Some aspects of state-building processes in Carpathian Ukraine on the eve of Second World War

ДЕЯКІ АСПЕКТИ ДЕРЖАВОТВОРЧИХ ПРОЦЕСІВ У КАРПАТСЬКІЙ УКРАЇНІ НАПЕРЕДОДНІ ДРУГОЇ СВІТОВОЇ ВІЙНИ

Автономна Підкарпатська Русь, а згодом самостійна Карпатська Україна, існувала впродовж надзвичайно короткого відтинку часу: з жовтня 1938 р. до другої половини березня 1939 р. Незважаючи на це, у краї відбувався такий бурхливий розвиток політичних подій, що до Карпатської України була прикута увага всієї світової громадськості. Це стосується і дослідників, які вже наприкінці 30-х років почали звертатися до вивчення історії Карпатської України. Проголошення незалежності 14 березня 1939 р. пояснювалося прагненням українського населення краю до свободи. Однак, важливе значення в поспішності цього акту мав розпад Чехословаччини і проголошення самостійності Словаччиною. Попри деяку спонтанність і поспішність, ця історична подія в житті не тільки закарпатських українців, але і всього українського народу мала велике історичне значення. Це була друга, після 21 січня 1919 р., спроба заявити перед цілим світом, що українська нація живе й готова до державного життя. І хоча цей акт проголошення незалежності, ратифікований 15 березня 1939 р. на Соймі Карпатської України, був більше символічним, ніж реальною політикою, він відіграв важливу роль у формуванні самосвідомості всієї української нації. Саме в період існування Карпатської України завершився своєрідний перехід у сфері свідомості від підкарпатських русинів до закарпатських українців.

Наприкінці 30-х років Карпатська Україна виявилася єдиною державою, де невелика гілка українського народу проголосила свою незалежність і заявила про бажання жити державним життям. Такої можливості не мали ні українці, які перебували у складі СРСР, ні українці під владами Польщі та Румунії. Однак, вони дивилися на Карпатську Україну як на територію, де здійснюється спроба відновити українську державність. Виходячи з цього, необхідно розцінювати утворення Кар- пато-української держави як другий, після визвольних змагань 1918-20-х років, етап у боротьбі за створення українського державного утворення на окремо взятій українській території.

Ключові слова: Карпатська Україна, Августин Волошин, Сойм, автономні уряди, державотворчі процеси, політичні вибори, політична криза, УНО, Карпатська Січ.

The main text

The formation of the Carpatho-Ukrainian state was the result of many years of activity of the Ukrainian patriotic forces in all spheres of social and political life. However, we should mention that the short-lived existence of an autonomous, and subsequently independent Transcarpathian region (Subcarpathian Rus', Carpathian Ukraine) coincided with the acute political crisis in Central Europe that took place on the eve of World War II. Naturally, the international factor made its mark on the socio-political processes that took place in Europe in general, and in Czechoslovakia and Transcarpathia, as an integral part of it, in particular. Despite the complexity of the international situation at that time, Transcarpathia won the autonomous rights and built its statehood in alliance with the Czechs and Slovaks.

Clarification of these and some other problems, an objective and comprehensive study of the place and role of Carpathian Ukraine in the context of the Central European political crisis before the Second World War deserves special research. The situation of Carpathian Ukraine in the late 1930s should be considered in two respects: as a subject of political processes that took place in Central Europe on the eve of World War II, and as one of the stages of the struggle of Ukrainian people for the restoration of their statehood, taking into account such fact that here we can talk only about a separate part of the Ukrainian lands.

Twenty years of being a part of the democratic Czechoslovak Republic has created optimal conditions for the diverse national and cultural development of Transcarpathia, though it is not necessary to idealize it. Owing to the active work of the Ukrainian parties, societies and individual socio-cultural figures, the national consciousness of the people in Transcarpathia grew up, the people who, in fact, underwent a peculiar evolution from the Hungarian Ruthenians to the Transcarpathian Ukrainians, to the self-awareness of their identity, to the idea of political unity with all Carpathian people.

Czechoslovakia's attitude to Transcarpathia and to the Ukrainian problem in general differed significantly from the policy on the Ukrainian idea of other European countries, especially Poland. This fact undoubtedly contributed to A. Voloshyn's clear Ukrainian course, albeit with a focus on German patronage, and the Transcarpathian autonomous governments received comprehensive support from Ukrainians in Eastern Galicia, European countries, the United States and Canada, who saw in that autonomous state the embryo of united Ukraine. Researching this problem has got an indisputably scientific meaning. The small branch of the Ukrainian people, having received material and moral support from the Ukrainian emigration, causing wonder all over the world, became able to carry out to some extent their own internal and foreign policy, which resulted in an attempt to form a Ukrainian statehood. This was not possible for the Ukrainians who were under the totalitarian regime in the USSR, who were in Poland and Romania.

The relevance of this study is also determined by the need to debunk the claims of modern neo-Ruthenian theorists who question the region's belonging to Ukraine. They deny in every way the regularity of the political processes that took place here in 1918-1919 and, especially in the late 1930s, they attempt to prove that the idea of independence of Carpathian Ukraine was brought to Transcarpathia from outside, in particular from Galicia. The sources from a number of national and foreign archives have arguably proved all the baselessness and pseudoscience character of such separatist interpretations. On the contrary, these sources convince that Carpathian Ukraine was a creation of local factors, although it was influenced by a number of international and internal factors.

On May 8, 1919 the Rus' Central People's Council in Uzhgorod decided to incorporate Transcarpathia into Czechoslovakia as an autonomy. This act fulfilled the requirement of the American Ruthenians, who on November 18, 1918, at their meeting in Scranton, called for the inclusion of the region into the Czechoslovak Republic. On November 18, 1919 I. Breich was appointed as a temporary administrator of Transcarpathia. According to the “General Charter”, the Czechoslovak government was obliged to give the widest autonomous rights to Subcarpathian Rus', as the region was called at that time.

The Prague government was constantly delaying the fulfilment of its promises, arguing that the Transcarpathians had not yet “matured” to an independent life. The first stage of autonomy was realized only on October 8, 1938. It was the victory of all the political forces of the region, both Russophile and Ukrainian, who actively fought for autonomous rights throughout the interwar period. The end of September 1938 should be regarded as a decisive moment in the relationship of the above directions. It should be noted that as early as September 2, 1938, the representatives of Russophiles and Narodovtsi (Ukrainophiles) signed a declaration to which the Czechoslovak government did not respond. The requirements announced by E. Bachynsky included the incorporation of the Presov region to Subcarpathian Rus', the provision of financial assistance to the Verkhovyna districts (mountain districts), and the personal replacement of the representatives in governmental institutions¹.

On September 21, 1938 negotiations were held in Prague with participation of E. Bachynsky, I. Pieshchak, P. Kossey, S. Fentsyk, A. Brodi, Y. Feldeshiy, P. Zhydovsky, and Y. Revai. They were all members of the Czechoslovak Parliament². At the same time, a delegation of American Ruthenians, consisting of I. Pop, I. Yanchyshyn, and O. Herovsky, visited Transcarpathia, and it “was supposed to help the parliamentary representatives of both groups to solve urgent political problems of the region. The delegation did not, however, represent the American Ruthenians of the Greek Catholics, who made up the majority of Ruthenians in the United States”³. That is why this delegation did not fulfil its tasks.

In early October 1938 negotiations between representatives of the two directions were resumed with the aim of creating an autonomous government of Subcarpathian Rus'. At a meeting on October 7, 1938 it was decided that only members of the Prague Parliament and the Senate could be members of the government. We must agree with V. Shandor's assertion that this was done “with the expectation of success in the government, because the Moscophiles were worried”⁴. On the same day, representatives of the Russophile bloc proposed a project of decentralization of state and executive power, which consisted of eight items. On October 8 a National Council of Subcarpathian Rus' was established in Uzhgorod, which included J. Kaminsky, V. Ho- michkov, M. Demko (Central People's Council of Rus'), A. Voloshyn, Y. Brashchayko, D. Nimchuk (First Ukrainian People's Council), A. Brodi, Y. Feldeshiy (Autonomous Agricultural Union), E. Bachynsky, P. Kossey (Republican Agricultural Party), S. Fentsyk (Rus' National-Autonomous Party), Y. Revai (Social Democratic Party), I. Pieszczak (Autonomous Agricultural Union of Presov Region), P. Zhydovsky (Republican Agricultural Party of Presov Region)⁵. Thus, the National Council of Subcarpathian Rus' included the representatives of all major political forces of the region.

At the first session of the Council, a Memorandum was adopted, which ended with a demand to immediately adopt a law on Subcarpathian Rus'. On October 8, 1938, Czechoslovakia's Prime Minister J. Syrovy dismissed K. Hrabar and appointed I. Parkanij as the governor of the land. The latter once again emphasized the main requirements of the National Council of Subcarpathian Rus'. Meanwhile, representatives of the two directions discussed candidates for the posts of ministers of Subcarpathian Rus'. Y. Revai proposed to invite three members from both councils. The proposition was accepted. The Ukrainian delegation was headed by A. Voloshyn, the Moscophiles delegation -- by J. Kaminsky.

At a joint meeting of the Rus' and Ukrainian Central People's Councils, proposals were made for the composition of the future government of Sub- carpathian Rus': “At the meetings it was unanimously decided: to seek the same rights for Subcarpathian Rus' that were granted to Slovakia on the basis of the requirements added to this Protocol. It was further decided unanimously to propose Andriy Brodi for the Prime Minister and the Minister of National Education, Dr. Edmund Bachynsky for the Minister of Internal Affairs, Dr. Ivan Pieshchak for the Minister of Justice, Yulian Revai for the Minister of Communication, ie: railways, post and public works, Fr. Avgustyn Voloshyn for the Minister of Health and Social Welfare, Dr. Stepan Fentsyk for the Minister of Economic Affairs. It is decided to demand an immediate fulfilment of these claims from the Czechoslovak government”⁶.

On October 11, 1938 there was formed the first autonomous government of Subcarpathian Rus', headed by A. Brodi -- the leader of the Russophile direction in the region. E. Bachynsky and Y. Revai were appointed as the Ministers⁷. After them, the ministerial post was taken by S. Fentsyk, and A. Voloshyn and I. Pieshchak became state secretaries. The first autonomous government included four representatives of the Russophile and two representatives of the Ukrainian direction. It is necessary to agree with the opinion of modern researchers that the correlation of two to one in favor of representatives of Russophilism, really reflected the interrelation between the two main political forces in the region⁸.

Appointment of A. Brodi as Prime Minister was not a surprise either, as he headed a direction, which had a dominant position in the socio-political life of Transcarpathia throughout the interwar period. It should also be noted that since the beginning of its formation in 1923, the Autonomous Agricultural Union (hereinafter referred to as the AZS), headed by A. Brodi, has consistently promoted the main political task -- the acquisition of autonomy, which was clearly recorded in the program, so as in the name of the party. In his article “We, the Autonomists, Build a New Free Autonomous Subcarpathian Rus”, published in 1935, A. Brodi wrote: “Let me briefly say what do we, the Autonomists, want and what we fight for: Subcarpathian Rus' in its ethnographic borders from Poprad to Tisza, as it is stated in the Saint- Germain Peace Treaty and the Constitution of the Czechoslovak Republic... We must know that our aim to live and stay in a large family of peoples will be successful if only we will rule and manage in our own land ourselves. We are fighting for it to this day. Today, power in our land is not in our hands, and we see and feel that we cannot keep the consequences of our work for ourselves. That is why we are fighting for autonomy. Everyone knows, and you already feel that as it has been till now, it can no longer be neither by God, nor by human, nor by natural law”⁹.

AZS, headed by A. Brodi, has grown dramatically in quantitative terms. In the late 1930's it counted from 5 to 7 thousand members. From year to year the authority of the AZS grew among the population of the region. For example, during the elections to the Czechoslovak parliament in 1924, AZS got 21161 votes (8,4% of all voters), in 1925 -- 28799 votes (11,6%), in 1929 -- 48509 votes (18,2%), in 1935 -- 44982 votes (13,9%)¹⁰.

A. Brodi was authoritative even among part of the exclusively Ukrainian population of mountainous regions. Synevyr priest (Volove District) F. Horvat wrote admiringly in a letter to the owner of the “rus'” printing house Y. Fel- deshiy about Brodi's speech in his native village: “Having been sufficiently fed with empty promises, our people, inspired by the speech of deputy Andrej Brodi in our village, were so excited that they had recently stated publicly at the meeting with Soc. Dem. envoy F. Revai: “We don't want any of the Czech parties, and we will support the Autonomous Agricultural Union”¹¹.

The autonomous government of A. Brodi held three meetings (October 15, 18, 22-23, 1938). At the first meeting on October 15, 1938 the main governing bodies, consisting of 9 ministries, were considered and approved, it was stated that 170 wagons of corn were imported from Romania to Subcarpathian Rus' in October 1938. At the second meeting, S. Fentsyk reported on the work done during the negotiations on the border marking with Slovakia, and Yu. Revai made a report on the ban on the export of state and private property from the territory of the region. Issues of amnesty, cooperation with Germany and others were also discussed. The focus of the third meeting was the internal political situation in Transcarpathia, in particular, there was discussed the issue of a reasonable response to the Hungarian ultimatum regarding the southern territories of the region.

On the initiative of A. Brodi, a commission was formed, which included well-known Transcarpathian scientists P. Sova, H. Herovsky, M. Kondrato- vych, M. Beskyd and I. Panjkevych, who got a task to prove scientifically that Transcarpathia is a Ruthenian land and with this to “fend off the Magyar demands”¹². On October 23, 1938, the continuation of the third meeting of A. Brodi's government took place, at which it was decided: “The region of the Rus' people in the south of the Carpathians, marked by peace treaties as an autonomous unit, is one integral whole, parts of which are firmly connected both by the millennial history and by the millennial economic conditions and by fraternal coexistence of its indigenous population... The integrity and inseparability of the region is also recognized by the great allied and friendly states in the international and peace treaties, and the change of its political situation and its belonging we consider to be possible only in its entirety, without the rejection of its southern part from the northern and vice versa, it could be possible solely on the basis of the right of self-determination of all indigenous population by democratic principles: popular vote”¹³. On October 22, 1938 correspondent of Lviv newspaper “Dilo” -- part of UNDO in Galicia -- R. Holian interviewed A. Brodi¹⁴. A. Brodi and the management of the Autonomous Agricultural Union conducted a double game, focusing on Hungary, which caused dissatisfaction with the representatives of the Ukrainian direction. Newspaper “Nova Svoboda” accused A. Brodi of promoting anti- Ukrainian actions. The Prime Minister assured that the provocations would be stopped, but they continued. There have been cases of use of force¹⁵.

It quickly became clear that A. Brodi had worked for a long time in Hungary under the nickname “Bertalon”¹⁶. Czechoslovakian counterintelligence closely followed A. Brodi's activities. On January 4, 1933 the head of the Presidium of the police department in Uzhgorod, Herr, reported to the Presidium of the local administration of Subcarpathian Rus' that “editor Brodi has great ties abroad.., he constantly meets with representatives of the Hungarian opposition forces in Uzhgorod”¹⁷. In the encrypted telegram of the Hungarian Foreign Minister K. Kanya to the Hungarian ambassador in Prague, J. Wettstein, there were such instructions about A. Brodi: “...tell Bertalan that he would not in any way obey the Czechs' promises and fully stand on previous positions, that is, with self-determination through plebiscite. Especially pay attention to the fact that if they do not join us, then in this case there will be unfavorable economic conditions for them. And if they join us, then these issues will be resolved in a friendly spirit, taking into account their interests. A plebiscite for autonomy within the Hungarian state is the only sensible solution for the Ruthenians... If for any reason there are difficulties in upholding this position, then Bertalan should in all circumstances come to Pest”¹⁸.

On October 17, 1938 Y. Revai warned the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Czechoslovak Republic, F. Khvalkowski, about A. Brodi's ties with Hungary. As a result, the Prague government banned A. Brodi from leaving for Budapest to negotiate with Hungary. Czechoslovakian Minister of Interior Affairs Ya. Chernyi claimed that information from the meetings of the ministerial council goes to the Hungarian Embassy in Prague¹⁹. The Czechoslovak government accused A. Brodi of violating the “Law on the Protection of the Republic” and arrested him. On October 26, 1938 a newsletter of the Press Service of Carpathian Ukraine reported that “with Brodi there was found a map of Carpathian Ukraine, on which he divided half to the Magyars and half to the Poles, and a lot of money”²⁰. Immediately after his arrest, A. Brodi went on a hunger strike. In prison he was visited by Y. Brashchayko, who gave him a letter, inviting him to accept Hungarian citizenship and leave Czechoslovakia, or stay in it, but for that he had to quit the political activity. A. Brodi rejected these proposals. On February 11, 1939 he was amnestied by the President of the Czechoslovak Republic, E. Hacha, who immediately accepted him and offered to cooperate. However, A. Brodi refused and went to treatment at the Tatra sanatorium. On March 5 he left for Uzhgorod, where his family lived²¹.

It is necessary to agree with the statement of the contemporary Slovak scientist I. Vanat that “in the pre-Munich Czecho-Slovakia the political ruthe- nianism became the fertile ground for irredentist autonomous political parties of Brodi and Fentsyk, who received support from Hungary and Poland”²². The researcher believes that after the occupation of the region by Hungary, the Horthy regime relied on the representatives of the Russophile direction. Proof of this is the fact that after the occupation of the region by the Hungarian troops, A. Brodi represented Transcarpathia in the Hungarian Parliament. The financing of A. Brodi by the Hungarian government is confirmed by the documents published in Budapest in 1959. Asked by the NKVD investigator on January 13, 1945, “what did you receive from the Hungarian government for your cooperation with them?”, A. Brodi replied: “...I received a parliamentary salary of 1500 pengoes, a ministerial pension of 1369 pengoes per month”. The resignation and arrest of A. Brodi sparked protests from his supporters, which grew into a mass demonstrations. And A. Brodi's associate S. Fentsyk managed to escape to the Polish Embassy located nearby and then move to Hungary.

Thus, Andrej Brodi, like all his direction, has undergone a kind of evolution. During the 1920-30s, it was a progressive phenomenon in the social and political life of the region, because it reflected the people's desire for equality within Czechoslovakia. From the late 1930s, it held a clear pro- Hungarian orientation, although his leaders continued to advocate publicly for the unity of Czechoslovakia.

After the arrest of A. Brodi, the Czechoslovakian government appointed A. Voloshyn -- the leader of the Ukrainian direction in the land -- as the new the Prime Minister²³. He, in the presence of Minister E. Bachynsky, Czech General O. Swatek and Vice Governor of the region O. Beskyd, swore allegiance to the Czechoslovak Republic. The protocol with the text of the oath was recently published in the collection of documents on Carpathian Ukraine: “The protocol was written on October 26, 1938 in the office of the Minister Dr. Edmund Bachynsky in Uzhgorod on the occasion of the government oath by telephone for the Minister of Subcarpathian Rus' Avgustyn Voloshyn, at the hands of the Leader of the Armada, General Jan Syrovy, in the intercession of the President of the Republic on the basis of paragraph 60 of the Constitutional Charter of the Czechoslovak Republic. Minister of Subcarpathian Rus' Avgustyn Voloshyn at precisely 4.40 pm read the following oath by the phone: “I swear in my honor and consciousness that I will conscientiously and actively fulfil my duties and will take care of the correct implementation of constitutional and other laws”. The oath was attended by witnesses of the Division General Oleg Swatek and Vice-Governor of Subcarpathian Rus' Dr. Olexander Beskyd”²⁴.

In a speech on October 26, 1938 A.Voloshyn stated that he would provide “the people of Subcarpathian Rus' with their cultural, national and economic achievements... without national and religious distinction”²⁵. On October 27, 1938, the newspaper “Nova Svoboda” published an invocation of the Ukrainian National Council “To all Ukrainians all over the world! To all Ukrainian parties, organizations, groups, societies in Galicia, Bukovina, Bessarabia, Dnieper Ukraine, Canada, the United States of America, and in general to Ukrainians wherever they reside”, which testified to the clear Ukrainian orientation of A. Voloshyn's government: “We believe, -- the invocation said, -- that the great 50 million Ukrainian people will continue to raise their great word and will not allow our eternal enemies to capture us, to put us in prisons again”²⁶. A. Voloshyn also received a letter from the OUN Executive²⁷.

A. Voloshyn formed a new government exclusively from the representatives of the Ukrainian direction. The exception was, perhaps, E. Bachynsky. This caused great dissatisfaction among the representatives of the opposite direction both in the land and abroad. The secretary of the AZS in Presov, V. Dancha, in the letter to A. Voloshyn expressed doubts about the possibility of joint actions of the two directions. Voloshyn's response was unambiguous: “We want to live in peace with those people of our kind, who identify themselves as the Rus' camp, when they think of it sincerely, which means that they feel sincerely as Slavs. But with people who, under the cover of Rus', want to join us to Hungary and are agitating for that clearly or through the so- called plebiscite, we do not want to have anything in common with them”²⁸. A. Voloshyn appealed to the representatives of Russophilism for cooperation, but his appeal had a declarative content. Not having their own people in the government, the Russophiles did not agree to the proposed cooperation. We believe that A. Voloshyn's complete distraction in practice from such a mass direction as was Russophile one, was unjustified and erroneous. Instead of making a compromise, the prime minister has stepped up against the opposition²⁹.

From the very first days of his premiership, A. Voloshyn began to focus on Germany, hoping for its patronage. As of February 13, 1939 the German national minority of the region was 8714, or 1,60% of the population³⁰. A. Voloshyn did everything to ensure that the German population did not experience any problems. He even issued an order according to which “all citizens of German nationality, regardless of their state belonging, are allowed to organize themselves in the “German Party” on the national-socialist basis and to organize in this party all the accustomed party bodies, as well as to carry honors and flags with a swastika”³¹. Engineer E. Oldofredi, as a representative of the German national minority, was included in the list of future ambassadors of the Ukrainian parliament of Transcarpathia on January 27, 1939³².

The government of Carpathian Ukraine did everything to ensure that relations between Ukrainians and Czechs, who lived in the region, remain neighborly³³. A. Voloshyn gave a task to the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Carpathian Ukraine, “that in the shortest possible time the normal, friendly relations should be established between the Ukrainian people and the Czech government”³⁴. We should mention that they were greatly exacerbated by the anti-Czech propaganda of the pro-Hungarian “fifth column” in the land, which will be discussed below. Appointing A. Voloshyn as prime minister, the Czechoslovak government had high expectations of him as a moderate politician, hoping for his neutrality in the internal political struggle that had not become weaker in the land. A. Voloshyn was well aware of this when he urged the local population to perform “their duties properly within the Czechoslovak Republic”³⁵. Even in the decree on the introduction of the Ukrainian language in the land, it was also suggested to put inscriptions in Czech or Slovak³⁶. Thus, the appointment of A. Voloshyn as a Prime Minister did not lead to a radical change in Ukrainian-Czech relations.

As of February 1939, there were 8,5 thousand Czech officials (together with their families -- 15 thousand). It is necessary to agree with modern researchers that the vast majority of them “treated the power of A. Voloshyn and all Ukrainian with hostility”³⁷, fearing the processes of Ukrainization. Members of the Ukrainian National Council in Velyka Kopania complained to A. Voloshyn about the local commandant of the gendarmerie, J. Krizh, who “makes great trouble in our village, agitated and today is still inciting the population against one candidate's letter”³⁸. At the request of V. Kopania residents to leave the village, J. Krizh responded: “I will leave Kopane, but first I have to kill twenty or thirty Ukrainians”³⁹. In the village Dovhe “the whole teaching staff is hostile to the Ukrainian nation”⁴⁰. V. Grendzha-Donsky wrote that “the Czechs, not only do sabotages at every step, but even openly agitate. Gendarmerie commander in Bushtyno says openly that with the arrival of the Ukrainian government it will be worse for the population”⁴¹. Inhabitants of the village Bilky complained to A. Voloshyn about the local gendarmerie commandant Bogac, who “is a fierce Czech chauvinist, who always treated and still treats the Ukrainian case in a hostile way”⁴². The authors of the complaint accused Bogac of provocative actions: “...Someone threw a swamp on the Czech inscription on a former Czech kindergarten, where the administration is now located... The windows of the administration chancellery were also thrown over by the swamp. Mr. commandant -- soon after the swamp was thrown on the inscription -- appeared in the Sich barracks and stated that this act was done by the Sich riflemen... We suspect that it was intentionally prepared to provoke us and defame, that we are against the Czechs”⁴³.

Thus, the vast majority of Czech officials were hostile to the Ukrainian government, which had a negative impact on the development of Ukrainian- Czech relations⁴⁴. However, it should be noted that often the initiators of anti- Czech actions were also the Sich Riflemen. Lawyer M. Bandusyak in his appeal to the investigative commission of the Presidium of Ukrainian Central People's Council wrote that A. Voloshyn's personal secretary I. Rohach “called on the Sich Riflemen to break the windows.., to take away the Czech flags. As a result of this provocation, the Sich Riflemen fought with the soldiers and the police”⁴⁵. I. Rohach's speeches were a signal to an action. Inhabitant of the village Kolochava, M. Shymonia, told how local Sich Riflemen together with Galicians threw down the Czechoslovak flag and replaced it with Ukrainian. The incident was settled peacefully. Another active participant in the events of 1938-1939, J. Sarvadiy, wrote about the anti-Czech actions by the district commander in Rakhiv, Solomianyi, who ordered to replace the Czech inscriptions with Ukrainian until March 21, 1939. “A local Sich team,” wrote J. Sarvadiy, “one night illegally took down the foreign language inscriptions, which caused a misunderstanding with the government. Dr. Fryshchyn publicly disapproved of this endeavor -- the Sich Riflemen interfere into other people's affairs. When Dr. Fryshyn was in the ministry of education in Khust, he was invited to the Sich's Main Team, where the blanket was thrown over his head and he was beaten so much, that even his ribs were broken”⁴⁶.

From the above mentioned it follows that the confrontation into the Czech- Ukrainian relations was brought by both sides. The Czechs did not accept the Ukrainian authorities and their decisions, and the Ukrainians tried to get rid of the “guardianship”, often using different methods, sometimes those that contradicted the Czechoslovak constitution. A. Voloshyn's government has not always been able to control the political situation in the land. Ukrainian-Czech relations worsened after the appointment of the Czech general L. Prchala as the third minister of Carpathian Ukraine. The government of A. Voloshyn treated the decision of the Czech authorities as interfering with the internal affairs of the autonomous state. On January 20, 1939 A. Voloshyn wrote in a letter to L. Prchala: “This violation of the autonomous rights of C.U. (Subcarpathian Rus') caused great outrage among the Carpatho-Ukrainian population. This is evidenced by the swing of demonstrations, which have greatly aggravated the good relations between the Carpatho-Ukrainian population and the Czech government of C.U....Cooperation with you in the government of C.U. (SR) in those circumstances is impossible”⁴⁷.

Demonstrations against the appointment of L. Prchala as the Ukrainian minister resulted in mass protests in many settlements. Inhabitants of the village Vuchkove sent to the Ukrainian Central People's Council a “Manifesto on life or death”, in which they demanded to withdraw L. Prchala, as well as to dismiss all the Czechs from the official positions⁴⁸. There was a protest note from the village Torun: “We will not give the Czechs our freedom, which was once gained with the price of our blood. Only after the death of all of us the Czechs can take our freedom”⁴⁹. Inhabitants of Kolochava, Richky, Velykyi Studenyi and other Transcarpathian mountain villages demanded an immediate recall of the minister-Czech⁵⁰. It should be noted that some representatives of the government traveled to the villages and called on the masses to protest against the appointment of L. Prchala as Ukrainian minister. On February 5, 1939, Kost Linevych was arrested by Captain Novosad “for attempting to campaign in the village Domanyntsi. He was accused of distributing leaflets against Prchala”⁵¹. The case ended in a compromise: L. Prchala performed the duties of the Minister of Transport.

From the above it is evident what was the attitude of the government of Carpathian Ukraine to the Czech and German population, living in the territory of the region. A. Voloshyn tried to implement such a national policy, which would allow all the national minorities to feel at home. The attitude of the Carpatho-Ukrainian government to the Jewish population is a proof of this. According to modern researchers, over 100,000 Jews lived in Transcarpathia at the time of Horthy regime's occupation, not counting the unspecified number of those who moved to Slovakia and the Czech Republic before the occupation⁵². On December 28, 1938 A. Voloshyn received a delegation from Jewish national minorities (12% of the total population), whose leaders declared their loyalty to the authorities. In response, the Prime Minister said: “I have always been respectful of Jews, who worship their religion and nationality. The Constitution of the state has not been altered so as to guarantee equal rights for all citizens of the federal state... As for the cultural needs of the Jewish population, they will be provided as much as it is possible”⁵³.

In the late 1930s, Czechoslovakia was a state in which more than thirty different political parties and associations were able to operate freely. All of them represented two main directions -- Russophile and Narodovtsi (Ukrainian). One of the most influential was the local organization of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (CPC), with close association of the “Union of Labor Peasantry”, “The Red Trade Unions”, “Left Front” and the “Union of Friends of the USSR”. They all stood on the pro-Soviet positions. The Social Democratic Party was very close to the communist one, although it never went closer to it. AZS and the Rus' National-Autonomous Party had Russophile and pro- Hungarian positions. Ukrainian position and position of unification were held by the Ukrainian Central People's Council, the Agrarian Party faction, the Christian People's Party, the cultural and educational organizations “Prosvita”, “Plast” and others. This situation existed until October 25, 1938, when the Prague government decided to dissolve the political parties.

Despite this decision by the Czechoslovak government, parties and associations continued to operate. In fact, only the Transcarpathian communists suffered the most because of this action. On October 25, 1938 the ViceGovernor of the region A. Beskyd issued an order to suspend the activities of the regional organization of CPC⁵⁴. On November 2, 1938 the chief of the Uzhgorod police reported to Prague that, according to the order, “the searches were carried out at the secretariats and apartments of the party leaders in Uzhgorod, Radwanka, and in Domanyntsi”, which resulted in “finding and confiscating a written material, seals, certificates and party badges. These things were taken to the police department”⁵⁵. The premises of the local organization of CPC were “locked and sealed”⁵⁶.

In 1938 there were four thousand Transcarpathian Communists (they worked in 261 primary organizations of 18 district committees), and in 19391941 they numbered only 61. The overwhelming majority of members of the regional organization of CPC emigrated to the Soviet Union⁵⁷. A. Voloshyn did not intend to resume the activities of this party; on the contrary, anti-communist propaganda intensified in the region. On the initiative of Transcarpathian nationalists in Carpathian Ukraine, on February 10, 1939, the “Society for the Fight against Communism” was formed. At the constituent assembly of this organization, the following leaders were elected: Y. Pere- vuznyk (chairman), M. Dolynaj (deputy), Yu. Khymynets (secretary)⁵⁸. “The purpose of the society,” it was said in the Charter, “is to combat communism and Marxism in all areas of national life and in all its forms, and to eliminate the consequences of Bolshevik-Marxist upbringing. A person, who during the last three years belonged to a society based on Marxist ideology, cannot be accepted”⁵⁹.