Why the Soviet Union under Khrushchev and Brezhnev failed with the complex mechanization of agriculture: International aspects (1953-1986)

The Ministry's excitement about the American model was not accompanied by the reflection whether the American technology efficient under the market economy could be transferred to the Soviet command economy. Unlike the USSR, the US decisive element were farmers: to get profit, they needed high efficiency and selected the machinery best for their soils and interests. Under the market competition, producers of agricultural machinery strove for their clients' satisfaction and provided efficient repair services during the peaks of fieldwork.

Veterinary inspection

In the veterinary services, the Ministry also wanted to copy the American model. On April 3, 1959, the board discussed the report of the delegation on the American production and application of new biologics, antibiotics and other veterinary medicines. The delegation brought many veterinary books to the USSR and ordered to develop the national production of these medicines. The American veterinary control at all border stations impressed the delegation. The board demanded to intensify the Soviet veterinary control in the ports and at the railway border stations by introducing the American veterinary and sanitary measures for meat and poultry. The American Yearbook on animal diseases was to be translated and published in the USSR. Movies were to inform the Soviet people of the new sanitary standards RGAE. F. 7486. D.8415. L. 62-70. ^{RGAE. F. 7486. D.8765. L. 172-198. RGAE. F. 7486. D.7970. L. 45-48.}. In 1963, another delegation visited Canada to explore the plant protection. After its return, the Ministry's board ordered the state inspection for quarantine and plant protection to prepare recommendations based on the delegation's report.

An impressive example of the shortcomings in the execution of orders is the failure to implement the obligatory quarantine for the imported plants and animals, which was ordered by the board in April 19567³ and repeated. This seemingly simple request for the state inspection for quarantine was not satisfied until 1971. Although the plant and animal imports increased significantly, an obligatory quarantine was not introduced, which led to the spread of diseases and pests in the USSR. The board repeated its request; however, in the late 1960s, fresh fruits were still imported without quarantine. On June 23, 1969, Volovchenko informed the CC of the fruits and vegetables imported with pests and diseases. Again, he demanded to introduce an obligatory quarantine at the Soviet borders RGAE. F. 7486. D.9207. L. 97-98. ^{RGAE. F. 7486. D.8415. L.5-6. RGAE. F. 7486. D.9208. L. 47-77. RGAE. F. 7486. D.9208. L. 93-108.}.

Concentrated feed and cattle fattening

On January 23, 1959, the board ordered the Lenin Academy of Agricultural Sciences to prepare instructions for drying grasses by electrical ventilators based on the foreign experience. Ventilators were to be tested already in 1959. Also, the Ministry ordered to produce highly effective concentrated feed based on the foreign experience. In the late 1960s, the quality of feed in the USSR was still very poor. On July 4, 1969, Matskevich calculated the import needs for raising the quality of the Soviet concentrated feed during the Five-Year Plan (1971-1975) for the CC and CM: spare parts for the machinery and equipment already imported, ten complex systems for the automatic production of 300 tons of concentrated feed per day with weighting cells. The USSR hardly produced any protein supplements. The annual demand would grow from 0.64 million tons in 1971 to 7 million tons in 1975. The farms' production of concentrated feed was to be increased from 4.27 to 47 million tons in 1975. Vitamins A and E, necessary for this growth, were to be imported. In the additional report to the CC and CM, the Ministry stressed the need to improve the technology of harvesting and storing the feed without losses. Abroad, the harvesting included an assembly line work in the best time period and ventilation of hay on the fields during drying.

In November 1968, a delegation headed by Morozov, deputy Minister of Agriculture, visited the US to study the industrial cattle fattening and meat production. After the return, the board required to reorganize cattle fattening in the USSR according to the American model. The delegation visited cattle breeding farms, slaughterhouses, and test stations. It reported about the US shift from dairy farming to cattle fattening. The number of cows was reduced in half, while the number of cattle for fattening doubled. Cattle fattening was cost-effective in the areas of grain cultivation for young animals did not need stables: in the southern states of the US, the young cattle grazed from November to March on the winter feed, which ensured about 100 kilos of weight increase, and the grain profited from the nitrogen fertilizer at the start of the growing season. Subsequently, fattening was based on the sugar beet concentrated feed.

The board expected that the drying of the beet pulp would be of economic significance for the USSR in the future, which would need a lot of transport. The board suggested to build at every sugar plant a section to dry the beet pulp and add to the feed. In the US, other forage crops were used too, such as corn, oats, barley and soy. The delegation stressed that the American success was linked to the supply industry under the market conditions: agronomy or animal husbandry in the US were not much more developed than in the USSR. The decisive difference was that the American industry supplied agriculture sufficiently and with high-quality fertilizers, and fully satisfied the American farmers' demand in the special harvesting machinery. The US companies had offices in all agricultural regions to ensure all repairs in a few hours. The board also suggested to use the American system of slaughterhouses in the USSR: they were located in the areas of animal fattening, often specializing on cattle or pigs. The board demanded to create a special branch `cattle fattening' and to reorganize feeding according to the American model. The efficiency of animal breeding was to be improved by the imported breeds; specialized cattle fattening state farms were to be established; industrial fattening was to be based on concentrated feed. This would allow an additional annual production of 2.5-3 million tons of beef and reduce its costs. The main challenge was to provide the annual 6-7 million tons of feed RGAE. F. 7486. D.9195. L.81-94. ^{RGAE. F. 7486. D.8578. L. 177.}.

Transfer of expertise to produce broilers: A success story?

The transfer of the knowledge on broiler production turned out a success. Broiler production is one of the few branches in which the Western knowledge was not only imported but partly implemented: chicken production grew and its costs per unit decreased. However, the Gosplan did not use the reduction in the production costs to lower the retail prices; therefore, the branch contributed to the budget incomes.

The archival material reveals that even in this case the knowledge transfer had many set-backs. In the report on the results of foreign contacts in 1959, the Ministry claimed that the broiler production experience had already been transferred. To use it at as many farms as possible, the Ministry ordered to import in 1960 two complete models of the large-scale broiler plants, the same as used at the collective farm Voskhod. In 1959, the imported poultry fell ill in the Moscow Region for the local poultry plant had veterinary defects RGAE. F. 7486. D.8512. L. 316-318. ^{RGAE. F. 7486. D.8512. L. 151-155. RGAE. F. 7486. D.8933. L. 212. RGAE. F. 7486. D.8924. L. 2-7. RGAE. F. 7486. D.8933. L. 205-210. RGAE. F. 7486. D.8933. L. 213-216. RGAE. F. 7486. D.8933. L. 217-219. RGAE. F. 7486. D.8933. L. 200-204. RGAE. F. 7486. D.8933. L. 212.}. On March 9, 1960, Matskevich accused the state commission for scientific cooperation with foreign countries and the main inspection for animal husbandry of being irresponsible for refusing to purchase the model poultry and diary farms In general, in the 1960s, the import orders were delayed by the governing bodies.

In the mid-1960s, a strange controversy occurred between institutions responsible for poultry farms and for concentrated feed plants -- about from which country to import the model of poultry farms. Although the archival materials do not provide clear evidence, probably, the controversy was determined by the competition of Western producers from England and the US at the moment when Matskevich returned to his office as the Minister of Agriculture. Some institutions asked to import the farms from the US, others -- from England. The winner, as always, was the Gosplan which decided to postpone the imports.

After the principal decision was made to purchase the plants from the US, the consultant for agriculture of the embassy in Great Britain Kozlovky wrote in December 1964 to the member of the CC presidium and deputy head of the CM Polyansky that the Saiks company guaranteed that after the purchase of their poultry farm each hen would lay 240-245 eggs a year. On March 31, 1965, Pak, the head of the poultry industry (PtAtseprom), asked Polyansky to purchase a farm from England. However, on April 28, 1965, Emelyanov wrote to Matskevich that the purchase from England was not acceptable. The American company was the international market leader, and the USSR had worked with it for nine years already. There were no political or economic reasons for the purchase in England, but suddenly Pak changed his opinion⁶. In the further communication with Mat- skevich, Pak and Morozov insisted on the purchase in England at a lower price. On May 22, Matskevich suggested to Kosygin to purchase poultry and pig fattening farms and a concentrated feed plant together with the necessary licenses. On July 8, 1965. Lomako, the head of the Gosplan, answered that the purchase in 1965-1966 was impossible due to the lack of funding, and postponed it to the Five- Year Plan of 1966-197088.

After the broiler project, the USSR focused on the block partners: the Soviet ambassador in Hungary reported that a giant automatic poultry farm of the Big Dutchman company was put in operation in Cloppenburg (FRG). Only three employees worked at this farm to look after 130,000 laying hens at the start and later after 250,000. Such farms already worked in the US. During the Kiev Poultry Exposition in 1966, a model poultry farm was bought from the Netherlands and opened in Kuchino near Moscow. However, the plant in Cloppenburg was completely different. Matskevich asked for permission to send experts to the FRG to study its work, while the USSR had already bought 24 smaller broiler plants from the Hungarian company Kompleks for testing RGAE. F. 7486. D.9131. L. 1-3. ^{RGAE. F. 7486. D.8049. L. 35-36. RGAE. F. 7486. D.8049. L. 278-290. RGAE. F. 7486. D.8169. L. 133-134.}.

Problems with the transfer of the Western agricultural technology

Despite the delays with executing imports orders, many efficient models (machinery, seeds, chemicals and so on) were brought to the USSR, and quite often they were ready to start mass production. However, the Gosplan blocked them or accepted only simple and low- cost models with much less efficiency than the original Western models, especially in the equipment for animal husbandry for it required additional construction efforts to be put in operation.

Already in 1955, combine harvesters imported from Sweden and the FRG (Claas) were tested. Potapov, the deputy head of the state committee for new technology, requested a report on the results by October 15, 1955. The report was delayed for the Soviet combine harvesters were to be tested in comparison, and they, as usual, did not arrive in time. Only on April 10, 1956, Matskevich and Khlamov (Minister for Tractor and Agricultural Machinery Construction) provided a detailed and balanced report on the imported machinery tests in the Soviet conditions, and on which elements proved to be superior to the Soviet machinery. For instance, among the self-propelled combine harvesters the Claas one got excellent marks, while the pull-typed harvester was assessed as not suitable for the Soviet demand. The expectation that the Soviet agricultural-machinery industry would use this knowledge immediately to improve their models did not come true. Already in 1957, the Ministry complained that the majority of new tractors and agricultural machinery went into mass production with a great delay if at al.

On March 17, 1956, the chairman of the state committee for new technology Malyshev gave detailed orders on how to proceed with testing the imported tractors and agricultural machinery: the Soviet machines were to be tested in the comparative perspective. Members of the assessment teams were to be approved by the state committee; the leading constructors and specialists of the agricultural-machinery plants were to attend the testing; to use the imported models in the future, they were to be kept in the special museum; positive tests meant that the imported machinery was to be reproduced; if machines were not suitable for the Soviet conditions but showed some interesting construction details, they were to be copied for the Soviet industry RGAE. F. 7486. D.8049. L. 275-309. ^{RGAE. F. 7486. D.9164. L. 1-13. RGAE. F. 7486. D.8169. L. 133-134.}. The archival material prove that these recommendations were followed until the late 1950s. Khrushchev's misguided `decentralization' was responsible for putting an end to the just established practice of testing and comparing the Soviet machinery with the efficient foreign agricultural technology as it subordinated the plants to the regional and national economic councils (Sovnarkom) (Merl, 2002). In 1968, Matskevich and Ezhevsky asked to return to this good practice in vain. In their report to Kosygin of January 3, 1968, they complained that the state testing took only outdated and often poor national model for comparison. To overcome backwardness and meet the world standards in the agricultural technology, it was necessary to import each year the newest models of the best tractors and agricultural machinery and to compare them to the technical level of the Soviet new construction⁴. This request was blocked by such governing bodies as the Gosplan and the state committee for science and technology: they had little interest in proving the poor quality of the Soviet machinery.

Based on the test results of the imported and Soviet tractors, in 1956 the Ministry of Agriculture issued a draft decree for the CC and CM “On the improvement of the technology for the mechanization of labor-intensive work in agriculture”. It claimed that the imported new methods of production would allow to significantly decrease labor input and costs. However, it complained that the proposals to introduce new effective machinery were implemented with delays. The board did not ask about the systemic causes of such delays -- it blamed persons or institutions for the shortcomings: the Ministry's main inspection was considered responsible: a crazy idea for the inspection had no influence on the governing bodies or the Soviet industry. The board suggested that persons with fluent foreign languages could raise the efficiency of expert delegations: each their member was to be responsible for a specific topic and to write a report on return. To spread the information on the superior technology, the board proposed to organize an annual exchange of experiences.

The Ministry of Agriculture reported to the State Committee of Science and Technology that in 1959, 73 different types of agricultural machinery were imported for testing. 36 were to be tested in 1959, other 37 -- in 1960; only three agricultural machines were accepted for the trial production (one from Italy, one from France, and one from the CSSR); of other eight machines models were to be constructed to be tested, such as the sugar beet harvester from the US, and the potato harvester from Lanz (FRG). The Soviet industry was given a recommendation to make use of the construction elements of other 13 machines, including the potato sorting machine from Lanz and England, and the sugar beet harvester.

After the successful testing of the newly constructed machines, the Ministry requested (in most cases in vain) to start mass production. In 1960, Matskevich had not yet lost his optimism and expected that mass production would start soon -- of harrows and plows, John Deere grain harvester, sugar beet and potato harvesters. He expected that the improved machinery would save inputs of the Soviet farms RGAE. F. 7486. D.8578. L. 185-186. ^{RGAE. F. 7486. D.8578. L. 186-187. RGAE. F. 7486. D.8578. L. 187. RGAE. F. 7486. D.8578. L. 184-188.}. The testing of tractors showed that their construction was possible with significantly less metal. Many progressive construction elements of the imported tractors were to be adopted: air cooling of the engine, its electric starting, independent power take-off shaft, separate-aggregate hydraulic system, multi-speed transmission system, etc. For instance, these elements were adopted for the new Soviet tractors DT-54M, MTZ-5MS, MTZ-7. The mass production of the tractor MTZ-50 (a 50-PS wheel tractor) (with power steering and wheel loader) would allow to increase the coupling weight and to reduce skidding of the tractors.

Mass production started in 1961: in 1962, 43,600 and in 1964, 59,600 MTZ-50 tractors were produced (Schinke, 1967: 6-7). In addition, the testing of low-pressure tires for tractors started: “The modernization of tractors will ensure enormous savings -- with metal needed for construction (about 0.5 tons per tractor!) and with a higher power despite the less need in fuels. Also, the chassis of new tractors could be improved based on the foreign expertise. Complex mechanization would allow to reduce some types of works significantly. To support complex mechanization, Matskevich demanded to import from the US four models of the machinery systems for cultivation and harvesting of corn, sugar beets and cotton. However, Matskevich's expectations did not come true. The mass production of most machines, especially harvesting, never started. Due to the Khrushchev's changes in the institutions' functions, only in the second half of the 1960s, the Ministry of Agriculture could at least name the Soviet deficiencies again. Despite all `agricultural programs' under Brezhnev, even in 1986, there was no precondition for their success -- no supplies of the efficient agricultural machinery complying with the international standards RGAE. F. 650. D.16. L. 5-30. ^{RGAE. F. 7486. D.8616. L. 238-242.}.

The use of the imported models for the complex mechanization of animal husbandry turned out to be much more difficult than working with the highly efficient foreign machinery -- due to the fact that animal husbandry urgently needed construction works (for stables, silage storage, and farms), which was a notorious bottle neck of the Soviet command economy. All construction materials were in short supply; in constructing facilities and plants, agriculture depended on local construction trusts, which determined not only long delays but also miserable quality of new buildings.

The bad use of the imported equipment for the mechanization of animal husbandry was presented in the Soviet media. On December 4, 1961, the Rural Life reported such a scandal: in 1960, the equipment for a diary farm with 1,000 cows was imported from the US to be tested at the All-Union Institute of Animal Husbandry in Klenovo-Chegodaevo. The equipment laid idle for five months, then it was brought to the test station of the All-Union Institute of Oil-Producing Crops and Ethereal Oils in Krasnodar. In December 1961, its construction had not yet started, although the head of the Institute was sent to the US to learn the use of such a farm. He was accused of irresponsibility, and the first test station did not check the delivery for completeness. On December 22, 1961, the board confirmed the newspaper's report, and ordered the Krasnodar station to use the equipment before January 20, 1962, and to order the missing parts from the US.

This case was not an exception -- rather a normal situation with the imported equipment for animal husbandry. This was due not to the irresponsible directors, but rather to the inherent conflicting responsibilities within the Soviet command industry: thus, the Ministry of Agriculture lacked effective control over research institutions and construction trusts. The USSR Commission for State Control uncovered a series of such delays in the use of the imported equipment for mechanized broiler production, concentrated feed and diary plants in 1962 in Ukraine and the Northern Caucasus.

The Ministry of Agriculture's board ordered the All-Union Research Institute for Poultry to build a plant for 4,000 broilers per shift until the end of 1961, which would start production in the first half of 1963. At the end of 1962, the inspection commission found only the foundations; it took a year to find a suitable construction location; the question of the construction's funding was still open; there was no reinforced concrete for the roof. On November 10, 1962, the Commission of State Control and the main controller Kapitonov sent their report to the Ukrainian CKRGAE. F. 7486. D.8704. L. 293-303. ^{RGAE. F. 7486. D.8704. L. 294-295. RGAE. F. 7486. D.8704. L. 293-300. RGAE. F. 7486. D.8704. L. 304-312. RGAE. F. 7486. D.8819. L. 60-76; D. 8852. L. 217. RGAE. F. 7486. D.9357. L. 121-124, 178-180; D. 9023. L. 59-70, 197-198; D.} 9253. L. 189-193.. After checking the construction of the broiler plant in the Crimea, the Commission stated that the construction was both delayed and full of mistakes. Only after the construction was completed, it was found out that the facilities for receiving chickens and for storing the produce were missing. No attention was paid to the Ministry's orders concerning the mechanization of cleaning, washing and disinfecting. No cooling facilities for the ready produce were constructed, i.e., even a short-time storage was impossible. Special transportation for broilers was missing: the Ukrainian Gosplan did not provide the necessary equipment. The Commission also found defects in the construction of both concentrated feed plants. In the Crimea, the construction was delayed, because the Ukrainian Gosplan had not provided the deficit construction material. Only the feed plant in the Donetsk Region was ready in May 1962, but the start of its production was postponed to September 1963. The Ukrainian Gosplan did not provide the plant with poultry to be processed, forgot to build a storage for raw materials and ready produce.

The model diary farm for 1,000 cows and 500 calves within the Sov Nar Khoz Krasnodar system was to start production in December 1962. The Commission found out that the start of the construction was delayed for there was no technical documentation and workers. At the construction site, the Commission found neither the construction machines nor the responsible engineer. Some of the delivered reinforced concrete was no longer suitable due to the long delay. The construction order was given to another construction trust. In all cases, the Commission only blamed irresponsible local official -- the systemic reasons were tabooed. On March 27, 1964, the Commission gave new orders to improve the purchase and use of the imported cattle, and provided a list of twenty organizations responsible for the use of the foreign expertise; i.e., to be blamed for all deficiencies linked with the use of the imported animal husbandry equipment.

In 1971, Dubrovin reported to the CC that the number of the not yet used imported equipment grew, especially due to the delays with the necessary construction works. Often the imported equipment was sent to other regions for the selected farms proved unsuitable; some parts of the equipment could not be used for it was not delivered fully. On June 29, 1971, Matskevich repeated to the CC-secretary Kulakov that the imported equipment was not used primarily due to the delays and unfinished construction work.

Problems with the imports of cattle and poultry

A lot of cattle was imported to improve breeds and their efficiency. In 1963, the Ministry of Agriculture reported that 1879 milk cows, 1941 meat-wool sheep, 111 pigs, 35 horses, 70,912 poultry and 10,000 eggs were imported, and that 35 reproduction-poultry farms were established. However, many directors of research institutions did not fulfill their obligation to report about the use of the cattle and poultry. Obviously, the Ministry lacked effective control, listed as `deficiencies' that Prodimport did not make purchase contracts in time, and organized the ship transport insufficiently. Many livestock arrived weakened. As there still was no border quarantine, the livestock was transported further without any border check RGAE. F. 7486. D.8819. L. 57-76. ^{RGAE. F. 7486. D.9195. L. 95-127. RGAE. F. 7486. D.8765. L. 32-45. RGAE. F. 7486. D.8947. L. 1-19. RGAE. F. 7486. D.8512. L. 318-321.}. The board required to purchase the livestock in May-June and to open quarantine stations at the bordersio.

Between 1955 and 1962, on the order of the Ministry, 7257 breeding cattle, 6496 sheep, 1871 pigs, 89 horses and 231,000 poultry were imported. The Ministry claimed that this was the basis to develop new and highly productive races in the USSR. This might be correct for some but not all cases. There are many materials on the bad use of breeding animals. For instance, despite insemination of 346 cows, only 30 calves were born. In the state farm Zarechie, due to the bad feed supply, 23 of the 76 calves imported from Holland did not survive the winter.

Still in 1966, many test stations hardly cared about the imported cattle. Even if specialists were sent abroad to select the cattle, this made little difference. Sending people abroad did not eliminate the deficiencies in the supply of feed and in the stables not suitable for mechanized animal husbandry. However, the board blamed the All-Union Research Institute for Animal Husbandry for the insufficient use of the imported livestock for new breeds, and for not developing a new technology for keeping and feeding livestock.

In the fall of 1960, the Ministry decided to import breeding eggs from the US and Canada to get highly productive hens and broilers. The All-Union and the Ukrainian Poultry Research Institutes were declared responsible^, and only then it became evident that both research institutes lacked the conditions for working with the imported eggs. Such failures with the selection of institutes or test stations happened quite often. The Ministry lacked reliable information on the local conditions, and many institutes and stations were poorly equipped. On October 22, 1960, the board asked the CM to post-pone the imports of eggs and to use the allocated finances to import 100 breeding cattle from England RGAE. F. 7486. D.8512. L. 375b D. 8578. L. 31..

The main problem with the use of the imported livestock was the lack of basic conditions for success -- adequate conditions for keeping and feeding. The lack or poor quality of forage, especially in winter, was due to the lack or poor quality of harvesting machinery and storing. The Soviet concentrated feed often did not meet the Western standard. Another bottle neck was the poor equipment and insufficient mechanization of the stables. The highly efficient imported cattle could not show its quality in these conditions; therefore, its productivity did not meet the expectations. Often the imports were not coordinated with breeding stations: when the imported animals arrived in the late fall or winter, there was already little feed, which determined stillbirth and death of calves.

Soviet agriculture in the international perspective

On January 3, 1968, Matskevich and Ezhevsky reported to Kosygin on the results of providing agriculture with new technology and highly efficient fertilizers, chemicals and pest-killers. The report revealed the catastrophic situation in the Soviet agriculture in the international perspective, and stressed the importance of complex mechanization in agriculture for reducing labor input and production costs: labor input in the USSR was about 10 times higher than in the US. The Soviet average agricultural labor productivity hardly reached 20% of the American one, in animal husbandry -- only 10-15%. Even concerning the average power of tractors (though at larger fields), the USSR lagged behind the US. Most Soviet tractors and agricultural machinery lagged drastically behind the US in productivity, reliability, and repair.

Usually, the low quality of new machinery was blamed: only 17% of the tested new machinery were recommended for mass production; 20% were declared junk. The Ministry insisted on testing Soviet machinery in comparison with the best foreign one RGAE. F. 7486. D.9164. L. 1-13. ^{RGAE. F. 7486. D.9166. L. 260-265.}. The Commission of the Peoples' Control presented a similar negative picture of the quality of the Soviet agricultural machinery. On March 22, 1968, it provided the CM with a list of tractors' deficiencies: time-consuming technical maintenance, high metal consumption for production, high need in fuel for operation, discomfort for the driver, and bad appearance. Matskevich and Ezhevsky argued that the Soviet chemical industry also lagged behind in the quality of mineral fertilizers, chemicals and pest killers, often dangerous for people. There- fore, they asked the CC and CM to oblige the Gosplan to execute import orders from the early 1967 without delay, the Ministry of Tractor история and Agricultural Machinery Construction -- to improve the quality and efficiency of machinery, the Ministry of Foreign Trade -- to purchase from England fattening plants for 10,000 cattle and 1,000 pigs, the State Committee of Science and Technology -- to allocate annually 1 million rubles to buy the newest models of foreign technology, and to get licenses to produce the machinery urgently needed by the USSR farms RGAE. F. 7486. D.9164. L. 1-13..

The channels used to gather information on foreign agricultural progress `Professionalization' of contacts with foreign countries

While the Ministry of Agriculture started contacts with foreign countries in 1955 with the permission of the CM and CC, the right to decide on foreign contacts under Khrushchev from 1958 onward was given to the state committees created in 1956: the State Committee for Cultural Exchange with Foreign Countries and the State Committee for Scientific-Technical Cooperation. The State Committee for Economic Relations with Foreign Countries coordinated the work in `less developed' countries. The intermediary role of state committees meant that sending specialists and delegations abroad became more complicated due to annual plans and coordination with others institutions. After a while, this caused protests as delays in the coordination meant that no representatives would go abroad RGAE. F. 7486. D.8475. L. 184-187. ^{RGAE. F. 7486. D.8883; 8884.}. The state committees started to sign bilateral exchange contracts (in culture, technology and education) which stabilized the contacts and allowed to exchange even PhD students and undergraduates. Under Brezhnev, also bilateral contracts for cooperation in research were signed.

From 1965 onwards, the CC-department of agriculture became responsible for the Ministry's foreign contacts. The CC-secretary Fedor Kulakov was the head of this department from 1964 to 1976. Permanent responsible officials (Matskevich and Kulakov) made the coordination of foreign contacts easier. The Ministry addressed its proposals and requests (and complaints) formally to the CC and sometimes directly to the CC-secretaryii. However, funding issues remained in the competence of the CM.

The central planning of business trips abroad and of hosting foreign scientists started in 1958. There were five categories: business trips to explore agricultural achievements; participation in international congresses and consultations; visits to international fairs and expositions; business trips to less developed countries; and equestrian sport. For 1958, the Ministry of Agriculture planned 42 business trips, half of them to `capitalist' countries; 34 participation in international congresses and consultations (including 7 trips to attend meetings of the European Economic Commission of the United Nations in Switzerland); 8 participation in international fairs and expositions; 34 experts' visits to less developed countries, often for a year or even longer (8 trips to China and Mongolia, others to Vietnam, Korea, Burma, Syria, Afghanistan, Ceylon and, within the FAO framework, to Yugoslavia). In the equestrian sport category, 4 visits were plannedi²⁰. In 1959, more than 100 specialists were sent abroad to explore agricultural achievements, 150 -- to participate in international congresses and consultations, and about 700 -- to help the less developed countriesi. In 1963-1964, 1,340 specialists were sent abroad and 1,006 foreign agricultural specialists invited to the USSR.

On January 27, 1958, a contract on cultural exchange was signed with the US, and the State Committee for Cultural Exchange with Foreign Countries was responsible for coordination and control of the cooperation. In 1959, a contract with England followed, including the exchange of students and the youth from collective and state farms. The contract on cultural exchange with the FRG was signed on May 30, 1959, including the exchange of agricultural delegations, visits to German peasant farms, insemination stations, and meat processing plantsi. For 1961, a business trip of specialists to the tractor plant was requested -- to explore tractors with continuously variable transmission, organization of the repair, cars and agricultural machinery, and to visit the companies Lanz, Krupp and Claas.

On January 6, 1965, the first contract on the bilateral cooperation in agricultural research was signed in London. A similar contract was signed with Sweden in 1965, with France and the Netherlands in 1966120. On November 15, 1966, Matskevich reported to the CC that in 1967, he intended to invite the Canadian Minister of Agriculture to Moscow to sign the bilateral contract on the agricultural RGAE. F. 7486. D.8356. L. 8-38. ^{RGAE. F. 7486. D.8356. L. 8-38. RGAE. F. 7486. D.8578. L. 166-167. RGAE. F. 7486. D.8882. L. 97-99. RGAE. F. 7486. D.8358. L. 2. RGAE. F. 7486. D.8361. L. 34-41. RGAE. F. 7486. D.8478. L. 38-42. RGAE. F. 7486. D.8579. L. 160. RGAE. F. 7486. D.8887. L. 24-25. RGAE. F. 7486. D.8882. L. 97-99. RGAE. F. 7486. D.8966. L. 16-17, 27, 41-50.} research cooperation RGAE. F. 7486. D.8966. L. 58; D. 9036. L. 319-366. ^{RGAE. F. 7486. D.9051. L. 22. RGAE. F. 7486. D.9214. L. 10-21, 23. RGAE. F. 7486. D.9050. L. 2-27; D. 9130. L. 60-76. RGAE. F. 7486. D. 8359. L. 45-53; D. 8361. L. 13-14, 25-26. RGAE. F. 7486. D.8885. L. 16-18. RGAE. F. 7486. D.8616. L. 4-7, 16-18. RGAE. F. 7486. D.8800. L. 80. RGAE. F. 7486. D.8800. L.90-93. RGAE. F. 7486. D.8819. L. 239-261. RGAE. F. 7486. D.8867. L. 176-186. RGAE. F. 7486. D.9195. L. 429-434. RGAE. F. 7486. D.9266. L. 269-328.}. In 1967, a contract on the joint agricultural research was signed with Italy, in 1969 -- with India. The GDR история played a particularly significant role: in 1967, a contract on cooperation and exchange in agricultural research was signed, and the number of delegations between two countries increased significantly.

The costs of scientific exchanges were a crucial factor during the whole period under consideration. Matskevich never forgot to ask the CM for the permission for the other side, especially the block partners, to cover all costs. High costs for the Soviet side were a reason for refusal, for instance, to participate in the horticulture fair in Erfurt in 196613⁵.

Financial constraints for exchanges became evident in the 1960s. The draft plan for business trips to foreign countries for 1961 was rejected. The State Committee required a special justification for each trip and each purpose. On September 3, 1963, the Ministry of Agriculture complained to the CM about the budget cuts for business trips abroad. While in 1963 360 and in 1964 415 specialists were sent abroad, their number for 1965 was cut to 330. The number of specialists sent to explore the progressive experience remained quite stable: 90, 112, 93. However, participation in congresses and conversations was drastically cut: from 110 to 23 in 1965. Only mobility in the equestrian sport category was not reduced (this was Matskevich's hobby). For 1965-1966, the board gave more exploration tasks to the permanent consultants for agriculture in embassies to cut costs, and the number of short-term trips was reduced in favor of the long-term. Business trips were reduced to the purchase of the advanced technology that would definitely be used in the Soviet agriculture. For 1970 and 1971, business trips were allowed only if the work could not be done by consultants^. Most of 45 business trips in 1971 were to capitalist countries; 47 other trips were visits to international congresses and participation in equestrian championships^.

The Ministry's board regularly considered consultants' reports RGAE. F. 7486. D.8691. L. 167-172. ^{RGAE. F. 7486. D.8691. L. 183-188. RGAE. F. 7486. D.8691. L. 235-241. RGAE. F. 7486. D.8800. L. 19-22. RGAE. F. 7486. D.8852. L. 1-3. RGAE. F. 7486. D.8924. L. 33.} and gave them clear orders. Thus, on June 11, 1962, the consultant in Canada was ordered to focus on specialized farms and labor input in productioni. Emelyanov, the consultant at the embassy in the US, reported to Kosygin that two consultants in the USA had supplied the USSR with diverse varieties, breeding cattle and eggs, agricultural machines, herbicides and pesticides. Taking into account the importance of the American agriculture, he proposed to increase the number of consultants in the US to four with two translators-assistants.

In the early 1960s, after the reduction of funding for delegation trips, the significance of consultants for providing information on the agricultural technology in the West increased. However, the cut of costs reduced the consultants' mobility too. In 1964, the Ministry of Agriculture protested against the decision not to provide consultants with cars nor to establish a special fund for business trips, because they needed personal cars to do their job. However, Malentin (Ministry of Finances) and Kosygin refused: the funding of consultants had to come from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. On March 22, 1965, Matskevich intervened again: as the work of consultants suffered from the lack of financial resources for business trips, he asked Gromyko to provide at least the same funding for these trips in 1965 as in 196414⁸. The situation worsened in 1970, when the consultant for agriculture should be subordinated to the consultant of the State Committee for Science and Technology which was blocking the efforts of the Ministry of Agriculture to bring the foreign agricultural expertise to the USSR. On September 3, 1970, Matskevich protested against this proposal to the CC: in 8 countries, qualified agricultural experts (with PhD or DSc degrees) worked. Their reports on the development of agricultural technology were essential for the Ministry's work RGAE. F. 7486. D.9278. L. 22-23. ^{RGAE. F. 7486. D.7786, 7787, 7788, 7789. RGAE. F. 7486. D.8360. L. 69-73. RGAE. F. 7486. D.8357. L. 150-158. RGAE. F. 7486. D.8360. L. 270-278. RGAE. F. 7486. D.7970. L. 111-114; D. 8415. L. 197-201. RGAE. F. 7486. D.8169. L. 164-167. RGAE. F. 7486. D.7970. L. 228-229; D. 8579. L. 13.}.

Participation in the international agricultural organizations

Stalin's death ended the self-isolation of the USSR on the international arena. In 1955, contacts with the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) were established. Although the USSR did not become its member, the FAO started `friendly relations' with the USSR as a `developed country' and invited the Soviet Union to join development aid, counseling and training, especially for Yugoslavia. In 1958, the FAO asked the USSR to help with delivering insecticides against the grasshopper plague in the Near Easti⁶³. From 1956 onwards, the USSR regularly attended meetings of the working group of the European Economic Commission of the UN for the mechanization of agriculture in Switzerland, which was an additional source of information and expertise for the Soviet agriculture, especially in mechanizing, electrification and such issues as choosing the correct type of tractor and harvester according to the regional climatei.

The Ministry of Agriculture tried hard to return a respectable place for the USSR in international agricultural organizations and associations. As membership fees were a critical criterion, the Minister always proposed the most cost-effective memberships to the CC and CM. The attempts to join international associations restarted under Khrushchev, but at first they failed due to the lack of experience, especially the attempt to invite international associations to have their annual meetings in the Soviet Union (mainly due to logistical challenges -- lack of hotels and suitable transport). Under Brezhnev, the Ministry became more professional and ready to take such an advantage in the participation as prestige for the USSR. Due to its potential as an agricultural power, the USSR was considered an attractive partner. Several associations decided to hold their annual meetings in the USSR. As the country was closed for foreigners under Stalin, the delegates were interested to visit the USSR. The Ministry wanted to have Soviet academics and specialists as members of associations' boards. The Congress of Agricultural Economists in 1970 was used to propagate the alleged advantages of the Soviet agricultural system.

The first attempt to invite an agricultural association to hold its congress in the USSR was made by Matskevich in 1958. On July 4, 1958, he asked the CM for permission to invite the 9th International Congress of Winemakers in 1959 to Tbilisi, as the participants had to cover the costs themselves RGAE. F. 7486. D.8359. L. 260-286. ^{RGAE. F. 7486. D.8653. L. 82-87. RGAE. F. 7486. D.8360. L. 254-267. RGAE. F. 7486. D.8867. L. 36-38; D. 8924. L. 44, 61-85, 147-158, 202-211, 262-265. RGAE. F. 7486. D.8962. L. 7-8. RGAE. F. 7486. D.8962. L. 43. RGAE. F. 7486. D.9276. L. 7-8. RGAE. F. 7486. D.9048. L.1-7.}. However, the winemakers chose another place, and only for the 10th congress in 1961 Tbilisi was accepted. On September 4, 1958, Matskevich made his next attempt, this time to invite the International Association of Poultry to hold its annual meeting in 1962 in the USSR. Again, only the second invitation was accepted. For the 13th World Congress of Poultry Producers in 1966, Kiev was accepted as a place of venue.

Matskevich requested the CM to provide funding for building exhibition pavilions and asphalting the exhibition area for participants from the US, England, Japan, FRG, Italy, Sweden, Holland and Canadai. On March 14, 1966, Matskevich asked the CC to approve Professor Penionz-kevich as the president of the World Association Either Kosygin or someone he approved was to become an honorary president of the Congress. With 2727 delegates, 1900 of them from foreign countries (GDR -- 327, USA -- 305), a record number of delegates participated (the 12th World Congress in Australia had 1545 participants, 540 from foreign countries). When the State Committee for Science and Technology cut funding for the poultry congress in Spain in September 1970 and provided funding for only 20 of 100 specialists, Matskevich protested to the CC.

On March 15, 1967, Matskevich informed the CC that the International Union for the Protection of Nature and Natural Resources planned to hold its third European consultation on the protection of water birds in 1968 in Leningrad, 120 participants were expected. But then the USSR invaded the CSSR. On September 19, 1968, Matskevich informed the CC that the international bureau canceled the meeting. He believed that it had to cover the preparation costs. Every registered participant was asked to contact the organization bureau but no participant from Western Europe showed up. Only representatives of 12 states came to Leningrad in September 15-30 (from the Comecon countries, Jordan, Iran, Senegal, Finland, and Ethiopia). Russian participants sent a protest letter to the president of the union RGAE. F. 7486. D.9129. L. 2-13. ^{RGAE. F. 7486. D.8962. L. 9-13. RGAE. F. 7486. D.9128. L. 1-13. RGAE. F. 7486. D.9210. L. 5-8. RGAE. F. 7486. D.9276. L. 2-6. RGAE. F. 7486. D.9276. L. 9-10. RGAE. F. 7486. D.9276. L. 22-24.}.

Politically the meeting of agricultural economists was of the greatest significance. In 1966, the president of the association asked to hold the world congress in 1970 in the USSR. Minsk was chosen as a place of venue in August 1970. On February 19, 1968, Matskevich proposed to the CC to use the congress to propagate the Soviet achievements to the international public. He expected about 2,000 participants, about 500 of them from the US. After the meetings, an excursion to the Soviet agricultural regions was planned. The general topic for the congress was `Economic policy, planning, and administering rural development'. As the Ford and the Rockefeller Foundations decided to support economists from Europe, Asia, Africa and Latin America, Matskevich suggested that the CC would support participants from socialist countries and scientists from Asia, Africa and Latin America.

At the beginning of 1970, to prepare the `socialist' participants for the congress, delegations from Bulgaria, Hungary, GDR, Romania, CSSR and Mongolia were invited to Moscow for five daysi. Matskevich ordered the Soviet participants to refer to Lenin's writings, to stress the advantages of socialist agriculture, and to declare Middle Asia a model for developing countriesi. On May 20, 1970, he asked the CC for the permission to officially invite the Canadian Minister of Agriculture to the congressi. Finally, about 1000 scientists participated in the congress, about 900 from foreign countries.

Ministry of Agriculture's work in `less developed' countries

Under the guidance of the State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations, the Ministry had to coordinate help to the `less developed' countries. In 1955, the Ministry of Agriculture was appointed a `general conductor' of government agreements in agriculture with Ceylon, Indonesia, Afghanistan, Iraq and the United Arab Republics, and with such `socialist' countries as Mongolia, Vietnam and Albania. This help consisted of providing qualified experts and agricultural machinery (produced in the USSR), and of managing construction projects.

Under Khrushchev's `decentralization', it became more difficult to fulfill these obligations. The Ministry of Agriculture made sever-al unsuccessful attempts to transfer the function of `general conductor' to the Gosplan. However, on September 2, 1959, the deputy chairman of the State Committee Suloev asked Matskevich to fulfill the obligations further and provide specialists for `less developed' countries RGAE. F. 7486. D.8436. L. 237-238. <sup>RGAE. F. 7486. D.8654. L. 208-210. RGAE. F. 7486. D.8659. L. 147-148. RGAE. F. 7486. D.8659. L. 300. RGAE. F. 7486. D.8654. L. 312-319. RGAE. F. 7486. D.8657. L. 134-135.</sup>. On July 4, 1961, the Minister of Agriculture Olshansky reported to the CC and CM that the Ministry was responsible for 50 projects in 11 countries. He asked to reduce these duties for the Ministry had lost many competences after the CC's and CM's decree of February 20, 1961 -- some competences were transferred to the Gosplan and Soyuzselkhoztechnika, such as the responsibility for mechanization specialists. Nevertheless, the State Committee for Economic Relations with Foreign Countries gave the Ministry further orders beyond its competences. On May 29, 1961, Pyshin, the deputy Minister, asked to be released from the obligation to deliver tractors and agricultural machinery abroad, because the Ministry lost all competences in this field and could no longer fulfill the function of `general conductor' of the technical assistance to Mongolia. However, the State Committee insisted on the Ministry's responsibility according to the Soviet-Mongolian Contract of February 10, 195917⁶. According to Petrov, in 1961, the Ministry still managed many projects: since 1957 -- in the United Arab Emirates, since 1958 -- in Ceylon, since 1959 -- in Guinea, Iraq, India, Mongolia and Iran, since 1960 -- in Ghana, and since 1961 -- in Somalia.