Why the Soviet Union under Khrushchev and Brezhnev failed with the complex mechanization of agriculture: International aspects (1953-1986)

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Why the Soviet Union under Khrushchev and Brezhnev failed with the complex mechanization of agriculture: International aspects (1953-1986)

S. Merl

Stephan Merl, Dsc (History), Professor, Bielefeld University. Bielefeld, Germany

The article provides archival evidence to the argument that complex mechanization after 1953 was a failure (Merl, 2020). International contacts were quickly restored after Stalin's death. They made evident to what extent the Soviet Union had fallen behind the West in agricultural technology and reliability of machinery. The article describes how successfully the Ministry of Agriculture collected information on Western technology.

Already in 1955, models of the Western agricultural machinery, seeds, highly productive breeds, chemicals, and feed were imported to be tested in the Soviet conditions. The expectation was that the Soviet industry would use this knowledge to improve the quality of its agricultural machinery, which would determine a significant decrease of labor input and costs, and an increase in productivity. However, only few advanced machines were delivered -- with long delays -- to the state and collective farms. There was no `green revolution' that increased yields and agricultural productivity with scientific data. No bottle necks in provision of feed and transport, and in reduction of harvest losses were overcome between 1955 and the founding of Gosagroprom.

The Gosplan and the State Committee of Science and Technology systematically ignored the decrees of the Central Committee and the Council of Ministers, following the Ministry of Agriculture's recommendations to produce improved technology. They refused to give priority to the agricultural development for modernization of the outdated Soviet agricultural machinery industry would have required huge investment. Since the mid-1960s, the Ministry of Agriculture tried to make the block partners produce at least part of the machinery needed by the Soviet agriculture.

These efforts also included the exchange of delegations with Western countries, the USSR's participation in international agricultural organizations, the ordered by Khrushchev cooperation with `less developed' countries and within the Comecon.

Key words: agricultural modernization, complex mechanization, Western technology, socialist industrialized agriculture, agricultural labor productivity, agricultural machinery, research cooperation, international agricultural associations, Khrushchev, Brezhnev

Почему Советский Союз при Хрущеве и Брежневе не смог провести комплексную механизацию сельского хозяйства: международные аспекты проблематики (1953-1986)

Штефан Мерль, доктор исторических наук, профессор Билефельского университета. Университет штрассе, Билефельд, Германия

Статья основана на архивных материалах, подтверждающих, что комплексная механизация в СССР после 1953 года провалилась (Merl, 2020). После смерти Сталина страна быстро восстанавливала международные связи, благодаря которым осознала, насколько сильно СССР отставал от Запада с точки зрения развития сельскохозяйственных технологий и надежности сельскохозяйственной техники. Автор показывает, сколь успешно министерство сельского хозяйства собирало информацию о западных технологиях. Уже в 1955 году были импортированы модели западной сельскохозяйственной техники, семена, высокопродуктивные породы скота, химикаты и корма -- чтобы апробировать их в советских условиях. Ожидалось, что советское машиностроение будет использовать западные знания для повышения качества сельскохозяйственной техники, что повлечет за собой значительное сокращение трудовых и финансовых затрат и одновременно рост производительности. Однако очень мало передовых машин и с большими задержками были доставлены в колхозы и совхозы.

В советском сельском хозяйстве не произошла «зеленая революция», которая бы увеличила урожаи и производительность благодаря научным достижениями. Никакие застойные проблемы в обеспечении кормами и транспортом или в сокращении потерь урожая не были решены в период с 1955 года до момента основания Госагропрома. Госплан и Государственный комитет по науке и технике систематически игнорировали постановления Центрального комитета и Совета министров, которые следовали рекомендациям министерства сельского хозяйства по улучшению производственных технологий. Госплан и Госкомитет отказывались отдавать приоритет сельскохозяйственному развитию, поскольку модернизация устаревшего сельскохозяйственного машиностроения требовала огромных инвестиций. С середины 1960-х годов министерство сельского хозяйства пыталось заставить своих партнеров по блоку производить хотя бы часть техники, необходимой советскому сельскому хозяйству. Эти усилия включали себя обмен делегациями с западными странами, участие СССР в международных сельскохозяйственных организациях, а также провозглашенное Хрущевым сотрудничество с «менее развитыми» странами в рамках Совета экономической взаимопомощи.

Ключевые слова: сельскохозяйственная модернизация, комплексная механизация, западные технологии, социалистическое промышленное сельское хозяйство, производительность сельскохозяйственного труда, сельскохозяйственная техника, научно-исследовательское сотрудничество, международные сельскохозяйственные ассоциации, Хрущев, Брежнев

After the World War II, complex mechanization of agriculture became overwhelmingly important. Only the substitution of labor input by machinery could decrease the costs of production. Under the international competition, the huge increase in demand made the producers develop agricultural machinery. Complex mechanization determined that labor productivity in agriculture grew faster than in other branches of economy.

The extra-ordinary increase in productivity in Western agriculture was primarily determined by the `green revolution', i.e., the proper use of agricultural research in the selection of highly productive seeds for regional conditions, and of highly productive breeds for milk, meat or wool production. Industry provided the necessary high-quality concentrated feed, chemical industry -- more effective pesticides, herbicides, artificial fertilizers and medicines for animal. By introducing border quarantine for plants and animals, an effective protection against diseases was ensured.

This article focuses on the question, why, after the death of Stalin, the Soviet Union did not manage to develop its backward agricultural machinery to the world standards, although, since 1955, the international contacts were restored and models of the superior Western agricultural technology were imported. Only few of the new models of agricultural machinery and of the superior plant and cattle breeding technologies -- with long delays -- were provided to the state and collective farms. The bottle necks in feed provision, transport, and harvest losses were not overcome between 1955 and the founding of Gosagroprom. In this period, the USSR even lagged further behind the leading Western (capitalist) countries in the agricultural labor productivity and in the costs of production. The USSR did not contribute to the `green revolution'. The Soviet agricultural machinery output lagged strongly behind the West in quality, reliability, provision of spare parts, fuel and metal needs (Merl, 2020).

Why did not the USSR use the Western expertise? Despite the decrees of the USSR Central Committee (CC) and Council of Ministries (CM), following the Ministry of Agriculture's recommendations to produce improved technologies, the Gosplan and the State Committee of Science and Technology refused to give priority to agricultural development for modernization of the outdated agricultural machinery industry would have required huge investment. Therefore, since the mid-1960s, the Ministry of Agriculture tried to make the block partners produce at least a part of the machinery needed by the Soviet agriculture.

Works on the Soviet agriculture paid little attention to the reasons for failure of the radical improvement of the Soviet agricultural technology, and for preventing the access of the qualified Soviet agricultural scientists to the necessary research equipment. Although, since the late 1950s, most state farm directors and collective farm chairmen were qualified, they were never able to decide on the economic success of their farm without state interference. As investments under Brezhnev were wasted for the low-quality inputs, melioration and construction, until the 2000s, Russia could not return its dominant export position in the world agricultural market (Wegren, Nikulin, Trotsuk, 2018). With the agricultural inputs in accordance with international standard, this would have been possible already in the 1960s. Most Soviet agricultural enterprises used unqualified история manual labor without machinery (Merl, 2020).

While focusing on contacts with the Western agriculture, the article follows the perspective of the Ministry of Agriculture. This allows to consider proposals to improve inputs so that to ensure agriculture of the world standards, the Ministry's assessment of the Soviet agriculture in the international perspective, and resistance to the implementation of the Ministry's proposals, i.e., slowing down and boycotting the transfer of the expertise into the farms' production.

The article considers the following issues: (1) restoring of international contacts -- delegations and specialists' trips to study the Western agricultural technology and to import models for improving the national production; (2) the resistance of governing bodies to this strategy; (3) the change in the Ministry's modernizing strategy in the mid-1960s to force the European Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon) to provide the USSR with superior machinery and research equipment; (4) the Ministry's desperate fight for importing equipment for research and veterinary laboratories; (5) the Ministry's proposals for using the Western expertise in the selected fields to improve the Soviet agriculture to the world standards; (6) problems with the transfer of the Western agricultural technology, equipment for mechanizing animal production and imports of cattle and poultry; (7) the state of the Soviet agriculture in the mid-1960s in the international perspective; (8) channels of information on the international agricultural progress -- professionalization of international contacts on cultural exchange and joint agricultural research; consultants on agriculture in the Soviet embassies in capitalist countries; participation in international agricultural organizations; (9) the Ministry's work in developing countries.

The period under consideration (primarily from 1953 to 1971, in some cases to 1986)The archive of the Ministry of Agriculture [RGAE. Fond 7486] is accessible only up to 1971. For the period from 1985 to 1989, the RGAE. Fond 650 (Gosagronom) was used. is marked by ruptures. Since the mid-1950s, the Ministry of Agriculture could play its role in promoting agricultural modernization only for a short period of time. Khrushchev's `decentralization' together with the liquidation of central ministries made the central regulation of agricultural machinery plants more difficult. Instead of overcoming the Soviet agriculture's backwardness, Khrushchev forced the Ministry to participate in his attempt to win the support of non-block nations by providing help to less developed countries and by presenting socialist agriculture as a `success model'. In 1961, Khrushchev undermined the Ministry's role in promoting agricultural modernization and kicked the Minister of Agriculture Matskevich out of office. Only after Khrushchev's removal, in 1965, the Ministry returned its function to give recommendations for agricultural modernization, and Matskevich returned to office. The Ministry made competent decree proposals to the CC and the CM, which shed light on the miserable state of the Soviet agricultural mechanization as compared to the leading Western countries. The Ministry demanded urgent actions aimed at the complex mechanization of farms to raise the efficiency of production and to decrease the labor input. However, hardly any of the required measures were implemented. The Gosplan never ordered the mass production of the required high-quality machinery and wasted resources to increase the `cheap' production of poor-quality and outdated machinery. Thus, the supply of agricultural machines and equipment to animal husbandry grew in numbers but not in quality. The official statistics kept silence on the poor quality and unreliability of the machinery, on its idle state due to the lack of spare parts and repair. The lack of urgently needed harvest machinery contributed greatly to the losses of harvest in the fields. Transport was in short supply, although the increase in animal husbandry tripled the need for in-farm transportation (Merl, 2020).

Restoring international contacts: Delegations and specialists' trips

Contacts with the West were restored very soon after Stalin's death. Already in 1955, Soviet delegations visited Western countries to consider the state of agriculture and found technologies of better quality and higher efficiency than in the USSR -- models of these machinery were imported to test them in the Soviet conditions.

1955 trip to the US and Canada: Western corn production

The most spectacular of delegations was headed by the deputy Minister of Agriculture, Vladimir Matskevich Vladimir Matskevich (1909-1998): Ukraine Minister of Agriculture (19491950), in 1953 -- the USSR deputy, from the fall of 1955 -- Minister of Agriculture. -- in the summer of 1955, to the US and Canada, by the invitation of John Storm, a plant grower from Woodstock, Illinois, who visited the USSR in 1946 RGAE. F. 7486. L. 20-21.. The trip was supported by famous Americans who wanted to improve the US-USSR relations, among them Ceyrus Eaton and Rosewell Garst Garst (1898-1977) -- the president of the hybrid corn seeds company Garst & Thomas. He visited the USSR six times. In 1959, he hosted Khrushchev at his farm as an ambassador of good will. -- both were in close contact with Khrushchev. Garst invited Matskevich to visit his farm and showed his corn and millet hybrid seeds resistant to droughts (Taubman, 2003: 372). Matskevich shared his impression with Khrushchev and emphasized that hybrid seed could be developped in the USSR in only 2 or 3 years, while the Americans spent 25 years RGAE. F. 7486. D. 8578. L. 168-171. ^{RGAE. F. 7486. D. 7708. L. 264-267.} (Taubman, 2003: 372). In the fall of 1955, Khrushchev appointed Matskevich the USSR Minister of Agriculture. He stayed in the position until 1973, interrupted by his work in Kazakhstan (1961 -- early 1965), likely because he dared to oppose Khrushchev.

The return visit of the Americans was in the fall of 1955, and Garst came to the USSR too. After Khrushchev started his corn campaign in 1954, he wanted to meet Garst. He invited him (together with Mikoyan and Matskevich) to his datcha near Yalta. Garst explained in which southern parts of the USSR corn production would be the most effective. He stressed the precondition for success: the use of hybrid seeds, fertilization, irrigation, mechanization, insecticides and herbicides. Nothing of this was available in the Soviet Union at that moment, which did not stop Khrushchev (Taubman, 2003: 372-373). He did not even ensure that the farms were supplied with the necessary machinery. The Ministry of Agriculture asked Khrushchev already on May 6, 1955 to order urgently the production of corn machinery for the campaign's success depended on mechanization⁶. The Ministry's board meeting on April 12, 1956 noted that the quality of the corn seeds was poor and asked to import 5,000 tons of hybrid seeds together with three Garst & Thomas plants to produce hybrid seeds. The board demanded the state inspection of quarantine to check the imported seeds carefully so that to avoid the spread of pests and diseases ^RGAE. ^F. 74⁸⁶. ^D. 797°. ^L. 45^-4⁸; 54^-57; ⁶7^-7⁰; 74^-7⁶.

On Garst's invitation, the delegation of Soviet corn specialists visited the US and Canada in June 1958. They were impressed by the fact that only one worker (instead of about a dozen in the USSR) was needed to cultivate 100 hectares of corn, and that hybrid seeds gave about 25-30% more yield and was easier to harvest. On June 16, 1958, Matskevich with the Minister of Foreign Trade Kabanov asked the CM to produce corn machinery, hybrid seeds and plants to process feed from corn. In addition, they proposed to import the mechanized small-scale equipment used in the US winery and horticulture, and breeding cattleRGAE. F. 7486. D. 8359. L. 91-93.. On July 10, 1958, Matskevich informed the CM and Khrushchev that Garst proposed to purchase six tractors and the necessary corn agricultural machinery, which would allow the USSR to reduce the labor input in corn production. Garst also suggested to buy three plants for the production of concentrated feed and to look after Soviet specialists staying in the US. To get the support of the CM, Matskevich reduced the amount of machinery to import: only two instead of four tractors with equipment, only two feed plants and two mobile feed-mixers, hybrids and a selection of other mechanized equipment and herbicides RGAE. F. 7486. D. 8359. L. 294-301..

Although Khrushchev and Mikoyan, two leading figures of the regime, supported the purchase, such governing bodies as the Gosplan refused to buy Garst's models in the required amount. Despite the CM decree, they blocked the purchase by financial reasons. On April 28, 1959, Matskevich stressed that the purchase price was significantly less than Garst's proposal. When in Moscow in March 1959, Garst proposed to buy also model agricultural machinery and equipment for poultry farms, breeding and hybrid cattle and poultry, and model products for the chemical industry. The CM ordered an additional purchase for 4 more million rubles. Matskevich asked the Ministry of Foreign Trade to make the purchase in 1959 RGAE. F. 7486. D. 8474. L. 46-59. ^{RGAE. F. 7486. D. 8476. L. 92. RGAE. F. 7486. D. 8578. L. 170-171. RGAE. F. 7486. D. 8691. L. 235-241.}. However, there was a new problem: the International Harvester Company refused to deliver two complexes of corn agricultural machinery and insisted on at least four. Therefore, on August 14, 1959, Matskevich asked Mikoyan to change the decree of March 10, 1959, and add two complexes of machinery.

From Matskevich's report on the results of the use of foreign experience in the Soviet economy from July 4, 1960, we know that these imports were delayed. The technology to produce hybrid seeds was brought from the US only in 1958. While testing the imported seeds, the Soviet producers started to develop their own varieties. In 1959, hybrid seeds were used on about 3,000 hectares. Matskevich argued that in the future, when hybrids were sown on 200,000 hectares, the USSR would save 600 to 800 thousand human-working days. In 1959, Soviet scientists worked on about 100 new, self-pollinating corn varieties which the delegation brought from the US and Canada in 1958. In addition, the American experience was used to produce hybrid millet seeds. Tests of some hybrids, bought from the Garst & Tomas in 1958 and 1959, showed impressive results: Soviet yields could have increased by 150%. Achievements in corn production in the following decades made Matskevich sound utopian: in reality it took the USSR several years to increase the sown area for hybrids. On August 27, 1962, the Ministry's board made a list of research institutions which still had not reported on the results of hybrid seeds nor started to prepare recommendations for supplying regional farms with the imported hybrid seeds Already the example of corn explains why the efforts of the Ministry of Agriculture to promote the complex mechanization of agriculture by importing models of advanced technologies were doomed to

fail. Although the delegation trips of 1955 and 1958 provided a lot of история information on the technical preconditions of successful corn production, Khrushchev paid little attention to the needed machinery. The central governing bodies, responsible for executing the CC and CM's decrees, gave no priority to the imported hybrid seeds, corn agricultural machinery and concentrated feed. Still in 1986, Gosagroprom claimed that the production of corn silage was insufficient and urgently needed improvement. Enormous losses of feed harvest happened each yearRGAE. F. 650. D. 16. L. 5-30. ^{RGAE. F. 7486. D. 7970. L. 62-66.} not due to the lack of knowledge: Garst and Matskevich told Khrushchev in 1955 what investments were a precondition for the campaign's success. However, Khrushchev focused on workers' mobilization and paid little attention to the need for high-quality machinery.

Import of Western agricultural technology

After each delegation trip, the Ministry of Agriculture asked to import models of the Western technology considered by the experts to be of higher quality and efficiency than the national machinery, seeds or breeding cattle -- to test them in the Soviet conditions and to reproduce so that the Soviet industry would improve its production RGAE. F. 7486. D. 7970. L. 2-9. ^{RGAE. F. 7486. D. 7834. L. 11-12.}. For instance, the Ministry's board demanded, after the delegation's report on the 1955 trip to Sweden, to import models of grain and sugar beet combine harvesters, potato planters and fertilizer spreaders. The delegation also studied the Swedish livestock production. Based on this information, the main inspection of animal husbandry proposed the Ministry of Foreign Trade to import models of fully mechanized livestock stables and feed plantsi. In November 1955, England showed interest in renewing contacts with the USSR and invited Matskevich with his wife and 12 experts to Coventry: the English side covered all costs. Obviously, the Soviet willingness to import models of agricultural machinery waked up the business interests of the Western machinery producers.

By the order of the CC and the CM, Matskevich and Khlamov (Minister of Tractor and Agricultural Machinery Construction) proposed on January 2, 1956 a draft decree to import about 70 combine harvesters, other harvesting machines and tractors -- 9-10 machines from Canada, the US, and the FRG, and additional machines from England, France, Sweden and Belgium. The list provided detailed information on the producer -- as Massey Harris, International Harvesters, John Deere, Claas, Lanz RGAE. F. 7486. D. 8049. L. 6-12. ^{RGAE. F. 7486. D. 8049. L. 138-145.}. But even the CC and CM's order did not guarantee that the Ministry of Foreign Trade would ensure the import: it refused to import tractors from England and combine harvesters from Sweden due to `the lack of foreign currency'. Matskevich renewed his request and asked the CM to give a special order to the Ministry of Foreign Trade to import the machinery. However, even special requests in most cases had no success.

Most of the delegations got the Ministry's clear orders to explore the situation. Thus, on January 4, 1957, the main inspection for potatoes, vegetables and melons asked to send a delegation to France to explore the production and marketing of vegetables in the suburbs of big cities. The delegation was to consist of experts in storage, processing and sales of vegetables, and to explore the use of herbicides. The Ministry's board was especially interested in the calibration of vegetable seeds and required to import models of the necessary machinery RGAE. F. 7486. D. 8169. L. 2-11. ^{RGAE. F. 7486. D. 8800. L. 90-93. RGAE. F. 7486. D. 8659. L. 30-32.}. In 1963, the Minister of Agriculture Volovchenko made a list of problems to be solved by consulting foreign experts in 1964-1965: improving soil fertility, use of chemicals, mechanization of agriculture, organization of seed breeding, producing new crop varieties and hybrids, livestock breeding, feed production and animal husbandry, new methods to fight plant pests, and agricultural specialization.

Rising resistance: delays and funding cuts

The Ministry of Agriculture protested -- often in vain -- against delays and ignorance of the CC and CM decrees to import models of the Western machinery by the governing bodies. Thus, on January 27, 1961, Petrov with Orlov (Gosplan) protested against the reduction of the number of agricultural machinery to be imported. On January 3, 1968, Matskevich and Ezhevsky (Soyuzselkhoztechnika) complained to Kosygin that the purchase of foreign agricultural technology was often delayed for years. They presented a long list of non-executed import orders. For instance, they waited for three years to get the permission of the Ministry of Foreign Trade, the Gosplan, and the Committee of Science and Technology to import models of pig and cattle fattening and dairy farms. Although the storage of hay in the neutral gas could reduce the storage losses to 25%, the import order was not executed. The required import of greenhouses from the Netherlands was not executed, nor the import of John Deere wheel tractors, self-propelled rice harvesting machines of Massey Ferguson, potato harvest machines from England, and eight-row corn sowing machines of John Deere spreading fertilizers, herbicides and insecticides. They reminded that in January 1967, they had asked the CC and CM to speed up the imports of the urgently needed efficient tractors, harvest machinery, and equipment for animal farms RGAE. F. 7486. D. 9164. L. 10. ^{RGAE. F. 7486. D. 9164. L. 9. RGAE. F. 7486. D. 9131. L. 16-17. RGAE. F. 7486. D. 9183. L. 350-352. RGAE. F. 7486. D. 8221. L. 195-197. RGAE. F. 7486. D. 9104. L. 212-219. RGAE}. ^F. 74⁸⁶. ^D. 9333. ^L. 25-33; ^126-134.. The Gosplan and the State Committee did not execute the CC and CM's order to check the import proposals. Matskevich and Ezhevsky suggested to speed up the use of the most urgently needed agricultural machinery at the state and collective farms by purchasing licenses from the Western companies to produce their machinery (just as with Fiat)2⁴.

On June 25, 1968, Matskevich complained to the CC that the Gosplan refused to purchase feed and diary plants from England for two years, and repeated his import request. In the FRG, such a dairy farm for 2,000 cows was opened. The Soviet Republic Estonia complained about the delay of milking systems imports for years, which did not allow to produce the high-quality milk for export -- the national milking systems contaminated milk with bacteria.

Since the late 1950s, the State Committee for Science and Technology showed little interest in the imports of the superior agricultural technology. The Committee often intentionally delayed the execution of import orders, probably, due to the fear of competition, because all comparative tests revealed the poor quality of the Soviet agricultural machinery. According to the bureaucratic procedures, the Committee had to check all import requests of the Ministry of Agriculture and had the right to deny them. For instance, in 1958, Sitnikov (Ministry of Agriculture) asked Maksarev, the head of the state committee, to approve the imports of 15 models of agricultural machinery from England, the US and France. When in 1967 Soviet constructors designed a 220 PS tractor, Matskevich and Ezhevsky informed the head of the State Committee, Kirillin, that the US already used much more powerful tractors. They asked to import a 600-PS tractor with the necessary machines.

Among the CM's import decrees not executed or executed with delays was the decree of August 26, 1966, to buy a poultry farm from capitalist countries. A similar delay happened with the CM's order of June 18, 1969, to purchase construction parts for diary farms with 2,000 cows. However, even in the beginning of 1971, the machinery was not imported. Instead of buying the construction elements, the Gosplan bought only the design project2⁰. Concerning the order to import a complex fattening farm for 1,000 heads of cattle, the Gosplan informed the CM on April 11, 1968, that it would be available only in 10 to 12 months. As the import plan for 1968 did not have enough funding, it suggested to postpone the purchase to 1969 RGAE. F. 7486. D. 9183. L. 235-237.. Considering the CM's decree of December 28, 1970, to import a new system of keeping cows from Sweden, the Gosplan decided to purchase it too early, when the system was still tested RGAE. F. 7486. D.9333. L. 220-227. ^{RGAE. F. 7486. D. 9184. L. 24-25; 221-225. RGAE. F. 7486. D. 9103. L.90-105.}.

In his report to the CM of June 26, 1968, Matskevich underlined the importance of complex mechanization and automatization of agricultural production. He requested to import models of diary and cattle fattening farms, models of machinery for the production and storage of hay bales and for feed distribution. The GDR bought a fattening farm for 13,000 heads of cattle and a diary farm for 2,000 cows from England. Matskevich asked to make the Gosplan provide the necessary funding to purchase such farms in England in the third quarter of 1968, which would allow to start their construction at the beginning of 1969. The Gosplan refused to execute this order for no finances for the imports were allocated in the 1968 plan. The Ministry of Foreign Trade refused the execution too and demanded that the Ministry of Agriculture would first provide the permission of the State Committee of Science and Technology for such imports. The purchase of the model would only make sense if the Soviet industry intended to start the production of such farms. This was a clear hint to the reason of the attitude to the Ministry of Agriculture's requests: if there was no intention to produce superior machinery in the USSR, the strategy of the Ministry was doomed to failure. It was based on the expectation that the governing bodies were interested in improving the quality of the Soviet agricultural machinery and the animal farms' equipment, which would require a fundamental reconstruction of the USSR's agricultural machinery plants constructed in the 1930s. Such investments were never provided, although they could have been paid off by reducing labor inputs and costs in animal husbandry.

Sometimes the industry blocked the imports when expected advantages from producing the equipment itself: for instance, by the order of the 23rd Party Congress to produce by 1970 990 cooling devices to provide the state and collective farms with equipment to store fruits and with poultry farms. Matskevich and Ezhevsky proposed to the head of the Gosplan Baibakov to purchase high-quality cooling devices from Hungary. But the Minister of Chemical and Petroleum Industry intervened to take over the production by changing the plan for 1968 accordingly.

Purchase of agricultural machinery from the Comecon countries

The USSR's search for successful models of agricultural technology to modernize the production of agricultural machinery focused on the Comecon countries, especially the GDR, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. The quality of the agricultural machinery production in the GDR was significantly superior to that of the Soviet industry. Many of machines, especially for harvesting, were not produced in the USSR; therefore, it was certainly the USSR who had to learn. When the Ministry of Agriculture realized that the governing bodies blocked the imports of superior technologies from `capitalist' countries due to the `lack of foreign currency', the Ministry tried to substitute these imports by the imports from the European-block partners. This meant a decisive strategy's turn: while the Western models were imported to improve the national production of machinery, the machines imported from the block partners were to be used at the Soviet farms.

Thus, on May 25, 1965, Matskevich asked Ezhevsky (Soyuzselkhoz-technika) to purchase seed cleaning and drying machinery from the GDR company Petkus for the collective and state farms. The Ministry had already bought the necessary machinery from this company for testing stations and universities RGAE. F. 7486. D.8933. L. 220-221. ^{RG. 327-345. RGAE. F. 7486. D.9104. L. 93-94. RGAE. F. 7486. D. 9130. L. 1-3.}. On May 8, 1968, Matskevich reported to the CC that from 1964 to 1967 850 complexes of the Petkus's seed cleaning and drying machinery were imported. They were of a much better quality than Soviet machines, and met the requirements. Matskevich asked the CC to purchase 300 more of these machinery complexes and to order the Gosplan to speed up the imports still blocked by it and the Ministry of Foreign Trade.

On July 31, 1967, Matskevich, Ezhevsky and Sinitsyn (Minister of Tractor and Agricultural Machinery Production) asked Baibakov, the head of the Gosplan, to increase the imports of the urgently needed agricultural machinery from the Comecon countries: the Soviet industry could not satisfy even the minimum demand of the state and collective farms. Concerning ventilating fans and silage harvesting machines, and mower-loaders, the demand exceeded the national production by 20 to 30 times. About the double national production was needed for potato harvesters, diary equipment, milking systems for 200 cows, and milking installations for milking pails. From the CSSR, more harvest machinery for turnips and carrots were to be imported. 15% to 20% of total costs were to be spent for spare parts for the machinery.

To develop the agricultural machinery production in cooperation with the GDR, a special commission was established. In February 1968, the talks with the GDR started -- on production of other potato and hay-harvesting machinery, systems for tillage and sowing in the next 10 to 20 years. Special attention was to be paid to the standardization of harvesting machinery (including for forage crops, cereals, sugar beets and potatoes). The standardized basic elements were to be developed for tractors, for storing and processing agricultural products³⁸. Standardization was of the greatest importance for spare parts and trailed implements were produced for only specific types of tractors, and standardization would have sped up complex mechanization. However, until the end of the 1980s, there was hardly any progress for it would also have required modernization of the Soviet plants producing agricultural machinery3⁰.

The import plan for agricultural machinery from the Comecon countries in 1969-1975, compiled on the CM order by the Ministry of Agriculture (Volovchenko) and Soyuzselkhoztechnika (Ezhevsky) on July 23, 1968, suggested to import all agricultural machinery not produced in the USSR from such `brother countries' as the GDR, CSSR, Hungary, Bulgaria and Poland -- machinery for silage and potato harvest, for processing cereal seeds, milking installations, machinery for processing feed and mechanization of animal husbandry. As these countries developed new agricultural machinery every year, the bilateral contracts required the supplies of the newest machines<sup>40</sup>. The bilateral contracts were to coordinate the production from 1971 to 1975. Machinery, for which testing in the USSR was finished, but mass production did not start due to the Gosplan's `unavailable capacities', was to be produced by the partner countries. According to the agreement with the GDR, almost all machines were to be produced in the GDR for the Gosplan did not provide production capacities in the USSR. The machines based on the Soviet technical documentation were to be produced only at the GDR plants.

On February 4, 1969, Matskevich, Lebedev, the Minister for Tractor and Agricultural Machinery, and Ezhevsky asked the CM to import complexes for diary production and cattle fattening from the GDR. They claimed that this was to be done urgently for the labor productivity in the Soviet animal husbandry lagged dramatically behind `capitalist' countries: for instance, the production of one decitonne of milk required 8 times more of labor input. The GDR's equipment for diary production could reduce the labor hours from 10-16 to 0.74². The CM agreed on the purchase on February 12, 1969. However, it became obvious that the state farms selected were not suitable RGAE. F. 7486. D.9253. L. 169-183. ^{RGAE. F. 7486. D.9252. L.131-144. RGAE. F. 7486. D.9241. L. 21-25. RGAE. F. 7486. D.9277. L. 3-5. RGAE. F. 7486. D.9277. L. 7-9. RGAE. F. 7486. D.8357. L.5-7.}. The purchase of milking equipment from the GDR had no alternative for the national installations were produced mainly at small история and not specialized plants (Schinke, 1967). On February 10, 1969, Matskevich and Ezhevsky asked the CM to import the equipment for mechanization of animal husbandry from the GDR from 1970 to 1975. Soviet plants did not produce enough of the urgently needed machinery such as silage harvesters and hay balers. Milking in the USSR was mechanized only up to 36%, harvesting with hay balers -- up to 13%45.

On March 30, 1970, Matskevich reported to the CC-Secretary of Agriculture, Kulakov, that, following his order, Matskevich had agreed with the Soviet ambassador in the GDR Abrasimov to intensify the `cooperation' with the GDR. Agricultural machines, which were in short supply in the USSR due to the Gosplan's refusal to increase production from 1971 to 1975, were to be imported from the GDR. Matskevich reported of the following deficit: 48,700 silage harvesters, 119,000 pick-up hay balers, 18,000 baler-chopper-loaders, 28,900 pneumatic transport systems, and 152,500 tractor-rakers. As Matskevich was not sure that the Gosplan, the State Committee for Material and Technical Supply, and the Ministry of Foreign Trade would ensure such imports, he asked Kulakov to oblige these institutions to increase the imports of harvesting machinery from the GDR4⁶. Due to the increased significance of the GDR in providing agricultural machinery, on August 6, 1970, Volovchenko asked the CC to introduce at the embassy in the GDR the position of a consultant for agriculture to coordinate the cooperation⁷.

The contacts with the European block partners were ambivalent. On the one hand, the USSR expected thankfulness for liberation from fascism, such as covering all costs of scientific exchanges. On the other hand, the agricultural machinery produced in these countries was better than the one produced in the USSR; therefore, the USSR demanded to receive large imports of these agricultural machines. Thus, the technological backwardness of the Soviet agricultural machinery was increasing until the late 1980s.

Cooperation within the Comecon countries suffered from the fact that the Soviet partner often did not fulfill its obligations to provide the promised information. For instance, according to the agreement of March 1957 in Prague, the USSR promised to improve the communication on testing tractors, agricultural machinery and on repair, but did not provide the information before the agreed deadline. On July 19, 1965, Volovchenko informed the CC that the USSR did not fulfill its obligation to provide its Five-Year-Plan (1966-1970) in time to the Comecon partners. He requested to order the Gosplan to provide the plan urgently to the permanent commission. Without the Soviet data, the Council could not complete its tasksRGAE. F. 7486. D.8883. L. 52-54. ^{RGAE. F. 7486. D.8801. L. 1-6. RGAE. F. 7486. D.8169. L. 130-133. RGAE. F. 7486. D.8371. L. 173-178. RGAE. F. 7486. D.8415. L. 20-22, 74-102.}.

The block partners were always disappointed by the poor quality of the Soviet tractors. In the Comecon countries (without Mongolia), on November 1, 1962, more than 25,000 tractors DT-54 were in operation and, as in the USSR, they needed repair and spare parts that were in extremely scarce supply, which made the block partners produce spare parts of low quality and with high costs. Pyshin, the head of the Soviet part in the permanent Comecon commission, asked the CM on March 7, 1963, to satisfy urgently the block partners' need in spare parts⁶⁰. Already on May 13, 1957, the Ministry of Agriculture's board admitted that often seeds, agricultural machinery and equipment of bad quality were exported⁶¹.

Fight for the imports of equipment for research and laboratories

In the 1920s, the USSR held a leading position in the international agrarian research. Considering its human capital, the USSR could have returned it in the 1950s. However, the USSR failed to provide the necessary research equipment as a precondition for solving this task. The Soviet industry produced hardly any of the equipment necessary for research laboratories or veterinary services, nor medicines for fighting animal diseases. In all these fields, Soviet researchers and veterinarians were prevented from doing their job. And the governing bodies did their best, under the pretext of the lack of foreign currency, to block such imports. Therefore, neither the test stations, nor the veterinary services could fulfill their tasks.

All requests of the Ministry of Agriculture and research laboratories faced insuperable obstacles and bureaucratism. At the end of 1958, Sitnikov asked Yushin (Gosplan) to import equipment and machinery needed for research institutions and higher education². After the International Exposition of Agricultural Research Equipment, on May 14, 1959, the Ministry's board ordered to provide recommendations on the necessary equipment for agronomists, animal technicians, veterinarians, chairmen of collective farms and directors of state farms -- so that to order the missing equipment. However, no effort was undertaken to produce this equipment in the Soviet Union. In 1962, the usual reduction of the imports requests for the urgently needed laboratory equipment caused protest: without the equipment for checking measurements, the laboratories could not work.

On May 4, 1962, Mozgov (Ministry of Agriculture) asked the Gosplan to provide the necessary imported medicines and laboratory equipment for veterinary services. He calculated the need in imports for 196366. For many years, only from 10% to 50% of the requested medicines and equipment were imported, which determined serious problems: the republics could not fight animal diseases. Levykin (deputy Minister of Agriculture) asked to allocate the necessary finances and to start a radical change in thinking.

The lack of the laboratory equipment caused damage for the national economy: for instance, in 1964-1967, there was a surge of cattle diseases, and sheep and pigs got infected from chicked⁷. However, on June 14, 1968, the Gosplan decided that only one position of the equipment needed for the veterinary research would be imported immediately, while other positions only in 19696⁸. The foot-and- mouth disease spread since 1965. As the veterinary service did not have any advanced equipment, it could not fight the disease. Matskevich presented a draft decree to the CC and CM on July 4, 1969, to fight the foot-and-mouth disease during the Five-Year-Plan (19711975): research institutes were to be established and the Soviet industry was to produce the necessary medicines. He listed the imports needs from the Comecon and capitalist countries. To save the foreign currency, the laboratory equipment was to be imported from the Comecon countries6°.

Due to the lack of the urgently needed laboratory equipment, the famous academics appealed to the CM directly. On October 30, 1964, the academic Lukyanenko (VASKhNIL) wrote to the CM that his research institute for plant selection in Krasnodar was in the urgent need of equipment. He asked to import it from the FRG and the US. On November 10, 1964, Polyansky (first deputy of the CM) promised a `favorable consideration'. However, on January 29, 1965, the Gosplan decided that there was not enough foreign currency. If the Ministry of Agriculture had had currency, the equipment would have been imported in 1966 Volovchenko protested against this decision on February 17, 1965, with the CM. In 1970, Lukyanenko, supported byMatskevich, wrote a new personal request to Polyansky asking for micro-filters from Canada RGAE. F. 7486. D.9332. L.33-44. ^{RGAE. F. 7486. D.9184. L. 11-16. RGAE. F. 7486. D.9252. L.145-161. RGAE. F. 7486. D.9253. L. 224-228, 261-262, 376-377.}.

There was a drastic need in the plant protection products. Those few produced by the Soviet industry were often not only of little effect but also harmful to people. Therefore, on June 19, 1968, Matskevich and Ezhevsky demanded imports, and on February 12, 1969, wrote to Baibakov about the import needs in the laboratory equipment from the CSSR, Hungary, GDR, Poland and (about 20%) `capitalist' countries during the Five-Year-plan (1971-1975). The foreign currency funding provided for the purchase of such equipment in 1970 was reduced compared to the previous year despite the increased demand. According to Volovchenko and Ezhevsky, the allocated finances covered less than one third of the urgent imports demand. On July 29, 1969, they complained in vain to the State Committee for Material Technical Supply and the Ministry of Foreign Trade. On October 21, 1969, Matskevich asked the CM to avoid the reduction and to order the Gosplan and Gossnab to check the financial allocations. For the imports of the laboratory equipment from capitalist countries, the Committee for Science and Technology provided only 10% of the needed funding in 1969 and nothing in 1970. The Soviet industry did not produce any of the equipment needed by the agrochemical laboratories; therefore, the Gosplan accepted that they would not conduct any agricultural research.

Ministry's proposals to bring the Western production expertise to the USSR

To prove the Ministry of Agriculture's understanding of the Western production processes and of the shortcoming of the Soviet industry, I will present some of the Ministry's proposals to import the Western production knowledge, although most of these proposals were not taken into account or supported by the governing bodies.

Development of new seed varieties and the fight against pests and diseases

In 1957, a delegation was sent to Canada to bring new crops varieties and herbicides to the USSR together with the new knowledge. The Ministry' border ordered that each region selected a farm as a test station. These farms were to develop local varieties with the lowest labor input per hectare. The selected farms were to be provided with the necessary agricultural machinery. In the same way, each история region was to choose a farm as a test station for animal husbandry. To use the foreign expertise, the knowledge of foreign languages was to be improved at the higher agricultural institutions. Every graduate and doctoral student was to be fluent in at least one foreign language. The test stations were to be provided with the experimental equipment imported from Canada: machinery for soil tillage without plows, small machinery, pesticides and equipment for breeding RGAE. F. 7486. D.8169. L. 186-192. ^{RGAE. F. 7486. D.8578. L. 167-168. RGAE. F. 7486. D.8415. L. 8-11.}. As the Ministry's board lacked any power to control the execution of its orders and their funding, nobody cared about establishing regional test stations. There were no imports of the necessary equipment from Canada.

Due to the problems with putting into practice, many imported crop varieties showed little efficiency. The 1960 Ministry's report mentioned 196 crop varieties imported in 1959, and 538 varieties from 25 countries were under testing. From 1950 to 1959, 163 tested imported varieties were sown on 6 million hectares. The state inspection reported about suitable regions for 13 additional foreign varieties in 1959, which in 1960 showed high yields. In 1959, additional 700 varieties were ordered (400 from the US, 48 from China) for being tested in 1960-19616⁷.

Cotton growing

In the fall of 1958, a delegation visited the US to study cotton growing. On January 23, 1959, based on the delegation's report, the Ministry's board sent a draft decree to the CC and CM “On the complex mechanization of cotton growing” so that to transfer the American practice to the USSR. The board demanded to purchase some best American cotton varieties to test them on the Soviet soil, and to import some models of the American cotton-growing machinery and chemicals. The Lenin Academy of Agricultural Sciences (VASK NIL) was ordered to test together with the Middle-Asian Science Academies the American methods of growing and harvesting cotton: planting cotton, herbicides, defoliants and desiccants used on cotton fields, hybrid cotton seeds, methods of chemical pollen sterilization, methods of irrigation with the flexible tubes along elongated furrows. The American cotton machinery and herbicides were to be tested in Middle Asia and Azerbaijan together with the American irrigation method based on the use of ground waters. One Tadzhik state farm was to organize its production by the American model. The USSR had problems with the cotton cleaning technology; therefore, on September 4, 1970, Matskevich asked to import a model cotton plant from the US to test the processing of cotton RGAE. F. 7486. D.9333. L. 174-179.. In i960, the Ministry reported that in 1959, a complete complex of the cotton technology and machinery used in the West of the US (similar to the USSR climate) was imported. The use of American herbicides proved to be highly efficient. If such herbicides were produced in the USSR, cotton yields would grow by 4-5 decitonnes RGAE. F. 7486. D.8578. L. 171-172, 174-175..