Turkiye’s approach towards Africa: solutions and challenges

Africa is known for being the second largest continent in the World and the second-most populous, claiming 15% of the human population in the World [1]. Such a vast expanse of land and population suggests aid would be beneficial in a continent troubled by conflicts and war [2], political upheaval [3][4], and impacts of natural hazards [5], to mention a few. Across its 54 recognized sovereign countries classified into North, West, Central, East, and South, Africa has and continues to require assistance from countries in other continents, Tьrkiye inclusive.

This paper aims to evaluate Tьrkiye-Africa relations to determine the impacts of Tьrkiye's foreign aid and approach in Africa. By assessing the solutions and challenges of the relations and determinants of foreign aid provided by Tьrkiye, this paper discusses its implications for Tьrkiye and Africa. The African region, the second biggest continent, regarding the UN statistics, has been suffering from inhumane conditions and poverty for long years. These conditions consist of humanitarian needs, lack of educational and physical infrastructure, and in some sub-regions, lack of state authority [6]. As colonial states controlled the continent until the 1960s, Tьrkiye's interaction with the region was limited. Of course, this limitation was not only about the colonial states' existence and their control of African politics [7] but also the orientation of the Turkish foreign policy, which was solely locked to the West (US/NATO and Europe) during the Cold War era [8].

After that time, 52 sovereign states emerged in the region, and in 1985 Tьrkiye started its first foreign aid expansion toward Africa. Tьrkiye, officially for the first time in 1985, has provided 10 million dollars of food aid to Sub-Saharan African countries experiencing drought problems. Tьrkiye's active role in development cooperation is undoubtedly closely related to its institutionalization in development cooperation. The Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA) was established in 1992 under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to ensure the Turkic Republics' economic development as independent nations following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Another critical turning point in the field of development cooperation in Tьrkiye is the political stability and economic development process that started in 2003 [9]. Thanks to the paradigm shift in Turkish foreign policy, Tьrkiye extend her foreign policy actions all around the World. Especially during the Cold War era, Tьrkiye's foreign policy was limited to Western Bloc politics; thus, Tьrkiye could not have been effective as desired in the African region from that time on. But after 2003, there was an apparent breakthrough in Turkish foreign policy based on extension and dynamism. It was declared that 2005 would be “the Year of Africa” due to Tьrkiye's dynamism, which stimulated Tьrkiye's expansion of the African continent [10]. After this announcement, Tьrkiye-Africa relations were gradually enhanced by state-level diplomatic ties and Tьrkiye's soft power presence with state institutions in the region. In the central part of the article, we will expand and explain Tьrkiye's soft power presence in Africa. Apart from that, the Covid-19 pandemic and providing humanitarian aid for combating the virus became essential to Tьrkiye's foreign policy approach. During the Covid-19 pandemic, 47 countries were affected by the virus, there were 8.659.127 cumulative cases, and 172.512 deaths occurred in Africa [11].

The objective of the study. This paper aims to evaluate Tьrkiye-Africa relations to determine the impacts of Tьrkiye's foreign aid and approach in Africa. By assessing the solutions and challenges of the relations and determinants of foreign aid provided by Tьrkiye, this paper discusses its implications for Tьrkiye and Africa.

Main part

The relations between Tьrkiye and Africa are entrenched in history and religion from the Ottoman Empire legacy, which established substantial relations with different African countries in the 15th and 16th centuries. Though more popular among the North African countries and the Muslim population in the continent, the legacy of the Ottoman Empire and its success in the past appear to be revisited through Tьrkiye's foreign aid policy. Countries in the Northern Africa and others like Somalia, Sudan, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Niger, and Chad who lived under the Ottoman Empire appear to be the highest recipient of foreign aid and humanitarian support from Tьrkiye in the modern age [12]. Likely to be facilitated by other reasons, it is impossible to acknowledge the historical linkage and the possible relationship between such historical association and Tьrkiye's foreign aid approach in Africa in the 21st century. Tьrkiye's foreign aid policy and corresponding actions worldwide are not disputed. Still, the pattern, strategy, and foreign aid preferences in Africa are gaining attention and are well documented by different scholars.

Kulaklikaya and Nurdun [13] observed that Tьrkiye's foreign aid is motivated by political and strategic considerations concerning trade concerns with countries receiving Turkish foreign assistance. Political motivations make Tьrkiye a `political' actor in Africa based on aid activities in Somalia [14]. When assessed, the food security crisis in Somalia in 2011, which prompted an immediate response from Tьrkiye, also increased Turkish involvement in the politics of Eastern African countries. What was initially a humanitarian response to the food crisis evolved into political and social dimensions [14]? According to Цzerdem [15], Tьrkiye's interests and foreign aid mission to Somalia are frequently questioned concerning whether it brings a lasting solution to the challenges experienced in the country or not. The case of Somalia is just one of several of Tьrkiye's foreign aid to African countries that remains in doubt, not for its efficacy or difference it makes on the ground to those who benefit from the aid program, but for motives that drive the policy agenda.

Opening representative offices in every African nation is crucial for fostering Tьrkiye's ties with the continent. In contrast to the 12 embassies that Tьrkiye had in

Africa in 2002, there are now 43 of them there by the year 2021. The number of African embassies in Ankara expanded from 10 at the beginning of 2008 to 37 due to African nations' continued interest in Tьrkiye. Mutual high-level visits are crucial to upholding Tьrkiye's foreign policy toward Africa. For instance, the President of the Republic of Tьrkiye, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, visited 28 African nations, namely; Algeria, Djibouti, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Morocco, Ivory Coast, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Republic of South Africa, Kenya, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Egypt, Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia. Thanks to those visits by President Erdogan, Tьrkiye's Africa policy gained momentum more than ever in the history of modern Tьrkiye. Of course, those mentioned high-level visits are pioneers for establishing the suitable and solid ground for building everlasting partnerships with the African states. TIKA is actively working in the region through one of Tьrkiye's foreign aid and soft power instrument institutions, which is the subject of this study [16].

Apart from that, Tьrkiye's expanding economic ties and rapidly rising trade numbers are two of the most evident signs of improving Tьrkiye-Africa relations. By 2020, Tьrkiye's overall trade with the African continent will have grown from 5.4 billion dollars in 2003 to 25.3 billion dollars. From $1.35 billion in 2003 to $10 billion in 2020, Tьrkiye's commerce with African nations increased significantly. Despite the pandemic conditions, maintaining a consistent commerce volume in 2020 is a significant accomplishment [17].

The measures Tьrkiye has undertaken on the African continent in recent years have attracted attention due to this goal, both domestically and internationally. Today Tьrkiye has 42 Embassies in more than 50 countries in the African region. Also, apart from the formal diplomatic missions, Tьrkiye supports her initiative in Africa with state and non-state actors. First and foremost, Turkish Airlines (THY), Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA), Anadolu Agency (AA), Yunus Emre Institute (YEE), Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency (AFAD), and Turkish Maarif Foundation (TMV) are acting in the region. Furthermore, Tьrkiye's Foreign Economic Relations Board (DEIK), Independent Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association (MUSIAD), non-governmental organizations, and companies establish contact with the people of the continent [17].

Before shedding light on the state mentioned above institutions' activities, explaining the concept of soft power is crucial. In 1990, Joseph S. Nye's book “Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power” introduced the idea of soft power to the field of international relations [18]. More complex new subconcepts have either begun to receive renewed attention in the literature or have been the subject of several investigations by academics like Joseph Nye and others that have followed this novel idea [19]. In the work mentioned above, Nye introduced the concept of “Soft Power,” which he defines as “the ability to achieve what you want by attracting it rather than using orders/force or persuading it somehow (such as providing money).” In other words, exporting a country's positive image attracts other countries to reach foreign policy goals [8]. In its broadest definition, soft power refers to the circumstance in which a state achieves its foreign policy objectives solely through the attraction effect on other nations, without any material, moral, indirect, or direct intervention. The essence of a country's “Soft Power” potential, according to Nye, is its ability to attract people with its culture, political ideals, and policies. The soft power of a nation will expand or diminish depending on the legitimacy of its policies in the eyes of the general public because Nye asserted that “soft power is needed to create peace” and that “making peace is tougher than winning the war” [18].

The political and military crises of the early 1990s marked the end of the Cold War and the beginning of a new age to which the Cold War-era balance of power strategies was ill-equipped to adapt. Because state-centered strategy and bilateral agreements are no longer successful at preventing conflicts, as seen by the bloodshed experienced on the territory of the former Yugoslavia. In such a setting, Tьrkiye has established new institutions that will serve as the pinnacle of regional and global cooperation and the power-related aspects of its foreign policy. However, Tьrkiye's sensible use of its “Soft Power” capability is the only means by which the new direction taken over its foreign policy can be realized [8].

According to Ibrahim Kalin, Spokesperson of the Presidency of the Republic of Tьrkiye, the traditional definition of foreign policy is no longer relevant. Because foreign policy and international relations now involve a broad range of actors, including businesspeople, non-governmental organizations, intellectuals, opinion leaders, journalists, think tanks, humanitarian aid, and international law, in addition to states and diplomats, according to Kalin, “national interest”-centered policies developed and implemented by states and diplomats no longer determine the framework of international relations. In addition, Kalin, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, does not alone construct the Republic of Tьrkiye's foreign policy, which aspires to become a global power. Kalin implies that Tьrkiye's foreign policy is also directly influenced by organizations like TIKA, Anadolu Agency, Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities, YEE, TRT, Turkish Red Crescent, and AFAD [20]. According to Kalin, “Soft Power” refers to a conception of foreign policy based on aspects like diplomacy, culture, discussion, collaboration, interdependence on one another's economies, and historical accumulation [21].

But according to Kalin, Tьrkiye's soft power is distinct from other nations' structure and reach. He emphasized that Tьrkiye's soft power potential reflects its rich historical and cultural heritage. He implies that Tьrkiye's subtle power potential begins in the Balkans and extends into Central Asia and Africa, which originates from its inherited history and culture rather than its advantage in terms of technology or military might [22].

Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA)

From its founding until the conclusion of the Cold War, the Republic of Tьrkiye had only limited contact with the Turkic republics of the Soviet Union.

Tьrkiye made significant efforts by making drastic decisions to develop its bilateral ties with the aforementioned Turkic Republics after turning its attention to this region following the fall of the Soviet Union. With the vision of Turgut Ozal and the TIKA, established in 1992 under the leadership of Umut Ark, the first and maybe most significant of these steps was achieved. Tьrkiye's relations with the mentioned Turkic Republics remained strained in the world order that the Soviet Union presided over, making the desired actions impossible. However, one of the crucial stages stated above was the founding of TIKA in the early 1990s, at the time of the Soviet Union's collapse and the end of the bipolar international system. To advance relations between the Turkic Republics and Tьrkiye more quickly, TIKA, in particular, conducted significant research on collaborative projects, infrastructure, and technical support during its development [8].

It is feasible to divide TIKA's actions since its founding in 1992 into two distinct periods, 1992-2002 and 2002-2013. The institution operated to provide technical assistance to the newly independent states in the former Soviet geography, namely the Caucasus and Central Asia, between 1992 and 2002, when TIKA was founded and can be considered in its infancy. During the ten years, that is, between 1992 and 2002, 2241 projects were completed. Between 2003 and 2011, TIKA signed roughly four times as numerous projects. Within the parameters of the 2011 research, the following nations utilized the most resources: Afghanistan is first with 20.61 percent, followed by Bosnia and Herzegovina with 6.76 percent, Palestine with 5.47 percent, and Lebanon with 3,89 percent [8].

The new discourse that governs Turkish foreign policy, known as TIKA in the form of humanitarian diplomacy, has drilled water wells and installed water pipelines to address the urgent need for clean water, not only for the local geography but also for the nations on the African continent, such as the crucial role it plays in the reconstruction of Afghanistan, TIKA's projects and activities, which provide for meeting the basic needs, such as shelter and food, of countries that have not yet established diplomatic relations with Tьrkiye. The technical assistance and foreign aid supplied by the completed projects helped build cordial and positive ties between Tьrkiye and the nations providing these services. Because its main objective is to reach the heart of the historical and cultural depth in the countries where the Turkish language is spoken and revitalize it, it is an extension of an active and multidimensional foreign policy concept. By 2022, the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency Presidency will have 62 Program Coordination Offices spread across 60 nations, operating in 150 countries. The Republic of Tьrkiye has an active and principled foreign policy, and as a result, the number of nations we collaborate with grows daily [23]. TIKA's main priorities in its activities in Africa:

• To ensure sustainable development in Africa,

• To help Tьrkiye share its experience, knowledge, and resources in line with the principle adopted to find “African solutions to Africa's problems” to provide mutual benefit,

• To accelerate Tьrkiye's development assistance activities while also fulfilling its commitments to the Least Developed Countries (LDCs), and

• To improve the relations between Tьrkiye and Africa [24].

Determinants of Tьrkiye 's Foreign Aid in Africa

Authors have explored different determinants of Tьrkiye's foreign aid in other parts of Africa. Zengin and Korkmaz [25] analyze the determinants of Tьrkiye's foreign aid in Africa to identify that African behavior focuses more on nationbuilding activities where foreign policy tools can be conveyed. In Sub-Saharan Africa, for instance, the involvement of Tьrkiye only increased after the 2000s, which is noticed through the increase in Turkish financial commitment to the region. For example, Turkish foreign aid to Sub-Saharan African countries increased significantly from 38 million USD in 2010 to 782.7 million USD in 2013 [26]. It is reported that a more significant percentage of this foreign aid budget goes to economic and social development in recipient countries. Tьrkiye's disbursement of development and aid funds since the start of the 2000s in Africa, especially in this region, and commitment therein is considered successful but not without raising suspicion and questions about motive [27]. The rapid increase in funding commitments and more active role in political, social, and economic activities in different African countries have motivated inquiries into Tьrkiye's motive and increasing role of Turkish civil organizations, businesses, and NGOs on the African continent, especially in Sub-Saharan region. Tьrkiye's tenacity in this region and entrenched involvement and approaches in otherwise problematic countries have helped differentiate Tьrkiye from more established donors [28].

While economic potential and other benefits are often identified by authors who examine Tьrkiye's foreign aid policy and plan, international relations, aid institutionalization, regional affinity, and religious factors are also strong determinants of Tьrkiye's foreign aid agenda. When further assessed beyond face value, Turhan [29] identified that Tьrkiye's foreign aid to Sub-Saharan Africa is one with moderate importance to countries collaborating with Turkish authorities. It is seen that continued ties with Tьrkiye are sustained through the assured context of humanitarian aid, which promotes Tьrkiye as the principal actor in the region [26]. While Tьrkiye's plan in this region remains debatable, the political and economic relations promoted through foreign policy are not different from other established donors in Africa. However, Tьrkiye's focus, commitment, and ability to work with various countries in the Sub-Saharan region, irrespective of their differences, differentiate Tьrkiye from other established donors. Therefore, the core determinants of Tьrkiye's foreign aid in Africa, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, range from humanitarian to economic, social, political, and development. The impacts of these determinants and complementary approaches may be associated with the progress made by Tьrkiye in this region thus far.

Impacts of Foreign Aid Determinants and Approaches

Tьrkiye's foreign aid approach in this region is seen to attribute relevance to non-state actors, understanding that NGOs, business, educational institutions, and trade associations are critical in a country's political, economic, and cultural interests in the Sub-Saharan African region [26]. The commitment of Tьrkiye to value common language more than other donor countries do is seen to differentiate Tьrkiye's foreign aid agenda in the Sub-Sharan African region [25]. The immediate goal of mediating in crisis to provide humanitarian assistance in countries in this African region is overtly conveyed [25]. However, Mehmetcik and Pekel [30] identified a multi-track approach where there are distinct interests and core motivations for Tьrkiye.

Though understandable to examine Tьrkiye's motive and plan, the positive impacts or benefits of the aid agenda are well-acknowledged in Africa, perhaps more readily than contributions from the West. Africa has increasingly recognized Tьrkiye's foreign aid policy, and increasing interests can also contribute to the success of social and economic development in countries benefiting from the aid. The benefit of financial gains for both sides cannot be denied because, through the aid, trade volume between Tьrkiye and Africa increases with the potential to generate high investment, which subsequently influences the employment rate. Strong political and economic ties are significant for trade, stability, and pathway for diversifying energy resources in Tьrkiye and Africa.

According to Ozkan [31], improving the volume of trade and export markets is significant for the economy in Tьrkiye. For example, through the aid agenda and implementation of humanitarian development of Tьrkiye to African countries, Turkish NGOs and business organizations can also benefit and expand their organizational goals as critical actors in the action plan for Tьrkiye [29]. As such, Tьrkiye's foreign aid is crucial to generating the international recognition and image sought by Tьrkiye. More importantly, it generates a more favorable mechanism for Turkish businesses to establish new markets and increase profit while accelerating foreign aid with its investment [26]. The ability to sustain such an economic agenda through foreign aid may further consolidate the image of all parties involved, especially Tьrkiye's emerging power that is more focused on humanity and nationbuilding [32]. When explored through the economic and political lens, it is easier to conceive Tьrkiye as the only beneficiary of Tьrkiye-Africa relations. It is often overlooked that donors like Tьrkiye are primarily in countries with economic, political, social, and other problems.

Somalia is considered a failed state, though it remained functional in some capacities [33]. With a history of continued violence, instability, and crises, Somalia has become increasingly less attractive for most donor countries, and intervention remains challenging even by well-known Western powers. Tьrkiye's foreign aid is evident through hospital renovations, rebuilding efforts, offers of scholarships, and hosting international conferences [12]. However, the involvement of Tьrkiye in Somalia has seen Tьrkiye now controlling and managing the country's most lucrative assets, such as the airport and the seaport. The direct contributions to social good through the means mentioned above project Tьrkiye's foreign aid as more humanitarian than economic. The array of soft power approaches used by Tьrkiye in Somalia, including diplomatic, direct, and engagement tactics, have helped fuel the success recorded thus far in a country otherwise known as a failed functional state. Establishing a direct flight from the capital city of Somalia to Istanbul on Turkish Airlines may be viewed by Somalis as a more genuine interest of Tьrkiye in the country's economic development than other world powers and established donors. Tьrkiye's businesses have undoubtedly benefitted from direct flights to the government, reaping its financial and lucrative contracts. Such an act also signals the shift of Tьrkiye's foreign aid agenda from humanitarian to economic.

According to Cannon [32], Tьrkiye's hybrid approach to assuage rather than solve the protracted problems in Somalia has created a level of trust between both parties to engage in profit and assistance-driven investment coordinated investments based on identified needs in Somalia. Thus, whether considered as an array of soft power, commitment to value local language, or hybrid or humanitarian approaches, the impact of Tьrkiye's foreign aid agenda in Africa, especially in Sub-Saharan African countries where most established donors have failed, is evident in the social and economic developments that have occurred in the region in recent years. However, the history of development and humanitarian aid is not without its challenges. Though, in the case of Somalia, there are more positives than negatives based on documented accounts from both parties, Andrews [34] explains that foreign aid and implementation of any development activities by foreign actors are not without their challenges in Africa.

Solutions from Challenges

Tьrkiye's foreign aid shift from humanitarian to prioritizing economic and political dimensions might be considered rational after some time. It could be argued that such change is inevitable if Tьrkiye were to sustain its humanitarian investments and not end up like other established donors in Africa. Considering the history of political instability, unrest, and security challenges in the African continent, such a record indicates that threats through the means mentioned above can threaten the country's sustainability and adversely impact progress made through humanitarian development [32]. The shift from humanitarian aid to accommodate security and political concerns is noted yet acknowledged as instrumental to the noticeable improvements in Somalia over the past few years [35]. An inherent risk factor often frustrates other donors and foreign powers who have operated in this region before Tьrkiye. Yet, Tьrkiye, through its foreign aid agenda focused on capacity building and self-development collaborative projects, Tьrkiye has managed to find its niche [32].

Tьrkiye's efforts brought immediate stability to relieve the situation in Somalia; it further located Tьrkiye as a political actor in Africa, which is more complex and multifaceted in the long term. Challenges associated with sustaining aid programs led to development intervention in Somalia [35]. As peculiar to most

African countries, different social, political, economic, and environmental factors interact, leading to the onset of any crisis [15]. As a result, immediate response to any situation is often ineffective without long-term commitment to stabilize and ensure that aid missions and foreign aid policies are considered successful by the donor country. Perhaps Tьrkiye has found herself in similar complex and multifaceted situations in which other donors such as the United States of America (USA), the United Kingdom (UK), and other Western powers.

Conclusions

Increased activities of Tьrkiye in Africa, especially in the Sub- Saharan region, may be viewed through different lenses. The approach taken in this paper to evaluate the major determinants, benefits, and challenges has shown that any donor country's aid provision to Africa would always be viewed with mixed feelings. Though this finding implies that all donations and foreign aid agenda are embedded with questionable motives, aid is no doubt needed, as seen in a country like Somalia. This paper is not to endorse Tьrkiye's foreign aid agenda in Africa, especially in the region mentioned in this paper; it is to contribute to discussing the dimensions of foreign aid in Africa. The theoretical implication also emerged from this paper by reviewing different approaches adopted by Tьrkiye in certain African regions. Whether intentional, orchestrated or inadvertently informed by a country of interest, it is undoubtedly one that has led to the progress Tьrkiye has made in an otherwise failed country. Therefore, future studies would benefit from this paper by exploring theoretical explanations for the determinants of Tьrkiye's foreign aid in other African regions and continents to which Tьrkiye is committed. While this paper has contributed to knowledge by advancing discussions on Tьrkiye's foreign aid behavior and approaches, it also raises questions about how Tьrkiye conducts risk management and establishes risk thresholds in countries of interest. As identified by Cannon [32], the economic rationale for risk among Turkish businesses is considerably high compared to the difficulties and challenging environment they are launched into in recipient countries. Though acknowledged as sensible in the actions taken in Somalia, they are nonetheless risky in every sense of safety and security for Tьrkiye and the businesses, NGOs, and civil organizations investing and operating in the country. In practice, African countries depend on donor countries like Tьrkiye, especially where host countries lead no transition plan or capacity and nationbuilding projects.

As the President of the Republic of Tьrkiye, H. E. Recep Tayyip Erdogan said, “In Africa, we do not leave any friend whose door has not been knocked, any heart whose wound has not been healed, any country we have not collaborated” [24], Tьrkiye's soft power is an extension of Tьrkiye's helping hand toward to Africa. As mentioned above, Tьrkiye is actively developing foreign policy steps in the African region through TIKA and related state institutions. As those institutions grow in the region, Tьrkiye's positive influence and effectiveness in Africa also grow.

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