Размещено на http://www.allbest.ru/

4

Размещено на http://www.allbest.ru/

1

FEDERAL STATE AUTONOMOUS EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTION FOR HIGHER PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION

NATIONAL RESEARCH UNIVERSITY HIGHER SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS

Faculty of World Economy and International Affairs

Structural Factors of Russia-China Relations in International Organizations: Case of Shanghai Cooperation Organization

BACHELOR'S THESIS

Field of study: International Relations

Degree programme:Higher School of Economics and University of London Parallel Degree Program `International Relations'

Alexander Skomorovskiy

Supervisor

Professor

Andrey Skriba

Advisor Professor

Dmitry Novikov

Moscow, 2020

Contents

Abbreviations

Abstract

Introduction

Literature Review

Methodology

Chapter 1. Background of the Sino-Russian relations

1.1 Roots of regionalist policies

Chapter 2. SCO: shared vision, different approaches

2.1 Security

2.2 Economic prospects

Chapter 3. Outside of the SCO

Conclusion

References

Appendix A (List of SCO Secretariat documents)

Appendix C. Figures

Appendix D

Abbreviations

BRI - Belt and Road Initiative

CIC - China Investment Corporation

CIS - Commonwealth of Independent States

CST - Collective Security Treaty

CSTO - Collective Security Treaty Organization

EAEU - Eurasian Economic Union

IEA - International Energy Agency

NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organization

OBOR - One Belt One Road

PRC - People's Republic of China

RATS - Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure

RDIF - Russian Direct Investment Fund

SCO - Shanghai Cooperation Organization

SREB - Silk Road Economic Belt

Abstract

Russia and China are essential actors in the Great Power politics, and comprehension of the relations between them may improve the understanding of the shift in the international balance of power. This paper contributes to the ongoing research on Russia-China relations by examining the specifics of their interaction inside the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. It aims to find the reasons behind the specific raison d'etat that exists between the two countries, particularly emphasizing the structural factors such as the military presence, economic performance, and power politics. The research aims to fill in the gap in the study of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and assess its efficiency. Russia and China differ in their understanding of the SCO, and these differences will be examined thoroughly in the article. Both countries know their weaknesses and strengths, and surprisingly, both can provide efficient response to each other's challenges. However, in this case, cooperation is not that simple.

international balance shanghai cooperation organization

Introduction

The world is rapidly changing, and predictions that were made even a month ago may have become obsolete and outdated. Today countries are going into lockdown, closing borders, restricting free movement. President of France Emmanuel Macron publicly announces that the Schengen agreement is close to its death (McGrath, 2020). Italy requests international assistance to fight the outbreak of the coronavirus and receives help only from Russia. China seems to be recovering from the consequences of the epidemic, and similarly to Russia, sends its medical experts to countries around the world. Not only they help the people in need of professional supervision, but they also benefit the image of China in the political sphere. Today the future seems as shadowed as it could be, and even the relations between the partners are put at stake. The crisis may alter the existing status quo, but the case of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization shows that Chinaand Russia have been on the political frontlines already for some time.

Relations between Russia and China are amongst one of the most popular research topics in international relations, and numerous journals publish related papers. These extensively cover the military, economic, political goals and principles of both counterparties. Moreover, the two states have been studied thoroughly since the end of the Cold War.Scholars have also covered relations inside all types of international organizations, ranging from the United Nations Security Council to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. The SCO is an organization that, since its establishment, has not changed much, and in some sense, SCO research papers never become outdated. Nevertheless, there is a lot of room for research of the structural relations between states, especially in spite of the recent admission of India and Pakistan. The two South Asian states may significantly alter the existing balance of power both within and outside of the organization. These prospects remain attractive to the researchers especially in the context of the Afghan crisis.

In some areas of the SCO, there was little to no progress due to policy deadlocks and the inability to come on terms. For instance, the economic cooperation has stagnated due to tacit disagreements between Russia and China. The former has been formulating the security agenda of the organization, while the latter has mostly focused on the economic aspects. To a certain extent, the voting procedure in the SCO is the root of the problem: it is consensus-based. Unless all of the members agree on the text of the document, it is not legitimate. In this manner, Russia and China have mutually deferred relatively interesting and promising projects.

The difference in national interests exacerbates the situation, as the perception of the SCO by both sides varies. In the first chapter this paper ponders on the conflict of interests, and explains Russian and Chinese stances on the subject matters. Hence, it may seem like there is not enough room for new research in Sino-Russian relations inside the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. In most of the cases they go outside of the organization and discuss everything on bilateral terms. Some scholars even refer to the SCO as an obsolete organization that has no particular efficient mechanisms. This paper will seek to disprove the following statement and prove the opposite. On the contrary, it could be argued that the Shanghai Cooperation Organization is unique because both sides still continue to interact within this framework. However, this paper will seek not only to corroborate some of the previous findings and predictions of the organization but also to attempt to fill in the gap of explaining why and how Russia and China have succumbed to preferring bilateral negotiations.

Hence, this paper will layout the history of the relations and changes in the relations between Russia and China. Both states regularly interact on a bilateral and multilateral basis, inside and outside international organizations. They have a long history of the relationship, containing both ups and downs, the divergence of interests, and straight-out conflicts. Moreover, scholars consider post-Cold War Russia-China relations to be exemplary in the sense that they have rarely succumbed to the logic of power politics. In contrast to realist logic, both states reserved themselves to the policy of good-neighborliness. The concept was coined by Henry Clay, a well-known government official in the US in the 19th century, but only came to use during Franklin Delano Roosevelt's presidential tenure. It used to denote United States foreign policy towards states in Latin America, promoting ideas of non-intervention and non-interference. These two key ideas are close to Russian and Chinese understanding of political culture, who greatly respect the idea of sovereignty. Both states declare that they term any meddling in internal affairs as unacceptable and provocative. The guiding principles of the Shanghai Cooperation Organizations are famously claimed to have generated the typical “Shanghai Spirit” (Ambrosio, 2008).

Russia will not hesitate to bite back the enemy if detected interference, and the potential harm would exceed the effect of the intervention (Korostikov, 2017). China is also very defensive and sensitive when it comes to intervention and interference. It has negative history connected to the interventions, both from Asian and European powers, and currently cautiously observes the international context. A very important aspect of Chinese current political framework is the concept of the peaceful rise (Bijan, 2005). Basically, the term describes the gradual increase of China's power on the international arena without any external aggression. A significant part of research devoted to the study of China's development concerns the economic reforms. Overall, Russian and Chinese doctrines present an alternative to the Western ideas of interference such as the responsibility to protect. Both states pay significant attention to the international law, and consider unanimous abiding as a necessary condition for global development (Putin, 2013; Holland, 2012).

Chinese national defense doctrine, released in July 2019, regards sovereignty, unity, territorial integrity and security as four pillars supporting the existence of the state. In some sense, both Russian and Chinese foreign policies depend mainly on realist thinking: survival of the state is guaranteed only by the preservation of sovereignty and territoriality. China has stayed true to its pledge of non-interference: sometimes its spectrum of national interests is just extending (Storey, 1999).

Lukin (2019), in his article on Russian-Chinese cooperation in Central Asia, identifies the national interests of Russia and China in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. From the Russian perspective, there are four main reasons for cooperation within the context of the SCO. First of all, Russia can coordinate regional policies with China. Russian policymakers understood that it would be impossible to prevent China's economic expansion to Central Asia, and thus they decided that interaction within a designated framework would be an acceptable solution by both sides. Secondly, Russia perceives the regional organization as a counterbalance to the relations with the Western powers. With the recent acceptance of India and Pakistan, the balancing factor becomes even more critical. Thirdly, Russia welcomed the possibility to establish mechanisms allowing to coordinate joint efforts against terrorism and other imminent threats to national security. The last factor stems directly from the first: because Russia could not prevent China's entrance to the region, at least it could enjoy the economic benefits from cooperation.

The Chinese perspective is relatively similar: maintenance of stability is a crucial concern for the People's Republic of China, and it seeks to eliminate the risks of terrorist insurgencies. The proximity of the extremist hearth to the Chinese Xinjiang province remains a crucial determinant of China's foreign policy in the region. One of the solutions that Chinese policymakers have developed is driving the economic development of Central Asian states that would help provide stability to the region (Lukin, 2019). While Russia and China seem to perceive security, in the same way, their vision of the purpose of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization is different. Russia primarily focuses on using the organization as a security buffer and as an instrument of influence in Central and South Asia. However, China wants to exploit open opportunities further. Every international organization presupposes increasing interactions between the states, and the SCO is not an exception. After forming a common stance on security, the Chinese government started to promote economic cooperation. The motivation is quite simple - China needs new markets, why should not use the markets of good neighbors. After all, that is what friends usually do.

On the contrary, Russia expresses no interest in the enlargement of the economic functions of the SCO. First of all, Russia knows that China will dominate economically, and second, Russia is already a member of the Eurasian Economic Union. There is an inherent contradiction between the two states' interests. Not only economic prospects are unlikely, but also the military advancements are not credible. Russia and China have no military agreement whatsoever, and there may not be one in the future (Lavrov, 2019). Even despite the absence of the official military agreement, Russia is designing an anti-aircraft warfare defense system for the Chinese government. The situation is tangled in a web of nuances and minor details. In essence, scholars discuss that the SCO is in a potentially deathly deadlock because there is no clear path for joint development. What makes matters worse is that Russia and China tend to work on bilateral terms, excluding any interference from third parties.

That being said, Russia and China signed an agreement devoted purely to friendship, good-neighborliness, and partnership inside the overarching framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in 2001. The document stated that counterparties promise to abstain from showing power or preventing threats to national security and securing conflicts through diplomatic negotiations in coordination with the United Nations directives. Article 3 (SCO Charter, 2001) reaffirms mutual respect for the chosen political, social, and cultural development paths, and Article 4 (ibid.) iterates the inviolability of the territorial integrity of the participating sides. The overall tone of the agreement is simultaneously vague and discrete: counterparties agree to respect the sovereignty of each other but without any directive prescriptions.

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization is based on the Shanghai Five group of agreements. The latter international entity became known by its name after a series of agreements starting from 1996. Shanghai Five consisted of Kazakhstan, China, Russia, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. Because the group was effective in promoting the development of friendship, good-neighborliness (dobrososedstvo), and international efforts to combat rising global challenges, the organization evolved to a larger entity.

Initially, the convention converged around fighting terrorism, separatism, and extremism as these threats present danger for international peace and security, prevent the development of friendly ties, and deny them fundamental human rights and freedoms. The cooperation was fruitful, and the SCO formed originally to tackle security issues. In 2001 memories of the Chechen wars were still fresh in the minds of Russian policymakers, Afghanistan had become a cradle of extremism and drug production after several interventions, and separatist movements in China were becoming a problem. Interestingly, these problems persist even after nineteen years of formal fighting with security breaches, partly because the Afghan situation has not been solved.

Interestingly enough, the SCO ministerial documents always reiterate that member-states work jointly to support the solution of the Afghan crisis. Today this agenda might be intercepted by the United States, who have already initiated talks with the Taliban. Furthermore, Russia experiences terrorism issues up to date, primarily due to the wave of immigration to the Islamic State (forbidden in the Russian Federation), and China struggles to solve the conflict with the Uygur population in the Xinjiang province. They even list the prevention of an independent East Turkestan as one of their national defense goals.

Today SCO is a platform for multilateral talks on many more topics, all of which, however, are still encompassed by a common arch of security. Consequently, SCO acts as direct heir of the Shanghai Five, only with an addition of Uzbekistan in 2001. In 2017 the group accepted two more members, India and Pakistan. There are currently four observer states to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization: Belarus, Afghanistan, Iran, and Mongolia. The presence of India, Pakistan, and China at one table of negotiations is a unique achievement of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. While this feat may be perceived as a victory of diplomatic efforts, many problems come along: some resolutions may be vague or overly broad. All three have territorial disputes that drive their relations in a vicious circle: there is much room for obstructing decision-making processes. Hence the effectiveness of the SCO as a platform could be marked as questionable. The following chapters of the article will ponder upon this question.

Literature Review

While there is a significant amount of research on both Russia and China's foreign policy, Since 2014, most of the research has been conducted indirectly as a part of Russian or Chinese foreign policy analysis. For instance, Tsygankov (2018) describes the Russian Foreign Policy in general. One of the articles in the edited book provides valuable insight into the Russian perception of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. He quotes Lukin (2016), who states that SCO represents the Russian normative view on the world-order, indicating a preference for multi-polarity. It is also a valuable instrument to regulate Central Asia, particularly protecting it from western influence. Lukin is the single most valuable resource in the Russian language regarding the analysis of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. While being a part of the MGIMO SCO Research department, he participated in multiple forums and negotiations, and his articles allowed to take a peek behind the curtains and the negotiations processes in the organization. Bordachev (2017) and his reports in the Valdai Club think tank provide useful information on the causes of the Russian foreign policy strategy.

In the same book, Freire (2016) mentions that the Shanghai Cooperation Organization rotates around the axis of geopolitics, regional security, and non-western values and norms. She warns that while the SCO may undoubtedly work as a counterbalance to NATO enlargement, it would be exclusionary to focus only on balancing the West. An inclusionary view of the SCO would also consider the internal balancing of member-states against each other: Russia-China relations and balancing of four other states. The recent addition of India and Pakistan also require consideration in the context of the changing balance of power.

Ambrosio (2008) also devoted his articles to finding and capturing "the Shanghai Spirit." This phenomenon is closely associated with sovereignty, territoriality, and non-interference in domestic policies. He points out the importance of these three aspects, emphasizing the fact that SCO is not merely a platform for discussion but rather "the embodiment of a new set of values." In his article, he examines how these values promote strict norms, defend the nature of the autocratic states, and how can an international organization offer an alternative to a liberal peace. He notes that from the normative perspective, the organization seems to understand "democracy" in non-western terms. For instance, various communiquйs and resolutions mention democracy only in the context of establishing international democratic peace (Ambrosio, 2017), but the documents never pay attention to democratic regimes.

Other authors also comment on the essence of the Shanghai Spirit, primarily from the perspective of Chinese multilateral foreign affairs. Aris (2016), for instance, attributes the appearance of the phenomenon to the intensification of the "good neighbor" policies in Central Asia after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The dissolution of its tremendous political partner led to the creation of new opportunities for economic development, and the potential for soft power exercise. Aris (Kavalski, 2016) also notes that the SCO acts as a supporting "pillar" for the Russia-China bilateral relations. As a result, Shanghai Spirit may be referred to as "promotion of communities of practices through regionalization." An expert on China Lukin (2018; 2019) also contributes to the topic, covering the agenda and structure of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in-depth, focusing on the problems of the advancement of the negotiations.

Analysis of the previous works in Russia-China relations is crucial for the understanding of the structural factors. Charap, Drennan & Noёl (2015) state that Moscow is in the position of "demandeur vis-а-vis Beijing," meaning that China is in the dominant position against Russia. The article is a valuable source of information, as the authors pay attention to the same factors that this work will consider. More importantly, they delve into the bilateral investment projects, specifically the sector of energetics (Lanteigne, 2018). China needs energy resources, and Russia is a trusted partner, having completed several deals with Gazprom. Today, energy sources have not lost their value, and China seeks alternative ways of providing energy security. More information on the economic relations is available from the official data provided by the Russian Bureau of Statistics and the Ministry of Economic Development of the Russian Federation (GKS Official Statistics, 2018). There is not a lot of information available on the status of current joint investment projects. However, the Russian-Chinese Intergovernmental Commissions have produced some valuable reports that will also support the claims of the work. More economic data comes from the National Bureau of Statistics of China (Statistical Data, 2019), the Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China (MOFCOM Statistics, 2019), and the World Bank (World Bank, 2019). Statistics regarding trade volume were primarily acquired from OEC (2020), UN Comtrade Database (2020), and the World Integrated Trade Solution (2020).

Another branch of research is concerned with Russia-China relations' connection to other countries (Dadabaev, 2014). In other words, how does their relationship affect the behavior of other states or political entities like the United States or the European Union? Marcin Kaczmarski (2015) fills up for this topic with his book on the entirety of Russia-China relations and its effect on global affairs. In six chapters, he covers the domestic and foreign aspects of relations, regional initiatives, and global trends and power shifts that are produced by the bilateral talks. Tsygankov (2019) explains the Russian point of view on the entirety of Russian foreign policy and covers the issue of power and stability extensively. Another vital part of literature is connected with the Eurasian Economic Union, and a constellation of authors provide valuable contributions (Gabuev, 2016). From the Chinese perspective, "Belt and Road Inititative" is an essential economic project, and in some sense, it is a counterpart to the EAEU (Wilson, 2016). The research on this initiative is an inherently valuable addition to the discussion (Yu, 2017). Gabuev (2017) also provides significant insight into the structural factors inside the SCO: he corroborates information about the debate between the OBOR and the EAEU in an outstanding manner. The first chapter of his work tells the evolution of Russian perception of One Belt One Road Initiative, and the next chapters explain why these Russia and China might become "frenemies." In another article for Carnegie Endowment Center Gabuev (2016) explores how Russia has become the largest exporter of military technologies to China.

This article also examines the official SCO documentation from 2001 up to 2020, tracking differences between different versions of the document. Moreover, it inspects the prior documentation that has led to the establishment of the Shanghai Five, and later - SCO. The official documents vary in their types: they include conventions, declarations, resolutions, statements, communiquйs, agreements, and charters. Another valuable source of official information comes from the Bulletin of International Agreements, which is published by the Administration of the President of the Russian Federation. The journal, which was published since 1993, contains information on all of the signed multilateral and bilateral agreements of Russia. As Ambrosio (2017) notes, there is not much information on international agreements from the Chinese side, so the research primarily focused on the available texts in Russian. Zakaria (2019), Morrison (2013) and Krahmann (2003) provide insight into the global context of the international arena, contributing to the understanding of Russia and Chinese relations in the context of the West.

Methodology

The primary method used in this paper is qualitative analysis, namely synthetic analysis of primary and secondary sources. The research will closely work with official documents produced by the respective secretariat of the SCO, paying attention to the documents in the English, Russian, and Chinese languages and the differences between them. The first chapter will examine the status quo between Russia and China in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, so the employed approach would be the analysis of the official secretarial documentation like conventions, resolutions, and statements. Additionally, the research will refer to the list of bilateral agreements between Russia and China. A total of 142 bilateral agreements and 113 SCO legal documents were analyzed and codified. The results could be seen in the Appendices A and B of this work.

Usually, the main challenge in applying qualitative research in social sciences concerns the construction of a solid theoretical background. While statistics tend to speak for themselves, qualitative data rarely provides valuable insights without proper methodology. One of the ways to overcome the limitations of qualitative analysis is the codification of content. It is a process of transforming qualitative data into specific codes or themes that may describe the general intent of the text or the speaker. In general, this method is widely applied in interviews, but it is also applied in speeches. The acquired texts were read, codified, and divided into separate categories. For instance, "Agreement between the government of the Russian Federation and the government of the People's Republic of China on cooperation in exploration and use of outer space in peaceful purposes" was codified in the category of "Scientific cooperation." Ambrosio (2017) similarly conducted his research but focused instead on the interconnection of the legal framework inside the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and between Russia and China. His article proved to be a great point of reference, especially in the translation of the documents.

It was challenging to acquire official transcripts of representatives' speeches, as most of the meetings are behind closed doors. Available performances were obtained mostly through official government sources such as embassies or presidential press releases. These speeches were codified similarly, paying specific attention to the tone and wording.

When talking about the economic factors that affect the relationship, the paper will employ a few quantitative methods. At some point, the paper would have to reserve to more sophisticated approaches like data aggregation and data processing. The data originates from different sources, ranging from the official bureaus of statistics, Ministries, and international bodies like the World Bank (World Bank, 2019).

Chapter 1. Background of the Sino-Russian relations

The SCO is primarily a security organization that appeared as a result of successful cooperation between the members of the Shanghai Five, primarily from the results of successful cooperation in the sphere of military technology and military presence.The official documents (Moscow Declaration, 2003; Tashkent Declaration, 2004; Shanghai Declaration, 2005) reiterate the importance of the organization and how it was a relevant response to the external environment. Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the world had been unipolar, and the hegemon were the United States. The period in between the end of the Cold War and September 11, 2001 was famously proclaimed “the unipolar moment” (Krauthammer, 2002). This era of American political hegemony, however, was relatively brief. Fareed Zakaria (2019) observes that in 1990s no one expected China's rise: “It is easy to see in retrospect that Beijing would become the only seriousrival to Washington, but it was not as apparent a quarter century ago.” Russia, on the other hand, developed out of a weak and helpless state to a country with strong disruptive power. In 2002 it became apparent that there are new types of danger that threaten the global status of the USA. Invasion into Afghanistan and Iraq after the 9/11 events have marked a turning point in the structure of the global power relations.

New actors and new actions have contributed to the creation of new threats to international security (Wellens, 2003). The threat of a nuclear war had been the major issue of international security during the Cold War. However, on the eve of the twenty-first century it was replaced by terrorism, drug trafficking, new types of weapons of mass destruction, and possibility of conflicts on ethnic basis (Krahmann, 2003). The character of the threats had also changed: new threats presented danger not only to individual states but also generated trouble for transnational relations, targeting individuals and societies. Such was the background of the global world order, the backdrop of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

The SCO was designed to tackle the new types of threats and create an organization that would guarantee the security of the member-states. The Declaration on the Establishment of the SCO (2001) directly puts forward its main goals:

“Being firmly convinced that in the environment of dynamic development of processes of political multipolarity and economic and information globalization in the 21st century, upgrading the “Shanghai Five” mechanism to a higher level of cooperation will help in making more effective use of emerging possibilities and addressing new challenges and threats…”

Shanghai Convention (2001) defines the most imminent dangers in the global world order: terrorism, separatism, and extremism. These three types of threats will become instrumental for the formulation of the agenda of the SCO. Both Russia and China had already become familiar with these types of threats. Russia had to go through two Chechen wars, while China experienced turmoil on its Western border in the region of Xinjiang-Uygur district. The American invasion of Afghanistan, aimed to destroy the terrorist insurgencies was welcomed, but the problem has not yet been solved (Lukin, 2019).

Regarding the well-being of the global economy at the moment of the SCO establishment, American dominance was hardly challenged. Russia was economically weak after facing the collapse of the USSR and then suffering from the 1998 crisis. However, China was already reaping the successes of its policies of “opening up” that were started by Deng Xiaoping. China's economic growth averaged around 10% every year since 1979, and by 2001 the prospects of becoming the world's foremost manufacturer appeared (Morrison, 2013). The rising manufacturing sector accumulated significant demand for energy, and China became one of the largest buyers of fuel resources in the world. These demands have skyrocketed by now, according to the data from the International Energy Agency.

The founding states of the SCO had different reasons to establish the organization: while some countries remembered the crises that had a devastating effect on the economy, China had an opportunity to find new energy sources. The Charter of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (2002) thereby claims the economic cooperation to be one of the main vectors of development of the organization. Besides, the document addresses the environmental concerns and humanitarian issues that would enhance the diplomatic relations inside the organization.

Designed to combat terrorism, separatism and promote non-interference, the SCO seemed to become an alternative for the Western vision of the world order. Lukin (2015), for instance, notes that many countries observed the US behavior in the role of the international policeman, and “displeased with this state of affairs began building bridges to one another.” The Shanghai Cooperation Organization became one of such bridges with a non-Western set of principles. These principles are revisited several times (Declaration on the Establishment of the SCO, 2001; Charter of the SCO, 2002) and are respect for sovereignty, territoriality, non-interference in domestic affairs, equality of all states, and peaceful settlement of any disputes. These guiding values directly reflect the foreign policy preferences of the organization's largest powers, Russia, and China. Hence, this chapter will examine the roots of regionalist policies of both Russia and China in the early years of the organization.

As it was noted, Chinese regionalism was different from Western in the sense that it promoted a different set of values (Aris, 2016; Kavalski, 2016). Clarke (2010) observes the enactment of a “peaceful rise” doctrine, which was accompanied by three major lines of international policy: “preservation, prosperity, and power” (Wang, 2005). China sought integration to the international institutions to acquire political and economic benefits. The immediate strategy of the then-incumbent government was to focus on promoting the ideas of “multilateralism, integration and regionalism” (Clarke, 2010). China did not amass resources to redistribute power in the existing world order but placed a bet on its economic potential. Zheng Bijian (2002), one of China's most prominent political thinkers, emphasized that the development of the country should be associated with peace and not hegemony. Hegemony, as he argues, is a way that is doomed to failure. While it is complicated to sustain the peaceful rise of a state with a population of over 1 billion people, China should focus on keeping its intentions as clear as possible.

Li Peng, Chinese prime-minister in 1996 in the report on the Ninth Five-Year Plan, endorsed not only continuous re-structurization of the economy but also pointed out Chinese adherence to the policy of good neighbor with countries around the world (Li, 1996). The tone of the message is very categorical and committed:

“We shall continue to develop friendly co-operation with Russia and attach importance to letting the two economics complement each other. We shall develop good relations with Central Asia and other CIS countries. We shall continue to develop friendly co-operative relations with countries in Southeast Asia, South Asia and the South Pacific region as well as with all neighboring countries.”

Li Peng, Chinese prime-minister in 1996 in the report on the Ninth Five-Year Plan, endorsed not only continuous re-structurization of the economy but also pointed out Chinese adherence to the policy of good neighbor with countries around the world (Li, 1996). The tone of the message is very categorical and committed:

In the same speech, the Chinese prime-minister reiterates the importance of Chinese cooperation with the governments of third-world countries, providing full assistance, and developing new ways of cooperation. Already in 1996, Chinese officials have signified the course of Chinese foreign policy that would last up to this day. Furthermore, Bijian (2002) stated that China must stay committed to cooperation with its neighbors, and quotes a Chinese saying: "A close neighbor means more than a distant relative" (p.19). In his other speech, he promotes the idea of Asian-Pacific regional development communities based on common interests, and cooperation would help to promote security. Bijian (ibid.) then makes an important statement: China's peaceful rise has developed a new type of strategic thinking. The world should not be divided into spheres of influence anymore, but the relations between states should be based on common interests, strategic cooperation and common development. He then proposes a specific regional division of "labor." While Northeast Asia (China, Japan, North Korea, South Korea, Mongolia) focuses on the collective security ideas, Southeast Asia (Cambodia, Thailand, Laos, Vietnam, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines, East Timor, Brunei) should construct regional cooperation based on the market integration. Northwest Asia (Russia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan) will mark counterterrorism and economic cooperation as its agenda (p.36). Already in 2004, one of the principal Chinese foreign policy advisors has publicly affirmed the plan for future integration. In this framework of regional cooperation China would be the primary link between the counterparties.

While China was thriving, Russia experienced a maelstrom of problems outside of the political spectrum. After the dissolution of the USSR, it struggled to achieve political stability and what is more important - economic stability. In 1998 Russia went through a default, suffering a currency crisis, leading to the devaluation of the ruble (Chiodo & Owyang, 2002), and struggled to return on the right track. At first, the state looked for help in the Western world: Kozyrev, then the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia, was the initiator of the Russian turn to the West (Suslov, 2016). However, the transition that promised to eradicate the previous paradigms and become a full-time member of the Western world did not work out. Rejected as a rival partner for the leading nations of the West, Russia did not tolerate the role of a junior partner. As a result, it had to bear with the problems in the state on its own, and somehow preserve its national interests. While the West did not accept Russia as a new global power, the East was ready to re-launch its relations with the new government. With Vladimir Putin coming to power in 2000, Russia was keen on battling the consequences of the tumultuous 1990s and develop into a global power.

It would be useful to delve into Russian regional policies to understand its primary interests in the region. Russia has had a long history of relationship with the Central Asian states. Before 1991 they were all part of one state, and after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia wanted to preserve the existing connections between the countries. For instance, The Commonwealth of Independent States that was established on December 8 in 1991 not only accepted the sovereignty of the signing members but also put forward the ideas of cooperation (CIS Article 7, 1991) in various spheres. The agreement first signed by Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine then was ratified in most of the former republics. However, Turkmenistan, Georgia, and Ukraine left the organization at various periods. As Suslov (2016) shows, initially, Russia did not seek integration with the former parts of the Soviet Union, but after failing to connect with the West in 1993, finally approached its local partners. Although there are firm diplomatic ties established through the Commonwealth of Independent States, Russia considers the maintenance of an excellent relationship with Central Asia as one of the main priorities of international politics. In addition to the CIS as mentioned above, Russia signed the Collective Security Treaty in 1992 with Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. In 2002 the members of the agreement signed a charter that became the founding document of the Collective Security Treaty Organization. The organization put forward the idea of collective security: if a member is subject to international aggression or perceives a national threat, other states oblige to provide aid, including military assistance (Charter of the CSTO, 2002). CSTO would become a powerful Russian instrument in the provision of security in Central Asia.

Another attempt to preserve common ties and establish security became the establishment of the Shanghai Five group. Shanghai Five was a group of states consisting of the Russian Federation, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and the People's Republic of China, that participated in a series of multilateral agreements. One of the first steps towards the establishment of an overarching security institution was the agreement on increasing mutual trust in the military sector along the consequent borders in 1996. The agreement stated that participating sides would not use its borderline forces to conduct a military activity that could be perceived by the neighbor as a threat (Agreement between Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and China on Confidence Building in the Military Field in the Border Area, 1996). To a certain extent, this document had solidified the foundation of security relations in Central Asia: the sides promised to notify each other about the forthcoming military exercises and conditions for appropriate dislocation of the fleet in the neighboring waters.

Three years later, countries agreed on the reduction of military presence near the borders (Mutual Reduction of Military Forces in the Border Areas, 1999). Former Secretary-General of the SCO Rashid Alimov puts these agreements in the retrospective in an interview to TASS (Kirillov, 2016) and notes that the documents were vital in laying down the foundation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. The organization, in its turn, became an important regional actor.

Chapter 2. SCO: shared vision, different approaches

2.1 Security

Three main factors could be identified when talking about the structural relations between states: economic, military, and political. Contrary to societal and attitudinal factors, which refer to characteristics of nations and individuals, respectively, structural level of analysis examines the “… formal and informal structures or machinery for aggregating the values of a variety of individuals and groups. These factors determine how societal and attitudinal factors are channeled into decisions and actions” (Kelman, 1955). In other words, these are the factors that shape the decision-making process of a particular state. In this case, structural analysis of economic, military, and political dimensions is used to understand the patterns of decision-making processes in Russo-Chinese relations in the context of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

Security became the core idea of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and the official statements reiterate its importance. The SCO Charter Article 1 (2002) lists security issues among the primary goals of the organization alongside economic and political concerns. Article 2 (2002) describes the main principles of the international organization, namely mutual respect of sovereignty, independence, territoriality, non-interference in domestic policies, non-violent conflict settlement, deliberate refusal to exercise military dominance in a given region, and equality of all member-states. The second article is exemplary in projecting the guiding values of the organization. Furthermore, the next articles discuss the procedural and structural peculiarities, i.e., the executive and legislative bodies. In particular, Article 10 of the Charter mentions the emergence of a permanent SCO body Regional Anti-terrorist Structure (RATS), headquartered in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan (in 2003, the location was moved to Tashkent, Uzbekistan). As the official website of the organization indicates, the organization promotes the interaction of local authorities across borders in order to prevent the spread of terrorism, separatism, and other sources of threat. In 2004 states produce an agreement on combating illicit drug trafficking (Source XXXX) and, in 2009, sign a convention to facilitate cooperation in counter-terrorism (Source, XXXX). The latter document establishes the legal procedures, primarily the exchange of information, division of authority, and measures to constrain terrorist sentiments. In 2008 countries had also signed and ratified an agreement on the prevention of illicit distribution of weaponry. In 2009 agreement on protection of information was signed, followed by an agreement on combating crime in 2010. Continuation of the anti-terrorist and anti-trafficking policies resulted in new documents in 2015 and 2017, multiple round tables and discussions at different diplomatic levels.

Although terrorism is not a new phenomenon, it has acquired a new identity on the verge of the twenty-first century. Chalk (1999), in his paper on the evolving dynamic of terrorism, notes that the United States Department of Defense had first mentioned terrorism as one of the primary threats to national security only in 1997. There are two reasons, according to Chalk: the rising number of terrorist acts since the end of the Cold War and the increased lethality of employed methods (ibid.). The incidence rate has also increased due to the nearly simultaneous collapse of the Soviet camp, leading to the establishment of many sovereign states, provoking competition for power. Chalk lists Russia and Caucasus as one of the central regions of terrorist activity. Another reason for the increased number of violent activity has been the rise of “Islamic-inspired” terrorism. Russia and its neighbors have a sizeable Muslim population, and the possible secession of the Chechen region and consequent invasion has only contributed to the increase in the frequency of terrorism. Soviet and the US invasion in Afghanistan also had a detrimental effect on the national security of states in Central Asia and Russia. China experienced the same problems, too. In order to constrain and prevent future spread of terrorism, it embarked on a path to the containment of the Muslim population, particularly in the Xinjiang-Uygur region, which is known for strong secessionist sentiments.

In 2001 in Almaty countries released a statement regarding the 9/11 incident in New York, publicly denouncing terrorism and reaffirming the pledge to work against terrorist efforts (Source, XXXX) jointly. In 2002 states signed a document that establishes RATS (Appendix A). Moreover, RATS is given priority status, freeing it from taxation and other types of payments (excluding payments for the provision of services) on the acting territory. Declaration signed in Saint-Petersburg in the same year places emphasis on the security agenda, whereas it pays a little attention to economic or political factors. Chapters III and IV of the document discuss anti-terrorism cooperation, nuclear arsenal, and the situation in Afghanistan, and Asian Pacific Region prospects. Ministerial conferences in 2002 have produced communiquйs that are centered around the security agenda as well, focusing on drug trafficking and Afghanistan. While Russia and China are aware of the new types of threats, such as the security of information, the balance of power remains the main guiding principle in the relations of states (Kaczmarski, 2015). In the 2000s, two powers did not favor the presence of the United States in the region and have seen possible interference as a direct challenge to national security.

Turbulent Afghanistan became an important project for both Russia and China, especially in terms of recovering and helping the state to return to a protected status. The instability of the state could produce malevolent spillovers in the neighboring countries. Russia, in particular, did not appreciate the prospects of NATO enlargement and the spread of the US influence in the region concerning its national interests.

In 2005 the SCO-Afghanistan Contact Group was established but later suspended its activity in 2009. Nevertheless, the states have produced an action plan before the suspension, and the roadmap became a vital achievement because it considered increasing Afghanistan's regional activity. Khan (2010) notes that China and Russia, although generally unwilling to cooperate with the United States, were ready to partner in solving the Afghan crisis. Moreover, the involvement of India and Pakistan in solving the conflict could become instrumental in the regionalization of Afghanistan. Both are in close contact with the Afghan elites and could act as mediators in the negotiations (da Silva Reis & Simionato, 2013). Until the accession of India and Pakistan in 2017, a few actions were done to consolidate stability in the country. The Contact Group was revived in 2017, and up to this date has already convened three times. In 2019 the heads of the SCO member-states, which included Pakistan and India, have signed the roadmap for the SCO-Afghanistan Action Plan.

Overall, the character of security relations inside the Shanghai Cooperation Organization is rather pragmatic and guided by realist thinking. Two regional powers, Russia and China, share a mutual vision of a peaceful Central Asia and are opposed to any external interference in the area. To some extent, the security position of both is a response to American policies. The concordance in the vision of security, however, does not imply concordance in the methods of achieving it. While Russia worked out the security channels through bilateral and multilateral negotiations, China's involvement in the securitization was minimal (Kaczmarski, 2015). Russia has military agreements with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan on temporary dislocation of troops. Russia pays around $140 million every year to Kazakhstan for the use of military facilities, and $115 million are paid from using the Baikonur spaceport. Russia sees its military presence in Kazakhstan as a part of the national defense complex, while in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, Russian military facilities' goal is to support the security of the region (Rossiyskaya Voennaya Infrastruktura v Tsentralnoy Azii, 2017). Bases in Kant, Kyrgyzstan, and the 201st military base in Tajikistan are essential to the sustainability of peace in Central Asia (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004). Russia has also developed plans on loaning the Ayni airport in Tajikistan, but no official agreement has been signed yet (Panfilova, 2015).