The Value Dimension of China’s Belt and Road Initiative as a determinant of EU-China Relations

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NATIONAL RESEASRCH UNIVERSITY - HIGHER SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS

UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON / UNIVERSITY OF KENT

The Value Dimension of China's Belt and Road Initiative as a determinant of EU-China Relations

Ценностное измерение Китайской инициативы «Пояс и дорога» как определяющий фактор отношений ЕU с Китаем

Patrick T. Allum

Moscow, Russia 2019

Contents

Glossary

Abstract

Introduction

1. The English School and the Concept of International Society

2. The Global Order: Past, Present and future

3. Values, between Liberalism and Chinese Traditionalism

4. The Belt and Road Initiative as Foreign Policy, and as a Mega-project

Conclusion

References

Glossary

? International society has two meanings in this article:

(1) The classical English school usage is about the institutionalisation of shared interest and identity amongst states, and puts the creation and maintenance of shared norms, rules and institutions at the centre of IR theory.

(2) Hedley Bull defined it as a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions.'

? International system - refers generally to the macro side of the interactions that tie the human race together, and more specifically to the interactions among states. Its usage in classical English school thinking is close to that in realism, being about power politics amongst states within a political structure of international anarchy.

? Pluralism - defines second-order societies of states with a relatively low degree of shared norms, rules and institutions amongst the states, where the focus of society is on creating a framework for orderly coexistence and competition, or possibly also the management of collective problems of common fate (e.g. arms control, environment).

? Solidarism - can be used as a synonym for cosmopolitanism, but in my usage defines international societies with a relatively high degree of shared norms, rules and institutions among states, where the focus is not only on ordering coexistence and competition, but also on cooperation over a wider range of issues, whether in pursuit of joint gains (e.g. trade), or realisation of shared values (e.g. human rights)

? State - any form of post-kinship, territorially based, politically centralised, self-governing entity capable of generating an inside- outside structure.

Abstract

This article was influenced by some of the leading thinkers in International Relations from Oxford and Harvard. First, Peter Frankopan, who argued that `The west has lost its bearings and is losing its way in a changing world', and that the future will increasingly be shaped, not by transatlantic connections but rather by what happens along the New Silk Roads, a fact which Europe and the EU need to come to terms with. Peter Frankopan, New Silk Roads ([S.l.]: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2016) Second, Yuval Noah Harari, whose recent book outlines three global challenges which can be characterised as enemies of humanity, including nuclear war, climate change and technological disruption. Yuval Noah Harari, 21 Lessons For The 21St Century (Spiegel & Grau, Jonathan Cape, 2018) Finally, Henry Kissinger, who wrote that humanity's greatest and most urgent challenge or `the mystery to be overcome' is how can peoples with `divergent historic experiences and values can be shaped into a common order.' Henry Kissinger, World Order: Re?ections On The Character Of Nations And The Course Of History (London: Penguin Books, 2014). p.9 In light of these insights, this paper aims to promote the idea of a “global International society” as set out in Hedley Bull's Anarchical Society. The paper will thus utilise English School (ES) terms and methods such as “Order”, “Justice” , “International Society” , and the “Pluralist/Solidarist” debate to answer the question. The paper considers EU-China cooperation as the basis for tackling these global trends, by identifying the determinants of the relationship, and the ability of both sides to work together based on shared values and goals, as well as the implications globally.

Introduction

In 2019, the EU finds itself in an international system where the `institutions and values reflected in existing multilateral arrangements are increasingly out of alignment with power political realities.' Edward Newman, "The Responsibility to Protect, Multilateralism and International Legitimacy", in Theorising the Responsibility to Protect (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), pp. 142-143 The historically near-global reach of the Liberal International Order (LIO) is in question, and the spectre of a return to great-power rivalry and instability looms large. One of the key factors which has precipitated the relative decline of the US is the “rise of China”, a phenomena which has been predicted as having the capability to supplant the US in all meaningful measures of power by mid-century. In the media and popular debate, this development is perceived by many to be a threat to the global rules-based system. To reference Kevin Rudd, we are rapidly approaching a moment when, for the first time since King George III the world's biggest economy will be non-western, illiberal and undemocratic. Despite this changing balance of power, and the challenging nature of China's world view, a combination of complacency and `western hubris' has precluded many in the west but particularly the EU, from accepting it. Indeed, a recent article described this mire as the “politics of eternity” whereby a failure of Europe to come to terms with its history or the future has rendered it `lost' and unable to respond effectively. What is now needed is a comprehensive and pragmatic reassessment of where the global order is heading and a proactive,values and practice-based response to it. Kishore Mahbubani, Has The West Lost It? (London: Allen Lane, 2018)

Before outlining my argument and the methodology, it is first necessary to define the EU and China as political entities and the Liberal International Order (LIO) as a construct. In this paper, the state will be taken to mean `any form of post-kinship, territorially based, politically centralised, self-governing entity capable of generating an inside- outside structure.' Buzan, From International To World Society? English School Theory And The Social Structure Of Globalisation, pp. 1-6 Though one could argue whether or not the EU is politically centralised, it certainly fulfils many of the other criteria of a state, and arguably it needs to act a bloc in its foreign policy activities if it is to have sufficient leverage, especially with China. Indeed, since 2015 the EU has strengthened its foreign policy capacity through the Common Foreign and Security Policy and has sought to influence the European and world order according to its norms and rules. It is clear that, though the EU could be defined as a multilateral organisation, it is yearly acting more like a unitary state, and is likely to soon acquire the means of coercion which heretofore has been the only factor to disqualify it as a state. China on the other hand can be considered a traditional, if extremely centralised nation-state. The LIO has been described by John Ikenberry as follows:

Multifaceted and sprawling international order, organized around economic openness, multilateral institutions, security cooperation and democratic solidarity. Along the way, the United States became the `first citizen' of this order, providing hegemonic leadership--anchoring the alliances, stabilizing the world economy, fostering cooperation and championing `free world' values. Western Europe and Japan emerged as key partners, tying their security and economic fortunes to this extended liberal order.

With terms defined, this article will be divided into four sections. First, will be an assessment of the benefits and limitations of the English School method and its core concept “International Society.” Second, the past, present,and future of the LIO will be considered with reference to two competing narratives of the order to come, which are adversarial and cooperative. Within the former vision there are three sub-categories within the former, which are multipolar, bipolar and what has been described as Eastphalian, or multi-order. Whereas, the latter comprises the multi-partner and multicultural narratives which foresee greater global cooperation either within or without the LIO. Section 3 will cover another element of international society building, which in this case will cover the compatibility of the EU and China's political values, examined through the prism of the ES's pluralist-solidarist debate. Finally, part 4 will consider the Belt and Road as foreign policy, and as a mega-project

From these sections a number of key ideas are developed. First, now more than ever, the English school's In order to broad approach, and specifically it's theorisation of `International society' offers a vital lens, to understand change and suggest a more inclusive way of delivering both `order and justice.' Second, with respect to order, this paper contends that the shifting global order, raises the spectre of more adversarial relations between the US-led LIO, of which the EU is a key sponsor and China, as the most prominent emerging power. Indeed, one need only observe the debate in Australia, another key sponsor to appreciate the current state of discombobulation among western powers, and the dangers this presents. Brendan Taylor and William T. Tow, `Crusaders and Pragmatists: Australia Debates the American Alliance', in Michael Wesley, ed., Global Allies: Comparing US Alliances in the 21st Century, Canberra: ANU Press, 2017, pp. 77-89 However, it is argued that such a future isn't certain, and that with careful management and wise policy choices on the part of the EU, we can preserve and strengthen the global international society of states, without division or conflict which has traditionally precipitated such shifts. Third, with respect to values in the international arena an argument will be presented for sharing western liberal values with those of Chinese traditionalism, to create a global values structure predicated on civility, fairness and Justice. The Final section will advance the hypothesis that proactive engagement by the EU (via the Euro-Asia Connectivity Agenda) with China's Belt and Road Initiative provides less a challenge as a great opportunity. It is possible to actualise the strengthening and preservation of a global international society. But that requires bold and decisive foreign policy choices now, as the system transitions from one of centralised US-led power, to diffuse power centres, of which China and the EU will be key shapers. In addition to the books which were referenced as inspiration, a large amount of data has been collected in the form of Policy papers, government documents, Books, Academic Journals, official statistics, Think Tank Reports, datasets and seven years following trends in Sino-Western relations

1. The English School and the Concept of International Society

The English school?

The English school (ES) has received varied criticism and praise by scholars for its simultaneous consideration of three political traditions, and its theoretically pluralist approach. These two core elements either render it useless or makes it a valuable addition to the study of International Relations. This paper contends that, despite criticism, the elasticity and complex nature of the ES approach is an invaluable tool, to understand the multi-faceted implications of the rise of China on the EU and liberal international order, the ability and necessity of diverse peoples to share values, and provides a vital foundation for understanding the foreign policy strategies of both. In order to conduct meaningful analysis, this paper will focus on the ES approach which was formulated by Hedley bull and further developed by Barry Buzan among others. For them, the ultimate aim of the order is the protection of life, truth and property, which Hedley Bull crystallises as two pillars of “Order and Justice.”

ES theorists broadly agree with the realist stance, that the international system exists in a state of anarchy, with states, the principal actors seeking to preserve and enhance their freedom of action by increasing their relative power. This logic holds that a minimum order based on restraints such as great power management, the preference for avoiding war and balance of power is paramount and that all other considerations are secondary. Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study Of Order In World Politics, p.74 However, the ES approach seeks to transcend this Machiavellian, deterministic statement by attempting to incorporate the cooperative tenets of international relations into the realist idea of an adversarial international system. English school transcending the preconditions of the international system It does this, firstly through the consideration of three key concepts/traditions, which are unified in an understanding that effective International Relations theory is rooted in a classical, history-based approach.

It is appropriate, therefore that the three strands which make the ES approach are often named for three great thinkers Thomas Hobbes, Hugo Grotius, and Immanuel Kant. Firstly, the Hobbesian or Realist tradition is focused on the anarchic state of the international system, where states compete, in a state of eternal conflict. Naturally, this paints a bleak picture of the future as a return to power-maximising Imperial forms of control.See figure 1. If we accept that liberalism, constitutes a messianic universalist moment, Thomas Hobbes, LEVIATHAN, or the Matter, Forme and Power of a Commonwealth Ecclesiastical and Civil., 1651; Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch, 1795; Hugo Grotius, Mare Liberum (Lodewijk Elzevir, 1609) Secondly, the Grotian or rationalist tradition centres around the idea of an international society, which, is the most studied and is concerned with suggesting a middle way (via media) for inter-state relations. Within this strand we find the Pluralist-Solidarist debate which informs the values debate later in this article and will be covered in more detail below. Finally, the Kantian or revolutionist tradition advocates for a world society, which transcends of the state's system with a focus on individuals, non-state organisations and even the global population as a whole in pursuit of a universalist, cosmopolitan future. Barry Buzan, "The English School: An Underexploited Resource In IR", Review of International Studies, 27.03 (2001), pp.475-476; see also, Barry Buzan, From International to World Society? English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalisation (Cambridge: Cambridge university Press, 2004), pp. 1-6 As will be seen throughout the paper, the particularities of these three traditions feature in all the debates regarding the future international order, the values it will imbue and the foreign policy which can take the global international society there. Needless to say, the arguments of Hobbes/Machiavelli, Grotius and Kant reflect the values, which national leaders must juggle in the guiding and conduct of foreign policy. In this sense, Realism gives primacy to the national (or in the EU's case: the union's) interest; Rationalism focuses on a state's international obligations and Revolutionism, which focuses on humanitarian responsibilities.Robert H Jackson, The Global Covenant: Human Conduct In A World Of States (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 169-178

The debate about the ES approach's utility is essentially delineated in the intellectual battle between the epistemology of Interpretivism and positivism. Proponents of the ES method, the interpretivists, argue that a classical approach is necessary to deliver meaningful outcomes, and that the positivist approach which relies on a `fetish' for measurement reduces the explanatory ability of IR theory. Hedley Bull, "International Theory: The Case for a Classical Approach", World Politics, 18.03 (1966), pp.361-365 Many have posited that it forms part of the `great conversation' of international politics, which exerts force in any discussion regarding foreign policy or International Relations and that, as such it constitutes a `healthy theory.' Buzan, From International to World Society? English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalisation, pp. 1-6; Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki and Steve Smith, International Relations Theories (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 127-148; Bull, "International Theory: The Case for A Classical Approach", pp.361-377; Edward Keene, "International Society As An Ideal Type", in Theorising International Society (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), pp. 104-125 Barry Buzan also suggests that the via media should be taken as the basis for a `grand theory' of IR, which represents far more than simply `another paradigm to throw into the tedious game of competing IR theories.' Buzan, From International to World Society? English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalisation, pp. 1-6 Indeed, Hedley Bull's argument goes furthest, suggesting that the move from generating testable hypotheses to making substantive judgments requires effective application of the classical approach. In sum, effective theorisation depends on the consideration of philosophy, history, and law, which is characterised `by explicit reliance upon the exercise of judgement and by the assumptions that [confining] ourselves to strict standards of verification and proof [drastically limits what can be] said about international relations.' Bull extrapolates that the study of IR is necessarily an imperfect process of `perception or intuition.' Bull, "International Theory: The Case For A Classical Approach", p.361

Whereas, detractors within the positivist camp, notably Kenneth Waltz see the ES approach as vague and overly broad, which renders it unable to offer accurate analysis. Kenneth Neal Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: Mcgraw-hill, 1979), see also; Dale Copeland, "A Realist Critique of The English School", Review of International Studies, 29.03 (2003). In the Theory of International Politics, Waltz posits that once a theory is established it should be subject to seven tests, failure in any leading to the failure of a theory. Tests one and two necessitate precise statement of the theory followed by the generation of hypotheses, a task made difficult by the ES's broad approach. The final test argues that if any of the previous tests result in failure, then the theory itself requires `repair and restatement, or requires a narrowing of the scope of its explanatory claims.' Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p.13, see also; Copeland, "A Realist Critique of The English School"Indeed, even Barry Buzan admits that the approach is under-developed, and that much work needs to be done. For Waltz, the devising of tests is of only secondary importance to `stating theories with enough precision and plausibility to make testing worthwhile.' Waltz, Theory of International Politics, pp.13,14; Barry Buzan and Richard Little, International Systems in World History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p.105 Others have pointed out that the anarchic state of the international system is predicated on a complete lack of international society. James Der Derian, International Theory (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001), p. 75In sum, positivists argue that the absence of clearly testable hypotheses and in particular, the lack of clarity regarding the ES's central idea of international society mean it has a long way to go before it can be considered a reliable theory of IR. David Boucher, Political Theories of International Relations: From Thucydides to the Present (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 16

It is the contention of this paper, that despite significant criticism, the English School's broad and classical approach represents a useful explanatory theory to understand the relationship between systemic change, political values and foreign policy as determinants of EU-China relations more so than one based solely on quantitative analysis. The elasticity and complexity of the approach is ES theory's key strength when tackling a question, which is not only normative but also has many variables to consider. The approach in this case also offers the best chance of predicting future trends, something which will be key, when advocating policy ideas.

The Concept of International Society

Hedley Bull argues that an International Society exists `when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society [in which] they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions.' Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki and Steve Smith, International Relations Theories (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 127-148.For the sake of brevity, this paper will focus on the ES's via media which stands between two extremes of realism and cosmopolitanism. Initially, it is important to stress the qualitative difference between international `system' and international `society,' as terms often conflated by scholars. The International system is omnipresent, and can be defined as `when two or more states have sufficient contact between them and have sufficient impact on one another's decisions to cause them to behave, at least in some measure as parts of a whole.' The inescapable system is what states make of it, and thus they must forces states to employ self-help policies in order to survive. Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics", International Organization, 46.02 (1992), pp.391-425 International Society accepts this anarchic logic to gain a meaningful understanding of how states operate globally; however it argues that individuals and states both exist in societies, which they shape and are shaped by. Thus, it's posited that how states perceive each other is a major determinant of their relations and that where they share a common identity, or a common set of rules and norms, a states behaviour is conditions and the social system's boundaries are set. Buzan, From International To World Society?, p.8 It follows that International societies have no defined scope, and are in constant flux.

In 1977, Hedley Bull found it unlikely that sovereign states would, in the near term agree to subordinate themselves to a consensual cosmopolitan world government. And, that the creation of a Hobbesian universal monarchy by conquest was equally unlikely. Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study Of Order In World Politics, p. 261-263 Despite being made more than forty years ago, these observations remain true today. The Unipolar moment, spurred by the collapse of the USSR in 1991, was heralded at the time as the `End of history.' Francis Fukuyama, The End Of History And The Last Man (London: Hamish Hamilton, 2012) In this brave new world, the one in which i grew up, it was imagined that Liberalism had triumphed and with it the Liberal International Order (LIO) which had been growing for at least the past 250 years, but notably since 1918. Kishore Mahbubani wrote that Western hubris, complacency and missed opportunities, have meant that the universalist messianic thrust of the west has not delivered the cosmopolitan, unified and peaceful world which it promised. Mahbubani, Has The West Lost It?, pp.1-9, 25-34, 42

In 2019, With the rise of china as a non-western, illiberal and non-democratic state, which is also the biggest economy in PPP terms, the boundaries of the global international society are once-again challenged. Therefore it is essential to prevent a return to power-maximising competition by states and in-fact strengthen and preserve the bonds of international society, in a way which favours: `incorporation, a bringing in of diverse peoples into a single international order' rather than fanning the flames of division. B.A. Robertson, "Law, Power And The Expansion Of International Society", in Theorising International Society (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), p. 189 Thus the core challenge is one of order building, which is just and enables all members equal opportunity to pursue `the good life.' Bull, The Anarchical Society, p.315. see also; Flockhart, "The Coming Multiorder World", p.13

As Hedley Bull argued, a balance must be struck between maintaining “order” and promoting “Justice” which he describes as the difference between “minimum” and “optimum” order. In this vein, he argues that when calls for justice are put forward without a consensus in International society as to what that constitutes, 'the prospect is opened up that the consensus that does exist about order or minimum coexistence will be undone.' Bull, "Order vs. Justice in International Society", p.282 Hedley Bull's observations form the crux of a key debate within the International society sphere is the pluralist/solidarist debate, which concerns the extent to which states and international societies can share values. For brevity, it is probably best conceptualised as two ends of a sliding scale with reference to the “thinness” and “thickness” of shared norms, rules and institutions. William Bain, "The Pluralist-Solidarist Debate In The English School", 2018 It is valuable because it creates space to consider shared values beyond liberalism, which have often dominated conceptions of International Society. This is necessary to consider the future of the post-liberal International order and the values which will shape it. Pluralists believe that an effective global international society can exist within relatively thin parameters with the simple aim of maintaining peace. Indeed, the restatement by rising states of the sanctity of state sovereignty and non-interference makes it difficult for international society to progress beyond minimum goals of dispute resolution, almost to the point of a-sociality. Buzan, From International To World Society? pp.1-9 Pluralism accepts this limited value sharing as a state of fact, and broadly aligns with the adversarial narratives of emergent order. Meanwhile, Solidarists posit that International Society can `develop quite wide-ranging norms, rules and institutions, covering both coexistence issues and cooperation in pursuit of shared interests, including some scope for collective action and enforcement.' Ibid, P.8 Solidarism holds close to the cooperative narratives of future order, and thus offers the best opportunities to address the global threats that we all face. However, it is not necessary to tie this to global cosmopolitanism which I argue is a long way off. A key takeaway of this debate is that solidarism builds on pluralism, in the sense that a move from `pluralism toward solidarism involves adding to characteristically pluralist values of survival and self-interest. Buzan, From International To World Society?, pp.139-147, 152-60; Bain, "The Pluralist-Solidarist Debate In The English School", 2018 In this sense, all ES theorist are essentially solidarists arguing that the global interest in survival will ultimately lead to a coming together, and the debate is mainly about what values will come to dominate and over what timescale.

2. The Global Order: Past, Present and future

As written previously, the scope of international societies depends in great part on the state of the global order and how actors perceive it. Thus, it is also a key determinant of EU-China relations. IR scholars broadly agree that the order is currently in a state of flux, though there is no consensus as to where it is headed. Much of the debate focuses on the future of the near- hegemonic, US-led Liberal International Order. In order to assess the LIO's future, we must consider it's past. John Ikenberry has identified three iterations of the LIO, which have marked both change and continuity since 1918. As will be argued, all three of these iterations are characterised by a degree of missed opportunity.

The first iteration was built on the ideas of US President Woodrow Wilson's fourteen points, which were developed at the end of the First World War and sought to eliminate war as a means of interstate dispute settlement. It aimed to build a `global collective security body' based on acceptance of universal liberal principles and the creation of a new institution, the League of Nations. G. John Ikenberry, "Liberal Internationalism 3.0: America And The Dilemmas Of Liberal World Order", Perspectives On Politics, 7.01 (2009), pp.71-87 Ironically, in 1918 Wilson's calls for liberty, self-determination, and protection for the rights of small nations struck a chord with a now challenger of the LIO, China. The Chinese, hoped that the United States, would side with China as the victim of Japanese aggression as it presented itself, both as a principled power and a supporter of `Right over Might.' Paul French, “A brief Moment of hope” in Betrayal In Paris: How The Treaty Of Versailles led To China's Long Revolution (London: Penguin, 2014). These hopes were ultimately to be dashed, and as Paul French argues was a deep betrayal which alongside a century of humiliation by western powers ultimately led to the collapse of China's fledgling republic and an explosion of revolutionary fervour, a missed opportunity. As mentioned before, one of the key principles of International society is the ability to incorporate and bring in groups of diverse peoples into a single international order, which all parties have an interest in maintaining. This first iteration of Liberal Internationalism failed to achieve a sufficiently stable peace due to both the imposition of a `Carthaginian' peace settlement at Versailles, and the weakness of the LON, which aided the coming of WW2.

The post-1945 liberal International order was multi-layered and more overtly hegemonic, with the creation of new institutions including the UN, NATO, The WTO and the Bretton Woods payment system. This order stood against the USSR in a bipolar system, with its own parallel institutions such as the Warsaw Pact; although, the role of global governance and security had been `contracted out' to the United States. Ikenberry `Liberal Internationalism 3.0', p.76 This is especially true of Europe, which was recovering from large scale destruction, was reliant on US financial aid, and was entering a period of decolonisation.

Indeed, the power of the LIO was further strengthened with the fall of the USSR, which allowed the US system to gain unchallenged dominance. Francis Fukuyama, The End Of History And The Last Man (London: Hamish Hamilton, 2012). Furthermore, its collapse was taken as a vindication of The West's liberal project leading to further alienation of Russia and increasing hubris alongside messianic universalist pre-occupations. This can at the precise moment when efforts to build a just global order should have been redoubled. Change all to Mahbubani, “Has the West Lost it.”Kishore Mahbubani, pp.46-47.The alienation of Russia may have served short term goals of defeating an ideological enemy but did nothing to shape a more cooperative international society. And, as the Treaty of Versailles in 1918 had done with China, so the way Russia was excluded from the order building process set the stage for renewed rivalry in the future. Indeed, it is noticeable that both Russia and China have re-emerged as challengers of the US-led order, being identified as `wanting to shape a world antithetical to US values and interests.' The failures and missed opportunities of previous attempts to remake the LIO thus feed directly into the problems of creating an international society today, which is both orderly and just.

Three Divides

In 1977, Hedley Bull outlined three divides in The Anarchical Society, ideological, economic, and cultural, which present challenges to the creation of a just and orderly international society both historically, presently and into the future. The first of these was described as the East-West divide, no doubt referring to cold war realities, Bull advocated collaboration between great powers according to common interests to create a `minimum world order' which above all else prevented catastrophic nuclear war. Bull, The Anarchical Society, p.315 Arguably this will remain true today, as we return to a more contested global order, with up to half a dozen nuclear armed centres of power. However, where Bull's views are outdated, is his argument that minimum order is only achievable through hidden diplomatic bargains between great powers, and his assertion that minimum order is acceptable in a choice of order vs. Justice. Bull, "International Theory: The Case For A Classical Approach" I would argue that it is possible to strengthen order and enhance justice simultaneously, and that the emergence of a post-liberal order shouldn't force a choice.

The Second divide, and among the most important is the North-South divide, or the gap between rich and poor countries. He rightly states that `no consensus is possible today that does not take account of the demands of Asian, African and Latin American countries and peoples for just change in respect of the elimination of colonialism and…the relationship of dependence or subordination in which most of them stand to rich countries.' Bull, The Anarchical Society, p.300 In 2019 the global order is composed differently, with decolonisation a distant memory, however the principles he stated remain true. It is ever more necessary to take account of the demands of developing and re-emerging centres of power such as those within the BRICs group and especially China, the world's second largest economy. This shifting global centre of gravity presents acute dilemmas for the EU, which is simultaneously trying to build a world with multilateralism at its core whilst dealing with an increasingly powerful China and a less reliable US . This presents strong incentives for rebalancing International society and committing states to a rules-based structure.

The final challenge identified is cultural. Bull suggests that:

`The future of international society Is likely to be determined, among other things, by the preservation and extension of a cosmopolitan culture, embracing both common ideas and common values, rooted in societies in general as well as in their elites, that can provide the world international society of today with the kind of underpinning enjoyed by the geographically smaller and culturally more homogenous international societies of the past.' Bull, The Anarchical Society, p.317

Though writing more than 40 years ago, Hedley Bull's argument that the future lies in progressive solidarism, once again holds significant weight when we consider the shift in the global order, which is once again underway. In fact, his argument is more pertinent than ever given that China not the US is likely to become the largest economy and most powerful state by 2040. See tables 1 and 2, on page 26-27 of this document. Culturally, the future international society will need to absorb `non-Western elements to a much greater degree if it is to be genuinely universal and provide a foundation for a universal international society.' Hidemi Suganami, "The Argument Of The Anarchical Society", in The Anarchical Society' At 40. Contemporary Challenges And Prospects (Corby: Oxford University Press, 2017).

The Future, Adversarial or Cooperative?

This paper contends that the LIO is over, and as such the EU needs to employ greater strategic cunning in its dealings with China and address the three divides outlined above. Narratives about the coming order differ, but can be split into two distinct camps, those who see the future as past, predicting a more adversarial order, and those who see it as fundamentally more cooperative. In the adversarial camp, by far the most prominent is the multi-polar world. According to this argument, we are returning to the structure of international order which shaped the nineteenth and early 20th centuries. That is to say, one which is characterised by Zero-sum gain, balance of power and Realpolitik as ordering principles, within an anarchic system. This is based on the principle that the unipolar moment is over, and the very architecture of the LIO is under threat. By this logic, the relative decline of the US leaves `institutions and values reflected in existing multilateral arrangements...increasingly out of alignment with power political realities,' and that the rise of the different will shake the global system in `unpredictable, uncontrollable and quite possibly detrimental ways.' These different/other states form `poles of attraction' and are understood to include: the EU, China, the US and potentially Russia, though it's economic potential is significantly less. Understandably then, the force which is seen as shaking the LIO is that presented by China's inexorable rise, which according to this narrative is revisionist. As can be seen in Table's 1 and 2. on pages twenty-six and twenty-seven by 2040 China is expected to surpass the US by all meaningful measures of power. Therefore, the key question is how they intend to use their growing ability to shape the world. In the Adversarial realist camp, a notable thinker is Graham Allison who compared the US led west and China to Athens and Sparta featured within Thucydides History of the Peloponnesian War, which posited that “the rise of Athens, and the fear that this instilled in Sparta...made war inevitable.” The Thucydides trap, as it was named in his recent book presents data which shows that in 12 out of 16 historic cases, where a rising power has threatened to displace a ruling power ended in conflict, and that in 2 of the 4 which didn't were powers which shared a large degree of commonality, notably Spain vs Portugal and Britain vs USA. This book is no doubt from a realist perspective, using material and military capabilities as the key metric of power. Taken at face value, this narrative presents a frightening prospect, when one considers the Chinese economy is far larger than the Soviet-Unions had ever been, and that it may seek to create a new order in its own image.

There are some within the adversarial camp who argue that we are instead entering an era of bipolarity shaped by the US and China (G2) as primary powers wielding normative power over the rest. In such a case the world would be shaped by competition between the LIO standing for liberal values, and Chinese traditional International Relations, which attempt to “make the centre everywhere.' This is certainly a possibility by mid-century, however, at this stage the EU accounts for almost a quarter of global GDP and so should by no means be discounted as a centre of power. The final tranche of those who foresee an adversarial future can be termed the Eastphalians or scholars who foresee a multi-order world. Eastphalians suggest that a new regional order centred on China would `reinvigorate' Westphalian principles (based on the 1648 treaty) which emphasise national sovereignty and non-interference, thus curtailing western power and ideas and challenging western preferences for the universalisation of transnational liberal principles. Sung Won Kim has argued that `Eastphalian' order might `effectively doom transnational efforts to alleviate suffering as an operative principle in world affairs.' Indeed, it would mean a reversal of a post-westphalian strategy which came to a head after the end of the cold war, or as Kishore Mahbubani, would argue, the point of maximum western hubris came at this time.

Trine Flockhart has recently suggested a Multi-Order future, which is similar to the Eastphalians, in the sense that the new order must accept pluralities in power and identity. This narrative yields a number of useful insights, such as that offshore balancing against china, as articulated in the previous two narratives should be resisted as it is unlikely to work Flockhart, “The Coming Multipolar World”, pp.25-26. However, it has some weaknesses i believe in addressing the change currently underway across the Asia-Pacific. Firstly, It is written from a post-modern, non-state centric perspective, which many states, particularly China, Korea and Japan do not subscribe to. Therefore, her assertion that the future centres around multilateral institutions, I believe is currently wide of the mark and doesn't relate particularly well to the situation on the ground in the Asia-Pacific. Any answer to the problem of order must account for these regional differences. Secondly, Despite being bold in moving beyond the state, the multi-order narrative precludes the possibility of creating a new set of values, which could preserve a one-world order. Instead, the multi-order narrative suggests that regional bubbles will develop, which are shaped by different values and are relatively insulated from one another, but still somehow capable of influencing each other. Again, this isn't borne out by strong evidence, especially when we consider China's ever-increasing internet censorship activities which present the possibility of a parallel internet. surely this would only increase insulation if we allow a separation into competing orders.

In the other camp, we have proponents of two key cooperative narratives. The first of which suggests that the structure and institutions of the existing LIO are resilient and will continue to exert magnetism in international affairs. Most notably, John Ikenberry, who defines current difficulties as a `crisis of success' and that the future is `quite bright' for a one-world system in which the United-States and it's institutions remain dominant. G. John Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, And Transformation Of The American World Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011), pp. 281-282, 287. This narrative is certainly more optimistic about the future, positing that the removal of great power war since 1945 prevents rival powers from overturning the system and fosters cooperation within existing institutions. Ibid, p.284. In current conditions this may well be so, however, it is important not to overstate these, indeed geo-economic strategies employed by China as well as the race for supremacy in Artificial Intelligence and even space could create new pressures for the existing LIO by Asymmetric means . The point being that just because the threat is slim today, doesn't mean it won't be in 25 years' time. Proponents of the multi-partner narrative also argue that the LIO continued to have universal appeal and reject the idea that it is culturally specific to the west, but is rather `a way of organising the world.' Flockhart, “The Coming Multipolar World”, pp, 8-9It is important to note, that the chief beneficiary of the LIO has been overwhelmingly China, and so it is possible that through the careful application by the EU of partnership diplomacy, retaining veneration for liberal values through soft power, and the reform of (old) institutions the existing order could be maintained, and China could be convinced to integrate more fully into it. There are however, two key flaws in this narrative. Firstly, that it risks further western hubris in defence of the liberal order, which Kishore Mahbubani argues could doom the west. Secondly, scholars such as Trine Flockhart have pointed out that the assumption that liberal order will be universalised is dangerous, and that, though it may strengthen internally its global reach will decrease. Mahbubani, Has the West Lost it?, pp.46-48; see also, Flockhart, “The Coming Multipolar World”

As explained previously, the central hypothesis related to order, is that the LIO is over, and that we are entering a Post-Liberal order. Indeed, some have cast doubt on the idea of a Liberal International Order in explaining the period of western leadership, as it appears to have neither been liberal, nor international, nor particularly orderly. In a number of debates, for example China has been identified as the main beneficiary, yet it is neither liberal nor democratic. Ferguson and Zakaria, "Future of Geopolitics" Furthermore, as was alluded to previously the coming decades will be shaped increasingly by activity along the New Silk Roads through Eurasia, and the main beneficiary of that is likely to be the East-Asian countries, particularly China. Frankopan, New Silk Roads; Kupchan, No One's World The West, The Rising Rest, And The Coming Global Turn These two phenomena, the end of the LIO and the re-emergence of the Silk Roads makes the multicultural narrative rather persuasive. One of its proponents, Charles Kupchan argues that the west is losing not only it's material supremacy, but also ideological dominance, with the rise of new powers. He goes on to argue that the Western liberal model is merely the result of one specific journey to modernity, of which there are many versions and that the future will be defined by different centres of power at different stages and on different paths to achieving it, and that as a result it will be “no-one's world.” The key challenge he identifies, which is similar to that of Kissinger is to establish a global consensus on the fundamental terms of a new order, which accounts for cultural divides, and to manage the peaceful transformation towards it. Kupchan, No One's World The West, The Rising Rest, And The Coming Global Turn, p.5; see also, Flockhart, “The Coming Multipolar World”, p.10; Kissinger, World Order: Re?ections On The Character Of Nations And The Course Of History, p.9 Amitav Acharya has also supported this post-liberal vision, by suggesting that there will develop a complex interplay between a model based on a concert of great powers, of which the EU, China and the US will be three, and a regional model based on groups of countries such as ASEAN and the EU. Amitav Acharya, The End Of American World Order (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2014), p. 4

In terms of EU-China relations, an adversarial future would have significant implications. Most notably, a return to great power rivalry, not in an intra-European conflict as in the past, but rather between the EU and others including China. Indeed, it appears that EU policymakers are beginning to view the world through an adversarial lens, when we consider dually the decision to diverge with the United States in its policies towards the Iran nuclear deal and China respectively, as well as increasing calls for the creation of `a true European Army' and European Security Council. In terms of China's Foreign policy, such its flagship Belt and Road Initiative, this would then be seen through the prism of neo-imperialism as has been the accusation in a lot of western mainstream media and the establishment of spheres of influence. Indeed, it would resemble a reincarnation of the British Empire, which developed gradually from a trading enterprise, to an exercise in control. Interestingly enough, we can already see a gradual shift from purely economic interests towards security interests, as a recent article in The Diplomat highlights.

The suggestion of a multi-partner future would also have an effect on the EU, as it would imply continuing to share destiny with the US. Henry Kissinger, sees this as a necessity for the EU as `a divided Atlantic would turn Europe into an appendage of Eurasia, forced to look not west, but east to a China, whose aim is to be the `principal advisor to all humanity.' Kissinger's words are stark, and they almost stand as a call to action, in defence of the Liberal International Order, which would effectively mean an adversarial relationship with China, which the US views as wanting to shape a world `antithetical to US interests and values.' This even an ostensibly cooperative vision of future order, would in reality be adversarial.

This paper agrees that the past has a significant impact on the future, and that we are in danger of returning to an adversarial system of order, however, it is advocated that the most likely future, is that advocated indirectly in Frankopan's New Silk Roads, and by advocates of the multicultural thesis, that the coming order fundamentally different than those before it. In sum, the EU and China are united in trying to navigate the coming order, the nature of which will necessarily affect and be affected by their respective values and foreign policy.

3. Values, between Liberalism and Chinese Traditionalism

Central to Hedley Bull's conception of International society is the importance of developing a set of shared values. This requires overcoming the modern equivalents of the three divides to build political values that all parties will subscribe to and uphold. This is not only necessary for the maintenance of “minimum order” but also importance in the aspiration for “optimum order.” Trine Flockhart notes that,' narratives about the future and the conduct of foreign policy must now be based on acceptance that liberal values will not be universalized.' Ibid, p.26. However, this does not necessitate a retreat into competition, which would be counterproductive. Indeed, it is possible that a combination of Chinese traditional values and western liberalism can offer a set of universal values which could be both acceptable and durable globally. In a recent report by the European Think Tank Network (ETNC) it was highlighted that the EU is hoping to pursue a `principled, practical and pragmatic' policy towards china, though this is yet to be defined. These facts mean that a progressive Solidarist approach is possible and desirable, if we want to avoid global conflict in future.