The framing of homeland in official discourse vis-à-vis Georgia's azeri-turk population

Azerbaijani-Georgian Relations Post-Saakashvili

The parliamentary elections of October 2012 heralded dramatic change in the Georgian government. Saakashvili conceded his party's defeat and looked on with trepidation as billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili's Georgian Dream party proceeded to form the new government. By the time that Giorgi Margvelashvili was elected President in 2013 under Georgian Dream's banner, however, the President's powers had been significantly decreased in favor of a parliamentary system and a powerful post of Prime Minister, a post that had been filled by Ivanishvili shortly following the previous year's parliamentary elections.

The early years of Georgian Dream leadership saw increased tensions in Azerbaijan-Georgian relations. One of the chief aims touted by Ivanishvili prior to the 2012 parliamentary elections was the restoration of the railroad road linking Russia- Georgia-Armenia (i.e. the Trans-Caucasian railroad) through the contested territory of Abkhazia. Ivanishvili's apparent readiness to discuss the reopening of rail traffic between Russia, Georgia, and Armenia was looked upon with alarm in Baku as well as within Georgian opposition circles, as were Ivanishvili's comments concerning the long- anticipated Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway. In a 2012 interview with the Georgian newspaper, Resonance, Ivanishvili reportedly stated that:

"The construction of the Kars-Akhalkalaki [Baku-Tbilisi-Kars] rail line raises questions. Perhaps, I will have to ask them on my visit to Azerbaijan, and very softly explain to our friendly country that at some stage this project would not be suitable for us..." (quoted in Idayatova 2012).

Baku's fears that the new Georgian government would choose to align itself more closely with Russia -- and, by default, Armenia -- were further heightened by the new Georgian government's willingness to negotiate with Russia's Gazprom regarding potential increases in Georgian imports of Russian gas. Following public outcry over talks held between Gazprom and Georgian officials in autumn 2015, in March 2016 the Georgian government announced that it would increase imports of Azerbaijani natural gas, thereby eliminating the need to import gas from Russia. Azerbaijan was set to meet 99.5 percent of Georgia's demand for natural gas in 2018 (Ajeganov 2016; Azernews 2018).

Despite these hiccups in Azerbaijani-Georgian relations from 2012-2016, tensions between the two countries' leaderships have gradually decreased. The relationship between Ilham Aliyev and Bidzina Ivanishvili never came close to rivaling that of Aliyev Sr.-Shevardnadze or Aliyev Jr.-Saakashvili in terms of inter-personal warmth and friendship. For example, despite the arrest order issued by the Georgian government for Saakashvili in 2014 or the revocation of his Georgian citizenship in 2015, the ex-Georgian President nevertheless traveled to Baku and met with President Aliyev in April 2015, taunting Georgian Dream officials from across the border. The Azerbaijani government never officially commented on Georgia's extradition request, but Azerbaijani news media reported that Baku rejected Tbilisi's request to hand Saakashvili over to the Georgian authorities (DFWATCH 2015a). The relationship between Aliyev Jr. and Margvelashvili was cordial since the latter assumed the Presidency in 2013.

Despite occasional setbacks, the relationship between Baku and Tbilisi has continued in its strategic importance, and Baku's political leadership has continued to beckon Georgian Azeri-Turks into its paternal embrace. Baku's endeavors at framing the Azerbaijani territorial state as the homeland of Georgian Azeri-Turks have not been concentrated solely in Tbilisi, despite the city's prominent socio-cultural, political, and economic status as the Georgian capital. The Azerbaijani nation-state positions itself as real presence Kvemo Kartli residents' lives through its leadership's efforts combining projects of infrastructural development, charity, and event sponsorship in ways that propagate Baku-based official narratives of national identity and loyalty to the “historical homeland”.

Aliyev Jr. and the Growth of the “Azerbaijani Diaspora” in Georgia from 2003-2017

An examination of speeches made by Aliyev Jr. at the previous three gatherings of the Congress of World Azerbaijanis (2006, 2011, and 2016) and annual statements in commemoration of Azerbaijani national holidays -- National Salvation Day, Day of Solidarity of World Azerbaijanis, Day of Genocide of Azerbaijanis, Khojaly Genocide, and National Mourning Day, for example -- demonstrate the current administration's continued dedication to narratives of Azerbaijani victimhood in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict as well as those sanctifying Heydar Aliyev as the savior of the Azerbaijani nationstate. For example, speaking at the Third Congress of World Azerbaijanis in Baku in 2011, President Aliyev stated:

“We have a large family living abroad, they are Azerbaijanis. These are the people attached to their native homeland. Our distinctive feature is that no matter where we live, we are attached to our home country. This is our homeland, our common homeland. Independent Azerbaijan is the motherland for all Azerbaijanis. We have one motherland - Azerbaijan! We have one language - the Azerbaijani language! We have a nationwide ideology - the ideology of Azerbaijanism! I want all Azerbaijanis of the world always to be together, to know that a strong state of Azerbaijan is behind them and they can always rely on Azerbaijan. I want to conclude my remarks with the unforgettable words of great leader Heydar Aliyev: 'We are all proud to be Azerbaijanis.'” (President of the Republic of Azerbaijan 2011).

Furthermore, a 2013 presidential decree concerning the celebration of the late Heydar Aliyev's birthday reads:

“Thanks to the consistent and goal-oriented policy pursued by Heydar Aliyev during his leadership of the independent Republic of Azerbaijan, the Azerbaijani Diaspora has formed, developed and demonstrated a close attachment to the historical homeland. The fact that the Azerbaijanis living in different countries of the world consider the Republic of Azerbaijan their homeland, see it as a temple of the national spirit, national and spiritual values, national culture, and are rallied around the idea of Azerbaijanism is precisely the result of Heydar Aliyev's activities” (President of Republic of Azerbaijan 2013).

As the Azerbaijani economy has grown, so too have the state's efforts with regard to creating and disseminating a diasporic consciousness among the peoples perceived to be “co-ethnics.” In Georgia, such efforts have been concentrated in the region of Kvemo KartLi, within the districts of MarneuLi, BoLnisi, Dmanisi, and Gardabani in particular. MarneuLi serves as the sort of “epi-center” of socio-cultural Life for Georgian Azeri-Turks, due in Large part to the municipaLity and district's popuLation size as weLL as the extent to which Georgian Azeri-Turks are concentrated there.

A. "Welcome to Marneuli": Symbolic Duality in the Material Environment

The glass and steel structures of the police station and public service hall serve as particular reminders of Saakashvili's endeavors to improve the quantity and quality of public services to locals in a modern and transparent manner. The structures standing between the police station and public service hall -- the “Tea House” and its immaculately kempt park, the SOCAR filling station and its incomplete McDonald's restaurant -- signify the presence of the Azerbaijani state in this city of approximately 20,000 people (MunicipaLity of Marneuli n.d.). The “Tea House” is home to the Marneuli Youth Center, the Mugham Restaurant, and lovely little park, all of which symbolize the manner in which Ilham Aliyev's regime has expanded official involvement with Georgia's Azeri-Turk community since 2003. Through the confluence of resource wealth, infrastructural development, humanitarian aid, and socio-cultural symbolism, Aliyev Jr. has carried on in his father's footsteps, taking even further steps to develop and maintain Georgian Azeri-Turks' ties to and perceptions of Azerbaijan as their “historical homeland” across the border.

In what Ilham Aliyev has termed efforts of his administration to “turn oil capital into human capital” (cf. AZERTAC 2014), the Azerbaijani state has been looking beyond the mere construction of oil and gas pipelines, railways, and/or electricity lines in Georgia to develop a diasporic consciousness among Georgian Azeri-Turks. Through the organizational and financial support of the State Committee for Work on the Diaspora, the Heydar Aliyev Foundation, the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan (SOCAR), and the

Azerbaijani Embassy in Georgia, the Azerbaijani state has invested in the development of a Georgia-based “Azerbaijani Diaspora” that is Loyal to the interests of the Azerbaijani state. These investments have taken the shape of changes to the built environment that simultaneously propagate the Heydar Aliyev cult of personality and connect it to narratives of Azerbaijani victimization in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Scholarships are given, schools are renovated, festivals are held, additional charitable deeds are done, but all come with strings attached. The expectation is that, by taking advantage of the opportunities presented to them by the beneficent Azerbaijani state, Georgian Azeri-Turks will gradually better their own collective socio-economic and political condition, become better integrated into Georgian state structures, and come to be the voice of (Azerbaijani) reason in Georgia. In his annual address to “world Azerbaijanis” in December 2017, President Aliyev stated:

“We persistently strive to achieve the set goals for the comprehensive development of our Motherland. Diaspora organizations also face important tasks of expanding the international relations of our country, promoting our ancient and rich culture and suppressing provocative actions against Azerbaijan. Therefore, our compatriots living abroad should closely rally around the idea of Azerbaijanism in the name of protecting our national interests. I believe that your focused and joint activity will multiply our strength and make a weighty contribution to the speedy settlement of the Armenian-Azerbaijani Nagorno-Karabakh conflict that worries us all, and restore the territorial integrity of our country” (Aliyev 2017).

Taking a tally of Azerbaijani diaspora organizations currently operating in Georgia is a difficult task, as a large number of these organizations founded shortly after independence appear to no longer be functioning. In some cases, these organizations' founders have passed away and the organizations themselves, perhaps due to lack of funding or effective leadership, have ceased operations. It is for this reason that claims pertaining to such diaspora organizations in Georgia as numbering 50 or greater should be viewed with skepticism. Fieldwork visits to Georgia and to the municipalities of Tbilisi, Marneuli, Bolnisi, Dmanisi, and Gardabani have allowed me to identify the organizations and actors most actively involved with Georgia's Azeri-Turk population and to determine which of these organizations and actors can be labeled as “diaspora organizations” due to their affiliation with the Azerbaijani state. These organizations include the Mirza Phatali Akhundzade House Museum and Azerbaijani Cultural Center in Tbilisi, Borchali Ireli Public Union (Marneuli), the Congress of Georgian Azerbaijanis and its associated Union of Georgian Azerbaijani Youth (offices in Tbilisi and Marneuli), Azerbaijani Student Union of Georgia (Tbilisi), the Azerbaijani Cultural Center of Marneuli and its Youth Department, the Marneuli Youth Center, the Integration Center for Azerbaijanis of Georgia, and the Heydar Aliyev Computer Learning Center of Dmanisi. These organizations are comprised of educational and cultural centers as well as collectives of intellectuals and community representatives. It is through the support of the Azerbaijani State Committee for Work on the Diaspora, the Heydar Aliyev Foundation, the Azerbaijani Embassy in Tbilisi, and SOCAR that the aforementioned organizations are able to provide locals with educational and socio-cultural resources in addition to knowledge about historical and contemporary Azerbaijani “realities” in service of the “historical homeland”.

In some cases, these diaspora organizations are housed within newly constructed or renovated buildings that both enrich the local landscape and imprint it with the echo of Azerbaijani influence and resource wealth. Key examples of this include:

1) Marneuli's “Tea House”, its Mugham Restaurant, and park (containing a statue of Nizami Ganjavi and Shota Rustaveli, benches, a decorative fountain featuring Azerbaijani carpets, and bushery trimmed into the shape of Azerbaijani fire symbols),

2) the Heydar Aliyev Computer Learning Center in Dmanisi (and the improved roads and landscaping leading to it), and

3) the recently-renovated house museum and cultural center dedicated to the poet and playwright, Mirza Phatali Akhundzade, located in Old Tbilisi.

These and other centers typically serve as sites of official events celebrating Azerbaijani state and national holidays and commemorative dates in addition to sites wherein usual functions (like educational and extra-curricular courses, trainings, seminars, etc.) are carried out. Such celebratory and commemorative events are also held in other buildings and outdoor areas marked with the presence of the Azerbaijani state, such as in the Azerbaijani Embassy building itself, Tbilisi's Heydar Aliyev Park, Marneuli's Neriman Nerimanov Park (currently in the midst of a contentious name change)¹, Marneuli's Ata Holding Center, or the Heydar Aliyev Park in Rustavi. Visits by members of the Azerbaijani and Georgian Parliaments, the Georgia-Azerbaijani Inter-parliamentary Friendship Committee, Georgian and Azerbaijani state ministries, SOCAR leadership, Embassy personnel, prime ministers and even the heads of the Georgian and Azerbaijani states themselves to these locations for special occasions and brief local consultations adds an air of authority and solicitousness to Azerbaijani actions vis-à-vis Georgia's Azeri- Turk population.

Officially propagated symbols of Azerbaijani nationhood are demonstrated, displayed, and reproduced at state-sponsored events and physical sites both within and outside the borders of Azerbaijan. These symbols include socio-cultural norms and values pertaining to the Azerbaijani language as the mother tongue of all Azerbaijanis and Islam as the spiritual anchor of the Azerbaijani people, feature traditional art forms such as mugam and a^iq/bard folk music, dance, poetry and literature, and carpet weaving. National costumes are regularly donned by youth and tables are laden with the delicacies of Azerbaijani national cuisine, all adding to the sensory experience surrounding the "narration" of the Azerbaijani nation. For more on the questionable circumstances surrounding this name change, see Storm, 2019c. Reference to the "narration" of the nation harkens back to Bhabha's (1990) work, Nation and Narration. In Georgia's Kvemo Kartli, these symbols of Azerbaijani nationhood are evident in official speeches, the types of state-sponsored activities available to locals at Azerbaijani cultural and youth centers, and even in the décor chosen to represent Azerbaijani national identity at official events. At the Azerbaijani Cultural Center in Tbilisi and the Youth Center in Marneuli, for example, carpeting classes are offered to Georgian Azeri-Turks and others interested in learning the 'ancient Azerbaijani art' of carpet weaving. Additionally, the Azerbaijani Cultural

Centers in Tbilisi and MarneuLi host events in support of BorchaLi's a^iqlar (bards) as well as traditional Azerbaijani music and dance ensembles. Performances by these ensembles typically accompany celebrations of Azerbaijani national holidays and commemorative dates, during which time the Azerbaijani flag typically flies alongside that of Georgia and the sounds of both countries' national anthems float through the air. At the Novruz festival held annually in Marneuli, young girls and boys don traditional Azerbaijani national costumes and pose for pictures with officials and laypeople alike among carpets, tea sets, traditional sweets, and national musical instruments. A model of Baku's ancient Maiden Tower graced Marneuli's 2016 Novruz celebration and provided a lovely backdrop for the aforementioned photos.

The Azerbaijani state has rather successfully been framing itself as the protector of Georgia's Azeri-Turk community and champion of this community's interests by doing what the Georgian has heretofore been unable to do on a sufficient scale -- renovate or completely reconstruct dilapidated Azerbaijani language schools (and provide them with textbooks), open cultural, educational, and sports centers (and provide them with modern equipment), improve locals' access to clean drinking water, heat and electricity, and facilitate events in celebration of civic, national, and cultural happenings that allow locals to feel as though they were part of a wider “imagined community" (cf. Anderson 1983). Furthermore, especially through the doings of SOCAR's Georgia office, locals are offered employment without the necessity of knowing Georgian. Despite all of these charitable activities, however, the Azerbaijani state does not encourage the permanent migration of Georgian Azeri-Turks to Azerbaijan. Visiting the “historical homeland” is indeed encouraged but remaining there is quite another matter. The Azerbaijani state has not made it easy for Georgian Azeri-Turks to live and work in Azerbaijan; rather, since 2007, tougher enforcement of immigration laws, stricter material requirements, and increases in bureaucratic “red tape” have created considerable difficulties for Georgian Azeri-Turks wishing to remain in Azerbaijan indefinitely (Ahmedbeyli 2009; Sultanova 2012; Tabachnik 2019: 5-6).

SOCAR and other Azerbaijani firms offer scholarships to Georgian Azeri-Turk students seeking to attend Georgian institutions of higher education, and Georgian language courses are offered at Azerbaijani-funded educational and cultural centers in hopes of improving young peoples' chances of obtaining gainful employment or spots in Georgian universities. Azerbaijani officials encourage Georgian Azeri-Turks to improve their knowledge of the Georgian language in order to become better integrated into Georgian society whilst reminding young people not to forget their historical and national roots. At his last visit to Marneuli (2015), President Aliyev thusly addressed local Georgian Azeri-Turks:

“We want the Georgians living in Azerbaijan and the Azerbaijanis living in Georgia, as citizens, to play a role in and make valuable contributions to the social, political, and economic lives of their countries in the future as well as, of course, not forgetting their own historical roots... Azerbaijanis in Georgia have always supported Georgian statehood and have become good citizens of Georgia. This is as it should be, as you have lived on these lands for centuries. ... We want the Azerbaijanis living in Georgia to know the Georgian language perfectly--as well as they know their own mother tongue--so that, by doing this, they can take their rightful place in Georgia. ... You are valuable citizens of this state, and through your hard work you contribute to the development of Georgia. These courses [at the “Tea House”] have been organized to help you learn the Georgian language. This is very important, but, of course, you should never forget your historical roots. Each nation is developed on the basis of its historical and cultural roots. Of course, the [Georgian] government will do its utmost to further this and to give you a comfortable experience so that you may continue to praise Allah and your historical roots at all times” (President of the Republic of Azerbaijan 2015).

By remaining in Georgia and benefiting from the socio-cultural, educational, and economic opportunities afforded them by Azerbaijan, the intention is for Georgian Azeri- Turks to internalize and further disseminate Azerbaijani narratives of Georgian- Azerbaijani fraternity, Armenian hostility, glorification of the Aliyev dynasty, and pride in the characteristics underlying Azerbaijani national identity.

Of the Azerbaijani state holidays and commemorative dates observed by Azerbaijani-affiliated organizations in Georgia, the most widely observed dates include the following: Heydar Aliyev's days of birth and death (May 10^th and Dec. 12^th, respectively), Solidarity Day of World Azerbaijanis (Dec. 31^st), New Year, “Bloody January” (Jan. 20^th), the dates associated with the Khojaly tragedy (Feb. 25-26^th), International Women's Day (March 8^th), Novruz (March 20-24^th), Day of Genocide of Azerbaijanis (March 31^st), Republic and Independence Days (May 25^th and October 18^th, respectively), and National Salvation Day (June 15^th) in addition to the Islamic holy days of Ourban Bayrami and Ramazan. On each of these days, representatives of Azerbaijani bodies, organizations, and cultural centers make public statements and take part in officially sanctioned events. These events are covered by local and national news agencies, and audiences in Azerbaijan and Georgia consume the resultant news pieces. Georgian state officials and representatives of regional and local governments attend these events as well, offering either their condolences or congratulations as appropriate. More than half of these events serve to propagate Azerbaijani official narratives pertaining to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict (Bloody January, Khojaly, and the Day of Genocide of Azerbaijanis) and the Heydar Aliyev cult of personality (anniversaries of the former leader's birth and death as well as National Salvation Day). Solidarity Day of World Azerbaijanis, Independence Day, and Republic Day, too, remain deeply connected with what is framed as Azerbaijan's historical struggle for political and territorial autonomy. Emphasis is placed upon the stabilizing and restorative role played by Heydar Aliyev in the face of these struggles both during and following the Soviet period. While official celebrations of New Year and International Women's Day represent the spread of Soviet and Western traditions in Georgia as well neighboring Azerbaijan, Novruz Bayrami, Ourban Bayrami, and Ramazan are officially recognized by Georgia and Azerbaijan as being of cultural and religious significance to the two countries' Turkic and/or Muslim peoples.

Events commemorating the life of Heydar Aliyev, Azerbaijani victimhood in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Novruz, Ourban Bayrami and Ramazan are held in Tbilisi as well as in the districts of Marneuli, Bolnisi, Dmanisi, and Gardabani in order to encourage the attendance of Georgian Azeri-Turks. These events are held in cooperation between the Azerbaijani Embassy and Azerbaijani state-affiliated organizations and cultural centers such as Georgia's SOCAR branch, Marneuli's Azerbaijani Cultural Center as well as the Integration Center for Azerbaijanis of Georgia, the Marneuli Youth Center, and a handful of select NGOs operating in the region. These events often serve dual purposes, oftentimes introducing locals to new state-sponsored projects in the region, presenting locals with charitable and other gifts (such as SOCAR-sponsored scholarships and grants, and/or textbooks and other literature pertaining to Nagorno-Karabakh), and propagating official narratives of Azerbaijani national identity. By officially sponsoring these and other events, the Azerbaijani state presents itself as the provider and guarantor of local Georgian Azeri-Turks' cultural and material wellbeing.

When asked if he had ever perceived any sort of suspicion or negativity on the part of Georgian officials with regard to Azerbaijani interaction with Georgian Azeri-Turks, Azer Suleymanov, one of the then-three Georgian Azeri-Turk representatives in the Georgian Parliament, stated:

“I think about it like this: How would you feel, if, for example, Canada [as a neighboring country] were to come to your country and start to build roads, factories, plants, and help your students? ... A person must be an idiot or a fool to be dissatisfied when a neighbor comes to him/her and builds something for free- gives homes, roads, factories, and plants. I have a very good relationship with Azerbaijani ministers and deputies. Azerbaijan is not interested in destabilizing Georgia. Azerbaijan needs a strong neighbor. Of course, Azerbaijan has many problems of its own. Like as is the case with Georgia, 20 percent of Azerbaijan's territories are occupied by the Armenian side. And still Azerbaijan is trying to improve our lives in some way. Not only for us, but for all of Georgia”. Author's unpublished interview with Azer Suleymanov, Marneuli, March 2016.

Mr. Suleymanov, a long-time member of the Georgian Parliament and staunch supporter of Mikheil Saakashvili, was publicly recognized by the Azerbaijani government at the IV Congress of World Azerbaijanis in 2016 for his efforts in support of Georgia's Azerbaijani “Diaspora” (Zim.az 2016). Suleymanov has also been very vocal in his desire to spread awareness and recognition of the Karabakh conflict within Georgia, at times even narrowly avoiding physical conflict with his Armenian colleagues in the Georgian Parliament (cf. Machaidze 2012; DFWatch 2015, 2016, 2016a). Suleymanov, along with other Georgian Azeri-Turk representatives in the Georgian Parliament and Tbilisi- and Kvemo Kartli-based, Azerbaijan-affiliated organizations, is a regular presence at events commemorating narratives of Azerbaijani history and culture in Georgia. Representatives of the Marneuli-based Azerbaijani Cultural Center, Integration Center for Azerbaijanis of Georgia, and the Congress of Azerbaijanis of Georgia regularly help host such events in Kvemo Kartli. According to Nargiz Aliyeva, head of the Youth Department at the Azerbaijani Cultural Center in Marneuli,

“. our youth should know the history of their motherland [i.e. Azerbaijan]. They should know it perfectly in order to inform the whole world about it. When we distributed brochures with the history of Khojaly, with pictures of martyrs, Georgians were so surprised. They were horrified with such kind of inhuman action towards civil population which was killed in Khojaly. And we saw that Georgians

don't hear about this genocide at all. That is why Azerbaijani students should know the Georgian language; they should know the history, and talk, spread information about this genocide to more people” (DFWatch 2016b).

When asked about the aims and functions of the Congress of Azerbaijanis of Georgia (GAK), Huseyn Yusubov, Chairman of the Congress, stated that:

“We, the Azerbaijanis living here, are not a diaspora... We aren't a diaspora, yet we operate as one. For us, Georgia is our homeland. Azerbaijan and Turkey are like our national, vernacular states. We try to inform Georgian society and Georgian intellectuals about Azerbaijani realities. Around one million Azerbaijanis were living in Armenia, and all of them were banished. Also, in Karabakh, hundreds of thousands of people were banished from their homes. Many children, women, and elderly people were killed in that war. We try to inform Georgian society about all of these realities.”¹

A key element of the above organizations' functions, however, is also to protect the rights and cultural autonomy of Georgian Azeri-Turks as well as to take note of their problems and concerns, later giving voice to these concerns to Georgian and Azerbaijani authorities. Author's unpublished interview with Huseyn Yusubov of GAK office, Marneuli, Sept. 2016. Author's unpublished interviews with Yusubov of GAK office (Marneuli, Sept. 2016) and Nargiz Aliyeva of the Marneuli Azerbaijani Cultural Center (Marneuli, Jan. 2016). This is not to say, however, that Azerbaijani-sponsored organizations such as the Azerbaijani Cultural Center, the Integration Center for Azerbaijanis of Georgia, and GAK are the only organizations seeking to represent the Georgian Azeri-Turk community, but they are some of the best funded and most visible thanks to their connection with neighboring Azerbaijan. Representatives of other organizations serving Georgia's minority communities, including, for example, Civic Integration Foundation (CIF), Civil Development Agency (CiDA), the United Nations Association of Georgia (UNAG), United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Union of Azerbaijani Women of Georgia, and Public Movement Multinational Georgia (PMMG) -- all primarily funded by North American and European bodies -- seek to facilitate the integration of minority groups into Georgian society. For Zaur Khalilov of CIF, for example, the aim is to turn the gaze of minority groups like Georgian Azeri-Turks inward to the Georgian state rather than outward to neighboring states like Armenia, Azerbaijan, or Russia for the resolution of their problems as well as to increase the state's capacity to resolve these problems. Author's unpublished interview with Zaur Khalilov of CIF, Tbilisi, 2016. Other organizations, like Marneuli-based “Qeyrat” National Movement or Baku-based Borchali Society, remain much more controversial in both Tbilisi and Baku for their critical stances toward their respective governments.

Representatives of “Qeyrat” allege that their presence is often not allowed at meetings of Georgian and Azerbaijani officials due to their outspoken criticism of the Georgian government, Author's unpublished interview with leader of “Geyrat”, Alibala Askerov, Marneuli, March 2016. whereas some representatives of Borchali Society, including Mr. Zelimkhan Memmedli, are banned from entering Georgia due to their allegedly separatist ideologies (cf. Musavat 2015; Ismailov 2015). These organizations and their representatives tend to operate in separate circles -- the Western-funded organizations in one, and the Baku-funded organizations in another. Still another circle exists for organizations like “Qeyrat” and Borchali Society, with their controversial and outspoken manners of operation. Whereas the Georgian government participates in events hosted by organizations in each of the aforementioned circles, its dealings with members of the so-called “third circle” are much more limited. In recent years, the Georgian government has shown that, not only will it deny entry to individuals such as the aforementioned Zelimkhan Memmedli for allegedly threatening the security of the Georgian state, but it will also deny entry, residency, or citizenship to critics of the Aliyev regime.

B. Extending Azerbaijan's Influence into Georgian Political Affairs

While Azerbaijani leadership frames the territorial state of Azerbaijan as the autochthonous homeland of Azerbaijanis all over the world, it does not hold all Azerbaijanis in equally high regard. In recent years, Tbilisi has become somewhat of a safe haven for dissidents and critics of the Aliyev administration. The 2017 kidnapping of Azerbaijani dissident and investigative journalist, Efghan Mukhtarli, from the Georgian capital and his subsequent reappearance in Baku has given some pause, including representatives of human rights organizations and, allegedly, some Georgian Azeri-Turks. Not only has the Azerbaijani government increasingly pressured its Georgia-based dissidents in recent years, but it has also urged its Georgian counterpart to do the same. According to the Brussels-based International Partnership for Human Rights, Azerbaijan has been increasingly applying pressure to its critics traveling to, residing in, or seeking to travel to/reside in Georgia since 2014 and in particular since 2016 (IPHR 2017).

There are several cases wherein the Georgian government has denied entry to Azerbaijani dissidents residing abroad and denied residence permits or citizenship to Azerbaijanis residing in Tbilisi. Furthermore, it is alleged that the Georgian secret service has been involved in surveillance of Azerbaijani dissidents in Georgia (cf. Adilgizi 2017; Aliyev 2017; IPHR 2017; Sajaia 2017). Mukhtarli and his supporters allege Georgian and Azerbaijani cooperation in the former's abduction from Tbilisi and arrest in Azerbaijan. In a 2017 interview with Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), leading Georgian political analyst, Gia Nodia, stated:

“I think it's obvious there is some kind of pressure by [Azerbaijan] on the Georgian government, which says, `You know we give you oil and gas and you depend on us energy-wise so you should do something about [the dissidents], it is unacceptable that all of our enemies are there and conspire against Azerbaijan... And the Georgian government doesn't want to alienate the Azerbaijani government. They don't want to openly harass these people or hand them back to Azerbaijan but they don't want to make the Azerbaijani government unhappy, either” (Nodia in Baumgartner 2017).

When journalist Khayal Azizov attempted to discuss Mukhtarli's abduction with Georgian Azeri-Turks shortly following the May 2017 incident, Azizov found people too afraid to speak with him about this or any other issue. According to Azizov (2017), “When I try to find out the causes of this fear, I am often told that one `fine day' they might also be covered by a sack and taken to a cell.”

In addition to the pressure that the Azerbaijani government places upon Azerbaijani dissidents in Georgia, there are grounds to suggest that the Azerbaijani government pressures Georgian Azeri-Turks to show support for Georgia's ruling party. For example, Georgian Dream (GD), and SOCAR Georgia officials allegedly held meetings with recipients of SOCAR grants prior to the Parliamentary elections of 2016. These gatherings were allegedly held to encourage participants to vote for the ruling party's candidates in the approaching elections. Furthermore, an implicit understanding exists between the grantors and grantees that the latter will be available when called upon to attend protests and commemorative dates hosted by Azerbaijani organizations in Georgia. Author's personal correspondence, 2016. This is purportedly a way that one can demonstrate one's loyalty to both the Azerbaijani and Georgian states. Representatives of a number of other non-governmental, non-Azerbaijan-affiliated organizations specializing in the protection of minority rights in Georgia have lent credence to allegations of Azerbaijani involvement (i.e. lobbying) in Georgian elections, stating in one-on-one interviews that such involvement has been a regular occurrence in Kvemo Kartli since 1993. Until the Georgian government substantially demonstrates its commitment to and belief in the integration of Georgian Azeri-Turks into wider Georgian society, these representatives urge, Azerbaijan's influence over locals' voting patterns is unlikely to abate in the near future.

Conclusion

In this article, I have examined ways that the key leaders of post-Soviet Azerbaijan and Georgia have tried to position their own territorial states as the vdtdn (i.e. “homeland”) of Georgian Azeri-Turks and to what ends, focusing particularly upon the Aliyev administrations' doings in this regard. Inter-personal relationships of Azerbaijani- Georgian leaders, coupled with the economic imbalance between both countries, have been key elements setting the scene of bilateral relations since independence. Of equal importance, however, is the construction of the Azerbaijani “Diaspora” in official Azerbaijani discourse since the mid-1990s and the bearing this discourse has upon Baku's official relationship with Georgia's Azeri-Turk community. Azerbaijani projects in the spheres of infrastructure, education, and culture in Tbilisi as well as Kvemo Kartli in particular help to remind local Georgian Azeri-Turks of their ethno-national ties to the Azerbaijani nation-state and provide further incentives to uphold these ties.

Georgian initiatives aiming to integrate Georgian Azeri-Turks into wider Georgian society have largely been diffident and limited in success in comparison with the endeavors of Heydar and Ilham Aliyev to promote ties between Georgian Azeri-Turks and the Azerbaijani territorial state. The efforts on the part of the latter have mostly taken the shape of state-funded infrastructural development projects and official Azerbaijani sponsorship of socio-cultural and educational courses and events, political happenings, and charitable works. These infrastructural development projects include the (re)construction of schools and educational centers, cultural centers, sports facilities, gas and water lines, electricity grids and large-scale oil and gas pipelines, as well as the resultant employment opportunities for Locals. Charitable works include the provision of textbooks, technological and other materials to the aforementioned schools and centers, financial support of Georgian Azeri-Turk students attending Georgian institutions of higher education, and even the occasional payment of locals' medical treatment costs. Events promoting Azerbaijani historical figures, literature, and art forms are held alongside days celebrating the life of Heydar Aliyev and/or commemorations of tragedies having befallen the Azerbaijani people at the hands of Soviet or Armenian forces. These events support official conceptions of Azerbaijani (nation-) statehood and their dissemination among Georgian Azeri-Turks, in Tbilisi and the region of Kvemo Kartli in particular. By examining statements and speeches by both Aliyev Sr. and Jr., joint Azerbaijani-Georgian political-economic activities, interviews with state- and non-state actors, and the content of Azerbaijan-sponsored opportunities and events, I have identified the following narratives as being regularly promoted by Azerbaijan in Georgian Azeri-Turk locales since 1993: 1.) the preservation of the socio-cultural attributes considered to be unique to members of the Azerbaijani nation (i.e. language and spirituality as well as traditional mores, values, and customs), 2.) the acknowledgement and/or acceptance of Azerbaijani victimhood (particularly with regard to Armenia and the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict), and 3.) the dissemination of the Heydar Aliyev cult of personality. Azerbaijan's official emphasis upon growing the Azerbaijani "Diaspora” carries with it the implication that Georgian Azeri-Turks can best serve the historical Azerbaijani vdtdn by remaining in Georgia and improving their positions there (rather than by migrating permanently to Azerbaijan).

Official Azerbaijani interaction with Georgian Azeri-Turks has further problematized the issue of minority integration into Georgian society, as Azerbaijani organizations operating in Georgia have tended to focus upon the preservation of official narratives of Azerbaijani culture, identity, and (nation-)state building among Georgian Azeri-Turks. This results in a situation wherein Georgia's Azeri-Turks are effectively caught between the nation-building endeavors and narratives of two states -- Georgia and Azerbaijan. Furthermore, according to CIF's Khalilov,

“Georgian society must take steps with regard to ethnic minorities, meaning that they must not push them away. And these minorities must also be ready to strive to be full-fledged citizens. So, it is necessary to change these peoples' thinking...that `You are a citizen.' Georgian citizenship isn't just about having a Georgian passport or serving in the Army. Your political and civic self-awareness must be oriented toward the well-being of your state. And, in terms of Azerbaijan, it is a neighboring state. We need to come to terms with this”. Author's unpublished interview with Zaur Khalilov of Civic Integration Foundation, Tbilisi, Sept. 2016.

The durability of ethno-cultural conceptions of national identity in Georgia, coupled with continuing insecurities over further potential losses of Georgian territories, have created a situation wherein the Georgian state has allowed its Azerbaijani counterpart to take responsibility for its own citizens, “Georgian” by virtue of citizenship, but “Azerbaijani” by virtue of widely accepted narratives of ethno-nationality. The economic situation has indeed affected this situation, but the continued isolation of Georgian Azeri-Turks from wider Georgian society is not to be blamed solely upon Georgian economic woes.

Saakashvili's domestic policies vis-a-vis minority groups in the realm of education (the "1+4" Program¹ in particular) and infrastructure were important steps toward correcting this imbalance and bringing Georgian Azeri-Turks closer to the Georgian state, but these efforts have not been substantial enough in their breadth and depth to completely dislodge Azerbaijan's influence in Georgian Azeri-Turk communities. The Georgian state, for its part, continues to vacillate between rhetoric of civic, inclusive nationalism and rhetoric that reinforces traditional, exclusivist conceptions of Georgian ethno-nationality with its linguistic and religious underpinnings. Such vacillating rhetoric, common during the Saakashvili period (2003-2013), has continued thus far under Georgian Dream leadership (cf. Bergund 2017; Devdariani 2004; Jones 2013; Storm 2017, 2019, 2019b). This program, which went into effect in 2010, was designed to simply university entrance exam procedures for members of socio-cultural, linguistic minority groups, such as Georgian Armenians and Azeri-Turks. Students wishing to attend Georgian institutions of higher education take a simplified exam in their native language, and, upon the attainment of sufficient scores, spend one year intensively studying the Georgian language. After passing their language courses, students are then able to go on to the Georgian university and program of their choice (i.e. the remaining four years of the '1+4' formula). It remains unknown whether or not this program will continue beyond the 2019-2020 academic year. This claim is also supported by the author's unpublished interviews with representatives of the following NGOs: Khalilov of CIF, Arnold Stepanyan of Public Movement Multinational Georgia (PMMG), and Aptsiauri of UNAG, Tbilisi, Sept. 2016. At the official level, Georgia's Azeri-Turk population is effectively caught between the rhetoric of two "veten" (homelands), one autochthonous, or “organic” (i.e. Azerbaijan), the other allochthonous, or “inorganic” (i.e. Georgia). In the words of Zaur Khalilov,

“There are very few integrated individuals [among Georgian Azeris]. There are people who try to strive for balance somehow. They support this balance so as not to act in a way that is offensive to either Azerbaijan or Georgia. But such a thing doesn't work. There are very few people who identify as citizens of Georgia, although the same can be said about Azerbaijan... They are, therefore, in a kind of `in-between' situation”. Author's unpublished interview CIF's Khalilov, Tbilisi, Sept. 2016.

Future research is needed at the grassroots level to ascertain the ways in which local Georgian Azeri-Turks perceive and respond to Azerbaijani and Georgian efforts at homeland-framing. This will help to provide a more complete picture of Georgian Azeri- Turks' state- and national-affiliations as well as shed light upon the possibilities that such affiliations imply.

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