The Central Asian (not including Uzbekistan) states and Russia are also part of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). Because of the entity's sole focus is security, military cooperation in the organization is far more developed than inside of the SCO. The members have produced agreements on joint military exercises as well as joint military troops. CSTO also pays attention to the same issues as the SCO: anti-terrorism, drug-trafficking, in addition to illegal migration and human trafficking (CSTO, 2019). It could be even implied that Russia advances the CSTO as the main security actor in Central Asia, overlapping with the SCO agenda (Torjesen, 2008).

In 2015 the SCO member-states developed a strategy on the development of the organization until 2025 (Development Strategy of the SCO until 2025, 2015). The document recognizes the necessity of a common strategy that would respond to the contemporary challenges of the world order:

“There will be a stronger correlation between security and prosperity of states. The complex nature of threats and challenges requires a collective approach to addressing them, as well as an awareness that it is impossible to ensure one's own security at the expense of others.”

The document encouraged the development of multilateral relations with dialogue partners, and further development of the political, economic, and security agenda. The strategy did not push any radically new points of agenda on the political agenda. The security dimension, however, makes an important statement regarding the proliferation of extremist, terrorist, and separatist ideas among the youth. Three years later, a separate standalone statement would be produced that condemns the spread of radical ideas among young people and calls for awareness and attention at this negative trend (2017). The Development strategy advances the ideas of cooperation in the investigation and prevention of economic or business-related crimes. The increased importance of the informational dimension of international relations was also reflected in the document, emphasizing the emergence of a crucial aspect of contemporary national defense: cybersecurity.

China, as Kaczmarski (2015; 2017) notes, has not developed a similar overarching structure in Central Asia. On the contrary, its activity in the provision of the security was minimal, mostly devoted to joint military exercises (Weitz, 2013). As a result, Russia could improve its relative position and achieve the role of the leader in regional security. China sees no danger in the Russian security expansion because the latter does not pursue any active regional policies. The accession of Pakistan and India to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization has not altered the relations between Russia and China but created new points for conflict between the members. While their inclusion has opened new windows for cooperation in Afghanistan, disagreements such as the territorial dispute in Kashmir stalls the consensus-based mechanism of decision-making in the SCO.

Bordachev (2017), in his article for the Valdai Club think tank, explores the consequences of India and Pakistan's accession and their future impact on the security of the organization. Both could significantly contribute to the SCO-Afghanistan Contact Group. For example, India had invested more than US$ 1 billion in the reconstruction projects in Afghanistan (Lukin, 2019). Pakistan maintained its stable relations with Afghanistan, and is also keen to reduce the risks of terrorist insurgencies on its North Border. India and Pakistan have also refreshed the SCO agenda while maintaining the general balance in the organization: Russia favored the idea of India's accession, while China promoted Pakistan. The main issue was to bring both parties simultaneously to avoid boycotts by one of the partners.

Russia and China had gradually increased their cooperation inside the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, strengthening security alliances. While both are not interested in a military alliance, they have successfully developed security relations within the SCO. Although the prospects of further cooperation in security remain shadowed, the success of the organization would result in the peaceful solution of the Afghanistan conflict.

2.2 Economic prospects

In the context of Central Asia, security and economy are deeply intertwined: on the one hand, there is interest in the mineral and fuel resources of the region, and on the other, there is a competition for influence. In comparison to the security agenda of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the economic cooperation lags far behind. Besides, the legal framework of security is far more advanced. Primarily the problem stems from the inherent conflict between the visions of the organization. While Russia has made its bet on the securitization of Central Asia, China perceives the region as a valuable economic partner. Central Asian states and Russia possess significant amounts of mineral resources and are especially rich in fuel and natural gas. The People's Republic of China requires much energy to sustain its economic growth and development and is keen on expanding its pool of suppliers. 

Even though Russia and its partners from the organization require Chinese finances and technology, countries continue to hold a certain degree of suspiciousness. Several problems come as a result: Russia and China become competitors for the energy resources in Central Asia, while the rest of the states are unwilling to become too dependent on either of the states. Nevertheless, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan all have increased their trade turnover with China (Picture 1). Russia is not an exception to the rule: the volume of trade with PRC has been on an upturn since the first bilateral agreements on trade in 1992. Most of the trade-related issues concern the energy sector, and fuels comprise a large share of China's import. WITS (2018) provides statistical data on 2018 Chinese imports of fuel: Russian Federation is the primary supplier of energy to the PRC, and fuels comprise a total of 71% of total imports from Russia. Nearly 62% of Chinese import from Uzbekistan is oil and its derivatives. A large share of Kazakhstan's export to China concerns natural gas supplies. 

Before the 2008 financial crisis, Russia had dominated the market, being nearly the sole buyer of natural gas from Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, which was later resold to Europe. China entered the competition later than Russia but managed to alter the status quo due to the financial crisis of 2008 (Kaczmarski, 2015). The Russian economy had suffered great losses and could not maintain its assistance on the pre-crisis level, which paved the road to China to become the largest energy consumer in the region. The demand for natural gas in Europe was falling, the price of gas decreased, and Russia abstained from ordering large quantities of fuel from Central Asia. Although Russia has maintained its energy relations with its regional counterparts, it was no longer the largest buyer on the market.

Moreover, the construction of pipelines that bypass Russian territory prevented Russia from supplying natural gas to Europe at the pre-crisis values. Chine newspaper Renmin Ribao ???±Ё (2011) expressed discontent with the Russian reaction to Chinese enlargement. The message deliberately claimed that China should not feel guilty for the incredible success and questions why Russia sold the latest nuclear submarines to Vietnam. Furthermore, the energy disputes in Central Asia are superfluous and groundless, and strategic partners should not pay attention to such petty things. Nevertheless, the energy sector is one of the drivers of the Russian economy, and the emergence of a new competitor on the market has undoubtedly decreased Russian comparative advantage in mineral resources.

While the SCO members have increased trade with each other, scholars usually believe there was much less agreement on the establishment of economic infrastructure inside the organization. Paradoxically, the number of official secretarial documents related or devoted economic cooperation has only been rising over the years, especially after the 2008-2009 crisis. While there were more security-centered documents before 2010, the need for the reconstruction and recovery after significant economic decline formed the agenda for the next decade. 

For instance, in 2009, during the SCO summit in Ekaterinburg (Appendix A), member-states have proposed a joint initiative to overcome the consequences of the financial crisis and to boost further development of regional economies. The agreement pushed the idea of catch-all multilateral trade cooperation, extensively covering the range of possible interaction: strengthening of customs infrastructure (agreements followed in 2014), development of transnational logistics systems (2014), and implementation of joint investment projects. From 2011 up to date, the economic cooperation was primarily discussed at the meetings of prime-ministers, where different initiatives were widely discussed. The investment agenda had been discussed inside the SCO Business Council and SCO Interbank Consortium, both established in the middle of the 2000s. 

Both organizations work to facilitate joint investment projects and promote interaction between financial institutions of partnering states and not the reduction of trade barriers or the establishment of regional free-trade areas. However, their functions were easily duplicated on the bilateral level, and these bodies remained relatively inactive. Furthermore, in the continuation of the vector of regional economic reconstruction, governments start to discuss the idea of establishing a common fund of mutual development inside the SCO and the idea of the SCO Development bank (Bishkek Communiquй, 2012; Tashkent Communiquй, 2013). 

Russia and China debated the necessity of these organizations. Russia opposed the establishment of the bank because China would similarly dominate the new entity how the United States exercise a large influence on the World Bank. The fund, however, promised zero to none benefits to China, and would also have a binding or a restricting character on the policy-making. Neither of the sides was interested in these proposals, and they have never come to life. 

Another economic project of the organization also received attention: In 2006, Putin advanced the idea of the SCO energy club that would mediate and harmonize the interests of international oil and gas producers (mid.ru). The project was put for public discussion in 2007 and received favorable reviews, and only Uzbekistan opposed the establishment of the Energy Club. Because the decision-making process in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization is consensus-based, the agreement was not passed. In 2011 five member-states decided to push the idea again: Uzbekistan stayed reluctant. Nevertheless, other SCO members convened three more times before the official signing of a Memorandum on the establishment of the Energy Club. Several dialogue partners and observing states have also signed the agreement, whereas Uzbekistan has rejected the offer. The Energy Club lists the following primary goals:

1. Development of the traditional energy industry

2. Research of renewable energy sources

3. Energy conservation

4. Energy security and sustainable energy development

5. Improvement of access to energy sources.

As of today, the results of this cooperation are yet to be seen. However, the potential of the Energy Club remains very high, especially after the accession of India and Pakistan to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which have opened new markets and new opportunities for mutual development. 

Failure to establish common ground on efficient economic development inside the SCO has led China to the initiation of other economic regional projects. In 2013 president Xi Jinping announced the enactment of SREB in Astana (Nur-Sultan) during his speech at the Nazarbayev University (Bitabarova, 2018), which marked a new stage of negotiations between Russia and China. Because president Xi Jinping delivered this message during his first visit to Russia and Central Asia, Russian officials considered this bold statement as a challenge. 

Gabuev (2016) explores the Russian reaction and finds that there were three main issues with SREB, OBOR, and BRI partnerships. The first reason was that policymakers feared that China would steal the agenda from the upcoming Eurasian Economic Union. The appearance of OBOR in the region could have driven cash flows in another direction. Another concern was that the new framework would develop at the expense of the Russian transportation system, namely the Trans-Siberian railroad. Russia could also barely compete with Chinese investors, so it feared that Russian economic presence would decrease. The Ukrainian crisis became the pivot point of Moscow's thaw towards the OBOR initiative. Even before the incident, Putin has proclaimed a turn to the East, and the economic sanctions had only sped up the changes in foreign policies. As a result, Russia developed the idea of cooperation of the Eurasian Economic Union with One Belt One Road initiative. Such a proposal allowed us to kill two birds with one stone: develop a preferable international institution and obtain access to the Chinese economic project. However, Gabuev (ibid.) notes that Russia has given such a proposal unilaterally, without the consideration of other state-members, which had stalled the talks. 

As it was already mentioned, the SCO member-states have produced a document that postulates the vector of the organization's development until 2025. While the strategy is described in relatively vague terms, in 2019, a similar document was written. However, the new strategy was devoted solely to the topic of multilateral economic cooperation. The text of the document is not published yet, but the content of the text is intriguing. 

Overall, it could be claimed that the Shanghai Cooperation Organization has failed to establish a viable economic framework that would satisfy all member-states. Most of the economic breakthroughs occurred in the context of bilateral agreements: China received access to the resource-intensive region, while Russian influence has decreased. The lag of the economic agenda behind the political and security developments resulted in an increase in the number of agreements, especially after the financial crisis of 2008-2009. However, even with strong legal support, member-states had to find alternatives to the economic development of the region. 

The difference in the Russian and Chinese perception of the Shanghai Cooperation organization becomes even more evident by looking at the speeches of the official representatives. For instance, Putin's speech in 2019 in Bishkek sounds very committed when talking about the security agenda:

“We fully support the plan to expand the organisation's security, economic and humanitarian cooperation with Afghanistan, as reflected in the relevant roadmap to be signed today. We aim to contribute in every way to the revival of the SCO-Afghanistan Contact Group's activity.” (Putin, 2019)

In the meantime, he is more accurate and cautious in making strong claims about the economic dimension: Putin is using hedging words like “plan to”, “could” and “considering”. Moreover, he makes a remark when talking about the China's Belt and Road initiative:

“We see a promising potential in integrating the Eurasian Economic Union with China's Belt and Road project with a future aim of building a larger Eurasian partnership and an open and equal constructive cooperation space based on the principles and norms of international law without any political or economic bias, but with consideration of each other's legitimate interests.”

Overall, Putin remains very reserved and stays true to the Russian vector of the promotion of security. Even if one looks at the text of the former president Medvedev's speeches in 2009 and 2010, one could notice that the discourse is similar to Putin's.

President Xi is exemplary in contrasting the attitude with the Russian officials. Xinhua News provides a transcript of the President Xi's speech at the Qingdao Summit (2018). His speech reflects stronger sentiments: Xi makes wide use of the strong obliging verbs like “should” or “need”. Furthermore, his speech is proactive: he announces the establishment of a special lending facility inside the Inter-bank Consortium.

It could be argued that outside of the SCO, Russia, and China had created a broader framework for economic interaction. However, as the satisfaction with the organization's performance had not been increasing, both sides decided to discuss further matters on bilateral terms or through other economic institutions. Policies that could not be passed within a multilateral framework go down to the vis-а-vis negotiations. However, this does not necessarily infer that Russia and China will abandon their efforts to construct an efficient economic agenda inside the SCO. 



Chapter 3. Outside of the SCO

The history of bilateral relations between Russia and China started far before the establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. To a large extent the success of the relations was guaranteed by the rapprochement of the USSR and the People's Republic of China. For instance, one of the foundational documents of the SCO, Agreement between Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and China on Confidence Building in the Military Field in the Border Area (2016) refers to the previous arrangement from 1990 (Agreement on the Guiding Principles on the Mutual Reduction of Military Presence).

In 1992 Yeltsin and Jiang Zemin signed a joint declaration on the foundation of relations between Russia and China during the Russian's three day visit in Beijing(Wudunn, 1992; Kalashnikova & Serapionova, 1992). The official document stated that both countries perceive each other as equal partners that will develop their foreign policies in accordance with the “good neighbor” concept. In addition, parties promised not to participate in third-party military or security alliances against the signing country. Another crucial feat of Sino-Russian relations was Russian affirmation of Taiwan being a territory of the Mainland China (?ВЅ). In addition they solved out the border demarcation problem, and agreed on reducing the number of troops along the border. The agreement also covered cooperation in economic sector, including joint enterprises and investments. The sides have produced a similar declaration in 1994, and later in 1996. The document signed in 1996 has a separate section devoted to the bilateral relations of the states. Russia and China had agreed on the concordance of the vision of the world order, and had reaffirmed their respect towards the concept of sovereignty and territoriality.

There is a total number of 142 agreements signed in between 1992 and 2018 (Appendix B, Bulletin of International Agreements, 2020). In contrast to the SCO, one of the most discussed topics between Russia and China is economic cooperation (Appendix C, Table 1).

The second most frequent topic is the mechanism of organizational procedures during the meetings between the representatives of the governments. Border regulation and transit agreements are primarily focused on the demarcation of the borders between Russia and People's Republic of China. Additionally the states have discussed checkpoint procedures.While the SCO is an organization whose documents constantly mention security, there are only 12 bilateral agreements related to the same issue since 1992. Some of the discussion of security was moved to the SCO agenda, for instance, the agreement on cooperation in combating illegal drug trafficking and abuse of psychotropic substances, signed in 1996. The main Russian products of export were mineral fuel, wood products and ferrous metals. In return Russia imported machinery, clothing and other essential goods.

The economic agenda outside of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization has been extensively expanded. Russia and China have signed multiple bilateral agreements on trade and economy relations (Bulletin of International Agreements, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1996, 1997, 1997-2000, 1999, 2001-2005, 2010) that regulate the trade cash flows. In addition Russia and the PRC have worked extensively in the sector of joint investment projects. Charap, Drennan & Noлl (2017) illustrate the spectre of bilateral agreements in the energy sector. After becoming a subject of international sanctions, Russia compensated its losses with the help of China, who became a major investor in the Russian fuel and mineral industry. In 2014 Russia and China have sealed an agreement regarding the latter's investment into a Yamal LNG project led by Novatek that later became a subject of sanctions. Chinese National Petroleum Corporation and the Silk Road Fund acquired 20.0% and 9.9% stakes respectively (ibid., p. 29). In the same year both sides finalized a deal on a 30-year liquid natural gas supplycontract, powered by the newly constructed and widely advertised “The Power of Siberia” pipeline. Nevertheless, China did not invest as much in other sectors of Russian economy. It could be implied that PRC's aims behind the provision of loans or participation in joint projects areguided by pure realist rationale. Charap, Drennan & Noлl claim that China actually does not need Russian natural gas because it has a plenty of other sources available: “Russia needs to export the gas much more than China needs to import it.”As explained earlier in the second chapter, China has found new sources of natural gas in Central Asia: not only Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan but also Turkmenistan.

The Intergovernmental Russian-Chinese Commission on Investment Cooperation provides significant insight into the portfolio of joint projects.Convening for the first time in 2014 (Ministry of Economic Development, 2014), it has resulted in the mutual discussion of prospective projects.Last November the sixth meeting took place, where states discussed the status of 70 investment projects with total sum of investments reaching $112 billion dollars (RDIF, 2019).However, Russian Direct Investment Fund does not disclose the list of participating projects and the status of negotiations. Chinese Investment Corporation (CIC) provides no data as well.

Many of these investments concern the development of the Russian Far East and the neighboring Chinese provinces. Zuenko (2018) observes that the Chinese cautious approach towards investments in Russian infrastructure persists from the Chinese side. Most of the agreements coming from the meetings of the intergovernmental commissions are not obligatory except for those signed at the highest level like the construction of the bridge or the cable car over the Amur river.While Zuenko suggests that the countries have chosen the slow and steady way to implement a successful framework, it is doubtful that even the agreed projects would come into life in the foreseeable future.

Belt and Road Initiativerelations with the Eurasian Economic Union could be considered one of the better examples of cooperation. As mentioned previously, Russia approached the OBOR through the lens of cooperation with Eurasian Economic Union. There were two main reasons for a such proposal:

1) One Belt One Road implementation was inevitable, and Russia did not want to miss out on the economic opportunity completely

2) Russia accepted the rise of Chinese economicpresence in Central Asia but found a compensatory compromise that would not be considered unacceptable by the PRC

As it was mentioned earlier, Russian offer was unilateral, and other members of the Eurasian Economic Union felt left out of the picture. Nevertheless, the states were able to push through the negotiations to a de

Somepart of security agenda lies outside of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization's competence becauseRussia and China have enjoyed a higher degree of development than their other SCO counterparties, they choose to discuss such matters tкte-а-tкte. Most of the security agenda in the relations between Russia and China take form in military cooperation.Gabuev & Kashin (2017) state that Chinese investment in Russian weapons was instrumental in the development of the military sector during the nuclear, while China could refurnish and replenish its military arsenal. With a short intermission in the middle of 2000s Russia has continued its partnership and provision of military technologies. The main factor that influences the bilateral cooperation in this sector is that Russia still has a higher level of military development compared to its Chinese counterpart and can afford sharing some of the blueprints. One of the results of such partnership was the HQ-9 anti-aircraft missile system that was based on the Russian C-300ПМУ-1 complex. An example of a recent partnership is the joint design of software for an early-warning radar which of China currently has no analogue. Baklitskiy (2019) also reports that China has become one of the main buyers of Russian contemporary military weaponry: it has recently acquired Su-35 and C-400 anti-aircraft missile complexes (Interfax, 2019). Countries have also agreed on the mutual notification of ballistic missile launches and space launch vehicles in 2009. The agreement is supposedly being extended, with plans to develop an agreement in the mutual notification of third-party launches circulating in the Russian media.

It could be argued that Russian and Chinese relations have been more fruitful than the relation outside of the SCO. The only problem is that if Russia does not participate in the regional economic initiatives, bilateral trade and joint investment projects would not compensate for the losses. Russian exports to China primarily comprise fuel and mineral imports, and while China has enough suppliers, Russia may end up in a situation when the demand for the natural gas and oil will drastically drop. The economic asymmetric relationship inside and outside of the SCO forces Russia to participate in the BRI project. While military cooperation is still valued by China, it may soon become obsolete due to China's advancements in the technical sector. Hence, the Far East and Central Asia are still the only two relevant points of tangencies. It would be crucial for Russia to understand what is going to be the next step.



Conclusion

The article aimed to understand the real character of the relations between Russia and China within and outside the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.Both states hold an asymmetrical view of the organization, with Russia placing emphasis on security while China favors economic development.The existing partnership, however, does not hold on the cooperation between the states: in the current position PRC already economically dominates Russia, and the gap in development would only increase.It could be argued that Russia requires Chinese cooperation more than China needs Russia. Russia struggles to counterbalance China, and has seriously reevaluated its capabilities. Inclusion of Pakistan and India to the organization would improve the leverage against China but if the relations with Central Asian states become fragile, Russia will lose most of its power in the region.

Moreover, the interaction outside of the organization remains weak as well. Cooperation between theEurasian Economic Union and the "One Belt One Road" initiative is very slow and not as effective as it could be. If Russia eventually misses the train of BRI due to the lack of coordination in the EAEU, it will suffer serious economic losses. It is necessary to work out a viable economic agreement that would satisfy all of the members of the union and startreal initiatives with China.

Several vital inferences are stemming from the Russian-Chinese cooperation inside the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. First of all, the organization resulted in a breakthrough in the security of Central Asia. Member-states have established a strong structure for dealing with national and transnational threats. Although the solution to the Afghanistan conflict has not been found, the organization managed to overcome the crisis in the 2010s. The accession of India and Pakistan is expected to produce a beneficial effect on the peacemaking process. The common vision of both Russia and China on the importance of a stable Afghanistan will drive the security agenda of the organization until the conflict is solved, and there may be hope that the resolution will come about in the foreseeable future. Besides Afghanistan, there were breakthroughs in the cooperation on new types of threats, particularly resistance to epidemics and informational security.

The dimension of economic cooperation remains less optimistic. China continues to invest heavily in the region but does so outside of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. PRC's partners in the SCO remain reluctant to the projects of the liberalization of trade and sign non-committal agreements that have no binding power. The non-permanent bodies of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization do not seem to be effective: the Business Council and SCO Interbank Consortium's functions remain very limited. Russia, however, remains dependent on the Chinese consumption of energy: Chinese imports of fuel from Russia are very high, and China has already found alternative suppliers of energy: Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan. Russia will have to adapt to sharing the Central Asian market with China, and must carefully consider the future of its energy sector.

Despite the fact that the SCO is one-sided, many agreements produce no visible effects or are non-committal, there are no alternatives to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. This fact is proved by both Russia and China, who do not develop other regional frameworks on security. They do not reject the prospects of further cooperation.While the economic agenda is not the strongest feature of the international organization, the security dimension is expanding: Russia and China together with other member-states, including Pakistan and India,are working on the solution to the Afghan conflict. Even though the Russo-Chinese relations are asymmetrical, the cooperation persists.



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Appendix A (List of SCO Secretariat documents)

#	Date	Document Type	Level	Place	Main Theme
1	15/06/01	Convention	President	Shanghai	SCO Regulatory Procedures
2	14/06/01	Declaration	President	Shanghai	Establishment of the SCO
3	15/06/01	Statement	President	Shanghai	Uzbekistan Accession to the SCO
4	14/09/01	Statement	Government	Almaty	Condemnation of the 9/11 Events
5	07/01/02	Statement	Foreign M
6	07/06/02	Charter	President	Saint-Petersburg
7	07/06/02	Agreement	Government	Saint-Petersburg	Establishment of RATS
8	07/06/02	Declaration	President	Saint-Petersburg
9	23/10/02	Communiquй	Foreign M
10	29/04/03	Information	Foreign M
11	05/09/03	Communiquй	Foreign M
12	23/09/03	Communiquй	Prime M
13		Declaration	President	Moscow
14	23/04/04	Information	Foreign M
15	17/06/04	Agreement	Government		Drug trafficking
16	17/06/04	Declaration	President	Tashkent
17	17/06/04	Convention	Government	Tashkent
18	23/09/04	Communiquй	Prime M
19		Provision	Government		Observer status
20	25/02/05	Communiquй	Foreign M	Astana
21	05/07/05	Declaration	President	Astana
22	26/10/05	Communiquй	Prime M	Moscow
23	26/10/05	Agreement	Government	Moscow	Liquidating the consequences of catastrophes
24	15/05/06	Information	Foreign M	Shanghai
25	15/06/06	Agreement	Government	Shanghai	Education
26		Declaration	President		5 Year Ann.
27	15/06/06	Provision	President	Shanghai
28	15/10/06	Communiquй	Prime M	Dushanbe
29	09/07/07	Information	Foreign M	Bishkek
30	16/08/07	Agreement	Government	Bishkek	Cultural Development
31	16/08/07	Declaration	President	Bishkek
32	16/08/07	Treaty	President	Bishkek	Good Neighbor Policy
33	16/08/07	Communiquй	President	Bishkek
34	05/10/07	Memorandum	Government	Dushanbe	CSTO partnership
35	02/11/07	Agreement	Government	Tashkent	Customs
36	02/11/07	Communiquй	Prime M	Tashkent
37	25/07/08	Information	Foreign M	Dushanbe
38	28/08/08	Agreement	Government	Dushanbe	Weapons
39	28/08/08	Declaration	President	Dushanbe
40		Provision	Government		Partnership
41	28/08/08	Communiquй	President	Dushanbe
42	30/10/08	Communiquй	Prime M	Astana
43	15/05/09	Information	Foreign M	Moscow
44	16/06/09	Convention	Government	Ekaterinburg	Counter-terrorism
45	16/06/09	Declaration	President	Ekaterinburg
46	16/06/09	Agreement	Government		Cybersecurity measures
47	16/06/09	Communiquй	President	Ekaterinburg
48	14/10/09	Communiquй	Prime M	Beijing
49	14/10/09	Statement	Government	Beijing	Fighting infectious diseases.
50	14/10/09	Initiative	Government	Beijing	Crisis Recovery
51	22/05/10	Information	Foreign M
52	11/06/10	Information	President	Tashkent	10th Presidential Meeting
53		Provision	Government		Accession mechanism
54	11/06/10	Agreement	Government	Tashkent	Cooperation in Agriculture
55	11/06/10	Agreement	Government	Tashkent	Fighting Crime
56	11/06/10	Declaration	President	Tashkent	10th Presidential Meeting
57	25/10/10	Communiquй	Prime M	Dushanbe
58	14/05/11	Information	Foreign M	Almaty
59	15/06/11	Information	President	Astana	10 Year Anniversary
60	15/06/11	Declaration	President	Astana	10 Year Anniversary
61	07/11/11	Communiquй	Prime M	Saint-Petersburg
62	07/11/11	Statement	Prime M	Saint-Petersburg	Statement regarding the world economy
63	11/05/12	Information	Foreign M	Beijing
64	07/06/12	Declaration	President	Beijing	Prosperity
65	07/06/12	Information	President	Beijing
66	05/12/12	Communiquй	Prime M	Bishkek
67	13/07/13	Information	Foreign M	Cholpon-Ata
68	13/09/13	Information	President	Bishkek
69	13/09/13	Declaration	President	Bishkek
70	13/09/13	Agreement	Government	Bishkek	Cooperation in Science
71	29/11/13	Statement	Prime M	Tashkent	Transport
72	29/11/13	Communiquй	Prime M	Tashkent	12th PM Meeting
73	31/06/2014	Information	Foreign M	Dushanbe
74	12/09/14	Declaration	President	Dushanbe
75	12/09/14	Agreement	Government	Dushanbe	Logistics cooperation
76	12/09/14	Information	President	Dushanbe
77	15/12/14	Communiquй	Prime M	Astana	13th PM Meeting
78		Provision	Government		Symbolic
79		Statement	President		WWII 70
80	03/06/15	Information	Foreign M	Moscow
81	10/06/15	Information	President	Ufa
82	10/06/15	Agreement	Government	Ufa
83	10/07/15	Declaration	President	Ufa
84	15/12/15	Statement	Prime M	Chengzhou	RTAs
85	15/12/15	Communiquй	Prime M	Chengzhou	14th PM Meeting
86		Statement	Government		Drug trafficking
87		Strategy	Government		SCO Development Plan
88	24/05/16	Information	Foreign M	Tashkent
89	24/06/16	Information	President	Tashkent
90	24/06/16	Programme	Government	Tashkent	Tourism development
91	24/06/16	Declaration	President	Tashkent	15 Years Ann.
92	03/11/16	Communiquй	Prime M	Bishkek
93	21/04/17	Information	Foreign M	Astana
94	09/06/17	Declaration	President	Astana
95	09/06/17	Statement	President	Astana	Counter-terrorism
96	09/06/17	Information	President	Astana
97	20/09/17	Information	Foreign M	New York	UN Meeting
98	01/12/17	Communiquй	Prime M	Sochi
99	24/04/18	Information	Prime M	Beijing
100	10/06/18	Information	President	Qingdao
101	10/06/18	Statement	President	Qingdao	Trade Procedure Simplification
102	10/06/18	Declaration	President	Qingdao
103	10/06/18	Statement	President	Qingdao	Resisting Epidemics
104	10/06/18	Statement	President	Qingdao	Message to Youth
105	10/06/18	List	President	Qingdao	Ratification
106	24/08/18	Statement	Jud M	Cholpon-Ata	6th MofJ Meeting
107	12/10/18	Communiquй	Prime M	Dushanbe	17th PM Meeting
108	29/04/19	Communiquй	Def M	Bishkek
109	14/06/19	List	President	Bishkek
110	14/06/19	Declaration	President	Bishkek
111	14/06/19	Information	President	Bishkek
112	19/06/19	Statement	Jud M	Sochi	14th MofJ Meeting
113	02/11/19	Communiquй	Prime M	Tashkent	18th PM Meeting

The table summarizes in a chronological order all of the publicly available SCO documents produced by the Secretariat of the organization. The second column indicates the date of signing, third specifies the type of the document, and the fourth shows the seniority level of the meeting. Themes described in the sixth column provide information on the main preoccupation of the document.

Sources: Secretariat Documents. (2019, November 2)

Declaration on the Establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. (2001, June 14)

McGrath, G. (2020, March 26). https://www.express.co.uk/news/world/1260947/emmanuel-macron-coronavirus-eu-news-covid-19-schengen-von-der-leyen. In Express . Retrieved from https://www.express.co.uk/news/world/1260947/emmanuel-macron-coronavirus-eu-news-covid-19-schengen-von-der-leyen



Appendix B

#	Date	Document name (English)	Theme
1	05/05/92	Protocol between the government of the Russian Federation and the government of the People's Republic of China on trade and economic cooperation in 1992	Economic cooperation
2	19/06/92	Agreement between the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China on mutual legal assistance in civil and criminal cases	Judicial
3	18/12/92	Agreement between the government of the Russian Federation and the government of the People's Republic of China on the provision of state credit for the supply of commodities from China to Russia (100 million renminbi)

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