The Historical Evolution of Russophilia in Europe: a Study of the Development and Transformation of Positive Attitudes Towards Russia

Contemporary History: “Razvyazka”

The level of European sympathy towards Russia following the dissolution of the USSR has exhibited variations across different countries and time periods. Although it is challenging to make sweeping generalizations encompassing an entire continent, discernible trends have emerged. Initially, there was a sense of optimism and anticipation for democratic reforms and closer integration with the Western world in the aftermath of the USSR's collapse. However, subsequent developments have contributed to a decline in sympathy for Russia within Europe. Besides, internal political dynamics in Russia, including the consolidation of power under President Vladimir Putin, the curtailment of democratic institutions, and concerns regarding human rights violations, have engendered doubts and skepticism among European nations. The divergence in values and governance between Russia and many European countries, particularly concerning democratic principles, rule of law, and freedom of expression, has fostered a growing disillusionment and a waning of sympathy. It should be noted that these trends are not universally applicable and differ among individual countries and contexts. Furthermore, public sentiment is subject to fluctuations over time, influenced by evolving geopolitical circumstances and events.

Germany

According to a study conducted by the Pew Research Center, 47 percent of people in modern Germany do not like the United States Stokes B. Which countries don't like America and which do. Pew Research Center. 2014, July 15. URL: https://pewrsr.ch/49t26Ag. Of course, the fact that 47 percent of the population of a country where 21 NATO military bases are located Knight B. US military in Germany: What you need to know. Deutsche Welle. 2020, June 16. URL:

https://www.dw.com/en/us-military-in-germany-what-you-need-to-know/a-49998340, which is the basis of the military defense force, harbors antipathy towards the founding state of NATO, indicates both the modern relics of the communist past of this country, and also requires us to look at the current sociological situation in Germany from a different perspective. It should also be noted that since we are looking at the issue from the aspect of russophilia, we do not take into account the influence of the history of US-German relations on these statistics. According to a study conducted by the Pew Research Center, 47 percent of people in modern Germany do not like the United States Stokes B. Which countries don't like America.... Of course, the fact that 47 percent of the population of a country where 21 NATO military bases are located Knight B. US military in Germany., which is the basis of the military defense force, harbors antipathy towards the founding state of NATO, indicates both the modern relics of the communist past of this country, and also requires us to look at the current sociological situation in Germany from a different perspective. It should also be noted that since we are looking at the issue from the aspect of russophilia, we do not take into account the influence of the history of US- German relations on these statistics.

In addition, the German Communist Party also has a great role in preventing the weakening of russophilia in modern Germany. Although from the 1990s until now, the party has not had a significant influence and has regularly lost elections, it is still on the rise in recent years. If we pay attention to the difference between the statistics of 2009 and 2021, we see that the votes received by the Communist Party in the Bundestag elections increased more than 8 times in 12 years The Federal Returning Officer. Bundestag election 2021. The Federal Returning Officer. URL: https://www.bundeswahlleiter.de/en/bundestagswahlen/2021/ergebnisse/bund-99.html. Considering that the communist parties are the main pillars of the Russian government's foreign expansion in modern times, we can claim that this pillar is getting stronger in Germany year by year.

Italy

Continuity in warm relations established during the Soviet era has persisted between Italy and its successor, the Russian Federation. Particularly notable were the strategic cooperation ties forged during the rule of Berlusconi, which have left a lasting impact evident even in present times Roberts H. Italy and Russia.... Italy currently harbors a significant presence of Eurosceptic and anti-NATO political factions, colloquially referred to as the “Russian party” Caselli I. Why Italy Is The Most Pro-Russian Country In The West. World Crunch. 2022, June 14. URL: https://worldcrunch.com/world-affairs/italy-support-russia. Undeniably, the growth in popularity of these politicians correlates with the deepening of relations with Russia. Empirical research further suggests that if a referendum were to take place in Italy, there is a distinct possibility of the country withdrawing from the European Union Roberts H. Italy and Russia.. It is important to acknowledge that certain factors underpinning Italian society's Euroscepticism have gradually bolstered these politicians over the years.

In addition to the above, we can see the results of the cultural expansion of Russia in Italy. Russia's 2013 and 2016 foreign policy concepts described soft power as an integral element in achieving its foreign goals. From this point of view, the cultural activities in Italy can be explained as a part of this policy in order to strengthen russophilia at the international level. In addition, Russia's special “care” for Italy during the COVID-19 pandemic and its extensive coverage in the Italian media also played a special role in the development of russophilia in Italy Caselli I. Why Italy Is The Most Pro-Russian Country In The West..

At the same time, there are many Russlandversteher in Italy Iacoboni J. Italy: Putin's Biggest European Friend? CEPA. 2022, February 23. URL:

https://cepa.org/article/italy-putins-biggest-european-friend/. This social group, which has influence in many areas of cultural, academic and media life, has an exceptional role in the formation of Russophile generations in the country. Even in recent years in Italy, the concept of “Putin's Wisdom” is often used by this social group Ibid., and this concept is an important element of Russophile propaganda.

Poland

Following the demise of communism, Poland underwent a rapid and transformative shift toward a market economy, characterized by profound changes. This swift transition propelled Poland, which had long been aligned with the USSR, to become one of the early supporters of Ukraine's independence from the Soviet Union Mick C. Ukraine and Poland: why the countries fell out in the past, and are now closely allied. The Conversation. 2022, June 15. Retrieved from: https://bit.ly/3SyemJQ. Over time, attitudes toward Russia within the country have evolved and deteriorated. Factors such as the proliferation of capitalism, the impact of globalization under the influence of the United States, and the assertive foreign policies pursued by successive Russian governments have contributed to a negative stance toward Russia, particularly among the younger generation of Poles. Presently, the majority of Poles identify themselves as European and perceive their nation as an integral part of Europe. Within Poland, there exists a profound animosity towards Russia, particularly in response to Putin's aggressive actions. Nonetheless, a segment of the population, particularly the elderly and those influenced by familial nostalgia, still maintain a fondness for Russia.

Based on a survey conducted in June 2022, a mere 2% of Poles identify as Russophiles, even during a period when Russia's standing in Europe has reached its nadir Tilles D. Only 2% of Poles view Russia favourably, lowest of any country in global study. Notes From Poland. 2022, June 22. URL: https://bit.ly/3QN0HgC. Although this proportion may appear modest at first sight, it corresponds to approximately 760,000 individuals within the Polish population, constituting a considerable electorate. It is worth noting that this figure represents a historic low, primarily attributable to Russia's military intervention in Ukraine, and there is a possibility that this proportion may have been higher in previous years.

Balkans

Following the dissolution of Yugoslavia, Serbia has emerged as a significant political stronghold for Russia in Europe. The close political, economic, and military ties between Serbia and the Russian Federation have undoubtedly influenced the propaganda efforts of both governments. Notably, Serbia has refrained from joining the sanctions imposed on Russia during the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, a stance that finds support among a substantial segment of the Serbian population. Consequently, alongside historical, ethnic, and linguistic affinities, the presence of shared political and military interests has contributed to the persistence of a high level of russophilia in modern Serbia. Paradoxically, while the country aspires to join the European Union, it also maintains its alignment within Russia's sphere of influence. This reality has resulted in a sociological division within the Serbian population. The first group identifies as European-oriented and considers themselves part of the European community, while the second group aligns with Russophile politics, emphasizing their Slavic heritage. A similar dichotomy exists in other countries of the former Yugoslavia, although the proportion of those identifying as European-oriented is significantly higher elsewhere, indicating a more pronounced divergence. However, in the case of Serbia, the difference between these two groups is not substantial Filipovic B. Pro-Russia Serbs march in Belgrade as country treads ever finer line between East and West. Reuters. 2022, March 5. URL: https://reut.rs/3MxjY3i.

Greece

Greece, which gained its independence from the Ottoman Empire with the help of the Russian state, is currently a NATO country. However, there is almost no spiritual value that binds it to the organization. The main reason behind the Greeks' membership of NATO is the security problem. The security opportunities that NATO can offer to Greece caused it to be included in the organization Ozturk B. Greece violates the spirit of NATO but alliance partners look away. TRT World. 2022, September 8. URL: https://bit.ly/3QPEZIQ. However, Greece is the only NATO country that has an official military alliance with Russia. Except that Turkey has approached

Russia in recent years and signed some military agreements, it has no military solidarity with Russia dating back to old years. However, Greece is both a NATO country and a Russian military partner. In the modern era, Greece's relations with Russia are developing not only at the military level, but also at the religious and political levels. In fact, Greece's relations with Russia in the 2010s are characterized by the concept of church diplomacy Patsea E. Church diplomacy.... As a result, it is understood how great the use of religion is in the diplomatic relations between these two countries.

From this, it is understood how geopolitical events and processes can greatly affect culture and sociology. As we can see, the warm relations between Greece and Russia bring the Greek people closer to Russia Силенко И. За что греки так любят Путина. Rua.gr. 2022, 4 апреля. URL:

https://rua.gr/news/sobmn/47321-za-chto-greki-tak-lyubyat-putina.html. Of course, the course of history also has a great influence here. Greek history lessons taught in schools and universities told the Greeks that they had historically good relations with Russia, that the transition of the Russians to orthodoxy was based on the Greeks, that the independence of Greece from the Ottoman Empire was achieved with Russian support, as well as the Greek civil war that coincided with the years of the Second World War. It is taught that the concern and support of Russia at the time was at a high level Avdela E. The Teaching of History in Greece. Journal of Modern Greek Studies. 2000. № 18 (2). P. 239-253.. Therefore, studying history in this direction helps to create a great Russian admiration and Russian sympathy in Greece.

Presently, Russia's military intervention in Ukraine has engendered divisions within Greece. However, a significant majority opposes a deterioration of relations with Russia. Surveys indicate that 67% of Greeks are against Greece supplying weapons to Ukraine, while 65% believe that Greece should maintain neutrality amidst the ongoing turmoil. Furthermore, over one-third of respondents do not view Russia's military intervention in Ukraine as an invasion Simon D. Why Putin has so many fans in Greece. Neoskosmos. 2022, April 3. URL:

https://neoskosmos.com/en/2022/04/03/sport/sport-opinion/why-putin-has-so-many-fans-in-greece/. These findings illuminate the existence of deep-rooted russophilia within the country.

The expansion of russophilia in Greece can be attributed to various factors, including the influence of the Greek Communist Party. In recent years, the party has experienced significant electoral gains, steadily increasing its representation in the Greek parliament Frezza B. Give Greece What It Deserves: Communism. Forbes. 2011, July 19. URL:

https://bit.ly/3MzWpqt. This trend is perceived as a further manifestation of russophilia within the country, fostering closer ties with Russia. Moreover, the current leftist government's close relationship with Russia and President Putin, coupled with systematic pro-Russian propaganda in the Greek media, serve to strengthen russophilia in Greece Simon D. Why Putin has so many fans in Greece..

Conclusion

Our study focused on investigating the origins and progression of russophilia in both Western and Eastern Europe. Through the utilization of portraiture, comparative analysis, and historical examination, we aimed to elucidate the factors contributing to the emergence and dissemination of russophilia. The findings of our research indicate that the prevalence of russophilia across European territories can primarily be attributed to the influence of communism, particularly the USSR, as well as cultural expansion. Notably, our study revealed that effective propaganda campaigns and the establishment of economic and social connections play pivotal roles in fostering profound admiration for another culture within a nation. As two peoples become more familiar with one another, accurate propaganda becomes an influential instrument in cultivating robust and positive relations between them. This phenomenon is evident in the cases of East Germany, Poland, Italy, and several other European countries examined in our research.

In addition to cultural expansion and the influence of communism, another significant factor contributing to the emergence of russophilia in Europe is ethnic kinship. This can be observed, for example, in the case of Yugoslavia. However, historical analysis reveals that ethnic kinship alone is not sufficient to foster deep cultural and political affinity. In order for ethnic kinship to evolve into integration, it must be supported by widespread propaganda that is systematically integrated into state policy. A manifestation of such propaganda can be observed in present-day Serbia, which has established closer relations with Russia compared to other former Yugoslav countries. These relations encompass various aspects, including economic and military ties.

Furthermore, the historical dynamics indicate that the severity of economic recessions in Europe has often accelerated the convergence of European societies towards communist ideology. Consequently, nostalgia for communism has become another driving force behind the strengthening of russophilia in Europe. Countries such as Germany, Poland, and Serbia, among others, have experienced an extended period under communist rule, particularly among the middle-aged and older generations. The positive aspects of the former communist systems still influence these individuals, intensifying their nostalgia for communism. This sentiment is not limited to the general electorate but is also observed among high-level politicians and bureaucrats. As a result, russophilia indirectly develops in some countries and directly in others, as the Russian-led USSR represented the most prominent bastion of communism worldwide throughout the 20th century.

Another important reason that develops russophilia under the influence of this nostalgia is that the nations share the same fate. Countries like East Germany, communist Poland, Yugoslavia and others shared the same fate as the USSR. They had the same (or similar) political ideology, lived the same (or similar) communist culture, had fraternal relations and were defeated by the capitalist USA. Through these commonalities, Russophile motifs multiply and deepen in the outlook of communist nostalgics.

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