Nevertheless, when President Putin came to power and oil prices went up, the situation changed. Russia strengthened its economy by ruble being tied up to oil prices and restored its place in the international arena by supporting the American war on terrorism and then meddling with international affairs on its wish. Russia, although still weaker than a typical Western state, did not want to live in a world where the West was the only pole of power. Russia did not want conflict or confrontation with the West either; the government wanted for the country to be recognized as a partner to the West, not a satellite.

During 2007-2008 International Polar Year Russia perform an expedition which caused a great deal of upheaval all around the globe. Arktika 2007 was remembered mainly for the controversial planting of the Russian flag at the seabed at the North Pole. Arthur Chilingarov was the explorer who planted it and proclaimed that `the Arctic is ours!' (Klimenko, 2016). Russia is still working on its shelf claims; however, international agencies proclaimed that flag-planting could not mean anything other than being a symbolic gesture. Though Arktika 2007 is still being used as an example of aggressive Russian behavior. In 2019 Russia also resumed patrols by fighter jets, as the Barents Observes states (BO). It led to some authors claiming that Russia pursues `gunboat diplomacy' in the Northern region (Valdai Club 2014). Another group of scholars claims that the situation is the other way around; Russia, at least in the Arctic, is a peaceful state which does not seek further conflict. This is because Russia has no interest in occupying the Arctic but benefits from international cooperation and investments. All military activities Russia is performing are purely defensive and are aimed at reiterating Russia's great power status, which is being constantly challenged by the West. The most significant argument in favor of the latter position is that today the Arctic is a stable and peaceful region, and no speculation has yet proven itself right.

Two international events are contributing to seeing Russia as a consistently aggressive power that cannot be trusted. Russian-Georgian war of 2008 and Russian integration of Crimea into its territory in 2014, which is still not recognized by many countries in the world. Both events were positioned as anti-Western and brought a sense of unease to Baltic and Nordic (especially Norway) states since they are although relatively highly developed societies but still territorially small states with limited military and personnel capacity. However, there is a significant feature of conflicts in Georgia and Crimea that is absent in the Arctic. In both conflicts, Russia claimed to protect its population that lives abroad. In 2014 Crimea had 67.9% of the Russian population and 15.7% of Ukrainian. The referendum was held in Crimea and Sevastopol, which asked whether the regions want to be included in the Russian Federation or remain as a part of Ukraine. In both territorial subjects, more than 95% of the population said `Yes'. Hence, the Russian official vision is that the country adhered to the will of the people and naturally accepted Crimea in the Federation. There are no violations of Russians' rights in the Arctic, however. The scenario of Georgia and Crimea cannot be repeated in the region. As Bertelsen (2020) noted, there is a tendency that policymakers have a misperception that the Eastern Europe crisis is a general situation and a typical example of Russian behavior, while the Arctic is seen as exceptional. The scholar writes that the Arctic is strategically vital to Russia. Therefore the military and economic build-up should not necessarily be seen as aggressive. Instead, it could be comprehended as an assertive behavior and Russia trying to both develop the region and remind the world that it still is a great power, not bowed down by sanctions and heavy criticism. It is vital for the preservation of active international cooperation to not fall into the Thucydides's trap and not see the development of Russia as a threat to the West.

There are two primary documents that outline the general direction in which Russian Arctic policy is going. One is The Foundations (or Basics) of Russian Federation Policy in the Arctic until 2020 and Beyond, developed in 2008. Now it has been renewed and replace with the Foundations until 2035. Another is Strategy for the Development of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation and National Security Efforts for the Period up to 2020, developed in 2013 as further development of 2008 Foundations. The main priority of these documents is ensuring that Russia stays robust, sovereign, and territorially whole in the Arctic. The second one aims to preserve the Arctic as a region of peace and international cooperation. Arctic's population and its economic and social well-being are also high on the list of Russia's priorities. Russia acknowledges the fragility of the Arctic ecosystem and its significance for the indigenous peoples of the North, therefore strives to protect and preserve nature. Finally, the Northeast passage (the Northern Sea Route) is of utmost importance for Russian economic competitiveness in the world market. As NATO Strategic Communications Center of Excellence (2018) states, Russian central values for Arctic development are sovereignty and economic development. Russia values peace, prosperity, stability, and pragmatism. Russia feels that increasing its presence in the Arctic is only `natural for the largest Arctic state' (NATO, 2018). The minister of international affairs Sergey Lavrov states that `Russia has always considered the Arctic as a territory of mutually respectful dialogue'. Russia seeks to integrate the knowledge of the Northern ancestors into modern economic and business activity.

Russia considers the Arctic as a critical zone for the state's security. The Kola Peninsula has a largely developed military infrastructure and is one of the most important military bases in the country. The perception of Western threat is intensified by the proximity of Svalbard or Spitzbergen island, which belongs to Norway. Any military development of Svalbard is evaluated as NATO aggression right at the Russian border. Archangelsk Air Defense Sector is a critical system used for the prevention of air attacks.

table 1

Arctic Priorities of Russia

Plus (+) indicates that the interest is present. Plus and the exclamation (+!) mark signify a critical interest. No sigh signifies either low or no interest in the issue at all. This holds for all further tables.

3.2 Iceland

`Iceland is that strange one, it is kind of hanging in there'

Gunhild Gjorv

Iceland's stance on foreign policy is highly ambivalent, as Wilson and Ingolfsdottir (2020) write. The country of slightly more than 360 thousand people experiences deep a divide within the society about the image Iceland should be projecting into the outer world. On the one hand, Iceland is a small country located on an island in the ocean. It has never been a significant international player on its own, nor it (or a part of it) wishes to be right now. This is why Iceland did not feel like it needed a National Security Policy (NSP) before 2016. Nevertheless, here it is, an NSP of 2 pages and 11 points. Why?

The other half of Icelandic society does want Iceland to be perhaps not a major, but a crucial player in Arctic policies. Moreover, this desire is not baseless. Campbell (1970) writes that before the Second World War, Iceland was indeed a remote island that other countries did not take into consideration. 1918 Act of Union transferred Iceland's international business to Denmark when the latter could act on behalf of the former. This is because both states were united under a single king. Iceland declared itself `permanently neutral', and it was up to Denmark to project that image internationally. This agreement was designed to last 25 years, and after 1940 could be prolonged or canceled by each state parliament's decision. Before and during the Second World War, the Icelandic population felt threatened by its own proclaimed neutrality. Nazi Germany invaded Denmark, and Iceland was concerned that it would be the next. Luckily for Iceland, Britain occupied the country before Nazi Germany. Britain promised that it would not disrupt Iceland domestic politics and also would pay for any damage caused by the British army. However, Britain itself was lately threatened by Nazi Germany, and Iceland worried that soldiers that kept the small nation safe would be relocated back to Britain.

As a consequence, in 1941, Iceland and the United States signed a defense agreement, and from this moment in history, Iceland was protected by the USA. The same agreement ended Iceland's neutrality. Interestingly, the Communist Icelandic party expressed its concerns over potential threats to the sovereignty of their country and wished to include the Soviet Union in the defense agreement as well, so it could stay neutral, and neither great power would attempt to subdue the island state (Campbell, 1970). Icelandic government usually was a coalition of leftist parties, and the Communists comprised a sound part of the government, so one may only imagine what this agreement would look like if they asked the USSR to join, and it would agree with the proposal. After the war, Iceland experienced several heated debates over whether American forces needed to be withdrawn and whether membership in the United Nations would mean that someday, Iceland would be asked by other nations to host their troops. Berlin blockage and Czechoslovakia events made Iceland fell vulnerable yet again and led to new debates between `neutralists' and `internationalists', as Campbell refers to them. Finally, `hostilities in Korea' (Campbell, 1970) created an impression that Iceland would not survive as a sovereign state without proper defense. Iceland became a founding member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization on the condition that it would not be required to create its military force.

But what did Britain and the United States want from Iceland so that they eagerly signed defense agreements with it? Iceland is an island of a strategic position. It is located in the so-called GIUK gap - a naval choke point between Greenland, Iceland, and the United Kingdom. A chokepoint is a location that an army needs to pass. However, it is very narrow and created additional problems for the army to cross. Both the United Kingdom and the United States wanted Iceland `on their side', so the West would hold full control of the GUIK gap. During the Cold War, the GIUK gap was of particular importance as it was used to fight the enemy's submarines should they choose the cross the region. After 1971 the government in Iceland changed, and the new policymakers openly stated that Iceland would reconsider its NATO membership if problems arise (Sparring, 1972). Iceland learned to use its geographical advantage as a bargaining card. Thus, it was able to win the famous (or for someone infamous) Cod Wars, each one of them. A small island state against the United Kingdom - all because Iceland threatened the US that it would leave NATO if Britain would not leave Iceland alone. And since the United States emerged from the Second World War stronger than ever, they could deal with their British allies (Wilson and Ingolfsdottir, 2020). Therefore, Iceland may be perceived as a small state with no international power, but it also proves otherwise. Not only is Iceland a founding member of NATO and the Arctic Council, but it also uses geopolitics to pressure a state no less than the United States.

So, what is it in for the Arctic and this paper? Iceland used to have a Parliamentary Resolution on Iceland's Arctic Policy, which became active from 2011. However, now it is absent from the Icelandic Ministry of Foreign Affairs website and is available only by Wayback Machine. The most recent and available document is Iceland fist, and so far, the only National Security Policy (NSP) released in 2016. This is because of terrorist attacks that followed the beginning of the twenty-first century and 2008 economic crisis. And it took so long to produce due to deep divides within the society which we have discussed previously. It is indeed a small document, yet it does not rule out any specifics of the Icelandic approach to foreign policy. Instead, by its shortness, it leaves spaces to different interpretations. Wilson and Ingolfsdottir (2020) talk about this NPS concerning the Arctic. The vital interests of Iceland, both in the international arena and the Arctic, are civil security and defense cooperation. 2011 Resolution on Arctic Policy was more frantic and nervous, stating that `securing Iceland position as a coastal state within the Arctic region' was the top priority. Now Iceland is calmer and aims for soft security measures, rather than hard security.

During the 2019-2021 period, Iceland presides as the Chair at the Arctic Council. In its strategy, it highlights four main priorities which are:

1. preservation of the Arctic marine ecosystem and dealing with litter and plastic in the ocean,

2. orientation on green production and green energy,

3. ensuring the welfare of the Arctic peoples and supporting relatable economic opportunities to help people thrive,

4. ensuring that the Arctic Council grows more reliable as a platform for cooperation.

Iceland also seeks to work on strengthening cooperation between the Arctic Economic Council and the Arctic Council.

table 2

Arctic Priorities of Iceland

3.3 United States of America

Approximately a year ago, May 7, 2019, US Secretary of the State Mike Pompeo came to legendary Rovaniemi, Finland, and made a scene. Pompeo was highly critical of almost every other state other than the United States, and his speech generally went against the spirit of cooperation, which defines the Arctic. He stated clearly that there are Arctic states and non-Arctic states, and the latter should have no interests and no activity in the Arctic. Pompeo attacked China for its continuous scientific and trade relations with the Arctic states. This attack was in line with the ongoing USA-China trade war but looked ridiculous in light of the consensus that both Arctic and non-Arctic states should cooperate to help make the region sustainable and prosperous. High North News (2019) names the infamous speech a `verbal thunderstorm', and I could not phrase it better. The Secretary of the State unsurprisingly heavily criticized Russia as he claimed that the country pursues actives militarization of the region and does not pay proper respect to international cooperation and UNCLOS in particular. Russia was also said to disrupt the navigation of foreign ships in international waters.

Despite such rough accusations, the United States is known for the overall exclusion of the Arctic region from its foreign and defense strategies. Before the 20 century, the region only gained attention when the gold seekers went there in search of their fortune. Nevertheless, this attention slowly has worn out, and the Arctic was forgotten again - a `seward's folly', right as it was after Alaska was bought (Corgan, 2020). Then the Second World War came, and during 1942-1943, three the Aleutian Islands in Alaska were occupied by Japan before being retaken by American forces again. However, it was not before the Cold War that the Artic has shown its real strategical importance. During the confrontation with the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc, the United States build the Distant Early Warning Line, also known as the DEW line. DEW line was a system of radar stations located in Alaska, Canada, Iceland, Greenland and the Faroe Islands, and a part of a Mutually Assured Destruction policy, the central pillar of the Cold War. The strategic northern location gave the USA hours to prepare in case of the Soviet ballistic effect.

Fritz (2010) states that some scholars believe the DEW line was `the largest and most ambitious peacetime military project in history', although I can hardly call the Cold war a peaceful time. The line facilitates the US economy since it gave a boost to the companies thriving on defense contracts. It also facilitated scientific development in the North and created valuable jobs for scarcely populated areas, invited medical professionals to the area, and increased market relations between locals and workers from the outside. When the construction process was still ongoing, site construction employed more than 25% of the local population. However, Fritz (2010) notices problems with construction. For instance, Canadian contract firms had little if no experience of such military technology and felt insecure about deploying it in harsh climate conditions. The sites constructed also took away the land traditionally used by local indigenous peoples. Construction also brought a bunch of toxic waste and chemicals which were not always removed after completing the site. Around 30 sites were abandoned, leaving them to decay. Fritz (2010) emphasizes that such an extended infrastructure project had a shocking effect on the region in terms that it brought a great deal of money and a great deal of environmental and societal problems, leaving the Arctic more divided and socially stratified than before. DEW line was finished in 1957, just at the time the Soviet Union finished developing its intercontinental ballistic missile for detecting which the DEW line was of no use (Fritz, 2010).

Nevertheless, because of many investments and resources poured into the project, the line continued to work until the 1990s. Then it was replaced with the less known `Northern Warning' system, although many still call it DEW line out of habit. Construction of the DEW line also invited many scholars to think about militarism and why it was increasing during the Cold War. With the Eastern bloc following Marxist-oriented policies, it was only natural for scholars to conclude that militarism and increasing military capacity follows either from innately flawed capitalism or the same way innately flawed nature of the states. Another Cold War defense project associated with the Arctic was the North American Aerospace Defense Command or NORAD. During the Cold War, NORAD was monitoring the potential threat from the Soviet Union, but the priorities were changed after the 9/11 attack. NORAD became a part of the counterterrorist military system (Charron, 2015). However, the new qualification of the system raises the question - does the Arctic region need the same defense attention as, say, New York or Washington? Or would the melting ice and the increased transportation though the Arctic, require even more attention of the defense and military departments? Should the United States construct new defense mechanisms to prevent the potential threat, or should it cooperate more with its international Arctic partners and rely on greater institutionalization of the region?

The Arctic had a great deal of trouble with getting in the United States official document. The first-ever Arctic US strategy was constituted in 1994. It talked about both the Arctic and Antarctic. However, the document was never circulated and gained no attention from the population, therefore nullifying all impact it could have made. Then the Arctic reappeared during George Bush's junior presidency after the 9/11 attacks. It was stated in two documents, the Homeland Security Presidential Directive HSPD-25 and the National Security Presidential Directive NSPD-66. They stated the need for preservation of the Arctic environment, the richness of the region in natural resources and the importance of the Arctic Council work. However, as Corgan (2020) states, the US believed that `a broad-scope Arctic Treaty is not appropriate or necessary'. Both documents had been released just before Bush left the office, so the established framework was supposed to work under the next president, Barack Obama. Obama was the first American president to actually visit the Arctic. In 2013 the National Strategy for the Arctic Region was circulated. Corgan (2020) defined three main ideas of the document: 1) enhancing international cooperation; 2) strengthening the Arctic and providing a proper leadership for the region's development; 3) acknowledging that talking about the Arctic is the same as talking about national security, thus understanding the importance of it. The same year the Department of Defense issues the Arctic Strategy. However, it included some questionable statements which casted a shadow over the hopes of American Arctic development. One is not allowing `premature and/or unnecessary investments', another is the `addition of a new hangar'. One. One hanger. That is it for the infrastructure. Current President Trump has already withdrawn the United States from the Paris Agreement, which raises doubts over whether America is still committed to combatting climate change or whether it has decided to move on from the promises made. Mr. Trump is an active climate change denier, and since the major security issue in the Arctic is the global warming and climate change, it is unlikely that any breakthrough in the US Arctic policy will occur any time soon. Neither the Arctic nor climate change was mentioned during Trump's election campaign. The only promise one may have observed concerned the increase in the number of icebreakers (right now, the United States has only 2/3 while Russia has over 40 of those, thus creating an `icebreaker gap').

The United States has not yet ratified UNCLOS, although the country does recognize the convention. Conservatives in the government generally object to the ratification as they see it as an additional constraint on America, not a benefit. By not ratifying the convention, the United States cannot officially make claims on extending its continental shelf.

table 3

Arctic Priorities of the USA

3.4 Canada

`Use it or lose it'

Former Prime Minister Harper

Although Canada claims international leader when it comes to humanitarian and individual security, especially in the regions as remote and fragile as the Arctic, Greaves (2012) criticizes Canada for the too outward-oriented approach to individual security. The scholar writes that Canada understands `a threat' as `violence', where violence is more about military interventions and crimes against humanity than environmental issues or, say, the rate of availability of comprehensible school education for children. Therefore, globally, yes, Canada is a leader in raising humanitarian issues. But domestically - not so much. This `circumscribed approach' (Greaves, 2012) is partially due to close Canada's cooperation with the United States. After 9/11, the US unleashed the war of terror, which on the one hand, reduced the terrorist threat but, on the other hand, reduced individual rights and freedoms as well. Moreover, a holistic approach to humanitarian security would mean that Canada needs to acknowledge the lack of such security within the state. Moreover, no government in the whole world would want to issue a statement against its policies.

The Arctic is essential to the Canadian identity, write Exner-Pirot and Huebert (2020). Canada prefers to be portrayed as a `true North', strong, independent, and free. The Arctic can help with that since it is indeed a region of beautiful nature and unique cultural practices. The Canadian Arctic Strategy was created with an idea of an external threat to Canadian sovereignty in mind. This is the remnant of the Cold War. Canada feels to be threatened by non-Western states like Russia and China so that its closest and powerful neighbor, the United States, would know that the US and Canada are on the same side, same time. Therefore, Canada would not need to care about the potential breach of its sovereignty by Americans.

Alas, this strategy odes not always work. The problematic issue is the Northwest Passage. Canada regards parts of it as internal waters so that other countries would need permission to pass through that. The United States and the European Union regard the Northwest Passage as international waters.

table 4

Arctic Priorities of Canada

3.5 Finland

1987 Murmansk's speech of Mikhail Gorbachev gave a sense that at least one of the great powers of that period voted for stability and peace in the Arctic Circle. The idea of cooperation became popular, and Finland quickly decided to act. Finland was a country that initiated the Rovaniemi Process in 1989 and thus contributed to the discussions about international cooperation in the Arctic.

Finland's Arctic Strategy was created in 2010, updated in 2013, and then was followed by separately published additions of 2016 and 2017. Finland has no coastline in the Arctic Ocean, yet it is a long-time player in the region. Finland is also a unique Arctic country in the sense that its major ethnos - Saami - is the only indigenous peoples represented in the European Union. Finland Arctic strategy's most prominent idea is sustainable development. The Arctic is one of the most best-preserved environments in the world, yet an increase in transportation, tourism, energy, and mining industries will inevitably disrupt the Arctic ecosystem. Finland warns of negative externalities of excess oil drilling and calls for action, particularly for cooperation with Russian and Norwegian oil-producing companies. The country claims to be `a pioneer in sustainable development' (2013) and offers its accumulated knowledge of renewable energy usage to overcome potential pollution problems of overproduction. Furthermore, in the light of 2020 being the year when oil is not as needed as it used to be, and oil-producing countries experiencing not only problems cooperating but also substantial economic shocks due to their economies being too dependent on natural resources, Finland's expertise may be of great use. Other Finnish interests appearing throughout the document are the business and international cooperation.

Economic growth in the Arctic is essential to help the region prosper and sustain itself. Finland addresses several issues that prevent the Arctic region from operating at its full capacity. First, the Arctic generally is a sparsely populated region. With less connections between people, less social institutions and abilities to exchange and receive knowledge, the region generally lacks specialists in all spheres. Secondly, the infrastructure is not as developed as one wishes it would be, so it is harder for specialists from other countries to come visit the Arctic. Businesses are also unavoidably hit by harsh weather conditions. Finland stresses that Nordic countries are `the main trading partners' (2013) for each other, so cooperation between them can help promote people's mobility and further infrastructure development. The country sees the Arctic as a region that needs to participate in global competitive trading relations, however there is no doubt that it requires more time and investments to grow. Finland's Arctic strategy pays much attention to cooperation and knowledge exchange between companies, both domestic and international.

International cooperation is 1) multilateral cooperation of Arctic countries and non-Arctic states with interests in the regions through established institutions, and 2) bilateral negotiations between states. Finland acknowledges the Arctic Council as the primary platform for Arctic international cooperation. European Union, the United Nations and the International Maritime Organisation all provide additional support and are closely involved with the region. As responsible for regional communication are also named The Barents Euro-Arctic Council and the Barents Regional Council. Finland's strategy of developing its northernmost regions (Lapland, then Kainuu, and Oulu) relies heavily on the European Union funds. These resources help Finland support not only local populations but the national parks and nature conservation areas as well.

Heininen (2020) emphasizes that Finland does not belong to the Arctic Five. Thus, it has less incentive to talk about sovereignty or security in the region. Finland also is a sort of non-aligned state; it is not included in NATO, nor does it have significant military cooperation with Russia. Instead, Finland positions itself as an `expert' in the region - not a significant player, but a necessary one for others to be successful. Finland is a special Arctic country since by now, it has no territorial disputes with other Arctic states (Heininen, 2020), so it can productively cooperate both with Russia and the other countries of Arctic Five which are NATO member states. However, right now, Finland's development has shrunk as it coped with negative externalities of decreased export. Hence, Heininen concludes, we should not wait for Finland to take the leading position.

Interestingly, Finland and Iceland are two states that actively though usually off the record, promote the idea of bringing security issues to the Arctic Council table. Both countries feel insecure and claim that geopolitical tensions have risen in the past several years. Before, the Arctic Council was enough, but now it is time to talk about hard security collectively. No official written statements have yet been made, and none of the Arctic Five supported this idea. Nevertheless, we may, in years ahead, see the extension of themes the Arctic Council deals with, especially with Iceland being the Chair till 2021. Katrin Jakobsdottir, the Prime Minister of Iceland, stated during the latest Arctic Circle in October 2019 that `We do not currently have an Arctic forum that addresses such issues or one that can handle disputes about territories or exploitation of natural resources'.

table 5

Arctic Priorities of Finland

3.6 Norway

Norway is a country that views the Arctic as a place for enhancing the country's military security. For Norway, the hard security, military security is not less important than, say, environmental security or the preservation of the way of living of indigenous people. It also feels threatened by the Russian Kola peninsula being close to the Svalbard archipelago. Svalbard is a hell of an issue itself, but I will not be focusing on the region specifically. Еtland (2020) writes that right after the Murmansk speech, a wave of desecuritization defined Norwegian Arctic policy. However, during Putin's years of presidency, Norway started to re-securitize the Arctic due to the increased Russian military activity in the North.

Norway's Arctic Strategy emphasizes the three most important dimensions - economic, social, and environmental. Norway supports Arctic local business and continues to empower indigenous people for them to feel ensured their business initiatives will be supported. For the economy to be healthy and competitive, reliable infrastructure is needed. The Arctic is a region of harsh climate conditions; hence additional attention to the infrastructure construction and availability is needed from both the central and the local governments. Research and development play a significant role in ensuring Arctic stability; therefore, Norway strives both to increase scientific work in the Arctic and improve the quality of education for the local people. The country states that in the Arctic there is lower population grow than in any other part of the country (4.7% versus 13.3% makes a significant difference in numbers), while the relative number of elder people will increase. Therefore, a comprehensive social policy in the Arctic is needed. The Strategy praises the work of the Sбmediggi, the Sбmi Parliament of Norway. Norway stands for stronger local government, especially in the Arctic, where the needs of the people are unique and can be adequately understood only by the local government, which is generally closer to the people. This is why Norway's County Councils undergo a series of reforms. Norway strives for peace and predictability in the Arctic and aims for green production and blue economy. International cooperation is praised, especially the Arctic Council, the Barents Euro-Arctic Council, the Northern Dimension of the European Union's policy, and the Baltic Council. The necessity of cooperation with Russia is emphasized. However, the Strategy is cautious about increased military activity in the Russian part of the Arctic, so it reiterates its heavy military security reliance on NATO.

table 6

Arctic Priorities of Norway

3.7 Denmark

Denmark is critical to Arctic policymaking and the other Arctic because it has Greenland, which along with the Faroe Islands, constitutes the kingdom. Although Greenland is not so sure it should belong to Denmark and continuously strives for independence. Nevertheless, the largest island in the world is not an individual country by now, so I have to discuss it concerning the kingdom of Denmark.

Greenland is of strategic importance to the West because of Greenland, Iceland, and the United Kingdom gap is also known as the GIUK gap. The gap was a vital military hotspot during the Cold War, yet still, political leaders treat Greenland cautiously. The island lies just between North America and Europe, and the American military base in Thule was very active in the 20th century. Project Iceworm planned to plant mobile nuclear weapons underneath the ice in Greenland. The suspicious American activity on the island was covered by Century Camp, which was a media-friendly research camp. However, the project failed.

Moreover, today Greenland is rich in minerals (cryolite, aluminum, niobium, tantalum, fluoride, and graphite), although their extraction is somewhat limited today. All of this can explain why president Trump was so unironically eager to buy Greenland from Denmark. Moreover, the same reasons why Greenland is so valuable to explain the fact that Denmark was one of the founding members of NATO.

Greenland is an example of why the environmental security problems are of utmost importance to the Arctic policymakers. As have been already stated, Americans did at least a couple of scientific projects in Greenland not all toxic waste was carried away when the projects either ended or failed. Due to climate change, global temperatures are increasing, and in the Arctic faster than in any other part of the world. Rising temperatures lead to ice melting. And if toxic chemicals, now frozen, will leak when the ice melts, who knows what the effects on the environment would be?

Denmark 2011-2020 Arctic strategy stresses sustainable development, the need for the green and blue economy, the need to deepen Arctic research, and enhance knowledge about the region. The Arctic should become a competitive region integrated into the world economy. However, it has to be done with respect to the vulnerability and unique ecosystem of the Arctic. Overall, the Arctic is a region of cooperation. Moreover, Denmark's Arctic strategy values the positive input of every actor, especially under UNCLOS and the Arctic Council system. Denmark welcomes non-Arctic states to participate in the region's development, too, such as China or South Korea. Bilateral cooperation in the Arctic helps to strengthen states' relations, and bilaterally agreed initiatives can then be later brought up to the multinational level.

table 7

Arctic Priorities of Denmark

3.8 Sweden

From the very first pages of its Arctic Strategy, Sweden states that the Arctic should be a region of low-security tensions. The general trend of Sweden's Arctic Policy is the demilitarization of the Arctic. Sweden praises the work of the Arctic Council, yet states that the Council better work even more to ensure stability in the region. Sweden is focused on reducing greenhouse emissions and coping with other negative externalities of economic development in the region. Sweden is also concerned with gender equality problems in the Arctic.

Sцrlin (2014), along with other scholars, questions Sweden's desire to participate in the Arctic actively. Swedish Arctic Strategy was published right before its chairmanship at the Arctic Council started, creating a feeling that the document was published out of necessity rather than out of general desire to act. Sweden has little if no security interests in the Arctic. The country maintains its neutrality and, although participating in the Partnership for Peace NATO initiative, still having divisive debates inside the country about whether to join NATO or not. Dalsjц (2014) states that the Swedish neutrality policy is significantly outdated.

table 8

Arctic Priorities of Sweden

3.9 European Union

`There should be more EU in the Arctic and more Arctic in the EU, because the EU has a lot to offer the region'

Antti Rinne

Former Finnish Prime Minister

Marie-Anne Coninsx, the previous EU's Ambassador at Large for the Arctic, does not believe that increasing number of Arctic strategies of specific European countries and regions would somehow undermine European Union's holistic approach to the region, as she tells the reporter of High North News in the late October of 2019. Then comes 2020 - and the world falls apart, with the European Union being of no exclusion to the rule. Countries do not trust each other, debates over Eurobonds for easing sovereign debts are heating up, and no simple resolution is on the horizon. Can politicians still stand on the same view that the EU can produce a unified political approach about anything? However, in times of uncertainty, I have nothing left but to look back, trust the already published documents, and hope that my research would not lose in its value in the years ahead. By now, there is no one reliable document summarizing all EU Arctic intentions.

European officials involved in the Arctic began with the Barents Euro-Arctic Council in 1993. Then, in 1995 Sweden and Finland became a part of the EU, thus making the Nordic region even more critical to Europe. Today, the European Union has many projects and initiatives in the Arctic. One such is the Northern Dimension (ND), which was initiated in 1999 by Finland. In 2006 the ND was reformed, and from then till now, the Northern Dimension is a joint policy by the EU, Russia, Norway, and Iceland. The ND echoes institutional Russia-EU cooperation in dealing with the four `shared spaces': environment and economy; freedom, security and justice; culture and research and development; and collaboration on external security issues (Airoldi, 2020). The Northern Dimension is an example of international cooperation on soft security policies. It is implemented by joint projects and serves as an `umbrella' for other regional councils such as Nordic, Barents, Baltic, and Arctic. European main priorities are the typical sustainable development of the region, the economic support of the indigenous people and their business initiatives, and facilitating international cooperation.

table 9

Arctic Priorities of European Union

3.10 China

China characterizes itself as a `near-Arctic' state. Being an observer state in the Arctic Council, China is a relatively new Arctic actor since its official Arctic Strategy was released as late as in 2018. However, its real involvement in the Arctic has more history to it. China's primary focus is scientific research in the Arctic. Other priorities are the transportation lines and tourism, along with sustainable development and rational usage of Arctic resources. Polar Silk Road is the Northern part of the `One Belt One Road' (OBOR) initiative. China also aims to use the Transpolar Sea Route once it becomes available. As China does with other OBOR projects, the country brings along investments and infrastructure projects. This adds to the Arctic Paradox as the country claims both to preserve the Arctic - and increase transportation, which would inevitably result in less favorable environmental conditions. China depends on resources imports, so it is unclear how much of the green and blue economy it can integrate into its strategies.

China is a controversial actor, especially for the United States and Denmark. The US lately actively protests any Chinese involvement with the Arctic because the government officials fear to lose their influence over Arctic transportation lines. The story resembles fear of Russian taking over, although both Taiwan and Hong Kong are not of the same value as Crimea or Georgia. Lanteigne (2020) highlights this similarity and writes that especially during the Obama presidency, the NATO alliance feared coordinated Russian Chinese actions in different parts of the world, Arctic too. Rainwater (2013) advises not to irritate China too much and instead seek to integrate its interest into overall Arctic discussions.

China heavily invests in Greenland, thus hitting right at the crucial GIUK gap. Both Denmark and the United States have been protested these investments because they fear that productive Chinese companies would start to meddle less with economics and more with politics. And the latter is not preferable. However, Greenland welcomes Chinese money since it facilitates infrastructure projects the government in Copenhagen does not have money to invest too - or do not want to. Investments from large China's corporations also serve as leverage in Greenland's negotiations with Copenhagen.

table 10

Arctic Priorities of China

3.11 Scotland

Scotland's brand new (and so far, the only) 2019 Arctic Policy Framework is of particular importance when it comes to Arctic strategies of European Union countries. For sure, Scotland is not officially part of the EU for two reasons: 1) the 2014 Scottish Independence Referendum did not result in Scotland's independence for the rest of the United Kingdom; 2) the 2016 United Kingdom referendum on leaving EU did result in Brexit after all. And just like that, the two subsequent referendums put Scotland's image as being a partially independent part of the international society at risk. That is exactly what Scotland's Arctic Policy Framework is about. From the very first pages, even an untrained eye would see that Scotland does not equate itself to existing only as a part of the United Kingdom. Scotland prides itself on having close and long-lasting relations with Arctic nations. The framework puts a strong emphasis on Arctic toponyms having Scottish origin, on Scottish explorers of the North, even on Scottish genes being spread all around Arctic states. Scotland puts a lot of time and effort in blue carbon research (carbon dioxide stored mainly in algae and seagrass) developing robotic technologies suitable for extreme conditions so that sea ices and the ocean can be appropriately studied. The country also supports programs aimed at educating children and young adults - `the pieces of training for invisible [secondary school] students with low self-esteem' (Scotland's Arctic Policy Framework, 2019), North2North mobility, UArctic university. These projects require international cooperation with countries like Canada, Denmark, Finland, Sweden, and the United States.

Scotland now promotes itself as `a European gateway to the Arctic'. The document emphasizes a wide variety of cooperation strategies with the European Union. To name those mentioned, these are the Northern Periphery and Arctic Programme (NPA), which is a smaller part of European Territorial Cooperation programs, Erasmus+, Horizon 2020, and LEADER programs. Scotland is indeed concerned that Brexit may have deprived the country of forums and platforms where it could express its concerns. Loosing not only recognition of being a somewhat state-like unit, which on some issues can act on its own, but EU funding as well is considered a threat. Throughout the whole document, one may sense a strong antagonism towards Britain and its decision to exit the EU.

To pinpoint Heininen's types of Arctic policy priorities, Scotland focuses mainly on peoples and their development. Spreading educational services in remote areas, establishing connections with rural populations, expanding and strengthening cultural ties - all that falls into the categories of Peoples and Indigenous. Science is a category we find in Scotland's Arctic framework as well since Scotland invests in scientific research and fosters international scientific cooperation. Sustainable economic development is also a priority, so I put a plus into the Economy section. The document talks a lot about connectivity, and though it uses vague terms, I would also highlight development as a priority. Transportation ports are central to the Scotland-Arctic system. They connect Scotland with Canada, Faroe Islands, Iceland, Greenland, Norway, and the United States. The environment is by no means a neglected area. Scotland cannot possibly talk about sovereignty in its traditional sense; however, it does resent UK general course of foreign policy, and it does talk about securing already established ties with the EU. So, I would argue that Security is a priority for Scotland, although whether sovereignty is a priority is open to debate.

table 11

Arctic Priorities of Scotland

Outcomes

Henrikson (2020) writes about three theoretical concepts which can be used to explain how states are trying to achieve peace in the Arctic - or their own economic and political goals masked by the pursuit of peace and stability. Those are:

1) Arctic as a concept, global commons or a sanctuary. This is an understanding of constructivists who believe that all actors, states and non-states, are able to cooperate and work towards stability because they have a common understanding of what the Arctic is. Arctic is a precious region and both heritage and future of the whole humanity.

2) Arctic as a field where states exercise their power to preserve stability. This is a typical realist/neorealist perspective. The idea is as simple as it is - to achieve peace and stability in any region, there should be a balance of power. The concept of `Nordic balance' originated during the Soviet era - Schopflin (1966) writes that due to Finland being close to the Soviet Union, it was essential for the state to act friendly. This led to a 1948 Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, or the Finno-Soviet Treaty. In the 1940s Sweden remained a neutral power and resisted attempts of Norway and Denmark to make the Nordic region more pro-Western. Both the Soviet Union and the United States were relatively disinterested in the Northern region which contributed much to stability.

3) Arctic as a zone where the international, interparliamentary and non-governmental organizations preserve peace. Organizations, both formal and informal, are the platform for the state to cooperate. There is no organization in the Arctic which would dare to talk about military security, so all issues discussed relate to the soft security and rarely cause a large disagreement between parties.

An intergovernmental organization, although present in the region, does not yet comprise the system of governance. As we have seen with the Arctic Five, governments still prefer to avoid the Arctic Council and other organizations/forums and instead discuss the issues directly with one another. Therefore, the third option is ruled out.

States do exercises power to preserve stability in the Arctic, that is true. However, they are not the only ones acting there. Not only international organizations but non-governmental ones, the scientific community, cooperation between search and rescue units - all that comprises the Arctic governance system. Therefore, the second option is ruled out too.

However, the constructivist approach seems to suit the best. Remember the Voices, Resources, and Actors approach. The Arctic is a field where all actors exercise the shared vision of what the Arctic is. It has been manifested during the analysis of the Arctic Strategies. The Arctic is an interplay of states, non-governmental organizations, international organizations, institutions, international law, media, and organizations of indigenous people who feel the most impact of all Arctic policies.

Below is the table which summarizes all Arctic priorities of the states, unions, and regions I have talked about.

table 12

Arctic Priorities

To paraphrase the research question, how have different states' Arctic strategies came into being, evolved and interacted with each other for the last seven years? It is indeed a vast inquiry, however, I believe that the Arctic is such a complicated and not very well-studied region that it is crucial to ask such encompassing questions. By trying to answer the big ones, researches simultaneously cover smaller, less controversial ones.

Although each state strategy is unique due to the particular role of the Arctic in each Arctic state's functioning, they all correlate on the need to preserve the region. This is the same idea that sparked their development. For the last seven years, there have been both confrontation and cooperation. Russia, Canada, Denmark, Norway, and the United States are all concerned about territorial claims, which affects their relationships. European Union and China are the most Arctic-involved among non-Arctic states and it is yet a question of how to involve them in the discussion and not let roam on their own. Russia develops its military in the Arctic thus triggering discussions and enhancing distrust. The USA moves away from the cooperation on the climate change and painfully reacts when the non-Arctic states fill the void America has created by abandoning international agreements. New non-state Arctic actors such as Scotland appear thus challenging the traditional view of the international relations as a state-centric field.