Quantifying Hyperbole: Explicit Estimates of Exaggerated Utterances

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Quantifying Hyperbole: Explicit Estimates of Exaggerated Utterances

Brittany A. Harman, Ph.D. in Psychology, Assistant Professor; Hennessy J. Strine, Undergraduate Psychology Student

Abstract

Purpose. People are exposed to exaggeration in some form every day. They must comprehend and interpret the hyperbole, or conversational overstatement, to which they are exposed. Research suggests that people cognitively correct hyperbolic utterances using information retrieved from memory to generate estimates of what really occurred in the situation or event and the sampling of memory traces during the interpretation of utterances is influenced by the form and contextual elements of the utterance.

Methods. In three experiments, participants were presented with texts containing information described in a literal or hyperbolic manner (e.g., "I caught a fish" vs. "I caught a fish the size of a whale") and asked for explicit estimates of value (e.g., number, size, duration). The form (Experiment 1), context (Experiment 2), and speaker (Experiment 3) of an utterance were all predicted to influence the estimates that people generated.

Results. It was found that the presence of hyperbole, as well as information about the context and speaker, had a reliable impact on participants' quantitative estimates. Conclusions. The form, context, and speaker of an utterance all appear to influence the estimates that people generated. Such results are consistent with the notion that people cognitively correct hyperbolic utterances using information retrieved from memory to generate estimates about what really happens in the situation or event. Future research should be aimed at designing experiments that can investigate these memory traces more directly.

Key words: hyperbole, exaggeration, context, speaker characteristics.

Áð³òòàí³ À. Õàðìàí, äîêòîð ô³ëîñîô³¿ â ãàëóç³ ïñèõîëî㳿, àñèñòåíò ïðîôåñîðà; Õåííåññ³ Äæ. Ñòðàéí, ñòóäåíòêà áàêàëàâðèàòó ç ïñèõîëî㳿

Ìåòà. Ëþäè ñòèêàþòüñÿ ç ïåðåá³ëüøåííÿì ó ò³é ÷è ³íø³é ôîðì³ ùîäíÿ. Âîíè ïîâèíí³ ðîçóì³òè òà ³íòåðïðåòóâàòè ã³ïåðáîëó, àáî ðîçìîâíå ïåðåá³ëüøåííÿ, ÿêå âîíè âåðáàëüíî ñïðèéìàþòü. Äîñë³äæåííÿ ïîêàçóþòü, ùî ëþäè êîãí³òèâíî âèïðàâëÿþòü ã³ïåðáîë³÷í³ âèñëîâëþâàííÿ, âèêîðèñòîâóþ÷è ³íôîðìàö³þ ç ïàì'ÿò³, ùîá ãåíåðóâàòè îö³íêè òîãî, ùî íàñïðàâä³ â³äáóâàëîñÿ â ñèòóàö³¿ àáî ïî䳿, à âèá³ðêà ñë³ä³â ïàì'ÿò³ ï³ä ÷àñ ³íòåðïðåòàö³¿ âèñëîâëþâàíü çàëåæèòü â³ä ôîðìè é êîíòåêñòóàëüíèõ åëåìåíò³â âèñëîâëþâàííÿ.

Ìåòîäèêà. Ó òðüîõ åêñïåðèìåíòàõ ó÷àñíèêàì ïðîïîíóâàëè òåêñòè, ùî ì³ñòèëè ³íôîðìàö³þ, îïèñàíó áóêâàëüíî àáî ã³ïåðáîë³çîâàíî (íàïðèêëàä, "ß çëîâèâ ðèáó" ïðîòè "ß çëîâèâ ðèáó ðîçì³ðîì ç êèòà"), ³ ïðîñèëè äàòè åêñïë³öèòíó îö³íêó âåëè÷èíè (íàïðèêëàä, ê³ëüêîñò³, ðîçì³ðó, òðèâàëîñò³). Ïåðåäáà÷àëîñÿ, ùî ôîðìà âèñëîâëþâàííÿ (åêñïåðèìåíò 1), êîíòåêñò (åêñïåðèìåíò 2) ³ ìîâåöü (åêñïåðèìåíò 3) âïëèâàòèìóòü íà îö³íêè, ÿê³ ãåíåðóþòü ëþäè.

Ðåçóëüòàòè. Âèÿâëåíî, ùî íàÿâí³ñòü ã³ïåðáîëè, à òàêîæ ³íôîðìàö³ÿ ïðî êîíòåêñò ³ ìîâöÿ äîñòîâ³ðíî âïëèâàþòü íà ê³ëüê³ñí³ îö³íêè ó÷àñíèê³â.

Âèñíîâêè. Ôîðìà, êîíòåêñò ³ ìîâåöü âïëèâàþòü íà îö³íêè, ÿê³ ãåíåðóþòü ëþäè. Òàê³ ðåçóëüòàòè óçãîäæóþòüñÿ ç óÿâëåííÿì ïðî òå, ùî ëþäè êîãí³òèâíî êîðèãóþòü ã³ïåðáîë³÷í³ âèñëîâëþâàííÿ, âèêîðèñòîâóþ÷è ³íôîðìàö³þ, äîáóòó ç ïàì'ÿò³, ùîá ãåíåðóâàòè îö³íêè ïðî òå, ùî íàñïðàâä³ â³äáóâàºòüñÿ â ñèòóàö³¿ ÷è ïî䳿. Ïîäàëüø³ äîñë³äæåííÿ ìàþòü áóòè ñïðÿìîâàí³ íà ðîçðîáêó åêñïåðèìåíò³â, ÿê³ ìîæóòü äîñë³äèòè ö³ ñë³äè ïàì'ÿò³ á³ëüø áåçïîñåðåäíüî.

Êëþ÷îâ³ ñëîâà: ã³ïåðáîëà, ïåðåá³ëüøåííÿ, êîíòåêñò, õàðàêòåðèñòèêè ìîâöÿ.

Introduction

People are bombarded by exaggeration every day of their lives. For example, they encounter sensationalized news stories on TV, radio, in print, and on the internet. The use of such hyperbole, often in combination with other forms of figurative speech like proverb and metaphor, can contribute to a dramatic increase in the emotionalization of public debates, such as that of the Brexit argument (Musolff, 2021) and COVID-19 (Stulajterova, 2021). Short-term consequences of the successful use of such hyperbole include impacts on referendums and election campaigns, while the long-term consequences can include an increase in “polarization and radicalization of public discourse” (Musolff, 2021). Indeed, hyperbole is frequently employed as both a persuasive political strategy (Abbas, 2019) and in response to accusations of wrongdoing, including in the political area (see Colston & Carreno, 2020, for examples).

When directly interacting with others, people are both the producers and recipients of exaggerated speech. For example, it is not uncommon to hear speakers refer to “millions of people” in line at a busy grocery store or to suggest that they have been “waiting forever” for the release of a popular new movie. Indeed, when people were asked to keep track of what, when, and how they retold events from their lives to others, 46% of the stories recorded over a four-week period were labeled as distorted, with 82% of those distortions containing embellishments (Marsh & Tversky, 2004). People typically reported exaggerating to entertain others, and retellings for the purpose of entertaining were less tied to the original events than were retellings for the purpose of simply informing others (Marsh & Tversky, 2004).

Even in situations in which accuracy of information is of the utmost importance, people still exaggerate. For example, because the circumstances surrounding a crime are often unique, emotional, and consequential, these types of events naturally lend themselves to being shared with others and to being described in an exaggerated way (e.g., “The perpetrator was literally covered in tattoos” or “the victim was stabbed a thousand times!”). Furthermore, exaggeration in a legal context is not only limited to witnesses providing exaggerated crime descriptions in front of one another; eyewitnesses may make exaggerated claims in the courtroom (e.g., “[The weather] became very nasty. It rained extremely hard <...> obviously, it was dark, it was night, visibility was pretty much zero”) and lawyers may use exaggeration to make their point about the details of a case (e.g., “So it's fair that you're pretty familiar with almost every inch of that property, isn't it?” or “Pretty much every square inch of the property was searched”) (State of Wisconsin v. Steven A. Avery, 2005).

Because exaggeration plays such a significant role in people's lives, it is important to understand the consequences when people are exposed to it. Such an understanding could provide insight into how audiences process major world events that have been sensationalized by authority figures or the media. In the context of eyewitness testimony, it is important to understand the effects of witness exposure to exaggerated statements to determine how such information may influence the witness's memory for the original crime details. Finally, in a legal context, being able to appreciate the consequences of exposure to exaggerated statements made by a witness or lawyer can lead to a better understanding of how such information can influence juror decision-making.

Hyperbole: A Distinct Case of Figurative Language

Historically, theories on rhetoric have viewed the figurative devices of metaphor, irony, and hyperbole as a single class of rhetorical strategies called “tropes,” because they share a variety of qualities, most importantly being that they all have literal meanings that are different from their intended meanings (Burgers, Renardel de Lavalette & Steen, 2018). According to Steen (2011), however, this changed in the 1970s with the “cognitive turn” in linguistics. Specifically, one consequence of this change was that research on figurative language began to focus on each trope in isolation and much of contemporary literature on hyperbole has followed suit (Burgers et al., 2018).

Carston and Wearing (2014), for example, examined the similarities and differences between metaphors and hyperboles and concluded that a distinction must be drawn between the two. Wilson (2017) argued that hyperbole and a range of other phenomena should not be viewed in the same scope as irony. Aljadaan (2018) similarly suggested that although hyperbole shares similarities with metaphor and irony, there are important differences between hyperbole and these tropes. Furthermore, it is emphasized that hyperbole shares certain features with generalization, but because there are still differences between the two, it is argued that hyperbole is its own distinct form of figurative language (Aljadaan, 2018). Barnden (2018) even went so far as to identify a special class of hyperbole called “reflexive hyperbole,” and from there differentiated between various forms of reflexive hyperbole.

Hyperbole is clearly its own distinct form of figurative language, should be studied separately from other, related tropes (e.g., metaphor, irony), and, as a result, is deserving of its own definition. Cano Mora (2006) has provided what is likely the most thorough, extensive, and multidimensional definition of hyperbole, which includes no fewer than nine qualifications for an utterance to be labeled hyperbolic. Such qualifications include hyperbole being a subjective act, one that produces contrast with reality, and the specification that the type of contrast created by hyperbole is one of magnitude (see Cano Mora, 2006, for the full list). Ultimately, the multipage definition boils down to a single sentence: “hyperbole is a figure whereby the quantity or quality of an objective fact is, whether purposely or inadvertently, subjectively inflated or deflated in varying degrees but always to excess in an utterance which listeners do not normally interpret literally or perceive as a lie” (Cano Mora, 2006: 108). Indeed, consistent with this definition, most definitions of hyperbole have emphasized the qualities of extremity and exaggeration (e.g., Cano Mora, 2009; Carston & Wearing, 2015; Norrick, 2004; Tian, Sridhar & Peng, 2021) and extreme case formulations (Colston, 2007; but see Christodoulidou, 2009, 2011). Claridge (2010) provided a useful preliminary definition of hyperbole by emphasizing the distinction between literal and hyperbolic expressions. Literal expressions “agree[s] with the extralinguistic facts in the given context” whereas hyperbolic expressions are said to “exceed[s] the (credible) limits of fact in the given context” (Claridge, 2010: 5).

Despite the fact that hyperbole should be examined separately from related tropes such as metaphor and irony, interpretations of isolated examples of hyperbolic utterances extracted from their contexts are also problematic. Claridge (2010) states that the role of contextual knowledge is necessary for identifying cases of hyperbole and it is our assertation that knowledge of speaker characteristics is likely also an important factor in the interpretation of such utterances.

The goals of this study were thus twofold: We examined interpretations of hyperbolic utterances first in isolation, to establish that hyperbolic statements do in fact lead to higher quantitative estimates than their literal counterparts. Next, we demonstrated that hyperbolic statements do not exist in a vacuum and it is not possible to accurately study the explicit quantitative interpretations of hyperbolic utterances without also considering both the context and the speaker. The ultimate goal of this paper, then, was to demonstrate that quantitative estimates of hyperbolic utterances are significantly influenced by the contexts in which they appear and by the characteristics of the speaker who uttered them.

Hyperbole Should Influence Explicit Estimates

When someone says, “I've heard that song at least ten thousand times today,” listeners will likely not reject this statement as a lie. Still, it is equally unlikely that they will truly believe the speaker heard the song at least ten thousand times in a single day. Upon exposure to a hyperbolic characterization of a real event, then, how do people arrive at an understanding of what really occurred?

The related literature on the interpretation of irony can provide insight into this question. It has been suggested that just as when someone hears an ironic utterance, a listener who is exposed to hyperbole may “cognitively correct” the statement. For example, with irony, when someone hears the statement, “What a lovely day!” on a rainy day, he or she “corrects” the statement to actually mean, “What a horrible day!” (McCarthy & Carter, 2004). If this correct process also occurs during the interpretation of hyperbole, the difference between the utterance and the final interpretation would not be one of kind (as with irony) but of degree or magnitude. The response to hyperbole may be to upscale or downscale the utterance to reflect reality more closely (Fogelin, 1998: 13). For example, perhaps the listener who hears, “I've been waiting an eternity for you to pick me up from work” corrects the utterance to something like, “[the speaker] has been waiting a long time,” or, in this case, perhaps the listener simply downscales “an eternity” and makes a more specific estimate of duration, like “[the speaker] has been waiting for about 45 minutes”.

For the time being, let's suppose that, rather than immediately rejecting a hyperbolic statement as false or accepting it at face value, people adjust the statement so the information more readily accords with reality. If people cognitively correct hyperbolic utterances as they do with ironic utterances, interpretations of hyperbole should be constrained by pre-existing notions of what constitutes a “realistic” or “physically possible” event. For example, people are unlikely to imagine that someone really did “a million loads of laundry” in a single week. Instead, they are presumably able to use their knowledge of the real world (e.g., how long a week lasts and how long it takes to do a load of laundry) to generate an interpretation of what could have realistically taken place.

Norm theory (e.g., Kahneman & Miller, 1986) provides a potential explanation of the processes involved in understanding a hyperbolic utterance so that the final interpretation of what really happened takes physical plausibility into account. For example, the listener who hears “I waited in line forever for a Coke at 7-Eleven” may retrieve a sample of memory traces related to the event (e.g., personal experiences of waiting in line at 7-Eleven) and construct an estimate of how long he or she has waited in line in the past. Furthermore, given that the description of the event is hyperbolic in nature, the listener may adjust upward or downward from the estimate he or she has constructed, reflecting the fact that, while the speaker certainly did not wait in line “forever,” the wait was likely longer than would typically be expected. Still, the final estimate of the length of time the speaker actually waited in line will likely be grounded in physical possibility, as determined through the sample of memory traces recruited by the retrieval cue (i.e., the utterance). The final interpretation of the hyperbolic utterance is likely a result of either sampling memory traces to construct an estimate of the “typical” amount of some quantity or magnitude and adjusting upward or downward from there to take the hyperbole into account or is simply the result of sampling memory traces in a biased fashion from the beginning (i.e., retrieving only those memories of waiting in line at 7-Eleven for longer than expected).

Experiment 1

The purpose of Experiment 1 was to examine the impact of hyperbole on the explicit estimates people make. Participants read scenarios that included literal (e.g., “I waited in line at 7-Eleven”) or hyperbolic (e.g., “I waited in line forever at 7-Eleven”) versions of the same utterances made by story characters. For the purposes of the present paper, we define and discuss hyperbole in a manner consistent with the very thorough description provided by Cano Mora (2006). When designing materials for our experiments, however, we relied primarily on the distinction between literal and hyperbolic expressions provided by Claridge (2010). This distinction naturally lent itself to the creation of literal and corresponding hyperbolic versions of the same utterance. After reading each scenario, participants provided an estimate of the quantity mentioned in the scenarios (e.g., the amount of time, in minutes, the character waited in line at the store). It was predicted that hyperbolic utterances would lead to significantly higher estimates than literal versions of the same utterances.

Method

Participants

Thirty-seven undergraduate students from a large public university participated in this experiment for course credit. They were all native speakers of English.

Materials

Forty scenario and question pairs were written. Each scenario consisted of one to two opening lines (e.g., “Kayla was complaining to her husband, Dylan, that he never did anything romantic for her”) followed by an utterance made by one of the characters. There was a literal version (e.g., “Kayla said, `My boss got roses from her husband' ”) and hyperbolic version (e.g., “Kayla said, `My boss got a truckload of roses from her husband' ”) of each utterance. The question that followed each scenario asked for an estimate of the quantity (i.e., number) or magnitude (e.g., size, duration) referenced in the scenario (e.g., “How many individual flowers do you think Kayla's boss got?”). Immediately following each question, participants were reminded how they should respond to the question (i.e., “Please express your answer as a whole number”). The order of the scenarios was randomized, and they were distributed four scenarios to a page in an eleven-page packet. The first page of the packet provided instructions, which included a sample scenario and question.

Design

This experiment used a within-subjects design. The independent variable was utterance type (literal vs. hyperbolic) and the dependent variable was mean estimate in response to each scenario. Two questionnaire packets were used. Each packet had twenty hyperbolic utterances and twenty literal utterances. The distribution of the utterances was counterbalanced so that participants read all forty scenarios, but only one version of each utterance. The order of the pages in each packet was randomized.

Procedure

Data was collected in groups ranging from two to eleven participants. After obtaining consent, an experimenter randomly distributed one of the two versions of the packets to each participant. Twenty participants received version 1 and seventeen participants received version 2. The experimenter then read the instructions aloud to the participants and asked if there were any questions before telling the participants that they could proceed to the first page. Upon completion of the experiment, participants were provided with a debriefing form that explained the purpose of the study.

Results and Discussion

Data were separated by utterance type and responses that were three standard deviations above or below the mean estimate for each scenario were removed. For this experiment, eleven responses (representing 1.49% of the data) for the hyperbolic utterances and ten responses (representing 1.35% of the data) for the literal utterances were removed.

Paired samples t-tests were conducted with participants (tj) and items (t₂) as random variables. As predicted, participants gave significantly higher estimates in response to hyperbolic (M = 0.43, SD = 0.43) compared to literal utterances (M = -0.42, SD = 0.22), tj(36) = 11.58, p < .01; t₂(39) = -13.95, p < .01. Experiment 1 provided evidence for the most basic claim that people exposed to hyperbole generate estimates of what occurred in the real world and these estimates substantially exceed those generated in response to literal versions of the same utterances.

Table 1. Sample Results of Experiment 1: Mean Estimates in Response to Literal and Hyperbolic Versions of the Same Utterances

Method

Participants

Twenty-seven undergraduate students from a large public university participated in this experiment for course credit. They were all native speakers of English.

Materials

Sixty scenario and question pairs were written. Thirty of the pairs were target stimuli, that used hyperbolic utterances, and thirty of the pairs were filler stimuli, that used literal utterances. Each scenario consisted of one to two opening lines (e.g., “Ashley told Nicole about her dog, Gia, and Nicole asked about Gia's size”) followed by an utterance made by one of the characters.

For the target stimuli, there was a low quantity context version (e.g., “Ashley said, `My Chihuahua weighs a ton' ”) and a high quantity context version (e.g., “Ashley said, `My Great Dane weighs a ton' ”) of each hyperbolic utterance. For the filler stimuli, there was only one context (e.g., “Ben said, `At the Berry's house, I was stung by bees' ”) for each literal utterance. The filler stimuli were included to reduce the likelihood that participants would catch on to the use of hyperbole.

The question that followed each scenario asked for an estimate of the quantity (i.e., number) or magnitude (e.g., size, duration) referenced in the scenario (e.g., “How much [in pounds] do you think Ashley's dog weighs?”). Immediately following each question, participants were reminded how they should respond to the question (i.e., “Please express your answer as a whole number”). The order of the scenarios was randomized, and they were distributed four to a page in a seventeen- page packet. The first page of the packet provided instructions, which included a sample scenario and question.

Design

This experiment used a within-subjects design. The independent variable was context type (low quantity vs. high quantity) and the dependent variable was mean estimate in response to each scenario. Two questionnaires were used. Each questionnaire had thirty target stimuli and thirty filler stimuli. Of the thirty target stimuli, fifteen used the high quantity context version and fifteen used the low quantity context version of each hyperbolic utterance. The distribution of target stimuli was counterbalanced so that participants read all thirty target scenarios, but only one version of each utterance. The order of the pages in each packet was randomized.

Procedure

Data were collected in groups ranging from five to ten participants. After obtaining consent, an experimenter randomly distributed one of the two versions of the packets to each participant. Fourteen participants received version 1 and thirteen participants received version 2. The experimenter then read the instructions aloud to the participants and asked if there were any questions before telling the participants that they could proceed to the first page. Upon completion of the experiment, participants were provided with a debriefing form that explained the purpose of the study.

Results and Discussion

Data were separated by context type and responses that were three standard deviations above or below the mean estimate for each scenario were removed. For this experiment, seven responses (representing 1.73% of the data) for the high context versions and six responses (representing 1.48% of the data) for the low context versions were removed.

Table 2. Sample Results of Experiment 2: Mean Estimates in Response to Low and High Context Versions of the Same Utterances