The phenomenon of musical identification. A view from heidegger’s early phenomenology

These average ontological characters include not only being-in-the-world, but also the subject-object dichotomy. Musical life-experience changes the ontological structure of subjectivity. According to Anders, the relation between I and music is a “structure” beyond the subject-object alternative (Anders, 2017, 60), it is a mode of “Being-with” (Mitsein):

In this situation of being-with of subjectivity with the object what is usually separate is

now identical. Both, subjectivity and object, are now at the same time [i. e. the same --

Ch. V.]. And this at-the-same-time guarantees that it is the same existence, which lives for itself in its immediacy and which steps out of itself to make objects of the world. (Anders, 2017, 126) „In dieser Situation des Mitseins der Subjektivitat mit dem Gegenstande ist nun identisch, was gewohnlich getrennt ist. Beides, Subjektivitat und Objekt, ist nun zugleich. Und dieses Zugleich garantiert dafur, dass es die gleiche Existenz ist, die fur sich in ihrer Unmittelbarkeit lebt, und die aus sich heraustritt, um Weltgegenstande zu machen“. Translating the term Mitvollzug in English is difficult. Vollzug means “carrying out” or “realization,” and so Mitvollzug would be “carrying-out-with,” “realizing-with.” I have chosen the translation “ac-tualization-with,” because it implies the “becoming-actual” of the thing being carried out.

As a possibility of Being (Seinsmoglichkeit), “Being-with” is also considered a carrying-out-with or actualization-with (Mitvollzug34): one performs (or listens to) music, while being performed (or listened to) as music. One is “actualized” with the “actualization” of music -- there is, in effect, no difference between the I and music. Musical experience consists in the I being actualized with the “forms of movement” of music:

man, in that he opens up in the musical situation, actualizes-with exactly this [purely musical -- Ch.V.] form of movement in that he lives in it. This “living” means something completely non-metaphorical: it means that man is now in this situation really a being of this form of movement. [...] In the actualization-with of such movements man is not only changed in his formal time structure, but is completely re-attuned and transformed. (Anders, 2017, 67-68) „[Die Bewegungscharakterisierungen werden philosophisch folgenreich erst durch die Uberlegung, dass] der Mensch, sofern er in der musikalischen Situation aufgeht, eben diese Bewegungsformen mitvollzieht, dass er in ihnen lebt. Dieses ,Leben` bedeutet etwas ganz Unmetaphorisches: bedeutet namlich, dass der Mensch nun in dieser Situation wirklich ein Seiendes von dieser Bewegtheits- form ist [...]. Im Mitvoll zug derartiger Bewegungen ist der Mensch nicht nur seiner formalen Zeitstruktur nach verandert, er ist vollig umgestimmt und verwandelt“. Anders doesn't seem to make a difference between the ontic name „Stimmung“ and its ontological correlate „Befindlichkeit“.

Beyond the subject-object divide, music “re-attunes” and “transforms” the I. The I is transformed in that it no longer constitutes itself as subject but is rather constituted by the musical life-experience.

Anders uses two established phenomenological concepts to define musical ac- tualization-with -- attunement (Stimmung) and act. The concept of Stimmung is an interpretive reference to Heidegger's (1967, 2010) idea of “attunement” or Befindli- chkeit in Sein und Zeit36 As is well known, in Sein und Zeit, Heidegger develops the so-called ,Daseinsanalytik`, which develops the problem of Being (Sein) in relation to one particular being (Seiendes), namely Dasein. Dasein is we ourselves: “The being whose analysis our task is, is always we ourselves. The [B]eing of this being is always mine” (Heidegger, 2010, 41)37. The “Da” of Dasein is its primal attunement, or its mood: “Mood [Stimmung] makes manifest `how one is and is coming along'” (Heidegger, 2010, 134)38. Stimmung is a defining aspect of the existence of Dasein because Dasein is always already somehow “attuned” or “mooded” Although it is self-evident to Dasein itself, its mood is not objectifiable: “In attunement, Dasein is always already brought before itself, it has always already found itself, not as perceiving oneself to be there, but as one finds one's self in attunement” (Heidegger, 2010, 135)39. Anders is referring to the same phenomenon when he is describing Stimmung as “object-less.” Stimmung cannot be cognitively (i. e. theoretically) “explained away” because “the possibilities of disclosure belonging to cognition fall far short of the primordial disclosure of moods in which Dasein is brought before its Sein as Da” (Heidegger, 2010, 134, translation modified)40.

The concept of “act” in Anders' opposition corresponds to the intentional act in Husserl's phenomenology:

If an intentional Erlebnis is actional, that is, actualized in the manner of the cogito, then in that process the subject is “directing” himself to the intentional Object. [...] This Ego-regard to something varies with the act: in perception, it is a perceptual regard-to; in phantasying, an inventive regard-to; in liking, a liking regard-to; in willing, a willing regard-to; etc. (Husserl, 1982, 65, translation modified) „Das Seiende, dessen Analyse zur Aufgabe steht, sind wir je selbst. Das Sein dieses Seienden istje meines“ (Heidegger, 1967, 41). „Die Stimmung macht offenbar, ,wie einem ist und wird`“ (Heidegger, 1967, 134). „In der Befindlichkeit ist das Dasein immer schon vor es selbst gebracht, es hat sich immer schon gefunden, nicht als wahrnehmendes Sich-vor-finden, sondern als gestimmtes Sichbefinden“ (Hei-degger, 1967, 135). „weil die ErschlieBungs-moglichkeiten des Erkennens viel zu kurz tragen gegenuber dem ur- sprunglichen ErschlieBen der Stimmungen, in denen das Dasein vor sein Sein als Da gebracht ist“ (Heidegger, 1967, 134). „1st ein intentionales Erlebnis aktuell, also in der Weise des cogito vollzogen, so ,richtet` sich in ihm das Subjekt auf das intentionale Objekt. Zum cogito selbst gehort ein ihm immanenter ,Blick-auf` das Objekt, der andererseits aus dem ,Ich` hervorquillt, das also nie fehlen kann. Dieser Ichblick auf etwas ist, je nach dem Akte, in der Wahrnehmung wahrnehmender, in der Fiktion fingierender, im Gefallen gefallender, im Wollen wollender Blick-auf usw“ (Husserl, 1976, 65).

According to Anders, musical experience suspends the difference between the object-less (and non-objective) Stimmung and object-directed Akt:

Between the two possibilities: the attunement, highly influenced by the object but non-objective, and the pure intentional mean-ing of the object, lies the actualization-with, as it is realized in listening to music. It is neither only attunement, nor only act; neither only object-less, nor only object-directed; it fills, as it were, the “immediate” existence of man, as if it was an object-less, unstructured attunement; but it is a process, which plays out in the same structures, in which the musical object itself proceeds. (Anders, 2017, 60) „Zwischen beiden Moglichkeiten: der vom Gegenstand hochstens beeinflussten, aber ungegen- standlichen Stimmung und dem puren intentionalen Meinen des Gegenstandes liegt der Mitvoll- zug, wie er im Horen von Musik verwirklicht ist. Er ist weder nur Stimmung, noch nur Akt; weder nur gegenstandslos, noch nur gegenstandsgerichtet; er fullt gleichsam die ,unmittelbare` Existenz des Menschen aus, als ware er gegenstandslose unstrukturierte Stimmung; aber er ist ein Prozess, der in den gleichen Strukturen sich abspielt, in denen der musikalische Gegenstand selbst ablauft“.

In musical experience one is “actualized” as music, as being identical to music in its becoming. One is at the same time musically attuned and sounding within music.

A similar view of musical Being was established by Ilya Yonchev (2007) in his own idea of musical Mitsein (which was developed without reference to Anders' work due to the fact that it was not accessible to Yonchev at the time of writing his book). Yonchev notes that within musical Mitsein (or ñú-áèòèå) music becomes the Being of the I, which is itself actualized in its capacity to be the “with-” of being -- according to Yonchev (2007, 112-113), the I is the mit- of musical Mitsein. Yonchev decidedly differentiates between musical and non-musical Being. According to Yonchev, the I outside of musical Mitsein “in its own self-sameness simultaneously plays the role of Being, of sense-horizon of all eventiveness and also participates in the structure of every event, thus being in this way the lawgiver of every possible sense” (Yonchev, 2007, 109) “A.3Kr, êîéòî â ñâîÿòà ñàìîòúæäåñòâåíîñò åäíîâðåìåííî èãðàå ðîëÿòà íà áèòèå, íà ñìèñëîâ õîðèçîíò íà ñúáèòèéíîñòòà è íàðåä ñ òîâà ó÷àñòâà â ñòðóêòóðàòà íà âñÿêî ñúáèòèå, êàòî ïî òîçè íà÷èí å çàêîíîäàòåë íà âñåêè âúçìîæåí ñìèñúë”.. This “non-musical” I is characterized as being constitutive of every experience with its “every possible sense.” Conversely, musical Mitsein is constitutive of experience in the stead of the I: “musical Being in me understands, encompasses in itself and makes-whole musical events, insofar as this is [...] me, but in my musical otherness, in my ontological musical wholeness” (Yonchev, 2007, 112) “Móçèêàëíîòî áèòèå ó ìåí ðàçáèðà, îáåìà â ñåáå ñè è îöåëîñòÿâà ìóçèêàëíèòå ñúáèòèÿ, äîêîëêîòî òîâà ñúì âñå ñàìèÿò àç, íî â ìîÿòà ìóçèêàëíà äðóãîñò, â îíòîëîãè÷íàòà ìè ìó- çèêàëíà îöåëîñòåíîñò”. A more extensive reading of Yonchev would require pointing out that, according to him, musical Mitsein is constituted by the so-called musical nomos: “In the self-evidence of musical sense there is an absolutely certain involuntariness. The nomos is an attempt to conceptualize the ontological condition of harmonic, musical situatedness of man in Being as a source of sense” (Yonchev, 2007, 47). „ ñàìîî÷åâèäíîñòòà íà ìóçèêàëíèÿ ñìèñúë èìà íàïúëíî îïðåäåëåíà íåïðîèçâîëíîñò. Íîìîñúò å îïèò äà ñå ïîíÿòèçèðà îíòîëîãè÷íîòî óñëîâèå çà õàðìîíè÷íàòà, ìóçèêàëíà ïîìåñòåíîñò íà ÷îâåêà â áèòèåòî êàòî èçâîð íà ìóçèêàëåí ñìè- ñúë“. The musical nomos “gives sense” to every event within musical experience: “the only acoustical musical event, which carries musical sense within itself, is constituted plainly by the musical nomos and this allows musical sense to be self-evident within it [the acoustical musical event]” (Yonchev, 2007, 82-83). “Åäèíñòâåíîòî àêóñòè÷åñêî ìóçèêàëíî ñúáèòèå, êîåòî íîñè â ñåáå ñè ìóçèêà-ëåí ñìèñúë, å êîíñòèòóèðàíî åäíîçíà÷íî îò ìóçèêàëíèÿ íîìîñ è òîâà ïîçâîëÿâà ìóçèêàë- íèÿò ñìèñúë äà áúäå ñàìîî÷åâèäåí â íåãî”. Yonchev's assessment of the relation between I and music underpins the constitutive function of the musical nomos. I would suggest, however, that within musical identification it isn't quite clear which side of the relation -- the I or music -- is “constitutive,” as they both exist as such only as related to each other. It is, thus, the relation, which seems to constitute -- i. e. bestow sense upon -- both I and music.. Unlike the “sense-bestowing consciousness which, for its part, exists absolutely and not by virtue of another sense-bestowal” (Husserl, 1982, 106), musical “consciousness” exists only in relation to music and is constituted in this relation.

It would be inappropriate, and perhaps irrelevant, to discuss at length the existential implications of Anders' and Yonchev's music philosophies. In terms of their phenomenological foundations, they both reflect on the fact that the relation between I and music suspends the subject-object dichotomy, including the constitutive function of the I. It seems that both Anders and Yonchev are articulating and interpreting the very same phenomenon that Furtwangler, Walter, Fischer, Gulda and Hofmann describe in terms of their own life-experience with music Based on the interpretations that have been put forward, certain aspects of the testimonies, quot-ed above, must be bracketed. Since musicians' attitudes towards musical life-experience are “life- worldly”, certain aspects of their descriptions do not accurately depict the given life-experience, but are rather distortions based on “natural” prejudices of the musicians themselves. Thus, Walter, for example, would speak of “mystical-musical unification' (Walter, 1957, 31), Fischer about be-ing “a mediator between the divine, the eternal, and man“ (Fischer, 1959, 36) and Gulda about musical “talking in tongues” (Gulda, 1971, 9) -- how are all these accounts to be taken “seriously” from a rigorous phenomenological standpoint? Needless to say, all presuppositions that we find in such statements, and, in fact, everything which we cannot find as given within the phenomenon, should be bracketed as being irrelevant to the phenomenological investigation. The quoted musi-cians seem to interpret as “divine” or “mystical” that, which is beyond their capacity as subjects to control and which, moreover, transforms them in suspending the ordinary structure of conscious-ness and experience. In all of the above statements, “divinity” is thematisized in direct connection with the “enruptedness-from-oneself” and the “being-outside-of-oneself” of the I. “Divine” is that, which transforms me from beyond myself. Thus, what is actually given in the phenomenon, is not the divine per se, but rather the transformation of subjectivity. Another assumption that should be bracketed has been put forward by musicians such as Walter and Fischer who describe musical identification as involving not only the I of the performer and the musical work, but also the “I” or the “spirit” of the composer. The assumption that the composer is somehow present within musical identification should, however, also be reassessed in phenomenological terms. In Walter's and Fis-cher's interpretations, the composer seems to be a sort of Ur-Ich of the musical work, i. e. the I of the originary relation with music. From a phenomenological standpoint, it seems that what is subse-quently recognized as the presence of the composer, is the sense of authentic unity of the performer with music, authentic in that it fully involves both the I (of the performer) and the work. In my view, the fullness of the relation between I and music -- and the fullness of the work's disclosure within this relation -- is attributed to the (metaphorical) presence of the “originator” of the work, namely the composer. The self-evident authenticity of musical life-experience is perceived as grounded in its authorship. However, the composer isn't given in musical identification -- what is given is the “authentic” musical position of the I, i. e. its musical fulfillment. In conclusion, both the appeal to divinity or mysticism, as well as the integration of the composer into the phenomenon of musical identification, should be bracketed as irrelevant to the phenomenological inquiry.. In this article, this phenomenon has been called musical identification. There are several moments that can be articulated within the phenomenon of musical identification. Firstly, musical identification is a relation between I and music, in which there is no difference between them. I hear myself in music, although not as identical with my non-musical self, but rather exactly and only as myself with music. I am musically “transformed” and exist as such only within my identification with music. Additionally, music is not simply an object for me -- in fact, it is not an object at all -- but rather, it is myself-as-music, whereas I am the mit- of musical Mitsein. Musical “objects” such as melodies, chords, first movements of sonatas, or musical works, are given to me only as my musical “co-respondents” or “counterparts,” i. e. as aspects of the whole of musical identification. Musical “objects” are nothing but “echoes” of my identification with music.

Based on the discussions so far, one can interpret the phenomenon of musical identification as being fundamentally relational. In fact, there is neither “proof,” nor a possible actualization of this phenomenon outside of the constitutive relation between I and music itself. The I seems to be the only witness to music, as music is only when the I is with it. Consequently, music is not constituted by the I, nor does the I constitute itself, but both are constituted by the relation between them, namely musical identification. The relation is before the I. Since the musical I is only given as “part” of the identification, it has no “existence” outside of it; neither does music exist, i. e. have sense, “before” being identified with the I-my own sense and musical sense coincide.

CONCLUSION

The phenomenological inquiry into the phenomenon of musical identification faces various challenges from the viewpoint of traditional ways of understanding phenomenal givenness, such as the subject-object dichotomy. The identification between I and music is primarily and originarily given as relation, which then constitutes all further givenness in musical experience, such as the experiences of the I and the various objectities we recognize as “music.” The early Heideggerian understanding of the resonance between I and world provides a framework for articulating musical identification phenomenologically. It would be a matter of further research to develop a phenomenological viewpoint to investigate in detail the different aspects of musical life-experience and their broader implications for subjectivity in general, where, in my view, musical identification would play an essential role. In this perspective, the question would arise of a “minimal” musical self For the idea of “minimal self” see, for example, Zahavi (2011). In terms of musical experience it has been used by Hoffding to describe the sense of “absorption” of the self in some forms of musical experience (Hoffding, 2018, 249-250)., which would necessarily involve an idea of how music participates in the very essence of subjectivity within the relation between I and music. Such an outlook could give rise to wider research into the ways we think about music in academic and non-academic discourse.

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