Oligarchs and judges: the political economy of the courts in post-soviet unconsolidated democracies

This all changed with Armenia's defeat in the Second Karabakh War in September to November 2020. After the signing of a ceasefire agreement handing swathes of Nagorno-Karabakh over to Azerbaijani control, opposition protesters stormed the parliament and assaulted the speaker. The Chief of Staff of the armed forces called on Pashinyan to resign, which the latter described as an attempted coup (BBC 2021). He was eventually forced to call snap elections for June 2021. Only in the aftermath of the war did the old regime obviously begin to mobilise. All three former presidents of Armenia (Ter-Petrosyan, Kocharyan and Sargsyan) will contest the snap election (Luciano Cricchio 2021). Such a comeback by former incumbents ousted in a “Colour Revolution'' is comparable only to Yanukovych's election in 2010 after having his 2004 presidential victory overturned by the Orange Revolution. Only time will tell whether the upcoming elections will erode Pashinyan's majority and plunge Armenia deeper into “feckless pluralism”, or enable a new incumbent to usher in a period of “dominant power politics”. In any case, it is clear that Pashinyan's failure to control the courts was a serious stumbling block for his revolutionary movement even before the disastrous war with Azerbaijan.

Georgia

Courts have played a far feebler role in Georgian politics since independence than the other countries in our sample. The only significant instances of “independent'' judicial intervention occurred around the Rose Revolution of 2003. In the run up to parliamentary elections courts reviewed more than fifty election related complaints. Two weeks after the election, which was rife with allegations of malpractice, more than three dozen hearings concerning electoral violations were pending (Trochev 2013: 75-76). The constitutional court rejected a complaint that the election results should be found unconstitutional. The Supreme Court, meanwhile, cancelled the election results for the 150 seats elected by proportional representation due to widespread fraud committed by election officials, but stayed silent on the remaining 75 seats elected in single-district votes. As Alexei Trochev points out, this was not a bold defection by the Supreme Court on par with the Ukrainian Supreme Court in 2004, because by the time judges gave their ruling the Rose Revolution was already a fait accompli. Opposition leader Mikhail Saakashvili and his supporters stormed the first session of the new parliament hastily convened by President Shevernadze, who swiftly fled the country. Many of Shevernadze's ministers and advisers had already defected to the opposition (Trochev 2013: 77).

If judges of the Supreme Court had hoped to curry favor with the victors with their ruling, they were sorely disappointed. Saakashvili lambasted the court for doing too little, since they failed to annul the results of the single-mandate elections. He wasted little time in purging the Supreme Court, reducing its size from forty-four to nineteen judges, and transferring jurisdiction over electoral disputes to the Tbilisi District Court without the possibility of appeal. He also forced the head of the constitutional court into honorary exile in Germany (Trochev 2013: 78).

This reflected Saakashvili's wider agenda of purging officials from the old regime and generally reducing the size of the state bureaucracy. Saakashvili's slashing of the bureaucracy and draconian punishments and property confiscation for corruption offences led to a dramatic decrease in petty corruption (Papava 2015). He also raised the salary of Supreme Court judges by 400 percent and lower court judges by 300 percent and tripled court budgets in the years following the revolution (Popjanevski 2015: 12). However, reducing petty corruption and improved court efficiency did not coincide with increasing independence. The judiciary was kept on a short leash both institutionally and informally. The President controlled the High Council of Justice (HCJ) until 2006. After constitutional amendments, nine judge members were appointed by a Conference of Judges, five non-judge members by the parliament and one non-judge member by the President (Popjanevski 2015: 14). The HCJ has, among other responsibilities, the power to appoint, promote and dismiss judges and court chairpersons, discipline judges, determine salary supplements and transfer judges between courts. This gave one semi- politicized body a dominant role in the judicial system, which created opportunities for political interference. The practice of political pressure on judges was widespread. Judges almost always ruled in favor of the prosecution, which was directly controlled by the Ministry of Justice (Popjanevski 2015: 16). In 2011, 98% of criminal cases resulted in guilty verdicts and over 80% were concluded with a plea bargain, while 85% of administrative cases were resolved in favor of the state (Article 42 2015). There was also a widespread practice of arresting Shevardnadze-era officials on corruption allegations without ever bringing official charges. Instead, the accused was asked to give a financial “reimbursement” to the state budget in exchange for freedom (Popjanevski 2015: 11). Transparency International cites a former judge, who stated that:

Almost 100% of all cases were being controlled [by the government], which eliminated cases of bribery almost entirely; however, there were other types of interference... For example, Court Chairpersons were selected for one purpose-to find “unauthorised” decisions and transfer them to Chinchaladze [then Deputy Chief of Justice], or other persons, who would then find a reason for the judge [to be punished], through the Prosecutor's Office or “exile” them to another court. (Shermadini & Kakhidze 2018: 12)

This claim is corroborated by the ruling of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in the case of the murder of Sandro Girgvliani. Girgvliani died in mysterious circumstances after an incident in a bar where Interior Minister Vano Merabishvili and other senior officials were present. The investigation and subsequent trial generated immense controversy and allegations of a cover up. The ECtHR ruling stated that “the Court was struck by how the domestic courts together with different branches of state power acted in concert in preventing justice from being done in this gruesome homicide case” (Shermadini & Kakhidze 2018: 17).

The lack of judicial independence was one of the main sources of criticism of Saakashvili's government by NGOs, international organizations and the opposition. There was also public dissatisfaction with widespread violations of property rights including the redistribution of private property with little or no right to appeal (Popjanevski 2015: 13). As a result, reform of the judiciary was a key promise of the opposition Georgian Dream during the 2012 parliamentary elections. After coming to power, the Georgian Dream continued to make public criticism of the judiciary. Prime Minister Bidzina Ivanishvili stated in an interview that “I have personally said that I plan to sue one of the judges, who during the pre-election period issued 60 illegal judgments against Georgian Dream representatives”. Meanwhile Minister of Justice Tea Tsulukiani urged judges who had made “shameful” decisions to “closely examine their conscience while there is still time”, and referred to the “dictatorship of the current leaders [of the judiciary]” (Shermadini & Kakhidze 2018: 17-19).

The Georgian Dream government's attempts to reform the judiciary was met with fierce resistance. Although judges had shown themselves to be highly subservient under Saakashvili, they proved highly effective in protecting their members from the new government's reforms. The main battleground was the composition of the HCJ. In 2013, the Conference of Judges had to elect seven judge members of the HCJ. This was especially important because many judges were coming close to the end of their ten-year tenure, and as a result of Georgian Dream's judicial reform they faced a three-year probation period before they could be appointed for a life tenure by the HCJ (a decision criticised by NGOs and the Venice Commission) (Shermadini & Kakhidze 2018: 22). Judges who had drawn the ire of Georgian Dream therefore feared dismissal if government- friendly judges took over the HCJ. The government seriously miscalculated with its harsh rhetoric, such as declaring the creation of a temporary “Commission for Identifying Judicial Errors” which could discipline judges for their decisions. As a result, the progovernment “Unity of Judges” group failed to gather enough votes to elect a single member of the HCJ. Instead, the Conference of Judges chose to elect those judges whose decisions had been criticized by Georgian Dream, and who were critical of the government's reforms (Shermadini & Kakhidze 2018: 19).

However, the effective self-preservation strategies of the senior judges did not lead to widespread judicial recalcitrance. Instead, the dominant group of judges in the HCJ and Georgian Dream quickly accommodated themselves to each other, returning to the practices of the Saakashvili era. Several components of the “Third Wave” of the government's judicial reform were dropped, allowing the HCJ to maintain its hegemony.

Moreover, Georgian Dream appointed members of the HCJ supported a number of controversial appointments, including the appointment of a judge in the GirgvLiani murder case to the Supreme Court (Shermadini & Kakhidze 2018: 25). The most controversial case of politicized justice under the Georgian Dream was the freezing of the property of opposition TV channel Rustavi 2, which was criticised by the ECHR, which warned the authorities to abstain from interfering in the editorial policy of the channel. (Shermadini & Kakhidze 2018: 27)

Why did Georgia not experience judicial rebellion

Unlike the other three countries analyzed so far, Georgia did not develop a domestically grown “old” oligarchy. Instead, the most influential oligarchs made their fortunes in Russia during the rise of the Russian oligarchy in the 1990s. The first to make his way into Georgian politics--Badri Patarkatsishvili -- initially supported Saakashvili's rise to power during the Rose Revolution, but the two quickly became rivals. Patarkatsishvili owned one of Georgia's most viewed TV channels--Imedi--and had an estimated net worth of $12 billion in 2007 (Georgian Times 2007). After Patarkatsishvili's rift with Saakashvili, the ruling elite surrounding the United National Movement did not contain any major “old oligarchs”.

Despite the lack of major oligarchs within the UNM, there was a tight nexus between money and power during the Saakashvili era. From 2003 to 2012, Georgia embarked on a radical transformation of its political economy masterminded by Saakashvili and the staunch libertarian Bendukidze. Regulations, workers' rights and social services were slashed to the bone in pursuit of foreign investment driven growth, while officials from the Shevardnadze era were fired en masse, alongside a substantial reduction in the size of the civil service. While this move succeeded in massively reducing petty corruption (since interactions between officials and citizens were considerably reduced), paradoxically it strengthened the relationship between money and power. Deregulation encouraged businesses to engage in patronage capitalism and to seek favor and protection from the state, especially given the aggressiveness of Georgia's tax police in pursuing businesses (Jones 2016: 7). Meanwhile the government developed informal ties with special business interests to strengthen its support base (Kupatadze 2018).

Moreover, Saakashvili's radical reforms of the public service (including the judiciary) stopped short of granting any real independence from the executive. As Ketevan Bolkadze argues, Saakashvili sought to balance creating an uneven political playing field with maintaining popular support, meaning that his bureaucratic reforms reached a “saturation point” and were curbed when further reform would have jeopardized executive dominance over the state administration (Bolkvadze 2017: 751).

Using his strong grip on the levers of political and economic control, Saakashvili was able to face down the challenge from Patarkatsishvili in 2008, despite the latter's vast wealth. At the 2012 elections however, he was unable to leverage the power of the state to defeat a stronger oligarchic challenger--Bidzina Ivanishvili--who had made his fortune in Russia and built a much more effective political vehicle in the Georgian Dream party than Patarkatsishvili had before him. Although the Georgian Dream benefitted from scandals such as the uncovering of systemic torture in the prison system (Mackay 2016), nonetheless Ivanishvili's vast resources and ownership of key media was crucial in overcoming the UNM's control of the state apparatus. The Forbes “World Billionaires” list calculated Ivanishvili's wealth at $6.4 billion in 2012 (Forbes 2012), the equivalent of 17.5% of Georgia's GDP for that year, and 3.4 times larger than total government expenditure.

The defeat of Saakashvili did not lead to the splintering of the power vertical into competing patronage pyramids. As Stephen Jones has pointed out, centralization was a hallmark of the Saakashvili era, with local government emasculated and power concentrated in a small governing cabal, with limited input from independent institutions (Jones 2016: 4). Even the transition from a semi-presidential to a parliamentary system passed in 2010 did little to reverse the weak role of parliament and dominance of the executive. As a result of inheriting a highly centralized system of governance, Ivanishvili and Georgian Dream were far more effectively able to capture the state, without a prolonged period of competing power pyramids. The more centralized and effective state apparatus enabled Ivanishvili to avoid a situation of “pluralism by default”. As we have seen, the judiciary resisted reforms and attempts to remove its members. But there is no evidence that judges remained loyal to the old regime, or that the UNM was able to create a patronage network capable of dividing loyalties within the judiciary or public service at large.

With control of the state apparatus combined with Ivanishvili's vast fortune, Georgian Dream has managed to maintain its parliamentary majority and keep the opposition in a weak position. This is shown by the overwhelming superiority of Georgian Dream in terms of party financing: Georgian Dream received 54% of campaign donations in the 2020 parliamentary elections, 66% in 2016 and 88% in the 2017 local government elections. The United National Movement's electoral alliance received a mere 10% of donations in 2020, resulting in 36 out of 150 seats in parliament compared to Georgian Dream's 90 (Chikhladze & Kakhidze 2020). Before the 2018 presidential elections, the government announced 1.5 billion lari (around $570 million) of debt relief, affecting around 600,000 citizens and backed by Ivanishvili's “Cartu Foundation” (OC Media 2018). Thus political and economic hegemony of the Georgian Dream prevented structural conditions which could encourage judicial autonomy. Senior judges engaged in selfpreservation strategies in the early stage of Georgian Dream rule, but quickly accommodated themselves to the new incumbents.



Moldova

Moldova has largely experienced a lower executive dominance of the judiciary than the other countries in our sample due to a high level of “pluralism by default” (Way 2002: 127) (Hale 2016: 133). In the 1990s, presidents Mircea Snegur and Petru Lucinschi failed to consolidate their power vis-a-vis the parliament, culminating in a shift from a semi- presidential to a parliamentary system (Fruhstorfer 2016: 365). The judiciary was notoriously corrupt, with widespread instances of “corporate raiding” (the forcible transfer of property or business assets from one party to another based on a dubious court decision) (Nicu 2020). However, the executive was unable to establish central control over the judiciary, and the appointment of key judicial bodies was Left in the hands of the Conference of Judges.

This changed in 2001 with the coming to power of the Communist Party. Communist President Vladimir Voronin embarked on a policy of judicial reform which actually consisted of strengthening political control of the Supreme Council of Magistrates (SCM), responsible for appointing, removing and disciplining judges (International Commission of Jurists 2019). The President was granted the power to approve all members of the SCM and involvement in the selection procedure, while authority over appointments was transferred to the parliament. As a result of executive control of the SCM, the judiciary became increasingly compliant and “telephone justice” more pervasive. Reforms adopted in 2005 reduced the president's role in judicial appointments, but given the Communist Party's dominance in parliament and over institutions, this did not have an obvious effect on judicial independence (International Commission of Jurists 2004).

Communist Party hegemony collapsed in 2009 after allegedly rigged elections, repression of protesters and the failure to elect a president created rifts and defections within the party. Although the communists remained the largest party after the 2010 parliamentary elections, a coalition of three pro-Western parties called the Alliance for European Integration (AEI) was able to form a government. At first the AEI won much praise from the EU for putting Moldova on a pro-European reformist course (Wilson 2013).

However, the reality was much more complex. The AEI was torn between the interests of the three coalition partners, who each captured different parts of the state as their private fiefdoms. The Liberal Democratic Party led by Prime Minister Vlad Filat controlled the customs service, oligarch Vladimir Plahotniuc's Democratic Party dominated the courts and prosecutor's office, and the Liberal Party were in charge of railways and aviation (Wilson 2013). What followed was a long battle for supremacy between business and political rivals Filat and Plahotniuc, with the courts as a key weapon. Filat attempted to reduce Plahotniuc's power by removing the Prosecutor General and dissolving the economic courts, while Plahotniuc fought back by launching corruption investigations against Filat's loyalists. Both used ad hoc alliances with Communist Party MPs to attack the other in parliament, including a vote of no confidence in Filat. When the President tried to reappoint Filat as acting Prime Minister, the Constitutional Court declared the move unconstitutional (Tudoriu 2015: 663). What followed was a last-ditch attempt from Filat to take control of the courts from Plahotniuc by passing a bill allowing the parliament to dismiss judges of the Constitutional Court. This maneuver failed, partly under pressure from the EU High Representative (Tudoriu 2015: 663-664) .

Plahotniuc ultimately secured Filat's arrest on corruption charges in October 2015, and his replacement as Prime Minister with his ally Pavel Filip. A former judge of the Chisinau Court of Appeals, Ludmila Ous, alleged that she was subject to pressure and intimidation from the president of the court to rule against Filat (Rata & Tarna 2019: 65). Plahotniuc then set about expanding his grip on state institutions previously controlled by Filat, in particular the customs service. He secured the defection of many MPs from the Communist Party and the Liberal Democrats. Despite his hegemony over both the state apparatus and financial flows, PLahotniuc struggled to garner electoral support, winning only 30 out of 101 seats in the 2019 elections. A 2015 poll showed that he was distrusted by 95% of the Moldovan public, due to the visibility of his capture of the state and allegations of his involvement in the scandalous theft of over $1 billion from Moldovan banks in 2014 (Catus 2016: 6).

With the collapse of Filat's Liberal Democrats and the Communist Party, two parties emerged to fill the gap-the pro-Russian Party of Socialists (PSRM) led by Igor Dodon and the pro-EU ACUM alliance led by Maia Sandu. The PSRM was widely seen as close to Plahotniuc, since the Democrats tacitly supported Dodon's successful bid for president in 2016 (the Plahotniuc-controlled Constitutional Court reintroduced direct presidential elections in 2016, since the Democrats lacked the three-fifth of MPs required to elect a new president) and voted together in parliament (Catus 2016: 8).

However, Plahotniuc's hegemony suddenly and unexpectedly collapsed in June 2019, when the PSRM and ACUM came to a last-minute coalition agreement, catching Plahotniuc by surprise. The constitutional court struck down the coalition agreement, claiming it had missed the three-month deadline (because the court counted in 30-day intervals instead of using calendar months). The court suspended Dodon as President for failing to dissolve the parliament and appointed Prime Minister Pavel Filip as acting President (Nicu 2020). This led to a nerve-wracking standoff, with the offices of the president, prime minister and speaker of the parliament all being claimed by competing individuals. Filip refused to hand over power for more than a week, with the police, prosecutor's office, and constitutional court siding with the Democrats. Under pressure from popular mobilization and condemnation from the US, EU, and Russia, Plahotniuc's nerve eventually broke. He fled the country, while the constitutional court overturned its decision and all judges resigned (Barrett 2021).

With the sudden fall of Plahotniuc and the resignation of the constitutional court judges, it is unclear which party or institution is in control of Moldova's courts. ACUM's Maia Sandu won the 2020 presidential elections, while the PSRM holds the most seats in parliament. However, neither party has been able to form a government. The new constitutional court quickly became a battleground. Two of six judges were appointed by the ACUM-PSRM coalition government, two by the parliament and two by the SCM. Initially the court blocked Sandu's attempts to trigger fresh elections which the PSRM sought to delay (Barrett 2021). However, the court approved a third attempt by Sandu to propose a prime minister, and annulled a state of emergency passed by the PSRM- controlled parliament which would have delayed elections. In retaliation, the PSRM launched a legislative assault, including the dismissal and replacement of the court president-a move declared unconstitutional by ACUM, the US, the EU and the court itself (Necsutu 2021). The PSRM eventually backed down and agreed to new elections. Thus, it appears that-at least for now-the constitutional court is not clearly subservient to either ACUM or the PSRM. As for the rest of the judiciary, it is still too early to make any empirical judgement.

The Political Economy of Moldova

Moldova has experienced Longer periods of “feckless pluralism” than the other countries in our sample, with only one period of dominant power politics under President Voronin and the Communist Party from 2001 to 2009. In addition, it is the only country which experienced substantial capture of the judiciary by an actor who did not control the executive. Vladimir Plahotniuc emerged as one of Moldova's most powerful oligarchs under Communist Party rule. With the collapse of the Communist Party, he quickly became the hegemonic oligarch in the country. Estimates put his wealth at $2 to $2.5 billion dollars at the height of his power-around a third of Moldova's GDP-although the true figure is obscure. Legislation passed in 2015 requiring media companies to publicly disclose their owners revealed that Plahotniuc owned four out of five national TV channels and three radio stations, amounting to 70% of Moldova's audiovisual market.

Plahotniuc's position as the dominant oligarch enabled him to capture many state institutions, in particular the courts and the prosecutor's office, even while he was not in control of the executive. It is testament to the weakness of Moldova's state apparatus that Prime Minister Filat was ultimately defeated by Plahotniuc, despite heading the government and controlling lucrative revenue streams from the customs service. It is also an indicator of the power of the courts as gatekeepers to power in unconsolidated democracies. By controlling the courts and prosecutors, Plahotniuc was able to intimidate and punish opponents. In a Freedom House Report on selectivity in criminal justice, 31% of defendants analyzed were affiliated with Filat's Liberal Democratic Party, and only 7% with Plahotniuc's Democrats, while several instances defendant who joined the Democratic Party during criminal proceedings saw investigations slow down or grind to a halt (Rata & Tarna 2019: 14-15). Moreover, he was able to defend his business empire and destroy competition. In 2014, a former director at the Ministry of Internal Affairs admitted that the Prosecutor General's Office and the Ministry of Internal Affairs had special lists of companies owned or controlled by Plahotniuc which had to be protected (Catus 2016: 5).

Despite his vast fortune and capture of almost the entire state apparatus and the media after the fall of Filat, Plahotniuc was unable to escape from Moldova's trap of “pluralism by default”. While he initially avoided holding public office and remaining in the shadows, his political ambitions became increasingly visible, especially after the billion-dollar bank theft in 2014 and his unsuccessful attempt to become prime minister in 2015 (blocked by then-President Timofti) (Catus 2016: 2-3). He was unable to garner sufficient electoral support to fully capture the legislature-the key institution in Moldova's parliamentary system. His desire to avoid unfavorable early elections in 2019 ultimately sparked the crisis which led to his downfall.

It is too early to generalize about the status of the judiciary after Plahotniuc's fall. Neither ACUM nor the PSRM are poised to take control of the parliament or the executive, and elections set for July 2021 are unlikely to change this. Moldova seems to have returned to the state of “feckless pluralism” which has characterized it since independence. Given the inability of any actor or party to dominate the system, control of the courts is likely to be a key battleground in attempts to shift the balance of power.



Conclusion

ALL four countries in our sample share certain patterns of political pressure and judicial response. Incumbents constantly attempt to subjugate the courts, mostly through control of supreme judicial bodies. So-called “judicial reform” largely focuses on purging these bodies or particular courts of disloyal elements. Incumbents have also successfully resisted pressure from Western partners to appoint new judges of integrity using transparent procedures. Even the most lauded example of successful reform-Ukraine's creation of a High Anti-Corruption Court (composed with the involvement of international experts)-has struggled to achieve its ambitious aims due to sabotage by other branches of power (Francis 2020). They also deploy informal strategies of pressure such as “telephone justice”, intimidation and patronage. For their part, judges frequently submit to pressure from incumbents, since often the cost of refusing is higher than maintaining independence. However, when faced with reforms which threaten their impunity or risk their dismissal, judges have shown themselves highly effective at collective resistance.

Our cases differ, however, with respect to judicial interference in politics. Armenia, Moldova, and Ukraine have oscillated between periods of “dominant power politics” and “feckless pluralism”. During the former periods, incumbents with powerful patronage networks incorporating almost the entire elite have a monopoly on judicial pressure, and judicial resistance is limited to self-preservation. During periods of “feckless pluralism”, competing patronage networks exert pressure on the judiciary, and judges have some autonomy about where to place their loyalty. Under these conditions, judges play a crucial role in determining the balance of power and resources, since they can punish certain actors and rule on matters of vital economic and political importance. Georgia on the other hand has maintained a state of “dominant power politics” despite two handovers of power since 2003. The centralization and consolidation of the state apparatus under Saakashvili has led to the dominance of the executive, which was only strengthened by the coming to power of the country's hegemonic oligarch Ivanishvili. As a result, Georgian judges have remained consistently subservient to the executive, apart from a brief resistance to reforms in 2012 which were concerned purely with self-preservation.

By focusing on the agency of judges and its interplay with political economy, it is possible to better understand the confusing nature of political battles in unconsolidated democracies. In particular, we can better understand why “Color Revolutions” have so far failed to result in significant improvements in judicial independence. While fewer convictions of opposition figures and rulings adverse to the incumbent's interests may seem to indicate a more independent judiciary, it more often reflects the weakness of new incumbents and the replacement of a monopoly of judicial pressure with a competitive market for court decisions.



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Addition

1. Judges of the Constitutional Court of Armenia (Sargsyan 2020)

Judge	Appointed in	Appointed by	Version of Constitution	Term Ends	Notes
Alvina Gyulumyan	1996 &2014	Ter-Petrosyan & Sargsyan	1995 & 2005	2021	Judge at ECHR 2003-2013. Removed by the 2020 constitutional amendments
Hrant Nazaryan	1996	Ter-Petrosyan	1995	2029	Removed by the 2020 constitutional amendments
Feliks Tokhyan	1997	Ter-Petrosyan	1995	2026	Removed by the 2020 constitutional amendments
Ashot Khachatryan	2010	National Assembly	2005	2037
Arevik Petrosyan	2010	Sargsyan	2005	2037	Deputy Minister of Justice 19992002. “Prosperous Armenia” MP 2007-2010
Araik Tunyan	2014	National Assembly	2005	2031
Hrayr Tovmasyan	2018	National Assembly	2005 Tovmasyan was appointed one month before the 2015 constitutional amendments came into force on April 9, 2018, allowing him to serve until age 65, rather than for a 12-year term.	2035	Minister of Justice 2003-2010, Republican Party MP 2017-2018. Chairman 2018-2020. Removed as Chairman by the 2020 constitutional amendments
Arman Dilanyan	2018	National Assembly	2015	2030	Administrative Court Judge 2013-2018. Chairman 2020-
Vahe Grigoryan	2019	National Assembly	2015	2031	Nominated by President Armen Sarkissian
Edgar Shatirian	2020	National Assembly	2020	2032	Nominated by Pashinyan government
Artur Vagharshian	2020	National Assembly	2020	2032	Nominated by President Armen Sarkissian
Yervand Khundkarian	2020	National Assembly	2020	2032	Nominated by the General Assembly of Judges. Court of Cassation Head 2018-2020



2. Armenian Oligarchs before the Velvet Revolution (Wikileaks 2009)

Oligarch	Pyramid	Main Assets	Notes
Mikhail Baghdasarov	Sargsyan	Mika (fuel imports), Armaviam (airline), Mika Cement
Nikolai Barsegh	Sargsyan	Flash (fuel imports), Ararat Bank
Samvel Alexanyan	Sargsyan	Yerevan City (supermarket chain), food imports, pharmaceuticals
Aghvan Hovsepyan	Sargsyan	Shant Television, Shant Dairy	Prosecutor General (1998-1999, 2004-2013)
Misha Minasyan	Sargsyan	Jazzve (cafe chain), Pares (tobacco distributor)	Son-in-law of President Sargsyan
Harutyun Pambukyan	Sargsyan	CPS (gas station chain)
Aleksander Sargsyan	Sargsyan	various	Brother of President Sargsyan
Hrant Vartanyan	Sargsyan	Grand, Masis (tobacco), Grand Candy
Gagik Tsarukyan	Kocharyan	Yerevan/Noy (alcohol), Ararat Cement	Founded “Prosperous Armenia” electoral alliance in 2017
Sedrak Kocharyan	Kocharyan	Converse Bank, Ardshinvest Bank, mobile phone imports	Son of former President Kocharyan
Andranik Manukyan	Kocharyan	Car imports, Metropol Hotel, Vivacell	Former Minister of Transport and Communications
Hovik Abrahamyan	Kocharyan	ArtFood, agriculture	President of the National Assembly 2008-2011, MP 20122014, Prime Minister 2014-2016
Khachatur Sukiasyan	Ter-Petrosyan	SIL Group, Pares (tobacco imports)	Stripped of Pares by the customs service

3. Domestic Wealth of Ukrainian Oligarch Clans (2007-2020) (billion US dollars)

Figures taken from Fokus magazine, oligarch clans based on the analysis of Demid Chernenko (Chernenko 2019: 393).

Oligarch Clan	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	Mean
Systems Capital Management (Akhmetov)	12	14.6	3.7	7.5	15.6	18.6	16.8	14.9	7.7	3.1	2.2	3.1	8	7.3	9.7
Privat Group (Kolomoyskyi, Boholyubov, Martynov)	7.2	10.5	4.7	6.1	11.2	9.1	7.7	7.2	4.1	3	2.5	3.1	4.8	3	6.0
Interpipe (Pinchuk)	4.4	10.5	3.5	2.9	3	1.8	2.2	2.2	1.8	1.3	1.1	1.4	1.7	2.4	2.9
Industrial Union of Donbass (Taruta, Mkrtchian, Haiduk)	5.1	6	1.4	1.6	6.1	4.2	3.6	1.9	1	0.7	0.9	0.5	0.4	0.1	2.4
Ukrprominvest / Roshen (Poroshenko, Kosiuk, Vadaturskyi)	1.7	2.5	0.9	1.7	3.5	2.5	2.6	3	1.9	2.2	1.7	1.9	2.4	2.7	2.2

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