Left vs. right: the faces of populism in contemporary Europe and Latin America

In contrast, European right-wing populism's skepticism towards globalization and supranational entities primarily centers around issues of national sovereignty and cultural identity [70; 71]. European right-wing populists often perceive globalization as a threat to national identity and job security, with particular animosity directed towards the European Union, which they argue undermines national sovereignty through supranational governance. Parties like the UK's UKIP under Nigel Farage have capitalized on these sentiments, advocating for a return to national sovereignty and stricter controls on immigration as a means of protecting national culture and the economy [72]. The Brexit referendum in the UK is a quintessential manifestation of this trend, where the desire to reclaim control over national borders and laws was a driving force.

These contrasting attitudes towards globalization and supranational entities can be understood within the broader context of each region's integration into the global economy and political order. Latin American left-wing populism's opposition to globalization is informed by a desire to redress historical patterns of exploitation and dependency, whereas European right-wing populism's skepticism is more rooted in preserving national sovereignty and cultural homogeneity in the face of global and regional integration processes.

The divergence in immigration policies between Latin American left-wing populism and European right-wing populism is a reflection of their distinct socio-political landscapes and historical contexts.

In Latin America, left-wing populist regimes generally have not made immigration a central issue in their political rhetoric or policy agenda, in stark contrast to their European counterparts [73]. This difference is partly due to the varying nature of immigration patterns in these regions. In Latin America, immigration has often involved regional migration, with countries experiencing both emigration and immigration. The discourse around immigration in Latin America has historically been less charged than in Europe, as the concerns have often been more about emigration and the treatment of their citizens in foreign countries, particularly in the United States and Europe [74].

In contrast, right-wing populism in Europe has frequently placed immigration at the forefront of its agenda. European right-wing populist parties and leaders have capitalized on public anxieties about immigration, particularly in the context of the refugee crisis and migration from Muslim-majority countries [75; 76]. Parties like the Alternative for Germany (AfD), and Italy's League have all espoused stringent anti-immigration policies. They frame immigration as a threat to national identity, economic stability, and social cohesion [77]. This stance is often coupled with Eurosceptic sentiments, criticizing the European Union's immigration and asylum policies as infringements on national sovereignty.

The contrasting approaches to immigration can be attributed to the different economic conditions, social structures, and historical experiences with immigration in these regions. In Latin America, the narrative around immigration is more about diaspora and regional mobility, often lacking the urgency and alarmist tones found in European right-wing populist discourse. In Europe, however, the recent surge in immigration, particularly during the refugee crisis, has ignited debates about national identity, cultural integration, and security, which right-wing populists have effectively used to mobilize support.

The relationship of left-wing populism in Latin America and right-wing populism in Europe with democratic institutions and the rule of law reveals significant contrasts, shaped by their respective political cultures and historical contexts.

Latin American left-wing populism has often been characterized by a contentious relationship with existing democratic institutions and the rule of law. Leaders like Hugo Chavez in Venezuela and Evo Morales in Bolivia have been accused of consolidating power by weakening checks and balances, including the judiciary and legislative bodies, and by manipulating electoral processes to maintain their grip on power [4]. This concentration of power is often justified as necessary for implementing broad social and economic reforms against entrenched elite interests. However, critics argue that such moves undermine democratic norms and lead to authoritarianism.

These populist regimes have also been involved in reshaping constitutions to align with their ideological perspectives, further entrenching their authority and sometimes enabling indefinite re-elections [78].

In Europe, right-wing populism also poses challenges to democratic institutions and the rule of law, albeit in different ways. European rightwing populists, such as those in the Alternative for Germany (AfD) or the Freedom Party of Austria (FPO), often gain influence within the existing democratic framework. They typically do not seek to dismantle democratic institutions outright but have been known to challenge the independence of the judiciary, undermine press freedom, and erode norms of political civility and discourse. In countries like Hungary and Poland, where right-wing populists have gained significant control, there have been notable efforts to restrict judicial independence and media freedoms, raising concerns about democratic backsliding [79; 36].

The populist challenge to democratic institutions and the rule of law in both regions stems partly from their portrayal of the existing system as corrupt and unresponsive to the people's needs. In Latin America, this is often framed as a struggle against oligarchic structures and foreign interference, while in Europe, it is more about national sovereignty and resistance to perceived overreach by supranational bodies like the European Union. However, the impacts on democratic institutions and the rule of law vary. In Latin America, left-wing populists have at times radically altered the political system and governance structures, while in Europe, right-wing populists often operate within the existing system, seeking to shift policies and discourse rather than overhaul the system entirely.

The foreign policy orientations of left-wing populism in Latin America and right-wing populism in Europe reflect their distinct ideological underpinnings and regional contexts, highlighting divergent approaches to international relations and global engagement.

In Latin America, left-wing populist regimes have typically pursued foreign policies centered on regional solidarity, anti-imperialism, and resistance to neoliberal global economic policies [80]. This approach is deeply rooted in the historical context of the region, marked by experiences of colonialism and U.S. interventions. Leaders of Venezuela and Bolivia sought to forge alliances based on ideological affinity, as seen in the creation of organizations like ALBA (Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America). These alliances aimed to counterbalance the influence of traditional Western powers and international financial institutions like the IMF and World Bank, which are often viewed as perpetuators of economic dependency. The foreign policy rhetoric of these leaders frequently emphasized themes of Latin American unity, sovereignty, and a collective resistance to economic and political pressures from more developed countries [82; 80].

Contrastingly, European right-wing populism's foreign policy orientation is primarily characterized by Euroscepticism, skepticism towards multilateralism, and a strong emphasis on national sovereignty. Parties such as the UK Independence Party (UKIP), and Italy's League have been critical of the European Union, advocating for a reclamation of national decision-making authority from Brussels. This stance reflects broader concerns about national identity, cultural preservation, and economic autonomy in the face of globalization and European integration. While not necessarily isolationist, these parties often favor bilateral over multilateral agreements, viewing the latter as constraints on national sovereignty. The Brexit vote in the UK is a quintessential example of this trend, where the desire for national autonomy in legislative and immigration matters trumped the perceived benefits of EU membership.

The rhetoric and communication style of populists, whether in Latin America's left-wing or Europe's right-wing spheres, play a crucial role in mobilizing support and shaping public discourse. Despite their ideological differences, both forms of populism share certain rhetorical strategies, yet they apply them in distinct ways reflective of their unique political and cultural contexts.

Latin American left-wing populists typically employ a rhetoric that revolves around social justice, equality, and anti-imperialism. Their narrative often positions the populace against the `elite' or external forces, such as multinational corporations or foreign governments, portrayed as oppressors or exploiters [83]. This rhetoric is rooted in the region's history of colonialism and economic inequality, using charismatic and passionate rhetorical expressions to appeal to the common people. Their communication often involved direct engagement with the public through frequent broadcasts and speeches, aiming to establish a connection with the populace while bypassing traditional media outlets [84; 85].

In contrast, European right-wing populists tend to employ a rhetoric that emphasizes national sovereignty, cultural identity, and a sense of lost greatness. Their discourse often frames the current socio-political situation as a decline from a once- great past, attributing this decline to factors like immigration, EU bureaucracy, or liberal policies [86]. Leaders such as Viktor Orban in Hungary and Matteo Salvini in Italy have mastered the art of appealing to cultural and historical sentiments, often using provocative and polarizing language to galvanize support [87]. Right-wing populists in Europe also make extensive use of social media and alternative media channels to disseminate their message, circumventing traditional media which they often portray as part of the `corrupt elite'.

Both Latin American left-wing and European rightwing populists share a common strategy of portraying themselves as the true representatives of the people, standing against a corrupt, detached elite. They also both tend to favor a charismatic leadership style and direct, often simplistic messaging that resonates with everyday concerns of the electorate. However, the content and thematic focus of their rhetoric differ, reflecting their divergent ideological underpinnings and the specific socio-political issues prevalent in their respective regions.

The comparison of social policies between Latin American left-wing populism and European rightwing populism unveils fundamentally different priorities and approaches, reflecting their respective ideological foundations.

Latin American left-wing populists typically prioritize social policies aimed at reducing inequalities and enhancing social welfare. These policies often include increased spending on education, healthcare, and poverty alleviation programs, with a focus on empowering traditionally marginalized groups such as indigenous communities and the poor. This approach stems from the historical context of deep social and economic disparities in the region [88; 89]. For instance, in countries like Bolivia and Venezuela, governments implemented substantial social programs funded by revenues from nationalized industries. These programs aimed to redistribute wealth and provide greater social security to the populace, reflecting the populist commitment to social justice and equity.

In contrast, European right-wing populism tends to focus on social policies that emphasize traditional values and national identity, often coupled with a skepticism of social liberalism. The social policy agenda in this context may include stricter controls on immigration, policies aimed at reinforcing traditional family structures, and in some cases, rolling back certain liberal social reforms [90]. For example, the Law and Justice Party (PiS) in Poland has promoted policies that align with conservative social values, including opposition to same-sex marriage and increased support for traditional family units. In Hungary the government has implemented policies that incentivize traditional family life, such as financial benefits for large families, while maintaining a strong stance against immigration [91].

The divergence in social policies is a reflection of the contrasting ideological underpinnings of these populist movements. Latin American left-wing populism is rooted in a struggle against social and economic inequality, leading to policies that aim to uplift the lower segments of society. European rightwing populism, conversely, is driven by a desire to protect national culture and identity, often perceived as being under threat from liberal social policies and immigration. This leads to a social policy agenda that is more conservative and nationalistic.

populism political latin america

Conclusion

In concluding this analysis of leftwing populism in Latin America and right-wing populism in Europe, it is clear that these movements, while sharing a common populist label, manifest distinctly in response to their unique regional contexts. The article has demonstrated that Latin American left-wing populism, with its emphasis on social justice, economic redistribution, and opposition to neoliberalism, differs fundamentally from the right-wing populism of Europe, which prioritizes national sovereignty, cultural identity, and is often characterized by anti-immigration sentiments and Euroscepticism.

The deep dive into countries like Venezuela and Bolivia in Latin America, and the United Kingdom in Europe, has provided critical insights into howpopulism can shape national policies, impact international relations, and redefine political discourse. The study has shown that populism, regardless of its ideological leaning, tends to emerge in times of significant social, economic, and political upheaval, offering simple solutions to complex problems and often challenging the status quo. One of the key findings of this research is the impact of populism on democratic institutions and the rule of law. In Latin America, populist regimes have often led to the erosion of democratic norms and institutions, while in Europe, right-wing populism has challenged the principles of liberal democracy and the post-war consensus on European integration. This has significant implications for the future of democratic governance and the liberal international order. Additionally, the study has highlighted the role of charismatic leadership in populism, the utilization of direct communication channels to bypass traditional media, and the framing of populist narratives that resonate with a significant portion of the population. These tactics, while effective in garnering support, often lead to increased polarization and social division.

As the global political landscape continues to evolve, it is imperative to monitor the trajectory of populist movements. Future research should focus on understanding the long-term impacts of populism on social cohesion, economic stability, and international cooperation. There is also a need to explore the potential for populist movements to adapt and change in response to new global challenges, such as climate change, technological advancements, and shifting geopolitical dynamics.

References

1. J.-W. Muller, “What Is Populism?” Jan. 2016.

2. M.D. Witte, “Populism is a political problem that is putting democracy at risk, Stanford scholars say”. Mar. 2020. [Online].

3. K. Weyland, “Latin American Neopopulism”, Third World Quarterly, vol. 24, ¹ 6, pp. 1095-1115, Dec. 2003,

4. S. Levitsky and J. Loxton, “Populism and competitive authoritarianism in the Andes”, Democratization, vol. 20, ¹ 1, pp. 107-136, Jan. 2013

5. M. Shifter, “In Search of Hugo Chavez”, Foreign Affairs, vol. 85, ¹ 3, pp. 45-45, Jan. 2006

6. M. Hidalgo, “Hugo Chavez's `Petro-socialism,'” Journal of Democracy, vol. 20, ¹ 2, pp. 78-92, Jan. 2009

7. S. Ellner, “Chavez Pushes the Limits: Radicalization and Discontent in Venezuela”, NACLA Report on the Americas, vol. 43, ¹ 4, pp. 7-12, Jul. 2010,

8. “Economic policy of the Nicolas Maduro administration - Wikipedia”. Jun. 2014. [Online].

9. G. Hetland, “The Promise and Perils of Radical Left Populism: The Case of Venezuela”, Journal of World- Systems Research, vol. 24, ¹ 2, pp. 277-292, Aug. 201

10. S. Anria, “Social Movements, Party Organization, and Populism: Insights from the Bolivian MAS”, Latin American Politics and Society, vol. 55, ¹ 03, pp. 19-46, Jan. 2013

11. D.L. Hicks, B. Maldonado, B. Piper, A.G. Rios, “Identity, Patronage, and Redistribution: Economic Inequality in Bolivia under Evo Morales”, Journal of Economics, Race, and Policy, vol. 1, ¹ 1, pp. 26-41, Jul. 2018,

12. A. Augsburger, “The Struggle for Hegemony and the Articulation of Plurinationality: Contrasting Visions of Social Change and State Transformation in Bolivia's Proceso de Cambio”, Jan. 2018, [Online].

13. L. Wehner, C.G. Thies, “The nexus of populism and foreign policy: The case of Latin America”, International Relations, vol. 35, ¹ 2, pp. 320-340, Jul. 2020,

14. B. Bull, F.S. Lopez, “Elites y populistas: los casos de Venezuela y Ecuador”, Iberoamericana: Nordic Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Studies, vol. 49, ¹ 1, pp. 96-106, Jan. 2020

15. C.M. Conaghan, C. de la Torre, “The Permanent Campaign of Rafael Correa: Making Ecuador's Plebiscitary Presidency”, The International Journal of Press/Politics, vol. 13, ¹ 3, pp. 267-284, Jul. 2008

16. C.D.L. Torre, “Populist Playbook: The Slow Death of Democracy in Correa's Ecuador | World Politics Review”. Mar. 2015. [Online].

17. K. Weiland, “Why Latin America Is Becoming Less Democratic - The Atlantic”, Jul. 2013, [Online].

18. O.E. do Amaral, T.J. Power, “The PT at 35: Revisiting Scholarly Interpretations of the Brazilian Workers' Party”, Journal of Latin American Studies, vol. 48, ¹ 1, pp. 147-171, Dec. 2015,

19. P.C. Paiva, “Lula's Political Economy: Changes and Challenges”, The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. 606, ¹ 1, pp. 196-215, Jul. 2006,

20. R. Roett, “Toodle-oo, Lula: Brazil Looks Forward with Dilma”, Current history, vol. 110, ¹ 733, pp. 43-48, Feb. 2011,

21. “Impeachment of Dilma Rousseff - Wikipedia”. Apr. 2016. [Online].

22. K. Hochstetler and M. Oliveira, “Old Ways and New Alternatives in Brazilian Politics”, Current history, vol. 114, ¹ 769, pp. 62-67, Feb. 2015,

23. M. Fernandez, J. de Diego, “Un devenir populista: comunicacion polrtica y mediatizacion en el kirchnerismo”, DeSignis, ¹ 31, pp. 271-282, Jul. 2019,

24. C. Wylde, “State, Society and Markets in Argentina: The Political Economy of Neodesarrollismo under Nestor Kirchner, 2003-2007”, Mar. 2011,

25. L. Trujillo, “La Argentina kirchnerista: Alcances y limites de una experiencia democratica sobre la distribucion del ingreso (2003-2015)”, Polis (santiago), vol. 16, ¹ 46, pp. 99-126, Apr. 2017,

26. A. Margheritis, “Politics and Policy in Contemporary Argentina”, Oxford Bibliographies Online Datasets. Apr. 2013.

27. A. Malamud, “Argentine Foreign Policy Under the Kirchners: Ideological, Pragmatic, or Simply Peronist?”, Palgrave Macmillan US eBooks. pp. 87-102, Jan. 2011.

28. W.A. Gaston, “The rise of European populism and the collapse of the center-left | Brookings”, Mar. 2018, [Online].

29. S.B. Hobolt, “The Brexit vote: a divided nation, a divided continent”, Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 23, ¹ 9, pp. 1259-1277, Sep. 2016,

30. A. Martinelli, “National Populism and the European Union”, Populism, vol. 1, ¹ 1, pp. 59-71, Sep. 2018,

31. A. Noury, G. Roland, “Identity Politics and Populism in Europe”, Annual Review of Political Science, vol. 23, ¹ 1, pp. 421-439, May 2020,

32. A. Benvenuti, “Between myth and reality: the euro crisis and the downfall of Silvio Berlusconi”, Journal of Modern Italian Studies, vol. 22, ¹ 4, pp. 512-529, Aug. 2017,

33. R. D'Alimonte, “How the Populists won in Italy”, Journal of Democracy, vol. 30, ¹ 1, pp. 114-127, Jan. 2019,

34. M. Caiani, “The populist parties and their electoral success: different causes behind different populisms? The case of the Five-star Movement and the League”, Contemporary Italian Politics, vol. 11, ¹ 3, pp. 236-250, Jul. 2019,

35. T.S. Pappas, “Populist Democracies: Post-Authoritarian Greece and Post-Communist Hungary”, Government and Opposition, vol. 49, ¹ 1, pp. 1-23, Jul. 2013

36. M.F. Plattner, “Illiberal Democracy and the Struggle on the Right”, Journal of Democracy, vol. 30, ¹ 1, pp. 5-19, Jan. 2019,

37. B. Vezjak, “Axis of illiberalism | Eurozine”, Jul. 2018, [Online].

38. A. Tremlett and V. Messing, “Hungary's future: anti-immigration, anti-multiculturalism and anti-Roma?”, Aug. 2015, [Online].

39. F. Vegetti, “The Political Nature of Ideological Polarization: The Case of Hungary”, The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. 681, ¹ 1, pp. 78-96, Dec. 2018,

40. F. Melito, “Finding the roots of neo-traditionalist populism in Poland: `Cultural displacement' and European integration”, New Perspectives, vol. 29, ¹ 1, pp. 23-44, Sep. 2020,

41. M. Kotwas, J. Kubik, “Symbolic Thickening of Public Culture and the Rise of Right-Wing Populism in Poland”, East European Politics and Societies, vol. 33, ¹ 2, pp. 435-471, Apr. 2019,

42. W. Sadurski, “How Democracy Dies (in Poland): A Case Study of Anti-Constitutional Populist Backsliding”, Social Science Research Network, Jan. 2018,

43. C. Ryzak, “The Law and Justice Party's Moral Pseudo-Revolution”, Dissent, vol. 67, ¹ 4, pp. 138-147, Jan. 2020,

44. S. Sierakowski, “Poland's Populist Party Keeps Winning Thanks to Its Welfare State Model”, Oct. 2019, [Online].

45. A.J. McGann, H. Kitschelt, “The Radical Right in The Alps”, Party Politics, vol. 11, ¹ 2, pp. 147-171, Mar. 2005,

46. M. Rooduijn, “The Rise of the Populist Radical Right in Western Europe”, European View, vol. 14, ¹ 1, pp. 3-11, Jun. 2015,

47. D. Thiele, B. Sauer, and O. Penz, “Right-wing populist affective governing: a frame analysis of Austrian parliamentary debates on migration”, Patterns of Prejudice, vol. 55, ¹ 5, pp. 457-477, Oct. 2021,

48. R. Heinisch, A. Werner, F. Habersack, “Reclaiming national sovereignty: the case of the conservatives and the far right in Austria”, vol. 21, ¹ 2, pp. 163-181, Jun. 2019

49. A. Hunt, “UKIP: The story of the UK Independence Party's rise - BBC News”, Nov. 2014, [Online].

50. E. Fieldhouse et al., “EU Accession Immigration and the Rise of UKIP”, Oxford University Press eBooks. pp. 74-93, Dec. 2019.

51. T. Bale, “Who leads and who follows? The symbiotic relationship between UKIP and the Conservatives - and populism and Euroscepticism”, Politics, vol. 38, ¹ 3, pp. 263-277, Feb. 2018,

52. H.D. Clarke, M. Goodwin, P. Whiteley, “Why Britain Voted for Brexit: An Individual-Level Analysis of the 2016 Referendum Vote”, Parliamentary Affairs, vol. 70, ¹ 3, pp. 439-464, Apr. 2017,

53. M. Freeden, “After the Brexit referendum: revisiting populism as an ideology”, Journal of Political Ideologies, vol. 22, ¹ 1, pp. 1-11, Dec. 2016,

54. T.W. Chan, M. Henderson, M. Sironi, J. Kawalerowicz, “Understanding the social and cultural bases of Brexit*”, The British Journal of Sociology, vol. 71, ¹ 5, pp. 830-851, Oct. 2020,

55. G. A. Flores-Madas, “Statist vs. Pro-Market: Explaining Leftist Governments' Economic Policies in Latin America”, Comparative politics, vol. 42, ¹ 4, pp. 413-433, Jul. 2010,

56. S. Edwards, “Protectionism and Latin America's historical economic decline”, Journal of Policy Modeling, vol. 31, ¹ 4, pp. 573-584, Jul. 2009

57. G. Leon, “Strategic redistribution: The political economy of populism in Latin America”, European Journal of Political Economy, vol. 34, pp. 39-51, Jun. 2014

58. L. Ennser-Jedenastik, “Welfare Chauvinism in Populist Radical Right Platforms: The Role of Redistributive Justice Principles”, Social Policy & Administration, vol. 52, ¹ 1, pp. 293-314, Jun. 2017

59. D. Swank, H.-G. Betz, “Globalization, the welfare state and right-wing populism in Western Europe”, Socio-Economic Review, vol. 1, ¹ 2, pp. 215-245, May 2003

60. D. Rodrik, “Populism and the economics of globalization”, Journal of International Business Policy, vol. 1, ¹ 1-2, pp. 12-33, Feb. 2018,

61. C. Mudde, C.R. Kaltwasser, “Exclusionary vs. Inclusionary Populism: Comparing Contemporary Europe and Latin America”, vol. 48, ¹ 02, pp. 147-173, Apr. 2013

62. N. Miller, “The historiography of nationalism and national identity in Latin America”, Nations and Nationalism, vol. 12, ¹ 2, pp. 201-221, Mar. 2006,

63. R.L. Madrid, “The Rise of Ethnopopulism in Latin America”, World Politics, vol. 60, ¹ 3, pp. 475-508, Apr. 2008

64. S. Warren, “Latin American Identity Politics: Redefining Citizenship”, Sociology Compass, vol. 6, ¹ 10, pp. 833-844, Sep. 2012

65. J.F. Siekmeier, “Nationalism and Globalization in Latin America”, Current history, vol. 114, ¹ 769, pp. 68-72, Feb. 2015,

66. C. Postelnicescu, “Europe's new identity: The refugee crisis and the rise of nationalism”, Europe's Journal of Psychology, vol. 12, ¹ 2, pp. 203-209, May 2016

67. R. Wodak, S. Boukala, “European identities and the revival of nationalism in the European Union”, Journal of Language and Politics, vol. 14, ¹ 1, pp. 87-109, May 2015,

68. B.R. Roth, S.F. Lean, “A Bolivarian Alternative? The New Latin American Populism Confronts the Global Order”, Cambridge University Press eBooks. pp. 221-248, Apr. 2015.

69. C. de la Torre, “A Populist International?: ALBA's Democratic and Autocratic Promotion”, The SAIS review of international affairs, vol. 37, ¹ 1, pp. 83-93, Jan. 2017

70. R. Cuperus, “The Populist Revolt against Globalisation”, DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals), Jun. 2017, [Online]

71. A. Zaslove, “Exclusion, Community, and a Populist Political Economy: The Radical Right as an AntiGlobalization Movement”, Comparative European Politics, vol. 6, ¹ 2, pp. 169-189, Jun. 2008

72. L. Peitz, K. Dhont, and B. Seyd, “The Psychology of Supranationalism: Its Ideological Correlates and Implications for EU Attitudes and post-Brexit Preferences”, Political Psychology, vol. 39, ¹ 6, pp. 1305-1322, Dec. 2018,

73. D. Acosta, “Free Movement in South America: The Emergence of an Alternative Model?” Aug. 2016. [Online].

74. D.A. Arcarazo, L.F. Freier, “Turning the Immigration Policy Paradox Upside Down? Populist Liberalism and Discursive Gaps in South America”, International Migration Review, vol. 49, ¹ 3, pp. 659-696, Sep. 2015

75. J.F. Downes, M. Loveless, A.H.W. Lam, “The Looming Refugee Crisis in the EU: Right-Wing Party Competition and Strategic Positioning”, JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 59, ¹ 5, pp. 1103-1123, Feb. 2021,

76. L. Hadj-Abdou, T. Bale, A. Geddes, “Centre-right parties and immigration in an era of politicisation”, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, vol. 48, ¹ 2, pp. 327-340, Feb. 2021,

77. B. Podobnik, M. Jusup, D. Kovac, H.E. Stanley, “Predicting the Rise of EU Right-Wing Populism in Response to Unbalanced Immigration”, Complexity, vol. 2017, pp. 1-12, Jan. 2017

78. X.V.V. Guachalla, C. Hummel, “Latin America Erupts: When Does Competitive Authoritarianism Take Root?”, Journal of Democracy, vol. 32, ¹ 3, pp. 63-77, Jan. 2021,

79. W.A. Galston, “The Populist Challenge to Liberal Democracy”, Journal of Democracy, vol. 29, ¹ 2, pp. 5-19, Jan. 2018,

80. G.L. Gardini, P. Lambert, “Latin American Foreign Policies”, Palgrave Macmillan US eBooks. Jan. 2011.

81. L. Vitor, “Strategie venezuelienne d'accord sur l'ALBA face a l'expansion commerciale Etats-Unis d'Amerique latine”, International Journal of Science and Society, vol. 3, ¹ 4, pp. 153-166, Dec. 2021,

82. S. Waisbord, A. Amado, “Populist communication by digital means: presidential Twitter in Latin America”, Information, Communication & Society, vol. 20, ¹ 9, pp. 1330-1346, May 2017,

83. K. Weyland et al., Populism in Latin America: Second Edition. Tuscaloosa: The University of Alabama Press, 2012. Accessed: Jan. 27, 2024. [Online].

84. E. Block, R. Negrine, “The populist communication style: toward a critical framework”, International Journal of Communication, vol. 11, pp. 178-197, 2017.

85. M. Ekstrom, M. Patrona, and J. Thornborrow, “Right-wing populism and the dynamics of style: a discourse- analytic perspective on mediated political performances”, Palgrave Communications, vol. 4, ¹ 1, Jul. 2018,

86. G. Bobba and D. McDonnell, “Different Types of Right-Wing Populist Discourse in Government and Opposition: The Case of Italy”, South European Society and Politics, vol. 21, ¹ 3, pp. 281-299, Jul. 2016,

87. H.L. Pase, C.C. Melo, “Polfficas pOblicas de transference de renda na America Latina”, Revista de administragao publica, vol. 51, ¹ 2, pp. 312-329, Mar. 2017,

88. M.A.G. Rodriguez, C.W.G. Cardenas, J.F. Socarras, J.B. Lucca, “El metodo comparado y el estudio de las polfficas sociales en America Latina y el Caribe”, Revista Latinoamericana de Metodologta de las Ciencias Sociales, vol. 8, ¹ 2, pp. e044-e044, Dec. 2018,

89. M. Fenger, “The social policy agendas of populist radical right parties in comparative perspective”, vol. 34, ¹ 3, pp. 188-209, Oct. 2018,

90. G. Meardi, I. Guardiancich, “Back to the familialist future: the rise of social policy for ruling populist radical right parties in Italy and Poland”, West European Politics, vol. 45, ¹ 1, pp. 129-153, May 2021,

Ðàçìåùåíî íà Allbest.ru