The sovereigntist turn: sovereignty as a contested concept again

Fifteen years after the first announcement of sovereign democracy, it is evident that many of the initial sovereigntist ideologemes have become guidelines for the domestic and foreign policymaking in Russia. In President Putin's recent speech at Davos, one can see the same criticism of international law that violates people's sovereignty and of the Western core that does not respect political multilateralism (Putin 2021). Much stronger, however, were his statements in the spirit of social conservatism, notably the emphasis on caring for a population struggling with the pandemic and the associated economic crisis, on the need to support family values and privacy, and on the need to inspire demographic growth and a return to social cooperation based on traditions (Putin

2021) . These statements were made by a ruler who was successfully reelected in 2018 in nonfree and noncompetitive elections, who introduced draconian control over civil organizations through "foreign agent" legislation in 2017-2020, and who amended his country's constitution in accordance with his sovereigntist program in 2020 (OSCE ODIHR 2018; Tysiachniouk et al. 2018; European Parliament 2020; Kazun & Semykina 2020).

Probably the most visible influence of sovereigntism on Russia can be seen in the constitutional amendments of 2020. The sovereigntist constitutional amendments included the following stipulations:

1) Recognition of international obligations only if they “do not contradict the constitution of the Russian Federation” (Article 79). Here the Putinist program managed to sever the constitutional grounds for the impact of the cosmopolitan part of the concept of sovereignty. De iure, the Russian state can now be exempt from all previously ratified international human rights and civil liberties agreements that provided Russian citizens with the same sovereignty as the citizens of other nation-signatories to these agreements.

2) Prohibition of foreign citizenship or a foreign residence permit for public servants of higher categories (Articles 77 and 78). In sovereigntist logic, the ownership of foreign assets, such as an apartment, makes public officials vulnerable to foreign influence on decision-making, which in turn makes Russia less able to serve its people and thus less sovereign.

3) A ban on foreign citizenship for Russia's president and the requirement of 25 years of permanent residence in Russia prior to the election (Article 81). This also is connected with the sovereigntist strategy to promote those politicians that have minimal firsthand experience with living in other societies and dealing with other cultures.

4) References to a “thousand-year-long history”, “remembering the ancestors, their ideals and faith in God”, and “defense of historical truth” (Articles 67, 2-3). All these statements are connected with the people's sovereignty ideologeme where the people is essentialized through its historical rootedness (or the Surkovian “depth”) in Russian soil, in synthesized “local multiethnic” tradition, in traditional confessions, and in specific Eurasian genetics.

5) Provision for “the balance between civil rights and obligations, of social partnership, and of economic, political, and social solidarity” (Article 71) (Zakon 2020; Venice Commission 2020). This amendment reflects the idea that the sovereign people is at the center of relations between public and private organizations, so that solidarity gains a social conservative overtone.

Altogether these amendments have finalized the rewriting of the Russian constitution as a text based on sovereigntist legal-political imagery, which strictly differs from the liberal imagery of the constitution of 1993.¹ Instead of imagining the future, today's power elites in Russia orient their political imagery toward the past, which is defined in sociogenetic, traditionalist, and populist terms. Despite its surface conservatism, this ideology must create new and reinterpret old ideologemes in order to accommodate Russia's ideological, cultural, social, lingual, and religious diversity. So the unifying terms of “multiethnic” (mnogonatsionat'naia) tradition and people require that elites and other social groups reinterpret this multiethnicity in their own way. This sovereigntist imagery demands the participation of both the rulers and the ruled in producing the meanings of such ideological posits.

This Russian sovereigntist creativity can be seen in several sovereigntist circles that in different times were close to Vladimir Putin and his immediate entourage. I should mention first of all Vladislav Surkov's opinion paper, “The loneliness of the half-breed”. Here Surkov, who at the time of writing it was losing his political influence and moving toward the margins of active politics in Russia, analyzed the direction of Russia's “post- Crimean” For more on Liberal-modernist imaginary of the post-Soviet constitutions of Russia and other countries, see Minakov (2018: 237ff.). ^{This term is widely used in the social sciences to describe Russian politics and society after the annexation of Crimea and its consequences for Russia's political culture and regime, its international position, and relations with neighboring nations (see: Shlapentokh 2014; Fabrykant & Magun 2019).} development. According to him, Russia had launched itself on a trajectory of isolating itself from the rest of the world:

Beyond 2014 there lies an indefinitely long period, Era [20]14+, in which we are destined to a hundred years (or possibly two hundred or three hundred) of geopolitical loneliness. (Surkov 2018)

In lengthy pessimistic lines he lists several waves of Russian Westernization that never served the good of the Russian people. For example, the most recent, post-Soviet Westernization was a mistake:

We agreed to shrink. We began to worship Hayek as fiercely as we had worshiped Marx. We slashed the demographic, industrial and military potential by half. We turned our backs on the other Soviet republics and were about to say good-bye to the autonomies. . . . But even a downsized and humble Russia proved unable to negotiate the turn towards the West. Lastly, a decision was made to do away with downscaling and downsizing and, what is more, to come out with a declaration of rights. The events of 2014 were unavoidable. (Surkov 2018)

This "decision to . . . come out with a declaration of rights” also shows how the Putinists understand laws and rights: as rightfully belonging to the people, not the individual, and

to the majority (defined by Local tradition), not to minorities (who by defending their identity undermine the majority's sovereignty).

Another important part of the sovereigntist imagery is a specific genetics. Surkov stipulates Russia's cultural specificity as a “Western-Eastern half-breed nation” with a “double-headed statehood, hybrid mentality, intercontinental territory and bipolar history”, and offers the only viable solution for its development in the contemporary full world: a long strategic “geopolitical loneliness”. This loneliness is required for Russia to cease “mixing” with Others and to reidentify itself, ideologically and genetically. Understanding the impossibility of such loneliness in the full world, Surkov is forced to look for a “creative solution”: Russia is supposed to participate in international politics and trade, and should focus not on “abroad” but deep inside itself, in its “depth”, from where “a slowly traveling message from deep space has just begun to reach our ears” (Surkov 2018).

Another failed Putin ideologue, Aleksander Dugin, came up with a new sovereigntist manifesto-like document that reacted to two recent ideological events. In the first event, Klaus Schwab published a report promoting the “Great Reset” idea, which calls for a “more inclusive, more equitable and more respectful of Mother Nature” economy (Schwab & Malleret 2020). The second event was Putin's social-conservative address in Davos (Putin 2021), to which Dugin responded in an online conversation.

In his text, Dugin declares Schwab's idea to be a new liberal attempt at a “takeover of humanity's imagination” that would lead to a global economy without the use of oil and its products, and to “greener” development (Dugin 2021). Dugin's reading of Schwab's reset idea immediately discloses the sovereigntist imagery. First, he immediately stipulates that through the use of mass media and social networks, liberal globalists are to trying to impose laws that would (1) “glorify” minorities (“gender, sexual, ethnic, biological”) and (2) “demonize” national states. Second, the concepts promoted by the Club of Rome (sustainable development in a full world) means decreasing Earth's human population. Third, the decarbonized economy is designed to hit the economies of Russia, the Arab countries, and some Latin American countries; thus the new economic plan means a strike against countries opposed to the liberal international order with its cosmopolitan understanding of sovereignty. Dugin's fourth claim Is that the liberal globalists promote digitalization as a means of seeking total control over human populations through AI, robotization, and genetic mutations. And finally, the natural environment, according to the new globalist plan, is to become another form of capital itself (Dugin 2021).

Altogether, Aleksandr Dugin interprets Schwab's Great Reset proposal as paving the way to “a triumph of liberal ideology in its highest stage, the stage of globalization”, which “dooms” humankind to be liberated. To resist this kind of future, Dugin offers instead a "Great Awakening" plan, which, in his opinion, was prepared by the supporters of Donald Trump. The Great Awakening means understanding the threat that liberal globalists pose to all people who disagree with liberal principles and the principles of cosmopolitan sovereignty:

'The Great Awakening' is the insight that modern liberalism in the stage of globalization has become a real dictatorship, has become a totalitarian ideology that denies-like any other totalitarianism-the right to have any point of view different from the dominant one. (Dugin 2021)

The manifesto ends with the description of today's world as the scene of an approaching war between globalists and their liberal supporters in each nation-state, on one side, against those who, like Putin, support "the people's" sovereignty, on the other side.

The Putinist understanding of sovereignty has both reactionary and creative elements that, unlike in the Trumpist case, have had an impact on Russia's domestic and foreign policy for about fifteen years, at least since 2006. President Putin's endless reign has resulted in the wide spreading of sovereigntist beliefs that have affected not only Russia's political institutions but also its political culture. This profound influence can be seen both in the constitutional amendments themselves and in the popular support for these changes,¹ or in the sovereigntist imagery of the Russian mainstream creative class. According to official data, 68% of Russian registered voters participated in the referendum on the constitutional amendments in 2020; almost 78% of voters supported the amendments, and only 21% of them abstained (please see data of the Central Voters Commission at http://www.cikrf.ru/ ). ^{This can be seen, for example, in the recent debates around the so-called “Bogomolov Manifesto” (Bogomolov 2021; Novaya Gazeta 2021), or in the analysis of the ideological background to recent Russian film-making (2020).} The Putinist interpretation of sovereignty describes the world as a battlefield- ideological, political, and economic-between sovereign peoples and their states, on one side, and transnational institutions with their neoliberal and cosmopolitan ideologies undermining sovereignty and even the ontological foundations for the life of the peoples on the other side. In such a context, human rights and civil liberties are either marginal issues or a source of threat for the majority and its culture, identity, and genetics. Minorities are seen either as the traditional ones, which have their place in the hierarchy of the “multiethnic Russian people", or as nontraditional ones (organized around civic, gender, sexual, social, religious, or other identities), which constitute a threat to the sovereignty of the people and its state. Any demand for equality of minorities with the majority should be seen through the lens of the supreme interest of the people. The interests of collectives bigger or smaller than the people (humanity, the individual, civic organizations, a minority group) can be regarded as legitimate only if they agree with the people's interests. Altogether, the Putinist worldview is a mainstream political religion, adherence to which opens up a political career or the status of a legitimate citizen. Alternative ideologies, including those that promote ideas about cosmopolitan sovereignty, are marginalized and characterized as either foreign or promoted by “foreign agents”.



Conclusion

Today's political and ideological processes take place in such a globalized world that domestic and external events are increasingly less distinguishable. This interconnectedness of political plans inspires different ideological camps to compete in redefining the key concepts that serve as a foundation for both the global order and the national order at the same time. Among these key concepts is sovereignty. Above I briefly described the history of this concept's development through five different definitions that in the post-World War II and post-Cold War period has ended with the imaginary of sovereignty in the form of a unity of national and personal sovereignty that promoted cosmopolitan norms of justice in each national jurisdiction. This unity was partially based on the liberal idea of the self-determination of the individual, who has the inalienable right to decide (even arbitrarily and irrationally) about his or her body (including abortion or euthanasia), property, lifetime, participation in collective life, and so forth. At the same time, this unity was enabled by states' approval of these universal norms as part of their own laws and obligations. The unity so achieved provided political, social, and economic actors with new opportunities for development. However, the unity itself and this development had their contradictions and drawbacks, which became the targets of criticism from different ideological groups, one of which is the new sovereigntists.

The contemporary sovereigntists vary greatly from country to country, region to region. But their common feature is a specific interpretation of the concept of sovereignty.

I analyzed this specificity using two examples, Trumpism and Putinism. The first ideology gripped the strongest old democracy on the planet, though just for four years (2017

2020) . The second ideology has guided Russia's development from a partially free state in 2000 to an achieved autocracy in 2021.

The Trumpist ideology ascribes sovereignty to the people, an imagined entity that has the qualities of working people, the majority, Judeo-Christian tradition, peacefulness, and readiness to include those who do not Insist on their minority identity. Such a people is the owner of a state-the state as part of the US as a country and of the federal government. International institutions or minorities that create obligations for the US are seen as hostile to the sovereign. This ideology avoids clear universalist definitions of sovereignty and the sovereign, and relies on blurred statements on social networks, visual materials, and permanent rediscussion in communities of supporters.

The Putinist ideology ascribes sovereignty to the people, an imagined collective that has the qualities of a multinational people united by a long history of living together, of majority, of traditional religion (Orthodox Christian or traditional Islam), and of a readiness to include those who neither stipulate their minority identity nor intend integration with the global core. Such a people is the object of care by the state. With the recent constitutional amendments, the state has become a monopolist in providing wealth and security to the people and a coordinator of other public and private organizations for the common good of the majority. Putinism is much more widespread among elites and the general population than Trumpism is. It is also better described in legal norms and publicized lengthy texts written by the ideologues. Alternative views and their spread exist under the control of the state and thus far do not constitute a threat to the ruling sovereigntist.

The sovereigntists of the old democracy and the new autocracy alike seem to share a distrust in international organizations and treaties that support the personal sovereignty of an individual human. However, Putinism treats the UN as a useful tool to inform other nations about the Russian government's policies, while for Trumpism, the UN is a dangerous organization that challenges the sovereignty of the American people. A certain level of distrust can also be witnessed vis-à-vis NATO and the EU, although for different reasons. For Trumpists, transnational organizations can be tolerated as long as they do not undermine the exclusive interests of the people, the sovereign of the world's core state. Conversely, Putinists are much more oriented toward isolation from international organizations; after several violations of international law against neighboring sovereign nations and imposed sanctions, the outside world is seen as a source of existential risk for the people and its historical traditions.

Both sovereigntist movements are hostile to human personal sovereignty, to minority rights, and to the universal norms of cosmopolitan justice. "Justice" stems from what is right for the collective imagined as a majority. Whatever undermines the supremacy of the majority is unjust. Thus the liberal concept of sovereignty that has also become part of national juridically is seen as unjust and cannot be practiced by a government loyal to its people.

Trumpism and Putinism represent two cases of the sovereigntist turn in different political, economic, cultural, and geopolitical contexts. They share the core vision of sovereignty as a quality that belongs to the people, which is an imagined majority whose specific qualities are traditional for each country. The role of the state in general is viewed as that of a caretaker of the people's interests; however, the level of etatist paternalism is much stronger in the Russian case. Both movements imply exceptionalism and isolationism, but again, Putinism is much more radical on both these counts.

With the above analysis and conclusions in hand, I can now answer the key question of this paper. Both cases of sovereigntist ideology react negatively to the challenges and responsibilities the full world demands from contemporary states and their citizens. Sovereigntist exceptionalism and isolationism are of a reactionary nature and reuse a traditional, pre-World War II understanding of sovereignty. However, in both cases the sovereigntist imagery demands the creation of a new understanding of the people, human and individual rights, minorities, post-World War II international organizations, and transnational challenges such as ecological erosion. In that respect, contemporary sovereigntism is an example of a conservative creativity that invents new identities (Judeo-Christianity, traditional religions), new temporalities (of those honest working peoples who are undermined by minorities and globalists; of the deep people; of strategic loneliness), and new functions for the state (which are less political or legal and more oriented toward the security of the majority and its biological and cultural reproduction). From that perspective, human rights, minority rights, planetary transnational issues, and the institutions that are responsible for keeping these issues on the international political agenda are seen as illegitimate and dangerous for the sovereign peoples and their polities. Thus it is logical to conclude that contemporary sovereigntism offers a worldview that denies the cosmopolitan norms of justice and stipulates that the world is a space of coexisting sovereign peoples and their states, on one side, and, on the other side, global transnational groups that try to achieve global

supremacy, subdue the peoples, and pervert the traditional understanding of man and woman, human being, family, and religion through cosmopolitan values and technologies.



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