction of America's exceptional status are likely to advance a foreign policy based on the promotion and health of the American economy along with the preservation of traditional values. They cautiously weigh the expense of cooperation with international organizations and the retention of unfettered sovereignty for the United States.
Erosionists who rejoice in the decline of American exceptionalism are more likely than most other theorists to favor cooperation without question. The United States has some very good traditions and policies that must be acknowledged, they claim, but proponents of this strain of revisionism anticipate an unavoidably lessened exceptional character in light of the changing global climate. They see the United States as slipping from its superpower perch, and, in light of American imperfections, they are hopeful for a humbler approach to world affairs.
Frowning at idealistic traditionalists, all erosionists claim to hold a very pragmatic position on American uniqueness and an equally usable approach to foreign policy. Most erosionists are not willing to claim superiority and are therefore wary of exporting any kind of American ideology or political structure to struggling nations. An effective foreign policy cannot be built upon bold claims of superiority, militarism, or unilateralism, and Americans must realize this sooner rather than later.
5. Equalists
“It was true--it seemed and still seems to me--that American history has been forced into a distorted and selective narrative of exceptional virtue. It is not wholly untrue. But important truths have been left out."
Godfrey Hodgson Godfrey Hodgson, The Myth of American Exceptionalism (New Haven, London: Yale University Press: 2009), xvi.
Departing sharply from traditionalists and erosionists, equalists deny that the United States has ever been exceptional. They often view the traditionalist view of American exceptionalism as misguided and hubristic nationalism. Offering an alternative perspective, they support America as an equal among the nations of the world, claiming that its people must abandon their “superiority complex” (despite few traditionalists' actual belief in America's superiority) in favor of international compassion and cooperation. In this denial of the United States as “better,” the equalists are the only group in my study to combat the comparison of the United States as better than the world rather than different from the world. They seem to be answering the comments of politicians rather than other scholars.
Godfrey Hodgson (2009), the quintessential equalist whose work Roger Cohen reviewed, argues that the United States is not nearly as special as many believe saying that Americans believe in “a distorted and selective narrative of exceptional virtue.” Ibid. A British scholar who lived for a time in the United States, Hodgson defines American exceptionalism as the uniqueness of the American experience and the American destiny. Ibid., 9. It is also an idea combining the superlative power and wealth of the United States with a claim that it is “also politically and morally exceptional.” Ibid., 10. Not disparaging its ideals, he claims American exceptionalism is like a religion in its instrumental properties, as it “make[s] those who believe in [it] wiser and more virtuous.” Ibid., xvi. This is evident in the Cold War's strengthening of American exceptionalism. Hodgson points to its instrumentalism in combating communism and names several prominent exceptionalist scholars like Boorstin and Bercovitch, Or, “Bercovitz.” who developed their perspectives during this time. Ibid., 7.
Since he does not completely eradicate exceptionalists' claims, Hodgson briefly reviews the reasons they hold their view. Many traditionalists' claims are included in this overview, including Turner's take on the availability of land which allowed settlers to expand settlements across the American continent. The lack of social classes also figures into American history, Hodgson says. Furthermore, the American role in world affairs is undisputed; the United States is a leader. It has certainly led in promoting classically liberal ideals such as freedom and democracy. More recently, capitalism and its benefits have been touted as American successes, which Hodgson claims many people want to spread to the rest of the world.
Most importantly, Hodgson claims that the United States is really not special because its ideology is similar to that adopted in other nations--a sort of national historical myth about superiority. Furthermore, since many nations have cherished “national myths” of superiority or uniqueness, Hodgson redefines American exceptionalism as simply a form of nationalism. Ibid., 15. Because Americans seem to have created this idea from their own inflated view of their country, Hodgson is very uncomfortable with the idea of American moral superiority. The values supported by American exceptionalism are not deleterious; they are simply overemphasized. Geographical placement does not develop people “more moral” than those born in another location. He says that it is arrogant and untrue to claim an “ethical superiority not only of the American condition but also of American ideals.” Ibid., 94.
According to Hodgson, American exceptionalism, if acted upon in foreign policy, is dangerous. Ibid., 16. Fearing the implications of a belief in superiority or invincibility, he says, “It is dangerous, for oneself and for others, to create a myth that seems to justify, even demand, domination, whether it is called empire or not.” Ibid., xvii. September 11, 2001, certainly shattered beliefs of invincibility, though Hodgson is not yet convinced that people have given up on their extreme “nationalism.” Though he does not go so far as to blame American exceptionalism for the “failed” invasion and attack on Iraq during George W. Bush's term, he does hint strongly that exceptionalist rhetoric from this President and others drew the country to that point. Hodgson believes the United States should rein in its exceptionalist beliefs and acknowledge its equality among other world powers. Though it has greater wealth than other nations, it is no more moral than other peoples of the world, and this is a crucial difference.
Walter Hixson agrees that the U.S. does not hold the mantle of morality, and with Michael Kammen, he holds that the United States is too diverse in small regional populations to be exceptional overall. Having studied the strained relations with what was then the Soviet Union, Hixson (1988) defines exceptionalism as “the belief that the United States is a `chosen' nation whose values and democratic institutions represent the best hopes for humankind.” Walter L. Hixson, “The Myth of American Exceptionalism,” Chicago Tribune (February 25, 1988). Deriding this as ignorance of world history, Hixson advocates an honest and critical approach to foreign relations, especially with the Soviet Union. First, he says that the United States is not the champion of good while the rest of the world is mired in evil. He points to American double standards in the arms race agreements, which were equal to those held by the Soviet Union. Hixson does not say that the Soviet Union is absolutely good, but it is not patently evil as many Americans believed at the time.
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