The Value Dimension of China’s Belt and Road Initiative as a determinant of EU-China Relations

The EU's values are founded on ideas which are both `inherently western' and `substantially European.' They are Western, in the sense that, for almost two hundred and fifty years, the societies and political cultures of Europe and North America have taken as articles of faith the principles of political and economic liberalism. These principles were then buttressed and institutionalised in the post-war LIO, of which the EU was a co-author, sponsor and dependent. The inherently western ideas bring about unity based on an acceptance of equality, freedom, democracy and secular governance. (Liberte, egalite, fraternite). As a co-author, the EU's values are also substantially European, adding the ideals of international cooperation (multilateralism) as the foundation of its survival, as well as robust structures for social provision and civil rights. The understandings of both Liberalism and the EU's values differ in nature and scope. Indeed, Ian Manners has argued that the EU's values constitute five `core' norms `peace, liberty, democracy, rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms - and four `minor' norms - social solidarity, anti-discrimination, sustainable development and good governance.' Whereas, a recent European Think Tank Network on China (ETNC) report included democracy, human rights, and the rule of law as core principles. These differing conceptions, say nothing of the differing definitions of liberalism globally. In China for example, liberalism is synonymous with Western-style democracy, which explains their constant use of the adage “with Chinese characteristics” to distinguish their system for the purposes of comparison, the EU's values will be considered as Democracy, equality, freedom, rule of law and multilateralism as indicative of its postmodern features. In terms of the EU's attitude to its values, it must be defined as a transformational, normative power. Indeed, its very foundations are built on the fact that its members must agree on core principles. As the EU has developed, it's neighbours have eagerly sought to join or be as closely associated with it as possible, and in so doing have been `attracted, induced or pressured to adopt European norms.' It must also be noted that the EU is a postmodern entity, which is built on transparency, mutual openness, and interdependence. Robert Kagan argued that it was essentially a post-historical paradise which has achieved Kant's `perpetual peace.'

China's political values relating to foreign policy are somewhat difficult to determine, as they are essentially a melding of several doctrines, which include Marxist-Leninism, economic pragmatism, and traditional Chinese values. At first glance, Marxist ideology retains strong influence on China's political values, indeed the Chinese government recently affirmed its commitment that Marxism should guide all activity, such that `[in] developing this culture, we must follow the guidance of Marxism, base our efforts on Chinese culture ...We must continue to adapt Marxism to China's conditions, keep it up to-date, and enhance its popular appeal.' However, this belies it problematic application to the conduct of foreign policy. This is because Marxism's core tenet is class struggle, an idea fundamentally at odds with the Chinese government's goal of peaceful development. It is noticeable, both that Marxism has not been publicly declared as a guiding foreign policy principle since 1978 and that both Hu Jintao and Xi-Jinping have given far more impetus to the idea that `China will continue to hold high the banner of peace, development and cooperation.' Ibid, p.41.

Second, Since 1978, what Chinese tradition describes as the `mandate of heaven' (the authority to rule) has rested, not on class struggle, but rather on economic pragmatism as the barometer of good governance. Up to now, in that pursuit per capita disposable income has risen 9,158% and more than 800 million people have been lifted out of absolute poverty. In foreign policy, it leads to the definition of interests in purely economic terms and is ambivalent towards the maintenance of global order, thus sharing some elements of Marxist doctrine.

The final set of values stems from Chinese traditionalism, which broadly coalesces around the ancient Confucian values of benevolence, righteousness and rights. Benevolence calls on a state's leaders to act responsibly to care for and empathise with their peoples. Mencius wrote that `Benevolence is man's mind and righteousness is man's path.' So it could be defined as Just and proper behaviour. Rites can be defined as social customs, and according to Yang Xuetong `rites are the foundation of civility and advance the social significance of human life beyond the principle of freedom.' Indeed, Confucius famously wrote that without `rites, your character cannot be established.' In a way Chinese traditionalism matches earlier European monarchical systems which trumpeted the idea of `enlightened despotism.' That is to say, the prevailing view in China is that democracy and the consent of the governed is secondary, and that performance is the basis of political legitimacy. Because Chinese political values emanate from competing ideologies, scholars have often struggled to comprehend the true impetus behind China's foreign policy. Those that have generally refer to those values as a hybrid of two or three of these political traditions. One notable example of this hybrid definition can be seen in a report by one of the EU's most prestigious think tanks on China. In it Didi Tatlow argues that the central theme of Chinese values in international relations is `a unique set of norms…rooted in a cosmological worldview located in “the centre”(emperors, the party)…where final authority resides. Didi Tatlow, Merics, p.4. One of the articles central claims is that China has always been a revolutionist and normative actor, whether it be the imperial pronouncements of Tianxia “V‰є(all under heaven) or the communist goals of a `Community of a shared destiny for mankind.'

Agreeing a common set of values:

Having surveyed the literature, we can deduce core values from both. On the Chinese side these can be defined as benevolence, righteousness, rights, multilateralism (international cooperation). For the EU it appears to be Equality, democracy, freedom multilateralism, and Rule of Law. Given the differences between these competing worldviews is it possible to build a common set of values between the EU and China, which create an interest in both to maintain the international system, which accept that liberal values are unlikely to become the universal value structure, while tempering the illiberal but equally entrenched Chinese value structure. Flockhart, pp.16-18 liberalism traditionalism global order

Though not an English School theorist, Tsinghua Professor Yan Xuetong has partly addressed this question, arguing that it's possible to create a shared set of values along the lines of progressive solidarism. And thus, build a truly global international society, which is orderly and Just. Firstly, it is advocated that the EU's values of equality could be merged with the Chinese conception of benevolence to popularise the idea of fairness in international affairs, if we take fairness to be a morality favourable to the disadvantaged, and Justice as righteousness of result. This would mean, rather than following a logic of absolute equality, the overriding logic should be one of `common but differentiated responsibilities.' This is a principle which the EU has already subscribed to in previous treaties such as the Kyoto protocol and notably, the Lome convention. Signed in 1975 between the European community and 46 developing nations across Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific (ACP), the convention offered economic relief and preferential treatment. This not only suggests that international society is moving in this direction but that the guiding principles of EU-China relations could coalesce around it. Xuetong, p.14

The second convergence could be found between righteousness and democracy. Utilising John Rawls famous conception of justice, Xuetong posits that, `by fusing democracy with righteousness, we can popularise the value of justice and help to ensure that the resolutions of international organisations are both legitimate in form and just in result. When the two are unified, justice is upheld.' Ibid. He goes on to consider the situation regarding aid, arguing that while democracy within the international system ensures only that every country can decide its own aid policy, justice calls developed countries to invest 0.7% of GDP in an effort to make poverty history.

Finally, the convergence between freedom and rites expressed within a modern conception of civility would be useful in allaying concerns regarding a clash of civilisations, expressed by numerous academics. Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash Of Civilization (Simon & Schuster, 1996). As Xuetong highlights, if rising and dominant states can guide competition for international power through the prism of civility, the chances of peace increase significantly. Just as the norms of civility are crucial to regulating competition between the US and China in a peaceful manner, so the EU can, as a normative power act as a moderator on the actions of both. The abandonment of Hubris as Mahbubani posited, would, in combination with the norm of civility serve, not only to transcend the messianic universalist assumptions of liberalism, but also to advance human civilisation. See Tocci; Mahbubani; Buzan; Chen. It is no doubt noted by the reader that the concept of Civility, more or less correlates to Hedley Bull's conception of order

In addition to sharing values in the form of fairness, justice and civility, both the EU and China subscribe to the principles of multilateralism. For the EU, multilateralism is the cornerstone of its ideology, having been formed in the ashes of an adversarial European system, which twice in the twentieth century, brought death and destruction on an unprecedented scale. In fact, the EU's very survival depends on building international relationships, which further `the `wider goal of building, defending and transforming multilateralism.' Tocci, p.5 This involves both the strengthening of inter-regional relations, which can be seen through the EU's closer ties with both Canada and Japan respectively. This commitment to multilateralism can also be keenly felt in the EU's response to Donald Trump's decision to withdraw support for the Iran nuclear deal. Indeed, the EU has decided to uphold this multilateral framework in support of Russia and China and in defiance of US mercantilist threats to impose secondary sanctions. Ibid. Possibly add to this idea of more EU multilateralism.

China too is conspicuous when it comes to both its words and actions in support of multilateralism. In a statement to the UN In 2018, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi announced that `China will not become, will not challenge, will not take the place of the United States.' Zhang Ruinan, "China's Foreign Minister Says China Will Not Seek To Replace US Leadership", Chinadaily.Com.Cn , 2018. Oriana Skylar Mastro, "In The Shadow Of The Thucydides Trap” p.38. Official CCP doctrine also rejects concepts such as zero-sum game, absolute security and alliance theory in favour of more universal and inclusive concepts. Ibid, "In The Shadow of The Thucydides Trap,” pp.25-45. In addition to these statements, it is apparent that China is pursuing a policy of `incremental intercontinentalism' which aims to temper its existing and projected economic power with a thick web of multilateral engagements and institutions, and in so doing gain a reputation as a benign and responsible actor. Zhengxu Wang, "Incremental Intercontinentalism." This policy is aimed to simultaneously build partnerships and lay the fears of key powers such as the EU, Russia, and the US that China is aiming for hegemony. China's support for multilateralism can be seen in its actions. For example, its creation of a peacekeeping stand-by force and the significant increase in its support for the UN's peacekeeping budget, alongside it's stepping up of counter-piracy operations is indicative of its ambitions.

There is a new multilateral order to be fought for, and the maintenance and enhancement of cooperation according to shared values between the EU and China, could like a force of gravity temper the adversarial tendencies of both Russia and the US. Indeed, there is a fleeting opportunity here for the EU to act as a balancer, and this should not be missed. As history reveals opportunities on the international stage to solve Kissinger's mystery of bringing in diverse peoples. Or in ES terms, to move towards progressive solidarism.

Above, we have seen how the EU and China, despite having significant differences, bold and imaginative policymaking could yield a set of universal norms, and so, it is not good enough for scholars or policy-makers to argue that differing values are insurmountable, and therefore, the global order will splinter into a number of competing order. Furthermore, it is apparent that there is currently what I call a public opinion dividend, which could be harnessed to increase the appeal of a global international society predicated on shared values. One survey conducted in China in 2010 found that the EU was the most popular foreign power, with a 74% approval rating, compared with 60% for the united states and 39% for Japan. Zhengxu Wang, "Incremental Intercontinentalism” p.132. For Zhengxu Wang this high level of approval is indicative of positive views held in China regarding European culture, civilisation and economy, with some taking it as a model for China's progress. Ibid, pp.131-134. He goes on to argue that there are also structural factors which frame the EU as a friendly power, namely, the lack of strategic competition which is increasingly characterising the China's relations with the US. The comparatively positive image Is not only about image, it is also practical, indeed many in the policy community have advocated using the momentum created by the US-China trade war to induce China to live up to its commitments especially in relation to the Belt and Road Initiative, which threatens to alter the geopolitical calculus. Zhengxu, also highlights the resolution/ lack of historical or territorial disputes between the EU and China, which also serve to create a high level of trust between the two. Ibid, see also; Zhengxu Wang, "Incremental Intercontinentalism.” Furthermore, the EU is now China's largest trading partner, with two way trade totalling 514 billion euros in 2016. It is important to note that public perception in the EU towards China is somewhat more mixed. A survey in 2017 found the highest approval ratings in Greece (50%) with France and Germany standing at 44% and 34% respectively. Clearly there is both an opportunity to both share values, and utilise this public opinion dividend. Not only this, but it is apparent that China's policy establishment has shared positive views of EU-China relations in the past, arguing that The EU and China are `highly complementary economically, thanks to their respective advantages' and that both countries seek `mutual emulation' through political, economic and cultural exchange.

4. The Belt and Road Initiative as Foreign Policy, and as a Mega-project

This final section will assess China's Belt and Road Initiative and the EU's response to it through the prism of foreign policy. Hedley Bull wrote that an international society flourishes when states comprising peoples of different cultures and worldviews are brought into a single international order, which each has an interest in maintaining. This statement implies that it is both necessary and possible to ultimately share values, and that in a post-liberal world, institutions should reflect power-political realities. John Ikenberry's previously mentioned argument is that liberalism is durable, both due to its popular appeal and the fact that great-power war in the 21st century, is untenable as a means of overturning the existing order, imposing a psychology of `if you can't beat them, join them' on would-be challengers.

Hedley Bull's focus is on an agreed order. While it cannot be doubted that China features among the primary beneficiaries of the liberal International order, it did so without becoming more liberal, and in fact has now taken an authoritarian turn once more. Furthermore, it is observable that China under Xi-Jinping has demonstrated a significant level of dissatisfaction with its position in the existing order. In 2012, Xi himself declared a desire to support a `new type of Great-Power relations' (xinxing daguo guanxi, ђVЊ^‘еЌ‘?Њn). As has been highlighted throughout this paper, China seeks to change the status quo, both unilaterally through its actions in the South-China Sea, multilaterally, within existing institutions, such as the UN, IMF, and WTO, alongside new-ones such as the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), and bilaterally through agreements in support of the BRI.

Ikenberry is right to the extent that the logic of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) largely precludes armed struggle between rising and existing powers. Allison, "China vs. America: Managing the Next Clash of Civilizations" However, he fails to understand that China has read the situation and is choosing to co-opt rather than coerce its neighbours into supporting its strategic goals. It is apparent that Xi has mastered Sun Tzu's dictum that the `supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting.' That is to say that China has become adept in the use of Geo-economics as foreign policy. Geo-economics can be defined as the `application of economic means of power by states so as to realize strategic objectives.' Indeed, as Hillary Clinton argued in 2011, `the economic is strategic and the strategic is economic.' It is noticeable that, at a time when the US is expanding its military and the EU is slashing it's aid budget, the traditional method of economic statecraft China has increased its use of economic statecraft. Indeed, China has notable advantages in this field. It's control of the state's economic capital through state-owned banks (SOBs) and state-owned enterprises (SOE's) provide it with geo-economics tools that dwarf those of the west. The use of these tools abroad can guarantee political influence in authoritarian countries such as Sudan and simultaneously offers access to materials and the opportunity to internationalize the Renminbi, all three of which can `offer a tremendous base of power in potential conflicts with The West.' Ibid, pp.75-76 Whether by design or default, China is developing the economic means to challenge The West in the most strategic areas of power. As can be observed in Table 1. and 2. below, the ability to challenge Washington in hard-power terms could come as early as 2040. It is clear to see that, long before 2040, Chinese economic interests will come to dominate East Asia. These realities draw into sharp relief China's growing ability to shape a regional order and possibly instate Eastphalia. These realities are also important for the EU, as, even if the US remains committed to its international obligations, in the not-to-distant future, it may lack the willingness or wherewithal to do so. The US may opt to disentangle itself from Eurasia and utilise its superior geographical position to pursue a policy of Offshore Balancing. Mahbubani pp.65-75, Flockhart pp.7-8, What must be taken from this, is that we have twenty years before China has the ability, if not the intention to shape the international order in its image, and so now, more than ever is the moment for the EU to engage constructively and proactively with China, to build a new order, which each has an interest in maintaining. This would help to avoid a return to adversarial systems of order.

Table 1. GDP Projections 2010-2040 (Trillion US Dollars)

Source: Alexander L. Vuving, "The Future Of China's Rise: How China's Economic Growth Will Shift The Sino-U.S. Balance Of Power, 2010-2040", p.415

Table 2. Balance of Hard Power, 2010-2040 (percentage of the largest [%])

Source: Alexander L. Vuving, "The Future Of China's Rise: How China's Economic Growth Will Shift The Sino-U.S. Balance Of Power, 2010-2040", p.417.Nathalie Tocci, "The Demise Of The International Liberal Order And The Future Of The European Project", IAI Commentaries, 18.63 (2018)

China's Belt and Road initiative is without doubt a mega-project. It's primary goal is to strengthen infrastructure, trade and investment links between China and some 65 other countries, which account collectively for over 30 percent of global GDP, 62 percent of the world's population, and 75 percent of known energy reserves. Investment bank Morgan Stanley has predicted that, in the period to 2027 China will make investments totalling up to EUR 1 trillion. The sheer scale of this mega-project makes it the biggest infrastructure programme in history. However, it is clear that the BRI is as much about making friends as it is about economics. Indeed, To further its objectives, China has launched a diplomatic charm offensive, having since 2013 signed 123 cooperation documents, with 105 countries across Asia, Africa, Europe, Latin America, and the South Pacific region, and 26 similar documents with 29 international organizations. At face value, the development of the new silk roads provides significant opportunities, and can be a `large net positive for the global economy and the people of Asia, Africa, and Europe. Well-managed infrastructure investments and lowered trade barriers among a large set of countries could have large productivity, poverty-alleviation, and economic-growth effects.' Not only this, but I argue it presents an opportunity for the EU and China to stand for the values of fairness, justice and civility, whilst extending multilateralism, and in so doing help to build a new global international society, without the need for conflict.

It should be noted however, that the BRI has received criticism by governments and within policy circles who argue that the BRI is effectively Chinese colonialism, and that it's main aim is to supplant the United States and undermine the LIO. Proponents of this idea often invoke China's historical interactions with the outside world which have always been either imperial or revolutionary. MERICS, China's cosmological communism, pp.3-6. According to this literature, China's foreign policy is shaped by the ideas of Tianxia “V‰є “all under heaven,” TianChao `.“V’©. “heavenly empire,” and Jimi оїчг“bridling and feeding.” Of these ideas, the latter appears to hold the most value, as historically it was aimed at managing non-Chinese by leveraging interests through a mixture of trade and threat. This strategy is furthered by state-controlled companies and media outlets, which serve a direct political function, as can be seen in China's response to Australian claims of interference. Ibid, p.4. This broadly supports the adversarial narrative of the coming order, that could see the emergence of a sphere of Chinese influence in a move towards creating something like “Eastphalia.” Some have recently reported the expansion of security cooperation along the BRI routes as further evidence of China's hegemonic ambitions. At face value, it could be said that China's BRI is truly aiming to `make the centre everywhere,' and that it is carrying through a policy of unrestricted warfare against the US-led order, which People's Liberation Army generals have espoused in the past. Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare: China's Master Plan To Destroy America (Dehradun: Natraj Publishers, 2007). This is certainly persuasive, and should be held in mind when the EU forms policy towards China, however, it is also important to move beyond to dictates of Realpolitik.

However, what the Chinese themselves say of the BRI. In official statements, the Chinese government has argued that it wants to build `mutual trust, equality, inclusiveness, mutual learning and win-win cooperation.' Jinping Xi, "Secure A Decisive Victory In Building A Moderately Prosperous Society. Xi-Jinping himself has said that he wants China to embark `Embark on a path leading to friendship, shared development, peace, harmony and a better future.' These statements also match China's stated and evidenced support for multilateralism. A 2017 China policy paper used the term multilateralism fourteen times and multipolarity only once, showing a clear statement of intent. Ferguson, China's Eurasian dilemmas p.96. Furthermore, its creation of new multilateral organisations, such as the AIIB, which now counts 93 countries as members indicates the desire to indeed create a `new-type of international relations centred on cooperation and win-win and build a partnership relation with conversation rather than confrontation, and partnership rather than alliance.' Throughout this paper we have seen how China's rise has been met with a mixed response, but it is increasingly clear that, whether by design or default, China will achieve true great power status and supplant the United States as the centre of global order. Aside from any considerations of domestic politics or significant unforeseen fluctuations, this presents a stark dilemma for the EU and could lead to it simply being an `appendage of Eurasia' as Kissinger warned. It is clear that a new policy should be created ,which addresses this, In order to maintain healthy and productive EU-China relations.

Whether the BRI is an exercise in cooperation or coercion is an important consideration, however, we must also consider that large-scale infrastructure projects are incredibly difficult to implement, not least due to large economic costs. Indeed, It is supposed that global infrastructure projects to 2040 faces a $94 trillion dollar investment shortfall, of which China has so far pledged $1 trillion. Indeed, even China's own $8 trillion BRI plans lack the necessary funding. The scale of China's BRI Ambition will thus lead inexorably to the conclusion that it cannot achieve its aims unilaterally and will need the support of other large economies such as the EU and indeed, much greater involvement with the private sector. There is thus an opportunity to co-opt China into collaboration in a more multilateralised effort. China's need of support means that the BRI could provide a conduit for the EU to drive the acceptance of the common values of fairness, justice and civility. Some have floated the idea of doing nothing, however, to allow the BRI to fail would not be prudent give its utility in addressing the global infrastructure shortage. Additionally, any failure of China's flagship foreign policy could `severely harm the political and economic destiny of countries across the globe and render even more vulnerable the fate of billions of people' who are already in desperate need of support. Sung Won Kim et al, “Eastphalia Rising?” p.64; Brookings, “China's Belt and Road.”

So, how does current EU foreign policy deal with China. One thing that's abundantly clear is that The EU's attitude to China has been reactive. This can be seen in the recent snap summit between Macron, Merkel, Juncker and Xi, but also the fact that China has managed to sign a number of bilateral agreements, notably with Italy and Greece without the EU's consent. Furthermore, the EU's approach has hardened rather than softened in recent years for 3 reasons. Firstly, there has been an authoritarian turn in China with Xi Jinping's abolition of term limits, which has caused a degree of European `disillusionment' as hopes for a more liberalised China appear to be slipping away. China Approves 'President For Life' Change", BBC News, 2018. Secondly, China's growing economic clout and uncertainty surrounding US foreign policy have made China a more important actor and thus alters the EU's calculus. Thirdly, the European Parliaments' new resolution reveals concern about the crisis of liberal democracy, questioning of free trade and undermining of Rules-based multilateralism. Tim Rьhlig has argued that the recent European Parliament resolution is principled, but not strategic. While the EU's increased defence of liberal values should be applauded, it evidently lacks strategic vision as it reduces the possibility of dialogue with China based on shared values and interests. The new resolution clearly utilises a high level of symbolism by reminding actors that the EU retains strong normative aspirations but this in turn increases the risk of ideological conflict with China, and makes it difficult to build a pro-active, pragmatic strategy. As Peter Frankopan highlighted, what happens along the silk roads will shape the world over the next century, and so it is important that we get this right. The key, takeaway here is the EU's current policy tends towards reactionary as opposed to being proactive.

What should the EU's policy be and how can it support the shared values of Fairness, Justice and civility through the BRI.

As Kishore Mahbubani highlighted, the west must pull back from the hubris, which marked and still marks much of the EU's foreign policy. In English school methodology terms, this means abandoning universalist messianic impulses and avoiding the temptation to slip into a power maximising imperial stance, both of which would fuel confrontation and thus impair our ability to deal with increasingly complex global challenges. Instead, we should endeavour to promote a set of shared universal values in interactions between the EU and China.

So far, this paper has aimed to argue in favour of a pragmatic EU response to China. In Mahbubani's analysis, a new EU policy should adopt a 3M strategy Mahbubani, pp.54-64 Minimalist, in the sense of limiting interventionist impulses which often fire resentment. Multilateral in the sense of working cooperatively to meet common challenges. Machiavellian in the sense that, by understanding Machiavelli's key goal as the promotion of virtue. Ibid, see note 71 It also means the use of strategic cunning to protect its long-term interests. As the famed Chinese strategist Sun Tzu `Know thyself, know thy enemy. A thousand battles, a thousand victories.' In this phrase, and in the 3M's doctrine we see that the key element is `Know thyself,' or as with EU-China relations and the BRI, knowing the geopolitical shifts which are underway. Ibid,pp.54-64. One important element of `know thyself' would be to understand that Europe, unlike the United States is not shielded from events in Eurasia, and is surrounded by an `arc of instability.' Chen pp.778-779; For more on the EU's position specifically see, Mahbubani, pp.65-75 The EU thus finds itself in the unenviable position of acting as a balancer, and must constantly consider, embracing China and the new-silk roads to the east, while remaining loyal to its transatlantic partnership. Incremental intercontinentalism; Ferguson, "China And The EU: The Hidden Balancer." However, this balancing act is no doubt also a great opportunity, as sitting between the two largest economic blocs in the world Asia and North America it is possible to have the best of both worlds. The EU is in a strong position to once more shape intercontinental multilateral arrangements, through bold and pragmatic policy choices, Indeed, it is not only vital that it plays this role, but now is also the opportune moment to apply maximum leverage to achieve it. This is not only because of the current balance of economic power, which is favourable, but also because the EU can use the momentum created by the intensifying US-China trade war to ensure China lives up to its commitments and promises.

Guided by the strategic, pragmatic and shared values-based approach advocated throughout, The EU should be proactive to `bring in' China and multi-lateralise the BRI. How can this be achieved? Firstly, in Late 2018 the EU launched it Euro-Asia Connectivity Agenda (EACA), which some have presented as a competitor to the BRI. Ruhlig, The BRI as a competitor. However, I believe this is not the right approach as we must accept that a mercantilist policy, at this juncture, would do little, but further yield the future to China, if its growth continues as predicted. Instead the EACA is highly complementary to the BRI, both in terms of shared goals and differing skill sets, and this should inspire cooperative multilateral effort. Rьhlig, "The EU'S New China Resolution: Principled But Not Strategic" The EACA's stated aim is to enhance the prosperity, safety and resilience of people and societies across Europe and Asia, which illustrates that both sides broadly agree on the importance of connectivity and mutually beneficial cooperation through the forging of physical and digital infrastructure and people-to-people exchange. Furthermore, according to the Chinese Academy of International Trade and Economic Cooperation (CAITEC), which sits under the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), it is important to accelerate third-party market cooperation, align with the Euro-Asia connectivity strategy, and expedite the launch of concrete projects.

Combining the BRI with the EACA also brings significant benefits in that it aligns well with the EU's other policy priorities in Asia, namely, the recent signing of a free trade agreement (FTA) between EU and Japan. This is exceedingly relevant as Japan too is a major global infrastructure player and is trying to create a multilateral approach to infrastructure development. Finally, a pro-active and Unified EU policy would not only address concerns relating to the BRI undermining its authority but maximise the positives of infrastructure projects across Eurasia. It is also notable that much of the investment of the European Bank for Reconstruction and development is directed at core BRI countries, such as Turkey, Kazakhstan, Mongolia and Ukraine, making coordination in practice relatively straightforward. The above effectively answers how cooperation with China's BRI can promote the shared interest in multilateralism. But, how can such an approach promote the identified shared values of fairness justice and civility.

So how can collaborative effort between the EU and China through the EACA and BRI promote shared values, and grow the global International society? The EACA' stated aim is to promote `Sustainable, comprehensive and rules-based connectivity' in order to enhance the `prosperity, safety, and resilience of people and societies in Europe and Asia.' Equally the BRI has always been pitched as an opportunity for win-win cooperation . Indeed, recently, the BRI was articulated as China's contribution to the world, having been a major beneficiary of the LIO, now seeking to give something back. As explained, both sides have an interest in improving connectivity, The EU should engage, to hold China to it's cooperative, multilateral rhetoric and ensure that BRI projects are truly fair, just and civil. As explained, neither side possesses enough political or economic clout to achieve their aims unilaterally.

How can such an approach by the EU promote fairness (as an amalgamation of the EU's values of equality, and Chinese ideas of benevolence) along the new silk roads? One of the chief criticisms of the BRI, has been that win-win cooperation invariably means the China wins twice. This is due to its perceived use of debt trap diplomacy, which sees countries paying more than they can afford for BRI projects, which often leads to default and the seizure of that countries strategic assets. For debt to GDP figures see: John Hurley et.al, Examining The Debt Implications Of The Belt And Road Initiative From A Policy Perspective," Appendix B. By engaging with the BRI, EU policy makers can influence the process and ensure that the Jimi dynamic regarding China's foreign policy principles doesn't take hold. By providing capital for projects on the silk road, the EU can have a greater say on what kind of projects are initiated, and how they are funded. As can be seen from figure 2 below, BRI projects are overwhelmingly completed by Chinese SOEs with little input from local or foreign contractors.

Source: James Kynge, "Chinese Contractors Grab Lion's Share Of Silk Road Projects | Financial Times" 2018.

Again, EU wholesale involvement could be utilised to induce a fair division of labour and contracts, and create a level playing field. This is particularly true in terms of moving the BRI away from state direction and opening fairer competition between state and private stakeholders. It is already being observed that the BRI's funding structures are looking to increase public-private partnerships, which presents tantalising opportunities for EU businesses. Furthermore, with increased investment by the EU as part of the EACA, it is easy to see how the EU and China could align their infrastructure goals. For example, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), has funded many projects across Turkey, Mongolia Ukraine, and Kazakhstan, having invested more than EUR 2 billion since 2009 in Turkey alone. In 2014, the EBRD also launched its Small Business Initiative, which by 2017 included 527 advisory projects with investment of EUR 72 million across Central Asia. It is notable that 80% of the EBRD'S investments are in the private sector, which would balance a BRI that has heretofore been driven by Chinese SOEs. Combined with the EACA and a 30% increase in the European External Action budget for the period from 2021-2027, the opportunities for EU-China cooperation regarding connectivity looks only set to grow. Not only this, but it is clear that a unified approach by the EU, would help to set and raise standards, while facilitating a further multilateralisation of global infrastructure projects John Hurley et.al, Examining The Debt Implications Of The Belt And Road Initiative From A Policy Perspective," pp.21-25.

The values of civility/Order and Justice are the two key elements of a functioning international society, so how can these common ideals, shared by the EU and China, be promoted through active engagement? Creating a project which is Just, is no doubt a multi-faceted question. this paper argues that there must be justice for governments, people and the environment. First, governments must acquire infrastructure, which is consistent with `national development aspirations, economic efficiency, transparency and accountability.' In this respect, the key question is `how can we multilateralise the BRI and bring better governance, disclosure, and transparency into the process?' Brookings, geopolitics of global infrastructure development p.5. In terms of achieving these goals along the New Silk Roads, the EU has a lot to offer. According to the World Justice Project, the EU's largest economies score very highly in all measures, from low corruption, to high standards of civil justice, to robust regulatory enforcement, all of which could provide guiderails for future infrastructure projects and ensure justice remains a core principle. For example, Germany, France, and the UK, which account for more than half of the EU's GDP score 6th, 17th, and 12th respectively, whereas China is 82nd. People deserve Infrastructure, which is high quality and maximises public benefits without jeopardising economic or environmental sustainability. Justice for the environment means ensuring that the desire to improve connectivity doesn't come at the cost of protecting it. Indeed, some EU members, notably the UK have put significant effort into devising ways of “Greening the Belt and Road” by providing finance through the issuance of Green bonds, which can help developing countries to leap-frog high carbon development pathways by ensuring that 95% of finance is put into sustainable ventures. The EU can help this greening process in three key ways. First, it can agree a common definition of what constitutes green finance to ensure that a `race to the top' dynamic is created rather than what can appear to be simply a money-making enterprise. Brookings, geopolitics of global infrastructure development. Second, financing of BRI projects has heretofore has a minimum of 70% Chinese bank participation, which could be addressed by pushing for increased use of EU based multilateral development banks (MDB's) such as the EBRD and the European Investment Bank. Third, it would be useful for both parties to promote trust through the creation of a joint monitoring body, to guarantee transparency both in the green sector and in new infrastructure contracts in general. Such an approach will also help to bring badly needed investors into the infrastructure field, which as mentioned before is needed, given the funding gap in China's BRI plans and the global demands for more and better quality infrastructure.

Finally, collaboration can better promote the values of civility, as an amalgamation of freedom and rites. One of the biggest problems of the BRI is that, though a multilateral process, policy decisions have been taken by China on a bilateral basis. This allows china to leverage interests unilaterally and in an opaque way. This neither reduces fear that China is pursuing hegemony, nor builds the trust necessary, not only for the success of the BRI but also the preservation and strengthening of global international society. Relations between the EU and China have been strained by these opaque dealings which have been seen as an attempt to undermine European unity. This can not only be seen through China's 16+1 framework, which engages eastern European states, without consulting either western European countries or the EU's central institutions. Naturally, this early move by China was met with suspicion and reactive policies by the EU. Two further cases can be seen in the Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) signed first between China and Greece and most recently with Italy. The bilateral BRI accords are notable because they were signed at moments when both countries were arguably at odds with the EU institutions. This friction demonstrates that China is taking advantage of the lack of a decisive EU policy towards it. Importantly, it shows that backing away from the BRI, or trying to shut out investments will not work. To be blunt, the adoption of a mercantilist or protectionist policy would amount to little more than “giving China the field.”

Conclusion

This paper has aimed to argue that though the Liberal International Order is coming to an end, there is at least a two-decade window from the time of writing, where western material power and ideational power will remain dominant. It should be noted that `ripeness of time' is a key element in all diplomacy, and it appears that now is the moment to engage in bold and imaginative order building. William Zartman (2001): The timing of peace initiatives: Hurting stalemates and ripe moments, Global Review of Ethnopolitics, 1 (1), pp. 8-18. By building a new inclusive order now we can enact change and lock in rules while the balance of power favours the EU and collective West. This would dramatically reduce the chances of conflict and make up for the missed opportunities which characterised recent incarnations of the LIO. Acting early, before any potential crisis or conflict ensues, would also set a positive precedent when it comes to tackling the key global challenges of nuclear war, climate change and technological disruption, none of which can afford to be subject to reactive policymaking.

What is needed is a pro-active policy by the EU towards China. Indeed, by engaging with the BRI as a full unified partner, the EU can preserve its integrity, without the concern of unsolicited and often detrimental bilateral deals with its members. This would be a first step in promoting civility, indeed, such an approach would mean respecting China's legitimate national interests, but it would in turn promote civility and trust, compelling both sides to create and maintain an agreed order. Engagement with the BRI would also serve to cement common values of Fairness, Justice and multilateralism, through supporting improvements in the quality and sustainability of global infrastructure endeavours, increasing transparency, and promoting more wide-ranging collaboration. Indeed, as mentioned earlier a key objective of EU foreign policy is and should remain in pursuit of `international relationships across all continents keeping an eye to the wider goal of building, defending and transforming multilateralism.' Tocci, "The Demise Of The International Liberal Order And The Future Of The European Project"

Multilateralism has to be carefully maintained, and thus China must be held to its rhetoric of win-win cooperation, ensuring that in cooperating with and financing infrastructure projects, the system remains one which works for all and avoids unilateral gains or exploitative debt practices along the Silk Roads. The time is ripe for the EU to adopt such a policy, not only due to balance of power, but also, the escalating US-China trade conflict, alongside the latter's need for allies provides ample opportunity to renew and lock-in the rules of the game. Another benefit relating to third country issues, is that a proactive response by the EU to China would show leadership and perhaps drive greater cooperation between third powers such as Russia and the US who currently have less than perfect relations. And in the case of the BRI, Japan who besides having signed a free trade agreement with the EU, are major players in the infrastructure field, and have already proposed multilateral mechanisms to monitor global projects and generate funding.

In short, the BRI is not just the biggest infrastructure program in history; but it is an unparalleled opportunity to preserve and strengthen the global international society, through progressive, solidarist shared values, and cooperative practice. This would also allow both the EU and China to take full advantage of the growing activity along the New Silk Roads and throughout Eurasia.

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