The phenomenon of musical identification. A view from heidegger’s early phenomenology

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The phenomenon of musical identification. A view from heidegger's early phenomenology

Christian Vassilev

The starting point of the following article are statements by various prominent musical performers of the 20th century who have testified to the life-experience of musical identification, i. e. the experience of unity and oneness with music. The purpose of the article is to explore the phenomenological implications of this experience on the basis of Martin Heidegger's early phenomenological work. The article compares Heidegger's early view of phenomenal givenness with that of Edmund Husserl. While Husserl sees phenomenal givenness as constituted by (transcendental) consciousness, Heidegger finds primary givenness in the resonance (Mitschwingen) between the I and its lifeworld. I argue that in Heidegger's early phenomenology it is not the subject, but rather the relation between I and world, which “constitutes” givenness. This viewpoint allows for the exploration of musical identification as a life-experience. Musical identification suspends the difference between subject and object. In musical identification, it is the relation between “I” and music, which is constitutive of both. Thus, music cannot be adequately grasped in phenomenological terms if it is regarded simply as an object, which is the premise of more traditional phenomenological approaches to music such as Roman Ingarden's and Mikel Dufrenne's. Ingarden and Dufrenne both position music at a distance from the subject, as something to be explored in its objective characteristics, without presupposing the constitutive relation between them. Contrary to them, Hans-Heinrich Eggebrecht, Gunther Anders and Ilya Yonchev all recognize that the subject-object divide is insufficient for the exploration of musical experience. However, while Eggebrecht ultimately remains within the subject-object-dichotomy, Anders and Yonchev both develop the idea of musical Mitsein, or Being-with-music, which dispenses with the subject-object premise altogether and interprets musical life-experience as a mode of Being within which the sense of the I and musical sense coincide.

Keywords: givenness, life-experience, constitution, relation, Mitsein, subjectivity, attunement, Mitvollzug.

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Îòïðàâíîé òî÷êîé äàííîé ñòàòüè ÿâëÿþòñÿ âçãëÿäû ðàçëè÷íûõ âûäàþùèõñÿ ìóçûêàëüíûõ èñïîëíèòåëåé äâàäöàòîãî âåêà, ñâèäåòåëüñòâóþùèå î ïåðåæèâàíèè ìóçûêàëüíîé èäåíòèôèêàöèè, òî åñòü î ïåðåæèâàíèè åäèíåíèÿ ñ ìóçûêîé. Öåëü ñòàòüè -- èññëåäîâàòü ôåíîìåíîëîãè÷åñêèå ïîñëåäñòâèÿ ýòîãî ïåðåæèâàíèÿ íà îñíîâå ðàííèõ ôåíîìåíîëîãè÷åñêèõ ðàçðàáîòîê Ìàðòèíà Õàéäåããåðà.  ñòàòüå ñðàâíèâàåòñÿ âçãëÿä ðàííåãî Õàéäåããåðà íà ôåíîìåíàëüíóþ äàííîñòü ñ âçãëÿäîì Ýäìóíäà Ãóññåðëÿ. Åñëè Ãóññåðëü ðàññìàòðèâàåò ôåíîìåíàëüíóþ äàííîñòü êàê êîíñòèòóèðóåìóþ (òðàíñöåíäåíòàëüíûì) ñîçíàíèåì, òî Õàéäåããåð îáðåòàåò ïåðâè÷íóþ äàííîñòü â ðåçîíàíñå (Mitschwingen) ìåæäó «ÿ» è åãî æèçíåííûì ìèðîì. Òåçèñ àâòîðà çàêëþ÷àåòñÿ â òîì, ÷òî â ðàííåé ôåíîìåíîëîãèè Õàéäåããåðà íå ñóáúåêò, à ñêîðåå îòíîøåíèå ìåæäó «ÿ» è ìèðîì «êîíñòèòóèðóåò» äàííîñòü. Ýòà ïåðñïåêòèâà ïîçâîëÿåò èçó÷àòü ìóçûêàëüíóþ èäåíòèôèêàöèþ êàê ïåðåæèâàíèå. Ìóçûêàëüíàÿ èäåíòèôèêàöèÿ óïðàçäíÿåò ðàçëè÷èå ìåæäó ñóáúåêòîì è îáúåêòîì.  ìóçûêàëüíîé èäåíòèôèêàöèè òîëüêî îòíîøåíèå ìåæäó «ÿ» è ìóçûêîé êîíñòèòóèðóåò è òî, è äðóãîå. Òàêèì îáðàçîì, ìóçûêà íå ìîæåò áûòü ôåíîìåíîëîãè÷åñêè ïîíÿòà àäåêâàòíî, åñëè îíà ðàññìàòðèâàåòñÿ ïðîñòî êàê îáúåêò, ÷òî ÿâëÿåòñÿ ïðåäïîñûëêîé â ðàìêàõ áîëåå òðàäèöèîííûõ ôåíîìåíîëîãè÷åñêèõ ïîäõîäîâ ê ìóçûêå, òàêèõ êàê ïîäõîäû Ðîìàíà Èíãàðäåíà è Ìèêåëÿ Äþôðåíà. Èíãàðäåí è Äþôðåí ðàññìàòðèâàþò ìóçûêó êàê äèñòàíöèðîâàííóþ îò ñóáúåêòà, êàê íå÷òî, ïîäëåæàùåå èññëåäîâàíèþ â åãî îáúåêòèâíûõ õàðàêòåðèñòèêàõ, íå ïðåäïîëàãàÿ êîíñòèòóèðóþùåãî îòíîøåíèÿ ìåæäó «ÿ» è ìóçûêîé. Íàïðîòèâ, Ãàíñ-Ãåíðèõ Ýãåáðåõò, Ãþíòåð Àíäåðñ è Èëüÿ Éîí÷åâ ïðèçíàþò, ÷òî ñóáúåêò-îáúåêòíîå ðàçäåëåíèå íåäîñòàòî÷íî äëÿ èçó÷åíèÿ ìóçûêàëüíîãî ïåðåæèâàíèÿ. Îäíàêî åñëè Ýãåáðåõò â êîíå÷íîì èòîãå îñòàëñÿ â ðàìêàõ äèõîòîìèè ñóáúåêò-îáúåêò, òî Àíäåðñ è Éîí÷åâ ðàçâèëè èäåþ ìóçûêàëüíîãî Mitsein èëè áûòèÿ-ñ-ìóçûêîé, êîòîðàÿ ïîëíîñòüþ ïîðûâàåò ñ ïðåäïîñûëêîé ñóáúåêò-îáúåêòíîãî îòíîøåíèÿ è ïîçâîëÿåò èíòåðïðåòèðîâàòü ìóçûêàëüíîå ïåðåæèâàíèå êàê ñïîñîá áûòèÿ, â êîòîðîì ñìûñë «ÿ» è ìóçûêàëüíûé ñìûñë ñîâïàäàþò. Êëþ÷åâûå ñëîâà: äàííîñòü, ïåðåæèâàíèå, êîíñòèòóèðîâàíèå, îòíîøåíèå, Mitsein, ñóáúåêòèâíîñòü, íàñòðîåíèå, Mitvollzug.

INTRODUCTION

musical performer identification oneness

Consider the following statements by renowned twentieth-century musicians:

The law of improvisation, which we labelled before as a pre-condition for all true form from the inside out, requires the complete self-identification of the artist with the artwork and its becoming. (Furtwangler & Abendroth, 1955, 68)„Das Gesetz der Improvisation, wie wir es vorhin gekennzeichnet haben als Voraussetzung aller echten Form von innen heraus, verlangt ein volliges Sich-Identifizieren des Kunstlers mit dem Werk und dessen Werden“.

Because we too are transformed: the piano player identifies himself with the Piano concerto in E-flat major by Beethoven, when he plays it, the separation between the I of the performer and the I of the Other, of the composer, is suspended. The Principium individuationis melts in the fire of such mystical-musical unification and nothing can be more real, nothing can be felt with deeper certainty than this mysterious act of becoming one between us, the [musical] work and its creator. (Walter, 1957, 31)„Denn auch wir verwandeln uns: der Pianist identifiziert sich mit dem Beethovenschen Es-Dur- Konzert, wenn er es spielt, die Trennung zwischen dem Ich des Ausfuhrenden und dem des Ander- en, des Komponisten, wird aufgehoben. Das Principium individuationis schmilzt im Feuer solcher mystisch-musikalischen Vereinigung, und nichts kann realer sein, nichts konnen wir mit so tiefer Sicherheit empfinden als diesen geheimnisvollen Akt der Einswerdung zwischen uns, dem Werk und seinem Schopfer“.

Prepared in such a way, this Something will come, which is unteachable, that favour of the silent hour, because the spirit of the composer is speaking to us, that moment of the unconscious, of the enruptedness-from-oneself, call it, as you may, intuition, mercy -- there all bonds, all inhibitions disappear. They are felt as suspended. One does not feel anymore: I am playing, but rather, it is playing, and behold, everything is correct; the melodies flow from your fingers as if from a divine hand, it streams through you, and you let yourself be carried from this streaming and you experience with humility the highest joy of the reproductive artist: to be only a medium, only a mediator between the divine, the eternal, and man. (Fischer, 1959, 36)„So vorbereitet, wird sich jenes Etwas einstellen, das unlehrbar ist, jene Gunst der stillen Stunde, da der Geist des Komponisten zu uns spricht, jener Moment des UnbewuBten, des Sichselbst-En- trucktseins, nennen Sie es Intuition, Gnade -- da losen sich alle Bindungen, alle Hemmungen schwinden. Sie fuhlen sich schwebend. Man fuhlt nicht mehr: ich spiele, sondern es spielt, und siehe, alles ist richtig; wie von gottlicher Hand gelenkt entflieBen die Melodien Ihren Fingern, es durchstromt Sie, und Sie lassen sich von diesem Stromen tragen, und Sie erleben in Demut das hochste Gluck des nachschaffenden Kunstlers: nur noch Medium, nur Mittler zu sein zwischen dem Gottlichen, dem Ewigen und den Menschen“.

A common theme in all these statements is the sense of unity between the I and music within musical performance, what I would like to call the phenomenon of musical identification. A fundamental characteristic of this phenomenon is the sense that the I does not belong to itself, but is somehow beyond oneself, which is expressed, for example, in the following:

Merk's, virtuosos and showmen: Self-consciousness makes one incapable of music. Capable of music is he, who is “not I,” “in state of favour,” “inspired,” “talking in tongues.”

The sensitive language calls this “being-outside-of-oneself.” (Gulda, 1971, 9)„Merk's, Virtuose und Showman: Self-consciousness [sic!] macht musikunfahig. Musikfahig ist der, der ,nicht ich`, ,im Zustand der Gnade`, ,inspiriert`, ,in Zungen redend` ist. ,AuBersichsein` nennt das die feinfuhlige Sprache“.

I believe that every composer of talent (not to speak of genius) in his moments of creative fever has given birth to thoughts, ideas, designs that lay altogether beyond the reach of his conscious will and control. In speaking of the products of such periods we have hit upon exactly the right word when we say that the composer “has surpassed himself.” For, in saying this we recognise that the act of surpassing one's self precludes the control of the self. (Hofmann, 1920, ix)

All these musicians seem to be describing the same phenomenon, each from a different perspective and in his own way. How do we account for these testimonies? The quoted statements are a reflection of particular life-experiences from the performative and interpretative practice of these musicians. Are these life-experiences subject to phenomenological investigation and how? In phenomenological terms, this question can only be answered by demonstrating how these experiences are given to phenomenological inquiry. The question of how a phenomenon gives itself, “purely and strictly” (Marion, 2002, 39) « purement et strictement » (Marion, 2005, 61)., has been the cornerstone of phenomenology and a point of difference between phenomenologists. The way phenomena give themselves is a fundamental aspect of what characterizes them as such and as objects of phenomenological inquiry Embracing what musicians have to say about their experience as a starting point of a phenomeno-logical investigation may seem to invest too much confidence in their capacity for reflective self-ex-amination. As early as Plato's Ion we find the idea that musical, and, in fact, all artistic practice, isn't a matter of “art” (techne), but rather of divine inspiration: “the god takes the mind out of [poets] and uses them as his servants [...] so that we their hearers may know it is not they, in whom mind is not present, who tell things of such great value, but the god himself who speaks” (Plato, 1996, 534c-d). Similarly, Kant underscores the fact that “[g]enius itself cannot describe or indicate scien-tifically how it brings about its products” (Kant, 1987, 308) and “himself does not know, and hence also cannot teach it to anyone else” (Kant, 1987, 309). Thus, a common conception seems to be that artists, precisely when they are actually good at their “art,” do not really know what they are doing, or, rather, how, i. e. by what means, they are doing it. To a certain extent, this seems to be true. However, if we think along the lines of phenomenological inquiry -- and, more precisely, through the lens of the early Heidegger -- one should take heed not to dogmatize the lack of knowledge and immediacy in artistic practice, but, rather, to try and follow the artist also in his reflections on his own art. These may provide valuable insights as well, when approached with the rigorousness of phenomenological inquiry..

Thus, as part of the phenomenological investigation into the life-experience of musical identification, one is immediately confronted with two fundamental questions. One, how is it possible for a subject to find itself in such a union with something else (i. e. music) to the extent that there is no longer any perceivable difference between subject and object? And two, how is this phenomenon given, both “in itself” and as an “object” of phenomenological investigation? Herein lies the issue of whether the I (as subject) or music (as object) are the primary constitutive agents of musical experience, or whether it is their relation, which “precedes” and constitutes them. The life-experience of musical identification suggests that it is, in fact, the relation between I and music, which precedes and defines what we call musical subjectivity and the musical object.

Musical identification cannot be explained within the subject-object dichotomy, which dominates classical phenomenological discourse in the field of aesthetics. The identification between the I and music is not a by-product of the I perceiving or thinking music as an “aesthetic” or any other type of “object,” but is rather a primal relation, which itself constitutes, for the first time, musical subjectivity and objectivity. From this point of view, there is no musical “subject,” or musical “object,” prior to musical identification. Such experience reveals that a proper phenomenology of music -- a music phenomenology -- would have to develop methodological tools, which conceive of the relation between I and music as the originary given of phenomenology. In the following text, Heidegger's early phenomenological theory will be used as a backbone to understanding how such a methodological framework is possible. In this respect, Heidegger's early views differ Husserl's transcendental phenomenology, which defines the subject-object paradigm as essential to phenomenological investigation. I will argue that, unlike Heidegger's, Husserl's take on phenomenal givenness -- and its implications for phenomenological aesthetics -- does not allow for the proper investigation of musical identification.

Further, musical identification will be articulated and interpreted in light of the musicological work of Hans Heinrich Eggebrecht and the phenomenological work of Gunther Anders and Ilya Yonchev. These thinkers have all considered musical identification as a fundamental phenomenon of musical experience, while interpreting it in various ways. While Eggebrecht remains within the subject-object-dichotomy, Anders and Yonchev both develop the idea of musical Mitsein, a Being-with-music, which dispenses with the subject-object premise altogether and interprets musical life-experience as a mode of Being within which the sense of Being and musical sense coincide.

HEIDEGGER'S RELATIONAL PHENOMENOLOGY AND THE GIVENNESS OF MUSICAL IDENTIFICATION

In order to be investigated as a phenomenon, the life-experience of musical identification must first be articulated in terms of its mode of givenness7. In his early phenomenology, Heidegger develops an idea of phenomenal givenness, which is All quotes by Husserl and Heidegger are given using the pagination of the original German texts. suitable for the investigation of musical identification, because it is based on the idea that phenomenology should explore life-experiences in their fundamentally relational character, i. e. in the “resonance” or “consonance” between I and world Heidegger's work from this period has been a topic of considerable analysis in recent years. For an overview, see Westerlund (2014, 30-138), particularly (Westerlund, 2014, 75-79).. With this view, Heidegger departs from the methodological framework of his mentor, Edmund Husserl, who defines phenomenal givenness as always constituted by consciousness. This difference is particularly important because it reflects on alternative ways of understanding musical life-experience. The identification between the I and music cannot properly be understood on the basis of the subject-object paradigm stemming from Husserl's transcendental phenomenology, and emerging in later phenomenological theories of aesthetic experience. Rather, it is only the idea of primary relationality between the I and the world developed by the early Heidegger, which allows for proper phenomenological inquiry into musical identification In the following, I will not deal with Heidegger's “philosophy of art,” i. e. the philosophy expounded in The Origin of the Work of Art (cf. Heidegger, 2012), because I am interested in Heidegger's purely phenomenological writings, before the Seinsfrage. Thus, Heidegger's ontological period-and the period after the so-called Kehre -- will not be discussed in this investigation. „Am Prinzip aller Prinzipien: dass jede originargebende Anschauung eine Rechtsquelle der Erkenntnis sei, dass alles, was sich uns in der ,Intuition originar, (sozusagen in seiner leibhaften Wirklichkeit) darbietet, einfach hinzunehmen sei, als was es sich gibt, aber auch nur in den Schranken, in denen es sich da gibt, kann uns keine erdenkliche Theorie irre machen“ (Husserl, 1976, 43-44)..

A statement of Husserl's position on the problem of givenness, and one that Heidegger refers to explicitly, is the so-called “principle of all principles”:

No conceivable theory can make us err with respect to the principle of all principles: that every originary giving intuition is a legitimizing source of cognition, that everything origi- narily (so to speak, in its “personal” actuality) offered to us in “intuition” is to be accepted simply as what it is given as being, but also only within the limits in which it is given there. (Husserl, 1982, 43-44, translation modified)10

Husserl, at least in his transcendental-idealistic period, clearly considers givenness in relation to intuition (Intuition or Anschauung). “Intuition” refers here to the reflective act of consciousness on its own content “It then becomes evident that every mental process belonging to the stream which can be reached by our reflective regard has an essence of its own which can be seized upon intuitively, a `content' which allows of being considered by itself in its ownness” (Husserl, 1982, 61). „Es wird dann evi-dent, daB jedes Erlebnis des Stromes, das der reflektive Blick zu treffen vermag, ein eigenes, intuitiv zu erfassendes Wesen hat, einen ,Inhalt`, der sich in seiner Eigenheit fur sich betrachten la6t“ (Hus-serl, 1976, 61).. According to Husserl, all originary givenness is constituted by transcendental consciousness: “in givenness we see that the object constitutes itself in knowing, that one can distinguish as many basic forms of acts of knowing, groups, and interconnections of acts of knowing, as there are basic forms of objectivity” (Husserl, 1999, 75) „in der Gegebenheit sehen wir, daB der Gegenstand sich in der Erkenntnis konstituiert, daB so viele Grundgestaltungen der Gegenstandlichkeit zu scheiden sind, so viele Grundgestaltungen auch der gebenden Erkenntnisakte und Gruppen, Zusammenhange von Erkenntnisakten“ (Husserl, 1999, 75). „Alle realen Einheiten sind ,Einheiten des Sinnes'. Sinneseinheiten setzen (ich betone wiederholt: nicht weil wir aus irgendwelchen metaphysischen Postulaten deduzieren, sondern weil wir es in intuitivem, vollig zweifellosem Verfahren aufweisen konnen) sinngebendes Bewufitsein voraus, das seinerseits absolut und nicht selbst wieder durch Sinngebung ist“ (Husserl, 1976, 120).. Every constitutional act is a bestowing of sense (Sinngebung) onto an object:

all real unities are “unities of sense.” Unities of sense presuppose (as I again emphasize: not because we can deduce it from some metaphysical postulates or other, but because we can show it by an intuitive, completely indubitable procedure) a sense-bestowing consciousness which, for its part, exists absolutely and not by virtue of another sense-bestowal. (Husserl, 1982, 106)13

Consciousness bestows sense on every object that is given to it -- it is, in fact, given to consciousness only insofar as it has been given sense by consciousness. Conversely, consciousness itself exists “absolutely,” in that it doesn't need to be given sense, in order to be The problem of the constitution of consciousness itself is, of course, much more complex. Hus-serl struggled throughout his life to solve this “most difficult of all phenomenological problems” (Husserl, 1991, 276), „das schwierigste aller phanomenologischen Probleme“ (Husserl, 1969, 276), namely the problem of the constitution of time-consciousness, as John Brough (2010, 21-22) points out. Husserl thought that consciousness would have to constitute time itself, in order for acts and objects to appear as time-objects. The pre-temporal consciousness that is “yet” to constitute time has been called by Husserl “absolute flow” (absoluter Fluss) (Husserl, 1969), “primal stream” (Urstrom) (Husserl, 2001), “primal presence“ (Urprasenz) (Husserl, 2006, 110) and so forth. These are, how-ever, only “metaphors” for what is truly meant: “This flow is something we speak of in conformity with what is constituted, but it is not `something in objective time' It is absolute subjectivity and has the absolute properties of something to be designated metaphorically as `flow'; of something that originates in a point of actuality, in a primal source-point, `the now' and so on. In the actuali-ty-experience we have the primal source-point and a continuity of moments of reverberation. For all of this, we lack names” (Husserl, 1991, 75). „Dieser Fluss ist etwas, das wir nach dem Konstitui- erten so nennen, aber es ist nichts zeitlich ,Objektives`. Es ist die absolute Subjektivitat und hat die absoluten Eigenschaften eines im Bilde als ,Fluss` zu Bezeichnenden, in einem Aktualitatspunkt, Urquellpunkt, ,Jetzt` Entspringenden usw. Im Aktualitatserlebnis haben wir den Urquellpunkt und eine Kontinuitat von Nachhallmomenten. Fur all das fehlen uns die Namen“ (Husserl, 1969, 75). In the issue of the pre-temporal flow of consciousness, Husserl's main problem is that of infinite re-gress. According to Husserl, every phenomenological given is given to consciousness. If the absolute flow of time-consciousness is to be a “given,” it has to be given to a certain consciousness; but such a consciousness also has to be a given for a consciousness and so ad infinitum. Ultimately, the ques-tion is if there could be phenomenological givenness that is not given to phenomenological reflec-tion. Dan Zahavi suggests that Husserl would subscribe to the idea of “pre-reflective self-manifes-tation of consciousness” (Zahavi, 2003, 171)-a position, which would solve the problem of infinite regress. It seems, however, that Husserl himself never reached a clear and unambiguous answer to these questions. Regarding the phenomenon of musical identification, it would seem that it has a similarly enigmatic nature, as it decidedly lays beyond the constitutive powers of subjectivity. One could say that the “absolute flow” and musical identification are similarly challenging phenomena to grasp..

Now, Heidegger's own conception of “originary givenness” is somewhat different. The way he re-interprets the “principle of all principles” is very telling:

If by a principle one were to understand a theoretical proposition, this designation would not be fitting. However, that Husserl speaks of a principle of principles, of something that precedes all principles, in regard to which no theory can lead us astray, already shows (although Husserl does not explicitly say so) that it does not have a theoretical character. It is the primordial intention of genuine life, the primordial bearing of life-experience [des Erlebens] and life as such, the absolute sympathy with life that is identical with life-experience. To begin with, i. e. coming along this path from the theoretical while freeing ourselves more and more from it, we always see this basic bearing, we have an orientation to it. The same basic bearing first becomes absolute when we live in it -- and that is not achieved by any constructed system of concepts, regardless of how extensive it may be, but only through phenomenological life in its ever-growing self-intensification. (Heidegger, 2008, 109-110) „Verstunde man unter Prinzip einen theoretischen Satz, dann ware die Bezeichnung nicht kongru- ent. Aber schon, daB Husserl von einem Prinzip der Prinzipien spricht, also von etwas, das allen Prinzipien vorausliegt, woran keine Theorie irre machen kann, zeigt, daB es nicht theoretischer Natur ist, wenn auch Husserl daruber sich nicht ausspricht. Es ist die Urintention des wahrhaften Lebens uberhaupt, die Urhaltung des Erlebens und Lebens als solchen, die absolute, mit dem Er- leben selbst identische Lebenssympathie. Vorlaufig, d. h. auf diesem Weg vom Theoretischen her- kommend, in der Weise des immermehr Sichfreimachens von ihm, sehen wir diese Grundhaltung immer, wir haben zu ihr eine Orientierung. Dieselbe Grundhaltung ist erst absolut, wenn wir in ihr selbst leben -- und das erreicht kein noch so weit gebautes Begriffssystem, sondern das phanome- nologische Leben in seiner wachsenden Steigerung seiner selbst“ (Heidegger, 1999, 109-110).

While Husserl, in defining the “principle,” is focused primarily on the givenness of pure phenomena of and to transcendental consciousness, Heidegger is pointing to something different, namely the “life-experience” in itself, as it gives itself in the phe- nomenologist's “sympathy with life.” While not necessarily co-incidental with what Husserl conceived of as the pre-phenomenological natural attitude In Husserl's phenomenology, phenomenological givenness to consciousness implies the fulfilment of the phenomenological reduction or enoyf (for the different “ways” to the reduction see Kern

(1962). The reduction involves the bracketing of the so-called “natural attitude,” which is how every subject (or I) relates to the world in everyday and pre-phenomenological scientific “life.” The natural attitude embraces the belief, among others, of “objective reality” or “transcendence” (being, which is independent of and “outside” of consciousness) of the world and the groundedness of the I as a be-ing among beings in this world (Husserl, 1982, 52). The world, as it is given to the natural attitude, is a world of practical values, meanings and interactions (Husserl, 1982, 50). The natural attitude is the attitude in which “theoretical consciousness” operates and includes all “states of emotion and of willing” of the I (Husserl, 1982, 50). In the phenomenological reduction this “worldly” I, along with all it considers “self-evident,” must be “bracketed,” beginning with everything “transcendent” as such (Husserl, 1999, 39). The phenomenological reduction institutes the phenomenological attitude, which “intuits” the essences (Wesen) of consciousness., this “sympathy” is clearly directed at the “lifeworld,” the world of immediate givenness of the “environmental something” (Umweltliches). A classic example is the example of the lectern in the lecture-room:

You come as usual into this lecture-room at the usual hour and go to your usual place.

Focus on this experience of “seeing your place,” or you can in turn put yourselves in my own position: coming into the lecture-room, I see the lectern. We dispense with a verbal formulation of this. What do “I” see? Brown surfaces, at right angles to one another?

No, I see something else. A largish box with another smaller one set upon it? Not at all.

I see the lectern at which I am to speak. You see the lectern, from which you are to be addressed, and from where I have spoken to you previously. In pure experience there is no “founding” interconnection, as if I first of all see intersecting brown surfaces, which then reveal themselves to me as a box, then as a desk, then as an academic lecturing desk, a lectern, so that I attach lectern-hood to the box like a label. All that is simply bad and misguided interpretation, diversion from a pure seeing into the experience. I see the lectern in one fell swoop, so to speak, and not in isolation, but as adjusted a bit too high for me. I see -- and immediately so -- a book lying upon it as annoying to me (a book, not a collection of layered pages with black marks strewn upon them), I see the lectern in an orientation, an illumination, a background. (Heidegger, 2008, 70-71) „Sie kommen wie gewohnlich in diesen Horsaal um die gewohnte Stunde und gehen auf Ihren ge- wohnten Platz zu. Dieses Erlebnis des ,Sehens Ihres Platzes` halten Sie fest, oder Sie konnen meine eigene Einstellung ebenfalls vollziehen: In den Horsaal tretend, sehe ich das Katheder. Wir nehmen ganz davon Abstand, das Erlebnis sprachlich zu formulieren. Was sehe ,ich`? Braune Flachen, die sich rechtwinklig schneiden? Nein, ich sehe etwas anderes. Eine Kiste, und zwar eine groBere, mit einer kleineren daraufgebaut? Keineswegs, ich sehe das Katheder, an dem ich sprechen soll, Sie sehen das Katheder, von dem aus zu Ihnen gesprochen wird, an dem ich schon gesprochen habe. Es liegt im reinen Erlebnis auch kein -- wie man sagt -- Fundierungszusammenhang, als sahe ich zuerst braune, sich schneidende Flachen, die sich mir dann als Kiste, dann als Pult, weiterhin als akademisches Sprechpult, als Katheder gaben, so daB ich das Kathederhafte gleichsam der Kiste aufklebte wie ein Etikett. All das ist schlechte, miBdeutete Interpretation, Abbiegung vom reinen Hineinschauen in das Erlebnis. Ich sehe das Katheder gleichsam in einem Schlag; ich sehe es nicht nur isoliert, ich sehe das Pult als fur mich zu hoch gestellt. Ich sehe ein Buch darauf liegend, un- mittelbar als mich storend (ein Buch, nicht etwa eine Anzahl geschichteter Blatter mit schwarzen

Flecken bestreut), ich sehe das Katheder in einer Orientierung, Beleuchtung, einem Hintergrund“

(Heidegger, 1999, 70-71).

In this case, the immediately given is the lectern as an object with a particular “orientation” and sense for me. There is no “founding interconnection” (Fundie- rungszusammenhang) in its givenness to me as such-it is given primarily and firstly as a meaningful object to me and not as a “physical object” in itself to be subsequently imbued with meaning: “the meaningful is primary and immediately given to me without any mental detours across thing-oriented apprehension” (Heidegger, 2008, 73) „das Bedeutsame ist das Primare, gibt sich mir unmittelbar, ohne jeden gedanklichen Umweg uber ein Sacherfassen“ (Heidegger, 2008, 73).. This relationship between I and world is a sort of resonance (Mitschwingen) or con-sonance (Mitanklingen):

In this experiencing, in this living-towards, there is something of me: my “I” goes out beyond itself and resonates with this seeing [...] More precisely: only through the accord of this particular “I” does it experience something environmental [ein Umweltliches], where we can say that “it worlds.” Wherever and whenever “it worlds” for me, I am somehow there. (Heidegger, 2008, 73) „In diesem Erleben, in diesem Hinleben zu, liegt etwas von mir: Es geht mein Ich voll aus sich heraus und schwingt mit in diesem ,Sehen` [.] Genauer: Nur in dem Mitanklingen des jeweiligen eigenen Ich erlebt es ein Umweltliches, weitet es, und wo und wenn es fur mich weitet, bin ich ir- gendwie ganz dabei“ (Heidegger, 1999, 73).

The world is thus not a simple “object” for a subject, but rather resonates with the I in a “chord” of meaning. There is also a rhythm in the way life-experience is given: “the environing world does not stand there with a fixed index of existence, but floats away in the experiencing, bearing within it the rhythm of experience, and can be experienced only in this rhythmic way” (Heidegger, 2008, 98) „[Wir fanden ferner], daB die Umwelt nicht dasteht mit einem festen Index der Existenz, sondern daB sie im Erleben entschwebt, in sich selbst den Rhythmus des Erlebnisses tragt und nur als dieses Rhythmische sich erleben laBt“ (Heidegger, 1999, 98)..

According to Heidegger, this immediate, resonating and rhythmic, experience should be the primary focus of phenomenology. Unlike Husserl's, Heidegger's grasp of phenomenal givenness is beyond the subject-object divide to begin with; rather than a subject-object phenomenological attitude, Heidegger is trying to develop what I would call a relational phenomenological attitude. It is the vibrant relation between I and world, which constitutes primary phenomenal givenness, not consciousness in and of itself. This, in turn, is the only viable foundation for the phenomenological inquiry into musical identification. In identifying with music, the I finds itself first and foremost in a relation -- it is in this relation that it is, qua I, first imbued with sense; which is also the case with regard to the musical “object.” In fact, music is, at first glance, no object at all, but rather simply an “aspect” of musical identification.

Musical identification is not simply an isolated phenomenon, but has a foundational role for the phenomenology of music as a “primal science” (Urwissenschaft), in Heidegger's terms. It defines the field of music phenomenology as fundamentally relational, i. e. as based on the primal, and constitutive, relation between the I and music. It is on the basis of this relation that musical phenomenology can develop its own thematic field. Conversely, when treated simply as an “object,” music (and musical experience) becomes a matter of theoretical science. Theoretical science objectifies (vergegenstandigt) and “things” (verdinglicht) the world:

Science is knowledge and knowledge has objects. Science determines and fixes objects in an objective manner. A science of experiences [von Erlebnissen] would have to objectify experiences and thus strip away their non-objective character as lived experience and event of appropriation. (Heidegger, 2008, 76) „Wissenschaft ist Erkenntnis; Erkenntnis hat Objekte, Gegenstande. Sie stellt fest, objektiv fest. Eine Wissenschaft von Erlebnissen muEte diese also doch vergegenstandlichen, objektivieren, d. h. gera- de ihres nicht objektartigen Er-lebnis- und Ereignischarakters entkleide“ (Heidegger, 1999, 76).

Theoretization is “the process of ever intensifying objectification as a process of de-vivification” (Heidegger, 2008, 91) „der ProzeE sich steigernder Objektivierung als ProzeE der Ent-lebung“ (Heidegger, 1999, 91).. From the point of view of musical life-experience, phenomenology may also discuss music as “object,” but only as an aspect of the primal identification between the I and music. To the contrary, when theoretical science objectifies music, without taking into account the constitutive role of musical identification, the original sense of music is obscured.

Even traditional phenomenological aesthetics often deal with music in an objectifying manner, while disregarding the fundamentally relational character of musical life-experience. One classic example is Roman Ingarden's (1986) phenomenology of musical works. While suggesting that his starting point is “the unsystematized convictions that we encounter in daily life in our communion with musical works before we succumb to one particular theory or another” and “the given of the immediate musical experience” (Ingarden, 1986, 1), Ingarden nevertheless defines the musical work as “an object persisting in time” (Ingarden, 1986, 15). Contrary to Ingarden, I would argue that it is precisely in immediate musical experience that the musical work is not primarily an object, but rather the I as musical. I am the musical work, and it is, vice versa, me, though the musical work is not simply a musical “reflection” of myself, and neither am I a reflection of the work-rather, what constitutes us both, is the relation in which we find ourselves. Of course, it must be stressed that Ingarden distinguishes between the musical work and an individual performance of that work. Thus, it may be argued that what I am referring to here is not the work, but rather, a particular performance of that work and one's experience of it. I would claim, however, that the very differentiation between “work” and “performance,” at least in Ingarden's terms, does not proceed from immediate musical experience, but rather, from a theoretical construct. For, as as I would suggest on the basis of my own musical experience -- and has been made clear by the testimonies of various prominent musicians of the 20th century -- the fundamental given of musical life-experience is musical identification, i. e. the identification between subject and object, I and music. It is only after this relation has been “bracketed” that the musical work (or its individual performance) can become an “object” in Ingarden's sense, i. e. an entity, separate from the I. Such an entity is surely thinkable, but it is not the primary given of musical life-experience and, by extension, of the phenomenology of music. Within musical identification, the musical work, just as the I, is constituted by this relation; to the contrary, the musical work qua object is constituted either by the subject, as in Husserlian phenomenology, or “in itself,” as, for example, in gestalt theory Such is Max Wertheimer's view who understands objective wholes as governed by laws, imma-nent to objectivity: such a whole is, for example, “a Beethoven symphony where from a part of the whole we could grasp something of the inner structure of the whole itself. The fundamental laws, then, would not be piecemeal laws but structural characteristics of the whole.” (Wertheimer, 1984, 327) According to Wertheimer, “[t]he given is in itself, to varying degrees, `made whole': given are more or less structured, more or less determined wholes and whole processes, with often very con-crete whole-characteristics, with inner laws, characteristic whole-tendencies, whole-conditions for their parts” (Wertheimer, 1922, 52). „Das Gegebene ist an sich, in verschiedenem Grade ,gestaltet`: gegeben sind mehr oder weniger durchstrukturierte, mehr oder weniger bestimmte Ganze und Ganzprozesse, mit vielfach sehr konkreten Ganzeigenschaften, mit inneren Gesetzlichkeiten, char- akteristischen Ganztendenzen, mit Ganzbedingtheiten fur ihre Teile“..

Another example of a phenomenological aesthetics of music, based on the subject-object dichotomy, is Mikel Dufrenne's (1973) theory of aesthetic experience. Contrary to Ingarden, Dufrenne acknowledges that “the musical work is itself only when performed: thus is it present” (Dufrenne, 1973, 4). However, in Dufrenne's theory, music is once again objectified: “The performance adds nothing. And yet it adds everything: the possibility of being heard, that is, of being present in its own way to a consciousness and becoming an aesthetic object for that consciousness” (Dufrenne, 1973, 4). According to Dufrenne, the musical work is known as aesthetic object, wherein its sense lies:

Let us then cease to wonder where the musical work proper resides, so that we may witness the emergence of the aesthetic object; for if I am to know the work, it must be present before me as an aesthetic object. (Dufrenne, 1973, 5)

It should be noted that Dufrenne comes closer to a relational phenomenological view in his theory of perception, which is based on Merleau-Ponty (1962):

The face of perception calls on us to conceive of a relation between subject and object such that the one exists only by means of the other such that the subject is relative to the object in the same way that the object is relative to the subject. In other words, the subject can encounter the object only if it is first on a level with it, if it prepares for the object from within its own depths, and if the object is offered to it with all its exteriority. This reconciliation of subject and object takes place within the subject himself, in whom the body as lived and the body as object are identified. (Dufrenne, 1973, 219)

One may find here an analogy of musical identification in the identification of my body as lived with my body as object. However, just as with my body, in my immediate musical experience I do not necessarily have to grasp music as an object of experience. Rather, music is me, just as my body is me. Its objectification is a subsequent act -- an act of consciousness. Primal musical life-experience is the experience of identification with music, prior to all its objectifications (e. g. as an aesthetic object).

MUSICAL IDENTIFICATION AS A RELATIONAL PHENOMENON

The effort to grasp musical identification as a relational phenomenon opens up a vast field of questions with regard to the way we look at musical experience not only in philosophy, but also in musicology and perhaps in all discourse about music. A more radical viewpoint may suggest that what we can observe in music and what we can say of it, is not dependent on our purely subjective efforts-music, as object of inquiry, does not really belong to us. One could then be tempted to suppose that music suspends our subjectivity entirely. Such a view has been expounded by musicologist Hans Heinrich Eggebrecht. Eggebrecht defines “aesthetic identification” as being beyond the subject-object dichotomy:

in the working-upon and hearing of music the subject-object relation is suspended in a concept of identity of such a kind that here the subject is at the same time object and the object is at the same time subject. (Eggebrecht, 1977, 105) „[Daraus folgt,] dab beim Wirken und Vernehmen von Musik der Subjekt-Objekt-Bezug aufgeho- ben ist in einen Begriff der Identitat derart, daB hier das Subjekt zugleich Objekt und das Objekt zugleich Subjekt ist“.

By aesthetic identification, in particular, Eggebrecht understands “the becoming-same of intended sense and sensual understanding” (Eggebrecht, 1977, 105) „Gleichwerdung von intendiertem Sinn und sinnlichem Verstehen“.. In musical identification, what is intended by the I becomes the same as the very understanding, which intends it. The musical I understands itself and its own sense as music. According to Eggebrecht, music is in the role of “aesthetically occupying” the I: “In the process of aesthetic occupation -- regardless of any differentiation between working-upon and hearing-music is always the trigger, the doer, the `subject'” (Eggebrecht, 1999, 102) „Im ProzeB der asthetischen Okkupation ist -- trotz aller Unterscheidung von Wirken und Ver- nehmen -- immer die Musik der Ausloser, der Macher, das Subjekt“.. Thus, musical sense structure is “totalitarian” in that it “inscribes its sense and content in the soul of the listener as if on a tabula rasa” (Eggebrecht, 1977, 110) ,,inscribiert seinen Sinn und Gehalt in die Seele des Zuhorers wie auf eine tabula rasa“..

It seems to me that Eggebrecht's concept of the listener as “tabula rasa” has a certain one-sidedness to it that could lead one in the wrong direction. Certainly, most practitioners would agree that there is always something “new” and “unheard of” in every instance of true musical identification. For example, Bruno Walter writes:

I believe that I am allowed to speak of my own life in that the more often I had to perform a musical work, the more careful I was to enliven in myself anew the feeling of the first inspiration I had for it, to check over and over again if that first spontaneity hasn't subsided into routine expression. [...] It may sound paradoxical but for me the greatness and beauty of masterworks of all art is not statically definitive: they live, they become greater and more beautiful with each encounter, just like works of little significance exhaust themselves and grow pale. To the question, if I know Mozart's Symphony in G-Moll,

I would actually have to say: today I believe I know it-tomorrow it will probably be new to me, because often have I thought that I was familiar with it; and often has it become new to me again. (Walter, 1957, 137-138) „Ich glaube hier aus meinem eigenen Leben berichten zu durfen, das ich, je ofter ich ein Werk aufzufuhren hatte, desto sorgsamer darauf bedacht war, das Gefuhl der ersten Begeisterung dafur in mir neu zu beleben, immer wieder zu uberprufen, ob jene erste Spontaneitat auch nicht einem routinierten Ausdruck gewichen sei. [...] Ja, so paradox es klingen mag, fur mich ist GroBe und Schonheit der Meisterwerke aller Kunste nichts statisch Definitives: sie leben, sie werden bei jeder Begegnung groBer und schoner, so wie Werke geringerer Bedeutung ermatten und verblassen. Auf die Frage, ob ich Mozarts g-Moll-Symphonie kenne, muBte ich eigentlich antworten: heut` glaube ich sie zu kennen -- morgen wird sie mir vielleicht neu sein, denn oft schon dachte ich mit ihr vertraut zu sein; und oft ist sie mir dann wieder neu geworden“.

A similar thought is reckoned by Sergiu Celibidache: “Everything in music is once and for all [einmalig], in its arising [Entstehung]. There is no Beethoven's Fifth, rather it arises [entsteht] in the moment” (Celibidache, 2008, 51-52) „Alles in der Musik ist einmalig, in ihrer Entstehung. Es gibt auch keine Wiederholung. Es gibt doch nicht die Funfte Beethoven, sondern sie entsteht im Augenblick“.. Thus, in a certain sense, the musician (and, of course, the listener) is always taken anew by music -- an instance of musical identification has to be, at least in a certain sense, original. But at the same time Eggebrecht's “tabula rasa” theory doesn't account for the feeling of actual presence of the I, which, admittedly, is not the I of everyday experience, but which still has an intensified feeling of self, or rather, of experienced musical sense as having filled up the self. As Walter maintains,

The ideal musical interpreter will therefore be the one who, completely filled with the work, is completely focused on the work, but at the same time uses the full force of his own personality, and thus also the pleasure of exercising his own talent, for the reproduction of the work, who has thus preserved the joy of music-making of his younger years and is allowed to pour his own essence into the interpretation, because it has entered into an intimate union with that of the composer. (Walter, 1957, 26) „Der ideale musikalische Interpret wird also der sein, der, ganz vom Werk erfullt, ganz auf das Werk gerichtet ist, zugleich aber die volle Kraft der eigenen Personlichkeit, damit auch die Lust an der Betatigung des eigenen Talentes fur die Wiedergabe des Werkes einsetzt, der also die Musizierlust seiner jungen Jahre bewahrt hat und sein eigenstes Wesen in die Interpretation ergieBen darf, weil es mit dem des Komponisten eine innige Verbindung eingegangen ist“.

Although we find the I musically transformed, it is not, in Walter's account, occupied by music in a totalitarian manner. The I is not simply a tabula rasa. To the contrary, it participates in its relation with music with the “full force” of its “personality.” This is also my intuition as to the nature of musical identification. We are engaged in musical experience not because it relieves us of our selves, but because it changes our selves -- we experience our selves in a wholly different manner. It is, however, we who participate in this relation Such a view of musical experience as intensifying the feeling of agency has been explored by Simon Hoffding (2018) in his topography of musical absorption. According to Hoffding, “musical action is not primarily generated by egoic consciousness. What is passive is the ego and what is active is what I have called the enlarged sense of subjectivity” (Hoffding, 2018, 188). The enlarged sense of subjectivity is a “mind-world continuum” (Hoffding, 2018, 183). The subject's active participation in musical experience is particularly evident in what Hoffding calls ex-static absorption: “From the perspective of ex-static absorption [...] we see a strengthened sense of agency insofar as I find myself in an agential position so superior that I can neutrally look over the music as a beautiful landscape that unfolds by itself, and choose not to interfere. The passive dimension is clearly seen in this abstention from interference” (Hoffding, 2018, 193)..

It is this strange tension between the musical and non-musical I, which is yet to be explored in depth in a phenomenological perspective. It is clear that I am not the same “within” and “outside of” the experience of musical identification. On the one hand, my self is fundamentally different, as it is constituted in a different way. On the other, in both cases, it is always I who am experiencing. As for the idea of music as quasi-object, the point, although trivial, must once again be made that music has sense only to the I, which hears itself in music. This point is, however, less trivial, when one emphasises that the I does not constitute what it hears as itself--it is the relation between I and music, which constitutes musical identification. Music is not a mirror of the I, nor does the I communicate with “itself” (in a trivial sense) in musical experience. Rather, the I finds itself musically transformed, imbued with musical sense. This I is no longer an autonomous, self-constituting consciousness, but an aspect of a “heteronomous” relation with music.

One way of interpreting the difference between musical and non-musical I (and between musical and non-musical experience), is to grasp them as alternative modes of being, as in Gtinther Anders' music philosophy. Influenced strongly by Heidegger's Sein und Zeit, Anders differentiates between being-in-the-world and being-in-music. The reconciliation of these modes of being depends on the realization

.. .that, on the one hand, one lives in the world, in the medium of one's own historical life, understands the world and life comparatively [...] that, on the other hand, one is not in the world but “in music" whereby the word music does not indicate a piece of the world that [one] can run into in the world, in short: that one lives in determinations that shake, even abolish, the average fundamental ontological characters of human existence, and in turn indicate an own mode of existence. (Anders, 2017, 16)„...dass man einerseits in der Welt, im Medium eigenen geschichtlichen Lebens lebt, Welt und Leben vergleichsweise versteht (oder sich geradezu thematisch in diesem Verstehen bewegt -- das heiBt philosophiert); dass man andererseits nicht in Welt, sondern ,in Musik` ist, wobei das Wort Musik kein in der Welt treffbares Weltstuck anzeigt, kurz: dass man in Bestimmungen lebt, die die durchschnittlichen ontologischen Fundamentalcharaktere menschlichen Daseins erschuttern, ja aufheben, und ihrerseits eine eigene Existenzart anzeigen“.