The framing of homeland in official discourse vis-à-vis Georgia's azeri-turk population

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The framing of homeland in official discourse vis-à-vis Georgia's azeri-turk population

Karli-Jo T. Storm

Abstract

This article unpacks the notion of “homeland” as it has developed in postSoviet Georgia and Azerbaijan vis-à-vis the Georgian Azeri-Turks of Kvemo Kartli. The author engages in top-down analysis of homeland-framing in official Georgian-Azerbaijani discourse from 1992-2017 to answer the following query: How and why have leaders of Georgia and Azerbaijan framed their respective territorial states as the veten, or “homeland”, of Georgian Azeri-Turks since 1991? Findings demonstrate that Georgia's Azeri-Turk population is effectively caught between the rhetoric of two homelands, one autochthonous, or “organic” (i.e. Azerbaijan), the other allochthonous, or “inorganic” (i.e. Georgia). Both states benefit from the inclusion of Georgian Azeri-Turks into the conception of the “worldwide Azerbaijani Diaspora”, albeit for different reasons; while Azerbaijan grows its politically motivated “worldwide Diaspora”, Georgia benefits from Azerbaijan-sponsored investments within disadvantaged minority communities. Through the triangulation of data from official statements and speeches, original interviews, participant observation, and landscape analysis, this article seeks to shed further light upon the implications of such homeland-framing within the lives, livelihoods, and subject positions of Georgian Azeri-Turks.

Key words: homeland-framing, Georgian Azeri-Turks, Georgia, Azerbaijan, nationbuilding, identity, South Caucasus

Introduction

On October 21, 2017, something rather unprecedented took place in the Georgian border region of Kvemo Kartli: a “non-Georgian” was elected mayor of the Marneuli municipality. The election of Teymur Abbasov -- a young and charismatic Tbilisi-born Georgian Azeri- Turk--to the post of Marneuli Mayor in autumn 2017 is notable because such posts have tended to be conferred upon “ethnic Georgians” themselves, even in locales like Marneuli, where non-titular Georgians are in the majority. Many local Facebook users considered Abbasov's autumn 2017 mayoral victory as a victory for the Georgian Azeri-Turk people as a whole, given that members of Georgia's Azeri-Turk population have served in lesser positions at the Local, regional, and even national Level, but never as the highest Links in the chain of command in post-Soviet Georgia.¹ Reflected in this status quo is the centrality of the “nation-state-territory” trifecta in both Georgian and international politics as well as the associated truism, visible on world maps, that the world is made up of political units that are led and legitimated by members of representative “nations” within their rightful “homelands”. The situation is nowhere near as simple as such mappings of the world would lead us to believe. In this article, I unpack the notion of “homeland” as it has developed in post-Soviet Georgia and Azerbaijan vis-à-vis the Georgian Azeri-Turks of the Kvemo Kartli region. In so doing, I seek to answer the following question: How and why have leaders of post-Soviet Georgia and Azerbaijan framed their respective territorial states as the vstsn (“homeland” in Azerbaijani) of Georgian Azeri-Turks? By engaging in a top-down analysis of what I call “homeland-framing” by the Azerbaijani and Georgian states from 1992 to 2017, I hope to open the door to future research concerning how individuals, families, and communities perceive, respond to, and perhaps even ultimately effect state-led endeavors to create, frame, and instill national identity narratives within popular consciousness. Abbasov's mayoral was short-lived, however, following his arrest in the summer of 2018 and his alleged role in the assault and humiliation of a local citizen. See Azerbaijani language source, Azadliq Radiosu, 2018. Rather than to focus upon the brief, controversial presidencies of Ayaz Mutabilov or Ebulfez Elchibey in Azerbaijan (from 1991-92 and 1992-93, respectively), this article emphasizes the presidencies of Heydar Aliyev (1993-2003) and his son, Ilham Aliyev (2003-present) in discussions of homeland-framing vis-à-vis Georgian Azeri-Turks in official Azerbaijani discourse. Problems facing Georgia's Azeri-Turks began to be raised more systematically between Georgian and Azerbaijani diplomats under Aliyev Sr.'s guidance. It was during this time as well that Azerbaijani officials began codifying citizenship policies and elaborating upon the ideology of "Azerbaijanism" to counter pan-Turkism and separatist sentiment in the country. For more on these issues, see: Kamrava 2001; Tabachnik 2019; Tokluoglu 2005 & 2012.

A plethora of material exists concerning minorities' integration in Georgia, much of which is sponsored by non-governmental organizations and think-tanks the likes of the European Centre for Minority Issues (ECMI, cf. Wheatley 2005 & 2009a), Civic Development Agency (CiDa 2011), Caucasus Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development (CIPDD, 2002), Human Rights Monitoring Group of National Minorities (MRMG, 2011) and International Crisis Group (2006) in addition to consortiums linked to the Organization for Peace and Security in Europe (OSCE, cf. Zviadadze et al. 2018) and the United Nations (cf. United Nations Georgia, 2013). Additionally, scholars including Berglund (2016, 2017), Broers (2008), George (2009), Wheatley (2009) focus upon key issues impeding the integration of Georgia's minority groups within Georgia's economic, political, and socio-cultural spheres. Work relating specifically to Georgian Azeri-Turks and the relationship between the Azerbaijani state and members of this collective, however, is comparatively paltry. The recent OCSE-backed report of Zviadadze et al. (2018), for example, provides a good general analysis of identity-related issues among Georgian Azeri-Turks, yet the scope, size, and methods of analysis of the data included evince significant theoretical and methodological shortcomings. The recent work of scholars like Berglund (2020) and Storm (2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2019a-c) represent positive steps toward the bridging of the aforementioned gap in the literature. The present article is intended to encourage greater discussion and research on the subject of national identity construction in contexts of socio-cultural, Linguistic, and/or religious diversity -- in Georgia as well as elsewhere throughout the world.

Theoretical Framework and Methodology. Since the emergence of the nation-state system from the West in the Late-17^th century, political and cultural elites the world over have engaged in nation-building initiatives intended to shape narratives of nationhood and embed them within popular consciousness (Anderson 1983; Connor 2004; Hobsbawn & Ranger 1983). An important element of these narratives has been to emphasize the characteristics that make members of one nation different from others and to invent traditions that celebrate and popularize this uniqueness (Hobsbawn & Ranger 1983). Territory has been a crucial element in the formation of nationhood, as primordial links have tended to be drawn between titular peoples -- as "first peoples” -- and particular lands as the homelands of particular nations (Kaiser 1994; Tishkov 1997). Irrespective of the historical commonalities that have gradually developed between particular groups of individuals (as, for example, speakers of a particular language or adherents of this or that religion) (cf. Smith 1991), the staying power of the nation in popular consciousness is owed in large part to the ability of the nation -- as an emotive idea -- to transcend spatio- temporality (Anderson 1983). States propagate particular narratives of national identity that emphasize the characteristics of their respective nations and the primacy of said nations within the territorial confines of the state (Paasi 1996, 2011, 2015; Newman 2011). Ideally, these territorial confines will coincide with the boundaries of the so-called national “homeland,” allowing members of particular nations the legitimate right to govern the lands from which their ancestors supposedly emerged.

Georgia's “Azerbaijanis/Azeris”: What's in A Name

Deeper meanings and symbolisms underlying terms Like “Azeri,” “Azerbaijani,” and “Georgian” are evocative of much more than nationality or citizenship. Inherent in the use of these and other such terms are categories of meaning and belonging. What does it mean to be Azeri/Azerbaijani and/or Georgian, for example? To whom are these labels attributed in official and/or popular discourse? Multi-scalar forces of inclusion and exclusion help mediate individual and collective self- and other-recognition. States play a central role in determining who belongs to the nation and who does not, subsequently determining for whom the territorial state is or is not a homeland.

In both the English and Azerbaijani languages, the adjectives “Azerbaijani” and “Azeri” are often used interchangeably to refer to the people of Azerbaijan or their language, history, culture, etc. In this article, “Azerbaijani” refers to the government as well as the titular nationality of the territorial state of Azerbaijan. “Azeri-” refers to individuals sharing certain socio-cultural and linguistic traits with the titular people of Azerbaijan, yet whom have neither Azerbaijani citizenship nor permanent residence. "Turk" is meant to serve as both a bridge and distancing device between individuals with greater or lesser ideological and felt ties to the Azerbaijani and/or Georgian territorial states (for more on these issues, see: Storm, 2019 and 2019b). homeland georgia azerbaijan

Looking at the historical roots of the Georgian Azeri-Turk population, it is important to call attention to the region's tumultuous past and the many centuries of warfare waged therein between powerful actors, including, for example, the Seljuk Turks, Ottomans, Persians, and Mongols as well as Greeks, Romans, and Russians. Suny (1994) does an admirable job detailing struggles with these and other powers for influence over Georgian territories as well as the influence these struggles ultimately had in the development of a Georgian national identity. Still, one interested in pinpointing the exact point of descent for Georgia's Azeri-Turk population will find that there is in fact no such one single point. Instead, what we see is a gradual intermixture of various Turkic and Persian tribes within contemporary Georgian territories and their eventual adoption of common socio-cultural and linguistic traits. This intermixture of peoples likely took place gradually between the 12^th and 19^th centuries alongside the region's various power struggles and the resultant in- and out-migrations of peoples.

By the time of the region's first census in 1897, all of the territories of present-day Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia (along with a portion of present-day Turkey) were part of the Caucasus Viceroyalty of Imperial Russia. The territories encompassing today's Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia were divided into five governorates, one of which was the Tiflis Governorate. The Tiflis Governorate consisted of territories that are now part of Georgia and Azerbaijan, and the areas of settlement of Turkic and Kartvelian peoples around its borders problematized the demarcation of borders following the Russian Empire's collapse and the establishment of the three independent states of the South Caucasus (1918-21). One of the ten districts of the Tiflis Governorate, Borchali, was an area heavily populated by the descendants of today's Georgian Azeri-Turks. The borders of the Borchali district coincide partly with the contemporary borders of Georgia's Kvemo Kartli region, bordering today's Armenia and Azerbaijan. Prior to the incorporation of these territories into the Russian Empire following the Imperial Russian-Persian Treaty of Gulistan of 1813, they were part of the Borchali Khanate under nominal Persian rule (1607-1755). Like other territories elsewhere in the region, the territories in question were subject to competing territorial claims and conflicts between the Ottoman Empire and Persia as well as local rulers (cf. Minahan 2016: 203; Gasimov 2018: 66-67). Azerbaijanis and local Georgian Azeri-Turks point to the historical concentration of Turkic peoples in Borchali as evidence of the deep roots of present-day Georgian Azeri-Turks within the Azerbaijani and/or Georgian territorial states.

Taking a closer look at the first and final census of Imperial Russia in 1897 and the subsequent Soviet censes conducted from 1926-1989, one finds that, in 1937, the term “Azerbaijani” replaced the prior designations of Turkic peoples in the South Caucasus region as “Turks,” “Tatars,” and/or “Moslems.” Yilmaz (2013) points to Stalin's desire to create as much distance as possible between the developing nationalisms of neighboring Turkey and Iran and Soviet Azerbaijan as a significant impetus for this change. Deteriorating relations between the Soviet Union, Turkey, and Iran in the 1930s and internal ideological changes pertaining to Soviet historiography necessitated the creation of a unique and primordial Azerbaijani national identity (ibid). Thus, from the time of the 1937 census on, this official change in national classification was applied to the Turkic peoples of Eastern Georgia as well as Azerbaijan. The official classification of the Turkic-speaking, Moslem population of Eastern Georgia as “Azerbaijanis” has persisted in Georgia since independence. The descriptive label given to the latter group of individuals implies a socio-cultural and historical link to the territorial state of Azerbaijan, a link that is broadly encouraged by the government of Azerbaijan as bolstering the size and strength of its politically motivated “Diaspora.”

Georgian Azeri-Turks Today: Their Numbers and Geographic Areas of Concentration

Significant demographic changes and population shifts between the last Soviet census of 1989 and the first census of independent Georgia in 2002 resulted in the number of Georgian Azeri-Turks exceeding those of Armenians, Russians, and other non-titular groups. Prior to this point in time, Armenians had been the most numerous minority group in Georgia, followed by Russians, with Georgia's Azeri-Turk population as the third most populous minority group. The number of Georgian Azeri-Turks decreased as well during this period (from 307,556 in 1989 to 284,761 individuals in 2002) in response to Zviad Gamsakhurdia's nationalistic rhetoric and the eruption of economic and social strife following Georgia's declaration of independence in 1991 (cf. GEOSTAT 2016; Khundadze 2016). Still, the scale of out-migration of other non-titular groups (primarily Armenians and Russians) eclipsed the decrease in the size of the Georgian Azeri-Turk community during this period.

As per the most recent census data (2014), Georgian Azeri-Turks continue to be the country's largest minority group, comprising 6.3 percent of Georgia's population of approximately 3.7 million people. This is a slight decrease from 2002, at which point Georgian Azeri-Turks made up 6.5 percent of the population of nearly 4.4 million people. Official figures place the Georgian Azeri-Turk population at approximately 233,000 in 2014, although official figures pertaining to the population size of Azeri-Turks in Georgia have been a point of contention between representatives of this community in Georgia and in Azerbaijan since independence. Unofficial figures pertaining to the size of the Georgian Azeri-Turk community in Georgia range from 300,000-500,000 (Storm 2016: 182; see also Abbasov 2011).¹ The tendency of members of this group to travel back and forth between their homes in Georgia and locations in neighboring Azerbaijan, Russia, and/or Turkey (primarily for economic reasons) complicates the task of pinning down exact numbers. Furthermore, instances of unregistered births are known to be higher in Kvemo Kartli, the region of their primary concentration, as well as in Guria and Kakheti (Hakkert 2017, 3).

Data from the 2014 census puts Kvemo Kartli's population at 423,986 individuals, of which 51.2 percent are designated as “Georgians,” and 41.7 percent as “Azeris/Azerbaijanis.” Zaur Khalilov of the Civic Integration Foundation (CIF) estimates the population of Georgian Azeri-Turks to be 320,000. Alibala Askerov of 'Geyrat' Public Movement (GPM), however, places their number at more than 400,000 individuals (Author's unpublished interview (AUI) with Khalilov, Tbilisi, September 2016; AUI with Askerov, Marneuli, March 2016). Data obtained from author's personal email communication with Ms. Donora Rukhadze of Georgia's Office of National Statistics (GEOSTAT), Jan. 17, 2017. Georgian Azeri-Turks make up the absolute majority in the districts of MarneuLi (83.7 percent), BoLnisi (63.3 percent), and Dmanisi (65.5 percent), while Gardabani's population comprises a greater mixture of Georgians and Georgian Azeri- Turks (at 54.2 and 43.5 percent of the population, respectively).¹ Compared to the 2002 census data, the results from 2014 show a slight decrease in the overall population of Kvemo Kartli among Georgians as well as Georgian Azeri-Turks. Author's email correspondence with Ms. Rukhadze of GEOSTAT. For more on these issues, see Khundadze, 2016. Still, the region's population (nearly 424,000) comprises 11.4 percent of the country's overall population of 3.7 million individuals. Sizable communities of Georgian Azeri-Turks reside in the Georgian regions of Kakheti, Mtskheta-Mtianeti, and Shida Kartli as well (ibid).

The Aliyev Sr. - Shevardnadze “Bromance” and Homeland-Framing since Independence

The idea of a geographical homeland is central to official conceptions of national identity in contemporary Azerbaijan and Georgia. The loss of Nagorno-Karabakh by Azerbaijan in the early 1990s and, likewise, the Georgian losses of both Abkhazia in the 1990s and South Ossetia in 2008 have left deep impacts upon the respective societies of each state. The loss of these territories -- territories framed as being of particular significance in national identity narratives in Azerbaijan and Georgia -- and their associated perceptions of injustice and victimization feature prominently in both official discourse and popular sentiment. These themes resound in officials' speeches as well as web-based and face- to-face discussions with average individuals pertaining to questions of territorial integrity. The loss of Nagorno-Karabakh for Azerbaijan and Abkhazia and South Ossetia to Georgia is an important feature framing the official relationship between the two states since independence. It has provided a sense of mutual understanding and commiseration between the post-Soviet leaders of Georgia and Azerbaijan and has provided leaders with a key issue upon which they can and do express support for one another. Support for the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan and Georgia and the return of the “occupied territories” of each by their respective usurpers is an important site of diplomatic support between Azerbaijan and Georgia. Another important impetus to maintain an overall positive diplomatic relationship is the mutual benefits to be obtained by both sides through economic cooperation.

The foundations of bilateral relations between Georgia and Azerbaijan -- as set down by H. Aliyev and E. Shevardnadze -- were primarily based upon economic and political, security-related cooperation (and commiseration on the subject of territorial disputes) (cf. United Nations 2000). The overall positive nature of these relations was further solidified by the longstanding friendship between the two former Soviet apparatchiks. As independent Azerbaijan began to reap the benefits from further developments to its oil and natural gas industries, Georgia gradually benefited as well. Georgia's location as the so-called “bridge” between the East and West presented the Azerbaijani leadership with an alternative for the transport of its lucrative natural resources to Turkey and onto Europe, bypassing Armenia and Russia.

Whereas Azerbaijan's natural resource wealth helped to gradually stabilize the country's economic situation following independence, the situation in Georgia was nowhere near as fortuitous. Coupled with the civil war of the early 1990s, the conflicts between Georgia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia wreaked havoc upon the Georgian economy. Zviad Gamsakhurdia's brief time in office and the upsurge in ethno-nationalism that accompanied it had resulted in a precarious situation with regard to majority- minority relations in Georgia. It was a time of mutual suspicion and distrust, as the words and the actions of the then-leader of the Georgian state supported a doctrine of “Georgia for Georgians!” rather than an inclusive doctrine of “Georgia for all”. This particular period remains controversial in official as well as popular consciousness. Today, some Georgian state representatives deny that hundreds of Georgian Azeri-Turks were ever forced from their homes in Georgia, despite evidence to the contrary.¹ The numerous official changes of Turkic village names in Kvemo Kartli that took place between 1990 and 1991, too, persist within the memories of local Azeris as an attempt by central leadership to reassert authority over territories long inhabited by non-ethnic Georgians. Author's unpublished interview with official from Georgia's State Ministry for Diaspora Issues, Tbilisi, 2016. Author's unpublished interview with Huseyn Yusubov, Chairman of the Congress of Azerbaijanis of Georgia (GAK): Marneuli, Sept. 2016.

After resigning from his Politburo post in 1987 and returning to Azerbaijan, Aliyev Senior began putting policies into motion that would create an ideology of what he termed “Azerbaijanism”, an ideology that would become an important facet of post-Soviet Azerbaijan's official identity discourse. December 31^st would become “the Day of Solidarity of World Azerbaijanis” shortly following its proclamation by Heydar Aliyev in Nakhchivan in 1991, and his presidential term (1993-2003) witnessed many meetings with groups of individuals included in the official conception of the “Azerbaijani Diaspora” and efforts to further institutionalize and strengthen it. According to Rumyantsev (2017), the creation of an Azerbaijani diaspora in the early years of Azerbaijani independence was an effort to counter what was and still is considered to be a powerful Armenian diaspora in the West and to influence the ways other societies and their leaders view Azerbaijan and its interests. Indeed, H. Aliyev's speeches commemorating the Day of Solidarity of World Azerbaijanis and/or speaking with “compatriots” living abroad from the early 1990s-early 2000s openly acknowledge the importance of loyalty to one's nationality. Such “loyalty” was to be expressed through adherence and retention of common linguistic, socio-cultural, and religious attributes as well as efforts to educate others about the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict and the territorial and human losses sustained by the Azerbaijani side.

As will become evident over the coming pages, the brand of Azerbaijani-ness marketed to Georgian Azeri-Turks is not entirely representative of what some scholars see as the largely inclusive, territorially-based ideology of Aliyev Sr.'s “Azerbaijanism” (cf. Cornell 2015, p. 259; Tabachnik 2019, pp. 3-6). Whereas the instillation of Azerbaijanism within Azerbaijani political discourse in the mid-1990s did indeed help to quell separatist sentiments along the country's northern and southern borders by offering an alternative to Elchibey's pan-Turkism, Azerbaijanism contains elements of jus soli as well as jus sanguinis conceptions of nationhood and is not a manifestation of purely one or the other. Official speeches and press releases by key Azerbaijani political figures referencing so- called diasporic populations, including Georgian Azeri-Turks, evince a mixture of ethnic and territorial conceptions of national identity. The Azerbaijani language, territory (i.e. Azerbaijan as the territory of one's birth/citizenship or those of one's parent/s), Muslim spiritual values (albeit in a secular context), recognition of Armenian enmity, and respect for the Aliyev dynasty, for example, are all emphasized in discussions of Azerbaijanism. Although it is not within the scope of this article to dissect Azerbaijanism in great detail, the information presented within these pages demonstrates that, while engaging in homeland-framing vis-à-vis Georgian Azeri-Turks, the national identity being marketed is not purely territorial. After all, when many, if not most, Georgian Azeri-Turks were neither born in Azerbaijan nor possess Azerbaijani citizenship, the same commonly being true for their parents, then how does one explain Azerbaijanism as being territorial as opposed to ethnic? There appears to be a disconnect between rhetoric, policy, and action when comparing the ideologies of Azerbaijanism and the “Worldwide Azerbaijani Diaspora”. If only certain individuals can be credibly deemed members of this diaspora, irrespective of having been born in Azerbaijan or having Azerbaijani citizenship, then the type of identity being propagated clearly includes a mixture of both inclusive and exclusive elements.

Georgian Azeri-Turks were folded into the official Azerbaijani conception of "Diaspora" almost immediately following the return of H. Aliyev to Azerbaijan and the establishment of official diplomatic relations with Georgia, irrespective of whether or not members of this community or their relatives had ever stepped foot within the territories of Soviet or post-Soviet Azerbaijan. The post-Soviet Azerbaijani state has consistently framed itself as the historical homeland of Georgia's Azeri-Turk population since the early 1990s. Initially, such portrayal was evidenced primarily in speeches and public statements made during bilateral visits of top Azerbaijani officials to Georgia.

The struggles of the Georgian Azeri-Turk population from the late 1980s-early 1990s did not escape Heydar Aliyev's attention. In his 1994 address to Colonel-General Fedor Reut, then-commander of the Russian troops placed in the South Caucasus, H. Aliyev expressed his concern:

“. we are concerned about the situation in Georgia on the whole, because we cannot be indifferent to the situations in the neighboring country, especially about the Azerbaijanis living in Georgia. There are a lot of Azerbaijanis in Georgia, according to our information it's about 600 thousand. In some regions, as for instance, Marneuli, Bolnisi, Dmanisi, Gardabani they live compactly. We receive alarm signals: at times about the facts of violence against separate Azerbaijanis, injustice and so on. ... I have had a telephone conversation with Edward Amvrosievich Shevardnadze, he said that the measures were being taken to restore order and create appropriate conditions for the citizens of these districts of the Azerbaijani nationality. These persons of the Azerbaijani nationality are the citizens of Georgia and they lived there for many centuries. Georgia is their native land, homeland and it is necessary to ensure their security, normal life and labor. If we do not prevent some negative cases, it will lead to more serious consequences” (HAHIOL1994).

As the official ideology of the Azerbaijani diaspora continued to develop, issues pertaining to the quality of life of Georgian Azeri-Turks and their integration into wider Georgian political, social, and economic structures continued to appear as items on the agendas of meetings between the Georgian and Azerbaijani heads of state. As the speeches and joint statements from official visits between H. Aliyev and Shevardnadze from the 1990s up until the early 2000s demonstrate, the well-being of Georgian Azeri- Turks was a continual theme of discussion alongside ever-increasing economic cooperation, historically fraternal/brotherly relations, and statements of political and ideological support between the two states. The language used to describe the national affiliation of Georgian Azeri-Turks was very measured, with both leaders taking care to acknowledge the bi-rootedness of members of this community in both Georgia and Azerbaijan:

“About half a million Azerbaijanis live in Georgia. They live in their homeland, in the historic land, they are indigenous people... Eduard Amvrosievich refers to the Constitution today at a press conference. Yes, the Constitution is fundamental. However, if the state, especially its head, does not take appropriate measures to solve these issues, the Constitution itself does not resolve them. As Eduard Amvrosiyevich said today, during the difficult period [the late 1980s-early 1990s], 800 Azerbaijani families had been expelled from their hometowns. All these discriminatory attitudes towards the Azerbaijanis were stopped after Eduard Amvrosievich re-appointed Georgia. Therefore, the Azerbaijanis living in Georgia have always been grateful to their brothers--the Georgian people for their centuries-long existence in friendship and brotherhood” (HAHIOL 2000b).

The violent transition of leadership from Gamsakhurdia to Shevardnadze led to a period of relative stability between titular and non-titular Georgians. It was a balancing act between the appeasement of Western, aid-giving organizations and the values of a rather conservative populace just beginning to recover from civil war, political disarray, and economic collapse (Jones 2013). Little attention was devoted to the investigation of issues at the root of the social, cultural, political, and economic isolation of Georgia's nontitular groups from wider Georgian society. Although Shevardnadze helped to create an environment wherein the religious and cultural rights of minority groups would be better represented in official parlance, his tendencies were more toward what Jones (2013) calls “pragmatic nationalism” in that he did what needed to be done to satisfy external, Western-based bodies and funding agencies while carefully maintaining the ethno- national hierarchy of power. By the time that Shevardnadze faced reelection in 2000, however, his base of support had eroded significantly, and opposition figures decried the presidential elections of that year as fraudulent and corrupt. Allegations of further official tampering in the parliamentary elections of 2002 culminated in widespread disillusion with Shevardnadze and his leadership and brought the Rose Revolutionaries and their leader, the young, charismatic and Western-educated lawyer, Mikheil Saakashvili, to the political fore.

The Aliyev Jr. - Saakashvili “Bromance": Homeland-Framing in a New Era

The final months of 2003 saw the removal of Aliyev and Shevardnadze from their central posts, but for very different reasons. Aliyev's health was in rapid decline, and his son, Ilham Aliyev, who had been groomed to resume the presidency following his father's death, became Prime Minister in August and President in October 2003 with nearly 77 percent of the vote, albeit in elections criticized by international monitoring organizations for failing to meet the minimal democratic standards. In contrast, Saakashvili was elected President in January of 2004 after having received approximately 96 percent of the popular vote, and the aforementioned monitoring bodies deemed the elections to be a positive indicator of the potential for further democratic development in Georgia (cf. OSCE's 2003 reports on presidential elections in Azerbaijan and Georgia).

The bloodless Rose Revolution of November 2003 and subsequent election of Mikheil Saakashvili to the presidency in January 2004 ushered in a period of significant political and economic change in Georgia. The revolutionary turn of events that resulted in the ouster of Shevardnadze and his replacement by Saakashvili was cause for concern among some of the country's minority populations, including Georgian Azeri-Turks, as well as in neighboring countries like Azerbaijan and Russia, whose political leadership feared similar political upheavals in their respective states. Whatever threats might have been perceived by the young Ilham Aliyev following the Rose Revolution and Saakashvili's ascendance to the Georgian presidency, however, were quickly abated. Baku was the third foreign capital visited by the new Georgian President in 2004, following visits to Washington and Moscow. Saakashvili seemed eager to assure his Azerbaijani counterpart that the revolutionary wave that washed over Georgia in 2003 was a uniquely Georgian phenomenon and that he had no interest in meddling in the domestic affairs of Azerbaijan (Aliyeva 2005).

A friendly personal relationship quickly developed between the two young South Caucasian leaders, despite their seemingly incompatible political ideologies and leadership styles. An important motivating factor behind the positive official relationship between Tbilisi and Baku likely had much to do with Saakashvili's ambitions to drastically improve and develop the Georgian economy. The Georgian state needed the income provided by cooperation with Azerbaijan in the energy sphere. Additionally, however, the restoration of Georgia's territorial integrity, allegedly the “goal of his [Saakashvili's] life,” continued to be a basis for bilateral commiseration between leaders of independent Georgia and Azerbaijan (Civil.ge 2004a). The continual strengthening of the Azerbaijani economy and its increased visibility in the international community due to massive stores of oil and natural gas were powerful motivating factors for Saakashvili and his administration to maintain cordial ties with its neighbor to the east.

Azerbaijani investment in the Georgian economy deepened, and together Saakashvili and Aliyev saw the opening of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (2005-06) and Baku- Tbilisi-Erzurum (2006) pipelines and the Kulevi oil terminal (2008). They expanded their cooperation in the energy and transport sectors further via agreements the likes of those concerning the Energy Bridge (electricity between Azerbaijan-Georgia-Turkey), Trans- Anatolian gas pipeline (TANAP), and the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway. Georgia became increasingly dependent upon Azerbaijani rather than Russian natural gas, especially following the pipeline explosions of 2006 that temporarily halted the supply of natural gas to Georgia. Occasional moments of tension did arise, of course, such as brief reinvigoration of the Davit Gareji border dispute in 2012 and Azerbaijani dismay over Saakashvili's pointedly anti-Russian remarks during an official visit to Baku during the same year (cf. Civit.ge 2012; Valiyev 2013). Despite these short-lived disagreements, however, the positive nature of Georgian-Azerbaijani relations appeared to be essentially unshakable.

When it came to issues concerning Georgian Azeri-Turks, both Baku and Tbilisi continued their overall approaches, albeit with greater vigor than that of their predecessors. Throughout both terms of his presidency, Saakashvili made repeated reference to the historical development of the Georgian value of tolerance and the role such tolerance has played in the formation of the Georgian nation, a nation united in its diversity, yet unique in the cultural characteristics of its main titular nationality. Berglund (2017), George (2009), Jones (2013), Storm (2019), and Wheatley (2009) all note Saakashvili's tendency of blending elements of ethnic nationalism with rhetoric in support of civic nationhood. Wheatley (2009) refers to the management of “ethnic” diversity in Georgia since independence as having taken “one step forward, two steps back”, moving from ethnic chauvinism under Gamsakhurdia to Shevardnadze's inclusive Law on Citizenship (1993) and constitutional protections of minority rights and cultural autonomy (1995)-without any further real dedication to the integration of minorities into Georgian society-and on to the mixed messages of Saakashvili regarding the parameters of membership in the Georgian nation.

Although a close examination of various speeches and public statements made by Saakashvili during his two terms as President reveal countless references to the Georgian nation as being inclusive, based upon the common goal of working together for a strong, prosperous and united Georgia, the ideological underpinnings of his championed policies often suggested an alternate view of the nation. For example, a study of the country's key pieces of national iconography since independence shows that, while Saakashvili did indeed ultimately make greater room for the country's minority groups in official narratives of national identity in Georgia than his predecessors, his reliance upon traditional, Orthodox Christian symbolism reinforced traditional, exclusive boundaries of membership in the Georgian nation (Storm 2018).

Storm (2016) and Berglund (2017) both highlight the significance of the Georgian language in the nation-building project under Saakashvili's leadership, noting the Georgian government's reliance upon educational reforms and the acculturation of minority groups to the Georgian language as being key to the socio-cultural, economic, and political integration of minorities into Georgian society. Berglund (2017) additionally points to Saakashvili's infrastructural improvements, particularly with regard to the construction or repair of roads, schools, hospitals, energy infrastructure, etc. in minority- populated regions, as being instrumental to lessening the geographic isolation of minority groups like the Armenians and Georgian Azeri-Turks and bringing them closer to the “center” physically, economically, and socially. Indeed, the following excerpts from

Saakashvili's public speeches during his attendance of Novruz festivities in MarneuLi demonstrate the importance his administration placed upon the Georgian language and infrastructural developments to the overall integration of the Georgian Azeri-Turk population:

“Beginning today with the decision of our government, graduates of Azerbaijani language schools will readily be accepted to Georgian universities. The purpose of this is to keep Georgian citizens, be they Azerbaijani or other national minorities, from leaving for other countries... The young people gathered here today are the future of Georgia. They mustn't stray far from Georgia. Before I became President, the situation in Marneuli was very bad. There was no gas or electricity. Today, thanks to our friend, Azerbaijan, Marneuli as well as the whole of Georgia has gas. Georgia is not a single nation-state, it is the state of every Azerbaijani, Abkhazian, and Ossetian. Georgia ought always to be friends with Azerbaijan. I thank Azerbaijan for coming to Georgia's assistance in times of trouble” (Musavat 2010).

The Novruz festivities of 2011 occasioned similar expressions from then-President Saakashvili:

“The fact that you feel part of Georgian society and this country, makes me more proud than new roads (which of course is a reason to be proud), those beautiful buildings which have been, and are being built, new education system (which in future will guarantee our success) and all other achievements which Georgia has made. The main target of the current Government is to create a state, where all its citizens, regardless of his ethnic or religious viewpoints, feel that he or she is an indivisible part of Georgia. It is very important to maintain our Azerbaijani culture, our Azerbaijani language, which is an integral part of Georgian culture and of the Georgian state, at the same time. I am glad that you are learning the Georgian language at schools because this is a guarantee for your success in our unified Georgian state” (Gabakhadze 2011).

While the changes brought about by Saakashvili's dedication to the development of the country's infrastructure did indeed do much to improve the daily lives of citizens such as the Georgian Azeri-Turks residing in Kvemo Kartli, his reforms targeting the educational system and endemic societal corruption often placed disproportionate pressure upon such minority groups. George (2009) attributes the disconnect between Saakashvili's rhetoric of civic nationhood and the continued alienation of minorities from wider Georgian society to particular aspects of his state-building program which “often worked disproportionately against the interests of ethnic minorities” (141). Although state-led efforts to increase the opportunities for minority groups to learn the Georgian language were intensified during Saakashvili's second term, the regime's stricter enforcement of language requirements for civil servants as well as educational professionals meant that many non-Georgian speakers were removed from their positions due to their poor knowledge of the language (Berglund 2017; George 2009). These events heightened the perception of discrimination and relative deprivation among some representatives of the Georgian Azeri-Turk community (Valiyev & Valiyev 2005).

Since Ilham Aliyev ascended to the Azerbaijani presidency in 2003, the steadily increasing growth of the Azerbaijani economy gave Aliyev Jr. the opportunity to strengthen and expand the visibility of the Azerbaijani state in the areas of Georgia having Long been populated by Georgian Azeri-Turks. This visibility took the shape of newly constructed or renovated schools, education, sport, and/or cultural centers as well as the materials therein, grants and scholarships for Georgian Azeri-Turk students to study at Georgian universities, and the sponsorship of celebratory and commemorative events as well as the increased opportunities for employment generated by infrastructural developments. The presence of the Azerbaijani state (and its resource wealth) became increasingly visible in the physical and symbolic landscape of Kvemo Kartli as well as certain areas of Tbilisi (i.e. near Abanotubani) and Batumi.

Strolling in the central, historical part of the city, a visitor to Tbilisi can hardly help but to take notice of the bust of the former Azerbaijani President, Heydar Aliyev, located in a carefully and well-kempt park in the Old City. The Heydar Aliyev Embankment runs parallel to a section of Tbilisi's famous Mtkvari River. Nearby Heydar Aliyev Park is the resplendent house museum of Mirza Phatali Akhundzade, which doubles as an Azerbaijani cultural center, as well as the equally impressive, albeit more austere-looking stone building housing the Azerbaijani Embassy. The final resting place of Mr. Akhundzade as well as several other prominent Azerbaijanis sits beneath a canopy of foliage in Tbilisi's Botanical Gardens, a tribute to the early proponents of independent Azerbaijani statehood at the beginning of the 20^th century. A grandiose structure resembling Baku's famous Maiden Tower serves as the central headquarters of the State Oil Company of the Azerbaijani Republic's (SOCAR's) Georgian office and is located nearby in central Tbilisi. Elsewhere throughout Tbilisi and the rest of the country, SOCAR petrol stations and gas lines symbolize cooperation between Georgia and Azerbaijan in the energy sphere and the disproportionate weight carried by Baku in the countries' economic relations. Perhaps not as easily identifiable as symbols of Azerbaijan's presence in Georgian domestic politics and economics, however, are the banks, hotels, and other luxury properties in Tbilisi and Batumi that are allegedly connected to Azerbaijan's first family, prime examples being Tbilisi Palace, located directly next to Heydar Aliyev Park in Old Tbilisi, and Pasha Bank on Tbilisi's central Rustaveli Avenue (see Mukhtarli 2015 & 2015a). Along with the construction of new oil and gas pipelines and railways connecting Georgia to Azerbaijan, all of the aforementioned adornments of the Georgian landscape symbolize the deepening disparities in Georgian-Azerbaijani political-economic relations since independence. From 2003-2012, the desired respective outcomes of Azerbaijani-Georgian partnership were recognized as serving the interests of both leaders--for Saakashvili's Georgia, the resultant strengthening of the Georgian economy would lead to greater possibilities for the provision of public goods, ultimately increasing living standards in the country and cementing the influence of Saakashvili and his party over the country's future development. For Aliyev Jr.'s Azerbaijan, careful investment in the Georgian economy as well as the so-called “Azerbaijani Diaspora” in Georgia would extend Azerbaijan's influence in Georgian geopolitical affairs, thereby better safeguarding and promoting Azerbaijani interests at home and abroad.