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NATIONAL RESEARCH UNIVERSITY “HIGHER SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS”

Faculty of World Economy and International Relations

Bachelor thesis

Arctic as a region of cooperation & competition since 2013

Larina Ksenia

Supervisor

Doctor of Sciences in Political Science

Bratersky Maxim

Moscow 2020



Table of Contents

international arctic heininen strategy

Abstract

Introduction

Literature review

Methods

Main body

1. Concepts

1.1 Soft power and hard power

1.2 Security

1.3 Regional security complex

1.4 Securitization

1.5 Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)

1.6 Blue Economy

1.7 Science diplomacy

1.8 Arctic Exceptionalism

1.9 Arctic Paradox

1.10 Northeast Passage, Northwest Passage and the Transpolar Sea Route

1.11 Heininen's framework

2. International organizations and forums

2.1 Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC)

2.2 International Arctic Science Committee (IASC)

2.3 Arctic Circle

2.4 Arctic Economic Council (AEC)

2.5 Arctic Council

2.6 International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES)

2.7 Northern Research Forum (NRF)

2.8 Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS) or the Finnish Initiative

2.9 Arctic Frontiers

2.10 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)

3. States

3.1 Russian Federation

3.2 Iceland

3.3 United States of America

3.4 Canada

3.5 Finland

3.6 Norway

3.7 Denmark

3.8 Sweden

3.9 European Union

3.10 China

3.11 Scotland

Outcomes

References



Abstract

In recent years the notions of both Poles - North and South - have become more and more frequent. Yet while Antarctica is still an unexplored and relatively stable region, the same cannot be said about the Arctic. The Arctic is a captivating issue - global warming, the opening of sea routes and passages, military concerns, economic advantages, predictions of vast mineral deposits, territorial disputes, usage of fisheries, lives of indigenous populations - all that contributes to this hot topic. More and more countries and even specific regions develop and publish their Arctic strategies. How can researchers possibly access such a vast ocean of information? For me, the best way seems to be the country-based approach and comparative analysis of what is each state's policy towards the Arctic region. The `New North' awaits - it is up to us to uncover it. The sustainable future of the Arctic is on everybody's mind yet is hard to achieve.



Introduction

`From an investment standpoint, the average economic rate of growth in the Arctic region is the highest in the world, relative to any country, or any continent… [the Arctic is] the best investment opportunity of the last 12,000 years, ' said Scott Minerd, a chief investment officer of the firm Guggenheim Partners. Although in 2020, the world is going through an unprecedented crisis, the firms, governments, and non-governmental organizations are still all looking at the Arctic with their hopes high. This attention can be both productive for the region's development - and can be harmful as well. Although almost all parties officially say that they would prefer the region demilitarized, being a scientific laboratory, and well as a hub of transportation routes, these words do not always result in according to actions. The Arctic is already a rich region when it comes to natural resources, and studies expect that there is more to that. No doubt that different parties would want to fight over potential valuable resources. The Arctic is also yet a disputable region because not all borders between states were settled. The Arctic is a fragile region not only because of a unique eco-system that is proved to be threatened by climate change and rising temperatures but also because it is home to many indigenous people with unique cultural practices. To preserve the Arctic also means to preserve people, their lives, their unique cultures. `Blue Economy' and `Blue Ecosystem' are only a couple of many terms that are being applied to the most desired version of the Arctic in the nearest future. Nevertheless, many challenges remain on the path towards this sustainable future.

The question of my research is, `What are the priorities of the Arctic states in the region?'. This is a question about the evolution of these strategies, their interaction with each other, and the results that they have produced or are yet aiming to achieve. This is also a question about the theoretical interpretation of Arctic strategies - are states acting according to the doctrine of, say, offensive realism in international relations? Or would it be more appropriate to access states' policies through postmodernist discourse and deconstruction of actors' interests? This is also a question about what each state values the most in the Arctic and what are the most securitized issues of the region for each actor involved. I expect to conclude that the blatant realism-liberalism theoretical dichotomy is not suitable in the situation when actors, meaning states, are pursuing very different, as I will demonstrate, policies. I hypothesize that for each Arctic state, there is a specific interest that affects its Arctic policy the most. Say, for Canada, the main factor is the desire of the state to prove its historical and cultural connection with the Artic to be genuinely significant and demonstrate that not only Russia and the United States are the `powerful Northern' actors. For Denmark, the expansion of territory and relations with Greenland are the most critical cornerstones of policy formation.

This paper's main body is divided into three parts. The first part introduces the concepts that are usually used in relation to the Arctic. This is the theory part. The second one explores different cases of institutions and organizations that operate in the Arctic. It is impossible to talk about what states do and strive to achieve individually but to omit the crucial platforms for the states' cooperation. The third part focuses on eight Arctic states and some more regions, and their approaches towards the Arctic. I analyze states' strategies using the framework of Heininen (2012), updating it to the current state of events. I will also discuss non-Arctic states and actors such as China or the European Union since the Arctic is gaining more and more attention from the non-Arctic states as well.



Literature review

Paper by Avango, Nilsson, and Roberts (2013) is a prominent example of postmodernism and possible methodological deconstruction of projects for Arctic development. Deconstruction is valuable because it helps to critically examine the interests of actors and worldviews and narratives they project. Authors emphasize that `describing' scenarios is almost the same as creating visions for the future of the Arctic. The article talks a lot about 'discourse of Arctic', but also incorporates more common viewpoints on the future development of the region. For instance, the article states that interest in the Arctic is increasing due to climate change which will provide new possibilities for the usage of the region. Both the extraction of natural resources and shipping will be - and already are - affected. Authors identify three `components of the current discourse' which help them access the region and deepen the understanding of it. Those components are Voices, Resources, and Governance. Voices are the actors themselves, those agents of discourse who act and whose decisions are making the impact on the Arctic. Resources are objects with which actors interact, both animate and inanimate. Governance is `structural features' which set the rules for Voices-Resources and Voices-Voices interactions; processes, structures, institutions, and organizations. All three components are in dynamic relation to each other, they move and interact together. Authors use agent-network theory, which values relations and postulates that nothing can exist outside relations. Permanently moving and shifting network of interactions of Voices and Resources ruled by Governance is the vision of Arctic that Avango, Nilsson, and Roberts (2013) promote. A future vision of Arctic for the authors is 'narrations of physical and human geographies in the near or distant future, and implicitly the processes through which actors attempt to realize those futures'. Since the future is seen as `narration', language plays a major role. Avango, Nilsson, and Roberts (2013) use cases Spitsbergen, resources in Russian North and whaling to illustrate the constant dynamic of Voices-Resources-Governance.

Perhaps, no author would argue that the Arctic is in any degree a stable region. Almost all the works and papers I've encountered acknowledge the present rapid change and a certain degree of volatility that comes along. Changing extrapolation and usage of energy resources, varying transport routes, volatile borders and questioned continuations of shelves, climate change and melting ice, changes in the security of the region. States do usually respond to such changes by altering their Northern policies and strategies. Even if we take into account only Arctic states - those who are influenced the most and who, in turn, influence the most - the web of interactions, cooperation and conflicts seem too complicated to untangle. That is why works that attempt to highlight the main points and intersections of states' interrelations are so vital to me. Such is the work by Heininen (2012). While it is outdated, it still provides a useful framework for analyzing newer states' strategies supplemented by tables and extensive research. First, the work lays out the main principles of Arctic policies for each of the eight Arctic states. It stresses the ambivalence of Canada and Iceland, Danish relationships with Greenland, aspiration of Finland to integrate its technology to improve winter transportation, the desire of Norway to cooperate with Russia, American fear to fall behind Russia after the expedition of 2007 and so on. Heininen (2012) also analyses the emerging Arctic strategy of the European Union and other actors interested in the region. Second, the paper proved an extensive comparative study of the outlined Arctic strategies. As Borlase (2010) notices, there are two fundamental `points of discussion that are most often references within Arctic geopolitics: that of conflict and cooperation'. Heininen (2012) concludes with several points (valid only up to the time of publication of this work). National security and sovereignty are the main objectives for five littoral states. Sweden, Iceland, Finland, and the EU never mention national security but instead talk about comprehensive security. All states stress the importance of economic development (especially regional development and enhancement of regional infrastructure) and include it in their Arctic strategies. Russia, the USA, Finland, and Iceland all prioritize the issues of transportation, but only Russia and Iceland talk about aviation. While all strategies acknowledge the presence and significance of environmental issues, only Russia sees them as an objective. Preservation of a suitable living environment for the `peoples' (sometimes referred to as `indigenous peoples') is also a common priority. Finally, all states agree on the importance of international cooperation, especially through the Arctic Council.

There is a group of documents, presentations, and researches that form a body of `what is it that the Arctic is so valued for?' papers. There is not the main part of my work; however, I believe that those documents are of great value, nonetheless. Indeed, the Arctic is important because of the military base and transport sea route. But the region is also experiencing an increase in popularity due to the extraction of natural resources. So, what are those resources? And what are the possible yet still not found resources which states only hope to acquire? The work by Bloymeyer et al. (2015) helps us understand it. This study incorporates issues of fisheries (key species, resilience, the ecosystem in general) and climate change (changing temperature and subsequent change in ice mass, the salinity of water, effect on fish). Then the authors move to predictions and forecasting, including the change that the future will bring upon communities of indigenous people. The report indicates that the entire `Arctic marine ecosystem is fragile and poorly studied'. Authors highlight the consensus of experts in the field that rising temperatures will contribute to increased productivity in the region, not only because of the broadening of sea routes but also due to `borealisation' of the fish community. As Fossheim, Primicerio, Johannesen et. al. (2015) explain this phenomenon - `the recent warming in the Barents Sea has led to a change in spatial distribution of fish communities, with boreal communities expanding northwards at a pace reflecting the local climate velocities'. Hence, some species will extend (and already are extending) their area of living which will, in turn, provide for a bigger amount of catch. Authors highlight the `structural shift' that borealisation is bringing along. Bloymeyer et al. (2015) also indicate that the real current amounts of catch are estimated to be `considerably greater' than those reported to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). The numbers provided by Zeller et al. (2011) are 75 times higher than the catches reported to the FAO.

It is impossible to talk about the Arctic and not to talk about the Arctic Council. Since it is not a new institution, there is plenty of relevant literature on this topic. Bloom (1999) describes the history of the establishment of the Arctic Council and outlines the fourth main `understandings' reached and documented in the 1996 Ottawa Declaration. Those are environmental protection, sustainable development program, encouragement of inclusion in the working process indigenous peoples and biennial chairmanship. Bloom (1999) also discusses the role of the Council as a `high-level forum' which didn't acquire any `legal personality' and cannot be considered as an international organization - yet remains influential. The authors outline the advantages and disadvantages of such informal cooperation, thus presenting a comprehensive view of the Arctic Council at the time the article was written. Koivurova (2012) goes further and names the order in which the Arctic Council has created an `imagines international regional community'. While this definition might seem too poetic, it nevertheless references to the status of the Arctic Council as intergovernmental, not an international organization. Koivurova (2012) stresses the importance of specific usage of soft law which allowed the Council to include indigenous people in the decision-making process. Up to 2012, the author believes, the Arctic Council has been successful in tackling environmental issues. Council also uses widely science and technological innovations to deepen cooperation in the region. Still, there is evident lack of communication and a certain degree of estrangement between the Council and actual decision-makers. Dodds (2013) writes about the inclusion of new permanent observers into the Arctic Council which are China, Japan, South Korea, and India. The author notices that since the establishment of the Council it has been called 'one of the most progressive regional bodies in the world'. The article indicates the main interests of states which include enhancing intergovernmental cooperation and creating a plan for the case of `oil disaster'. Dodds (2013) also talks about pressure from outside groups and organizations which the Arctic Council experiences - one such example is Greenpeace and their `Save the Arctic' campaign. Still, the main focus is believed to be the interests of eight Arctic states (those absolutely cannot be compromised) and states-observers.

Book by Howard (2009) explores issues of natural resources in the Arctic, the Arctic Ocean and governmental policies towards the Northern region. One of the main ideas of the book is that most narratives about looming and perhaps ongoing resource wars are exaggerated. Howard (2009) provides readers with a line of reasoning which aims to prove the unreasonability and economic inexpediency of such wars. Although the book is written shortly after the outbreak of the world economic crisis, the aftermaths of which would be felt for the years to come, it is full of optimism about the effects the increased globalization and interconnectedness would have upon the Arctic region. Howard (2009) stresses that all challenges in the Arctic are shared between states-stakeholders, therefore, cooperation is preferred to conflict by reasonable actors. The author also emphasizes the non-chaotic nature of the Arctic region, stressing the importance of structuring effect the United Nations Convention on the Law of Sea (UNCLOS) has on the Arctic. Howard (2009) predicts that Russia, Norway and probably Greenland are the ones to benefit the most from the increased extraction of hydrocarbons. The author also states that with the climate change and rising temperatures new sea routes will be open which will in turn decrease significantly the costs of transportation. All in all, climate change seems to be not such bad of a trend. According to the Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment (AMSA) of 2009, there will be always (or for a long time) ice in the winter due to temperatures in the Arctic increasing much slower than in the rest of the world. Howard (2009) leaves a special place for the involvement of non-Arctic states. One of the overall conclusions is the need to demilitarize the region (not only waters but the land as well) and enhance intergovernmental cooperation. However, Brigham (2011) in his review of Howard's book notices the implausibility of such claims since all Arctic states consider parts of Arctic as their territory and would interpret any `outside' restriction on the usage of the military as a violation of their sovereignty. And since the Arctic Council, the only body which could impose any restrictions, is not an international organization, but an intergovernmental one, it lacks the power to act outside the sphere of influence which those eight sovereign states have granted it. It would be simply impossible and, mainly, unproductive to go against the wishes of eight Arctic states.

The Routledge book edited by Gjorv, Lanteigne, & Sam-Aggrey (2020) is a real treasure for anyone who studies the Arctic. It analyses the security in the region - environmental, economic, military, humanitarian and indigenous. It talks about both the states and the institutions and how do they all preserve the Arctic as a region of cooperation. The book includes several essays on what does security mean. I find it particularly valuable that the book promotes the soft security and urgues the policymakers to look beyond conventional militaristic approach to security. Almost all the contributors argur that the Arctic does not suffer from any military conflict or from a possibility or an expectation of one. Instead, the region suffers from the lack of knowledge and attention from the outside world. Arctic has been regarded for far too long as a white desert with no one to live and work there. But it cannot be further from truth today. Economic activity in the Arctic is blooming, policymakers pay full attention to the education of the Arctic children and youth. All Arctic states in a greater or lesser degree work towards integrating their parts of the Arctic into the global market, towards making the Arctic competitive. Therefore, the greatest threat arises more from the lack of cooperation that from guns. And this book does a great job of proving that.

Methods

In my research, the dependent variable is the states' Arctic strategies. There are already laid out in the corresponding documents, but each record is a `black box' in itself. These black boxes are opened in my research. Policymakers usually write such papers in vague terms, and only though more comprehensive research can one explore their true intentions. Since I carefully examine each Arctic state, the research is heavily based on case studies. The comparative method is also used to not only highlight the differences within each state's Arctic strategies over the years but contrast the states with each other and find unique factors that influence the formulation of policies. Discourse analysis helps me to go beyond traditional views on policy formulation and invite more critical reasoning to it. Historical research grounds my work and shows where the roots are and what the preconditions for this or that decision were. There is no constant pattern or an absolute according to which I could have compared political decision making, hence the research is generally inductive. Grounded theory is what seems to suite this paper the most. Grounded theory is grounded (pun intended) in the assumption that to create a theory or some general idea, one has to start with the individual cases. And the Arctic Strategies are indeed the individual cases.



Main body

1. Concepts

To begin with, I need to address specific theoretical frameworks that will be used later as I move on with examining Arctic strategies and policies.

1.1 Soft power and hard power

As Joseph Nye stated, soft power is the ability to shape the behavior of others as one prefers, the power to `entice and attract' (Nye, 1990). Soft power is usually promoted through culture, foreign policies, and political values. For instance, Moscow has a Japanese teaching center which is sponsored directly by the Japanese government. Alternatively, Russia Today, a prominent media corporation whose aim is to educate people in other countries about Russia and to promote a viewpoint on the news which would echo Russian official political discourse. Some soft power sources are sometimes named propagandistic. Hard power is mainly military power, war, economic interference, sanctions. Hard power is coercion, while soft power is persuasion.

1.2 Security

It is impossible to talk about cooperation and conflict and not talk about security. Padrtova (2020) explicitly analyses the concept of security from different theoretical perspectives and applies it to the Arctic. She identifies traditionalists and non-traditionalists, alternatively, realists and liberals. Traditionalists think about security in terms of a state and its military power, which ensures the state's survival (Walt, 1991). Non-traditionalists are subdivided into wideners and deepeners. Deepeners are concerned with the questions `who is threatened?' and talk about the security of an individual (Booth, 1997). Wideners acknowledge the importance of traditional military threats yet believe that there is a broader range of security issues - environmental, economic, and social (Buzan, 2003).

1.3 Regional security complex

A regional security complex (RSC) is `a set of units whose major processes of securitization, desecuritization, or both, are so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart from one another' (Buzan, 2003). It is a concept promoted by the Copenhagen School and particularly by scholar Barry Buzan who first talked about it in his book `People, States and Fear' in relation to the Middle East and South Asia regions. He then develops the theory of RSC further because Buzan believes that security issues that are nor individual neither international do not simply fall into state security. At first, the definition Buzan gives stated that an RSC is necessary `a set of states', but then a more constructivist approach was taken, so it became `a state of units.' Before, there were recognized 12 RSCs around the globe. This constructivist turn allows scholars to use RSC theory to talk about the Arctic region. Still, Buzan emphasizes that the main trends and security objectives in RSC are being produced by the states which are included in an RSC. Three main components of an RSC are

1. `the arrangement of the units and the differentiation amongst them,'

2. `amity and enmity patterns,'

3. `the distribution of power among the principal units' (Buzan, 2003).

Since RSCs are a product of anarchy and anarchical in nature, they can be destroyed (or, better say, dismantled) by a regional integration that creates a `single larger actor' (Buzan, 2003) and brings along institutionalization. RSC's creation can be disrupted if there are great powers in a region of a potential RSC which do not allow cooperation between different states and other units. Buzan calls it an `overlay'. The other side of the disruption coin appears if local powers are not powerful enough to care about regional political dimension and instead prefer to focus solely on domestic issues.

1.4 Securitization

Securitization is another concept the Copenhagen School came up with. Securitization occurs when a state starts perceiving an issue as having an existential nature, a matter of life and death. States do not necessarily all securitize the same things. Buzan (2003) gives an example of securitizing culture and religion in Iran. The same would not be adequate for the Netherlands or Sweden. Securitization also means that states would do whatever it takes to keep the securitized issue secure, even if it would require to breach international law or agreement. The securitizing move by the agent is not enough; the wider audience (usually the population of a state) should be persuaded that a possible threat to securitizing object is genuine of existential nature.

1.5 Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)

An EEZ is a UNCLOS defined 200 nautical miles zone measured from a country's coast. EEZs are considered as the internal waters of the state. The state can use and extract all resources from the EEZ as it has the sole right to do so. However, the state cannot prevent others from sailing in the EEZ.

1.6 Blue Economy

The concept of the Blue Economy originated during the 2012 United Nations Conference in Sustainable Development. It is the same as the green economy but for oceans. Blue Economy promotes the sustainable development of a business that, in some way, use marine ecosystems. Preservation of unique marine environments becomes a priority for more and more states, especially with international and non-governmental organizations pushing the agenda.



1.7 Science diplomacy

Science diplomacy is the usage of science in order to achieve foreign policy goals. Science diplomacy has three dimensions:

1. Providing scientific advice or `science in diplomacy';

2. Improving scientific cooperation internationally or `diplomacy for science';

3. Using science to facilitate cooperation between countries or regional blocks of states or `science for diplomacy' (The Royal Society, 2010).

As Bertelsen (2020) argues, during the Cold War, science diplomacy was an excellent tool for improving fragile relations between the West and the East. International Geophysical Year of 1957-1958 led to the creation of the Antarctic Treaty, which included both the Soviet Union and the United States. In 1973 the USSR, the USA, Canada, Denmark, and Norway signed the Polar Bear protection treaty, which was the first example of scientific cooperation in the Arctic. Bertelsen (2020) that from the 1950s till the 1980s, the Soviet Union and the kingdom of Denmark served an excellent example of science diplomacy cooperation. Both countries fostered the connection between their ethnographical and ethnological scientists, and the USSR embraced Denmark as a `safe space' for the Soviet scientific professionals to visit.

1.8 Arctic Exceptionalism

Arctic Exceptionalism is a theoretical view of the region as being incredibly, exceptionally peaceful, and cooperation oriented. This is a view that the Arctic is `detached' from the rest of the world, and the conflicts that originated in other regions do not affect the Arctic by any means. As Kдpylд and Mikkola (2015) state, this is a very `romantic' perception that sees the Arctic as a show desert with little or no population. This is what Oran Young (1992) wrote about - the Arctic being almost useless in economic and political spheres of life, but a fruitful field for scientific cooperation. An uncorrupted region of peace.

1.9 Arctic Paradox

An idea which many scholars are talking about but was properly formulated by Palosaari (2012). All countries involved in the Arctic in this or that way talk about the preservation of the unique ecosystem and working on the ways of producing sustainable development strategies for the region. However, the Arctic is the region rich in hydrocarbon resources, the very extraction of which leads to temperatures rising and affects the ecosystem profoundly. This is precisely the Arctic paradox. Climate change is probably the most significant security threat in the Arctic, and all actors accept that. However, the same actors are interested in increased capacity of sea routes (both for resources transportation and for tourism), which would increase if glaciers are not preserved and melt instead. So, climate change and global warming are seen both as a threat and economic opportunity.

1.10 Northeast Passage, Northwest Passage and the Transpolar Sea Route

These are the three shipping marine routes in the Arctic with the Transpolar Sea Route is yet unavailable due to not yet melted ice. However, it is expected to come into use soon. Northern Sea Route is a part of the Northeast passage and is under Russian law jurisdiction since it is within the Russian Exclusive Economic Zone. Northwest Passage is a passage near Canada which constantly rises debated over whether to count these waters as international or not. Transpolar Sea Route is a route which will be open once the ice in the Arctic Ocean melts enough. The countries which plan to use the Transpolar Sea Route are those trapped in the Arctic Paradox, particularly China.



1.11 Heininen's framework

Lassi Heininen, along with his other achievements, is a Research Director at the Institute for Atmospheric and Earth Research at the University of Helsinki and a member of the Advisory Board of the Arctic Circle. Back in 2012, he wrote a comparative study where analyzed different states' Arctic Strategies, for that Heininen came up with a set of criteria that I now use for my study. These criteria are the main priorities found in Arctic Strategies, so we can pinpoint the exact states' interests and compare them. Arctic Strategies usually are comprehensive and even wordy documents that say a whole lot of things. However, it is necessary to narrow the agenda and analyze only the primary interests.

The criteria are:

1. sovereignty (Sover)

2. national security, in this case mainly military and economic, hard security (Sec)

3. economic development (like sustainable economic development) (Econ)

4. development of a specific region with aiming at building proper infrastructure (Dev)

5. transport, developing and using transportation routes (Transport)

6. protecting the Arctic environment and the unique ecosystem (Envir)

7. governance and management (Gov)

8. search and rescue operations and international cooperation in this ares (Res)

9. human development in general (Peo)

10. protecting and helping the indigenous people - preserving their culture, hearing their voices, facilitating business relations, working towards gender equality (Ind)

11. scientific research and science diplomacy, international cooperation to facilitate the Arctic science (Scien)

All Arctic states aim to be at the frontline of events, claiming leadership over this or that field of policymaking and expertise. However, in recent years the Arctic has become a hot topic even for states with no regional presence in the Arctic or for separate regions of states. Therefore, it seems only logical to look through Arctic strategies of all countries which express interest in the region. My analysis is mostly based on official strategies documents, however, for further clarification and looking beyond written texts to what the political leaders saying at the moment, and I will look at the news (and scholarly articles) as well. The harsh climate and shallow temperatures make countries cooperate and rely on each other. However, the increasing attention to the region produces conflict and disagreements over which issues should be addressed internationally and which to be left to sovereign states to deal with.

There are several groups of states which are considered official players in the region. First, there is the Arctic Five. Those are five littoral Arctic states - Canada, the kingdom of Denmark, Norway, the Russian Federation, and the United States. Those are also the states that usually talk about preserving sovereignty in the Arctic, and only then about sustainable development and green politics. Second, there is the Arctic Eight, also known as the states which comprise the Arctic Council. Those are the Arctic Five plus Iceland, Sweden, and Finland. Then, there are non-Arctic states which have either an Arctic strategy or are planning to release one such as China, Singapore, Switzerland, and South Korea. Lastly, there are alliances of states which too, aim to act on their own in the Arctic, such as the European Union.

For the more fundamental understanding, I will begin by discussing international institutions, organizations, and forums that are involved in the Arctic and define the region. Then I will move on to the Arctic Five, the Arctic Eight, and the European Union. Finally, I will analyze several non-Artic states or regions which have an Arctic strategy.



2. International organizations and forums

The most popular forum for interstate cooperation in the Arctic is the Arctic Council. However, the Council, although the most noticeable, is far from being the only one. To fully understand the web of Arctic governance we should also talk about Arctic Environment Protection Strategy (AEPS), Barents Euro-Arctic Region, Arctic Economic Council, the International Arctic Science Committee, the Arctic Circle, Arctic Frontiers, International Council for the Exploration of the Sea and the Northern Research Forum. Some knowledge of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea would also be helpful.

2.1 Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC)

BEAC is an intergovernmental forum for countries that are located in the Barents region. Those are the Russian Federation, Sweden, Norway, Iceland, Finland, Denmark. The European Commission also is a member of the Council. However, the chairmanship rotates between only four countries, namely Russia, Sweden, Norway, and Finland. There are 8 Observer members, among which are the United Kingdom and the United States. BEAC also has several working groups, e.g., Joint Committee on Rescue Cooperation or Working Group on Economic Cooperation. Barents Regional Council compliments the BEAC and gives a platform to provincial authorities. As Bailes and Уlafsson (2017) write, the BEAC's creation process was initiated by Norway in 1993 to enhance the cooperation in the North and bring all significant players to the discussion table. Norway held in mind two lines of motives, one considering Russia and another considering the European Union. In the 90s, Russia and its population were going through tough times, and each next move of the court in the international arena was unpredictable.

Moreover, Norway was concerned with the economic crisis in Russia and the potential desire of the northern Russian population to migrate to the nearest Nordic countries, which would be Finland, Sweden, and, in turn, Norway. The EU was mainly invited for its money, the funding of projects. Moreover, the Norwegian government wanted its population to become more EU-oriented so that the country could request even more financial backup for the local projects. Therefore, the BEAC initiation was a win-win situation for Norway. BEAC's work aims at fostering protection of the unique Arctic ecosystem and dealing. With excessive pollution, local economic development, enhancing existing transportation routes and creating new ones, collective management of borders and customs (especially when cooperating with Russia), preserving local culture, and strengthening scientific cooperation. BEAC, just like the Arctic Council, keeps security issues of the table. Thus, it can achieve collective agreements in more `soft power' spheres.

2.2 International Arctic Science Committee (IASC)

IASC is a non-governmental organization that fosters and facilitates interdisciplinary research in the Arctic. IASC is an institutionalized format of science diplomacy in action.

2.3 Arctic Circle

The Arctic Circle is a non-profit network that runs `the largest dialogue' on the Arctic. It is a platform for governments, organizations, scholars, and citizens who would like to speak on Arctic-related matters. The main events are annual assemblies in Reykjavнk, Iceland. There are also forums organized all around the globe. The Arctic Circle mainly deals with environmental issues, transportation, extraction of resources, international law, tourism, shipping, and investments.



2.4 Arctic Economic Council (AEC)

AEC is an organization that claims to provide expertise and `know-how' to Arctic businesses and improve business-to-business (B2B) relations. It has three tiers of membership: Legacy Members, Arctic Partner, and Permafrost Partner. Legacy Members are three representatives from each Member State and each Permanent Participant of the Arctic Council. Legacy Members are the only ones with voting power. Arctic Partners are the representatives of the non-Arctic countries. Permafrost Partners are business.

2.5 Arctic Council

Arctic Council was established in 1996 by the Ottawa Declaration. It is an intergovernmental forum that promotes `cooperation, coordination, and interaction' among the Arctic States. There are eight Arctic states mentioned above. Decisions are being made on the consensus principle - all eight states ought to agree in order to make a decision. There are Permanent Participants who are the organizations of indigenous peoples who are Saami Council, Aleut International Association, Inuit Circumpolar Council, Arctic Athabaskan Council, Gwich'in Council International, and Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North. They are supported by Indigenous Peoples Secretariat, which was initially established in 1994 under AEPS. Approximately 4 million people are living in the Arctic, and 500,000 out of them are indigenous. This calculates to around 12.5% of the whole Arctic population, which is a significant number indeed. Therefore, the need to include indigenous peoples in the decision-making process is evident. Permanent Participants can address other members or propose projects they feel are necessary, but they do not make final decisions - this is solely up to the Member States. There is also a category of Observers, which includes non-Arctic states, intergovernmental, non-governmental, and interparliamentary organizations. Observes have no voting rights. Turkey and the European Union are still waiting to be approved as Observers in the Council. Within Arctic Council, there are different Working Groups such as the Sustainable Development Working Group or Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme.

What are the strong sides of the Arctic Council as an intergovernmental forum? Koivurova (2012) states that there are plenty of them. To begin with, the Council is a flexible organization that allows for a variety of responses to possible problems and threats arising. Arctic Council is based on soft law, which does not create any actual legally binding agreements, as the hard law does. Fajardo (2014) explains soft law as a term that `encompasses soft rules that are included in treaties, nonbinding or voluntary resolutions, recommendations, codes of conduct, and standards'. In combination with the decision-making process where all states have to agree on an issue, soft law basis allows for more trust in the organization. States are not being compelled to oblige. Instead, they work out the solutions together and taking into account each other's independence and sovereignty. Arctic Council serves as an illustrative example of international cooperation as it should be. Secondly, the Arctic Council is known for its inclusion of indigenous peoples. Innuits, Saami, Aleuts, the various peoples in the Russian Federation - they all are included in the decision-making process, and their voice is ensured to be heard. The inclusion of the indigenous people is a rare practice in international politics, but so far, it has been proven successful. They are Permanent Participants and do not have the final vote yet are listened to. Then, Arctic Council uses science and technological expertise in the region building processes. Seeing the Arctic as a territory of mutual heritage and unique place to explore and experience nature, rather than just another territory for regional competition and the military arms race, sets an example for treating a fragile natural environment. Koivurova (2012) emphasizes how important is the mere fact that scientific exploration and region-building around issues of environment, climate, valuable and finite resources, economic and social conditions of indigenous people, sometimes tend to overcome concerns about national sovereignty and lead to productive cooperation.

To sum these up, the Arctic Council was able to `create a type of imagined international, regional community', Koivurova adds. Imagined community is a political science term coined by Benedict Anderson in his 1983 book `Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism'. There he states that every nation is an imagined community since it exists mainly socially and is socially constructed, yet members of a nation do not know each other and rarely interact. Koivurova goes further with this metaphor since the Arctic does not have a universal nation - yet it very well may be constructed by the Arctic Council. If Arctic Council functions appropriately and all Arctic States are willing to work cooperatively, then it would be a perfect intergovernmental forum that would establish proper governance over the region. Putting words like `international' and `regional' seems to be counterintuitive at first glance.

Nevertheless, it is not. The Arctic is indeed a region of the world, but the issues which are raised regarding the Arctic and the decisions actors make on them affect the whole planet. How do we act when it comes to climate change? Do we extract resources if the process of extraction can harm the environment and wildlife? How do we empower the regional communities of indigenous people?

There are certain downsides as well. Apart from indigenous peoples' participation, there is yet a limited involvement from any regional sub-governments in the Council's work. This leads to a weaker connection between the Arctic Council with its decisions and actual policymaking in the regions. Koivurova (2012) notices that there is also a lack of permanent funding. In 2016 Arctic Council issued a report on sources of funding for the organization. This report is based upon information received from the Executive Secretaries and Working Group Chairs. According to their data, the Arctic Council is mainly funded by the government of Norway (42,5% of annual budget), and other Arctic states provide the other part of the budget. This is not to say that Norway is not the largest country nor the largest economy among Arctic states.

Furthermore, with ongoing rhetoric of the USA president - Mr. Trump - one would not expect the increase in funding for any international organization, let alone international forum with limited decision making power. Another major downside to the effectiveness of the Arctic Council is that still, the Arctic Five remains to be the most critical coalition when it comes to decision making. The 2008 Ilulisaat Declaration is the most prominent proof of extreme state-centrism in the Arctic Circle. Only the Arctic Five (A5), being the coastal Arctic states, were invited. Nor the other three members of the Arctic Council nether the indigenous peoples' representatives attended the event in Greenland. As a result of the meeting, the Declarations were adopted. It clearly stated that although coastal states recognize the power and effectiveness of both the Arctic Council and the Barents Euro-Atlantic Council, these five states by the right of their sovereignty declare that there is no need for any further or additional institutionalization of the Arctic region. This means there would be no overarching Arctic Treaty in the years to come. Rahbek-Clemmensen and Thomasen (2018) argue that the Ilulissat Declaration gave the Arctic Five states the power to shift the authority to A5 whenever they would like to do so. This implies that if A5 faces any unwanted pressure from the other three Arctic states, any non-Arctic state, international organization, non-governmental organization, or the EU, they could decide on issues within this small elitist group and exclude others from the decision-making process. Whether such an action would receive a positive response worldwide is an open question, but it is nevertheless theoretically possible.

Bloom (1999) points out that the Arctic Council has two main objectives, which it continually pursues. One is the promotion of environmental protection; Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy or AEPS serves as a multilateral agreement on possible means of protecting the environment and the wildlife. AEPS was launched in 1991. Another goal is broader and harder to implement - it is a broad definition of sustainable development in the region, especially concerning the economic and social circumstances of indigenous peoples. While being primarily focused on nature preservation and environment, the Arctic Council broadened its agenda.



2.6 International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES)

ICES was founded back in 1902, which makes it the oldest intergovernmental organization which deals with science diplomacy (Rozwadowski, 2004). Rational usage of marine resources is the idea at the core of the Council. ICES balances scientific research and advice given to the governments, especially about the sustainable usage of fisheries.

2.7 Northern Research Forum (NRF)

NRF was launched by Iceland's initiative in 1998 and began its work in 1999. The Forums is an international forum for all interested in the Arctic to come and discuss pressing issues, be they civil servants, politicians, businessmen, or research fellows.

2.8 Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS) or the Finnish Initiative

AEPS was founded on the ministerial conference in 1991, Rovaniemi, Finland. It was a. multinational yet non-binding agreement between the eight Arctic states. There were several reasons for the AEPS to be complete. First was that there were reports on toxic waste in the territories of the former Soviet Union, primarily in Russia in the Arctic. Second is that Russia was eager to cooperate with the West, and it was a possibility to start a successful integration of Russia into the Western practice of institution building. The third is that the Arctic was generally a very polluted region, and reports were stating that indigenous people who live in the Arctic suffer greatly from human-made chemical poisons in their living environment. Finland took the courage to call upon other Arctic states to deal with it. Therefore, the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy came into being.



2.9 Arctic Frontiers

Arctic Frontiers is an international conference which welcomes all those interested in the Arctic development.

2.10 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)

UNCLOS was concluded in 1982 in Jamaica, Montego Bay. After the 1994 and the 60 states that ratified the Convention, UNCLOS came into power. The oceans around the globe became known as the `common heritage of mankind', and UNCLOS is often referred to as the Constitution of the oceans (Rubin, 1994). UNCLOS regulated shipping and transportation, it introduced the Exclusive Economic Zones and has a dispute settlement mechanism.

Now that we have covered some main and the most popular international organizations, forums and conferences that relate to the Arctic, let us move on to the states.



3. States

3.1 Russian Federation

Russian international political decisions cannot be understood without using a constructivist framework. The same goes for policies that other countries adopt towards Russia. Russia and `the West' still exist and act in the Cold War paradigm, and since the 2014 conflict in Crimea, this ideological framework seems to be as strong as it was back in the days of its origin. Russia is a country that stands in partial opposition to the other Arctic Five since it is the only country not included in the NATO. In recent years Russia-NATO relations have deteriorated speedily, with some scholars claiming that now the relations are at the lowest point since the Cold War. This deterioration did not affect the Arctic, yet many believe that it is only a matter of time that Russia shows its `true' face and tries to… no one knows what exactly. Occupy the whole Arctic? Invade others' territory? Theories are many, and the solid proof of these theories is yet scarce.

The Arctic was a strategic region during the Cold War. Both great powers of that time, the United States and the Soviet Union were Arctic states. So were many countries in NATO block. The Soviet Union Secretary-General of the Communist Party Mikhail Gorbachev's famous 1987 Murmansk speech called both for stability and peace in the Arctic and the end of long-lasting Cold War confrontation. Right after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Arctic was more a liability to Russia rather than a useful asset. The economy was in shambles, so was the necessary infrastructure which steadily deteriorated when faced with the lack of investments. Unlike for the Western part of the world, where the 90s were perceived as a decade of stable growth, in Russia, the 90s were a period of chaos and lack of authority, criminal authorities, chaotic privatization, and a weak economy. No wonder the country did not think much back in the days about the sustainable development of the Arctic.