The reception of Heidegger’s terminology in Paul Tillich’s philosophy

Candidate of Philosophical Sciences, Associate Professor, Associate Professor at the Department of Philosophy, Oles Honchar Dnipro National University

Topic. In the early decades of the twentieth century, many Christian thinkers were influenced by Martin Heidegger's philosophy. This influence can be seen directly and indirectly. The most obvious example here is Rudolf Bultmann, Heidegger's close companion during his Marburg period. Unlike Tillich, Bultmann admitted directly to Heidegger's influence. Concerning Heidegger's influence on Paul Tillich, it is important to keep in mind the following: Paul Tillich himself never admitted to this influence, at least not directly. Also, there is no consistent work of Tillich's that contains a careful analysis of Heideggerian teaching. For this reason, it is necessary to trace Tillich's reception of Heidegger's terminology through an analysis of his writings.

Aim. A brief survey of the presence of Heidegger's categories in Paul Tillich's theological andphilosophical writings.

Methodology. Given that Tillich made no systematic presentation of Heidegger's thought, a descriptive method was generally used. A concise survey of Heidegger's categories in Tillich's vast writings was attempted.

Results. An investigation of Paul Tillich's writings reveals that he had had the experience of reading and analyzing Sein und Zeit. References to it appear sporadically in his papers and monographs of the 1950s 1960s published as Courage to Be, Dynamics of Faith, Theology of Culture, Systematic Theology, and The Nature and the Significance of Existentialist Thought. Tillich's autobiographical reflections are also a source for his reception of Heidegger's terminology. It is shown that Tillich utilizes at least thirteen of Heidegger's terms with various degrees of analysis. Among them are: Dasein, Das Nichts, Das Vorhandene, Geworfenheit, Entschlossenheit, Eigentlichkeit / Uneigentlichkeit, Jemeinigkeit, Vorhandensein, Verfallenheit, Sorge, Zeitlichkeit, Zuhandensein.

Key words: Sein und Zeit, Dasein, Martin Heidegger, Paul Tillich, existential philosophy, categories, terminology.

Данканіч Артем Сергійович кандидат філософських наук, доцент, доцент кафедри філософії Дніпровського національного університету імені Олеся Гончара

РЕЦЕПЦІЯ ГАЙДЕГГЕРІВСЬКОЇ ТЕРМІНОЛОГІЇ

History shows that theology never exists separately or in a vacuum. Theology is not the thing-in-itself or a way of mystical practice apart from discernible cultural elements. Of course, there is mystical theology within the religious traditions, exalting loneliness, fasting, contemplation, purification of the mind, and struggle with the passions. The Desert Fathers of the third century A.D. embody this type of theology in its most vivid form. Yet even they were forced to interact with the culture in a particular way. To a large extent, this process is inevitable.

In the early decades of the twentieth century, many Christian thinkers were influenced by Martin Heidegger's philosophy. This influence can be seen directly and indirectly. The most obvious example here is Rudolf Bultmann, Heidegger's close companion during his Marburg period. Unlike Tillich, Bultmann admitted Heidegger's influence directly. The noted German biblical scholar explains it in light of his philosophical interpretation of the New Testament: «Over and over again I hear the objection that demythologizing transforms Christian faith into philosophy. This objection arises

from the fact that I call demythologizing an interpretation, an existentialist interpretation, and that I make use of conceptions developed especially by Martin Heidegger in existentialist philosophy» [1, p. 45]. Furthermore, Bultmann argues that his method of demythologizing is a type of philosophical approach.

Concerning Heidegger's impact on Paul Tillich it is important to keep in mind the following:

1. There is a common consensus among scholars regarding Heidegger's influence on Tillich's thought.

2. Paul Tillich himself never admitted this influence, at least not directly.

3. There is no one consistent work of Tillich's that contains a careful analysis of Heideggerian teaching.

The purpose of the study

In this paper, we will focus on Tillich's early reception of Heidegger's thought in the light of historical and philosophical analysis. Special focus will be on the Heideggerian terminology present in Tillich's writings.

Method of research

Given that Tillich made no systematic presentation of Heidegger's thought, we will be required to search for and uncover it in his scattered writings.

Results and discussion

A close reading of Paul Tillich's writings reveals that he had had the experience of reading and analyzing «Sein und Zeit». References to it appear sporadically in his papers and monographs given in the 1950s 1960s published as «Courage to Be», «Dynamics of Faith», «Theology of Culture», «Systematic Theology», and «The Nature and the Significance of Existentialist Thought», as well as Tillich's autobiographical reflections.

As we mentioned above, our primary purpose here is to examine Tillich's reception, quotation, and interpretation of Heidegger's teachings. For this reason, we initially will quote some of the passages where it is found. In his autobiographical accounts, Tillich refers to his Marburg days, that «It was a benefit when, after almost five years in Berlin, my friendly adviser, the minister of education, Karl Becker, forced me against my desire into a theological professorship in Marburg» [3, p.14]. It is during this period of Tillich's teaching there that he encountered «the first radical effects of the neo-orthodox theology on theological students». Tillich correctly points out the following fundamental ingredients of Barthian neo-orthodoxy:

1. Exclusion of cultural problems from theological thought.

2. Rejection of theologians like Schleiermacher, Harnack, Troeltsch, and Otto.

3. Banning of social and political ideas from theological discussion.

After a period in Berlin that was overwhelming, depressing, and stimulating, Tillich started down a new intellectual path. In 1925 in Marburg Tillich began work on a «Systematic Theology», the first volume of which appeared in 1951. As we can see, the work on this volume took 26 years. It is well known that at that time, Heidegger was in Marburg as a professor of philosophy. Commenting on the significance of this early contact with Heidegger, Tillich remarked that Heidegger was influencing some of the best students. Furthermore, existentialism in its twentieth-century form crossed Tillich's path. It took years before he became fully aware of the impact of this encounter on his own thinking. Along with this change of attitude regarding Heidegger's thought, he writes: «I resisted, I tried to learn, I accepted the new way of thinking more than the answers it gave» [3, p. 14].

In order to properly understand Tillich's reception of Heidegger's thought, it is necessary to turn our attention to his magnum opus «Systematic Theology». The first appearance of Heidegger in the «Systematic Theology» is found in the first volume. In this case, it is important to understand the whole context of Tillich's reference to Heidegger. The first decades of the twentieth century marked a turn to ontology in European Philosophy. Paul Tillich was no exception in this regard. As to the matter of ontology, Tillich affirms that it involves all forms of life, emphasizing that «Man occupies a preeminent position in ontology, not as an outstanding object among other objects, but as that being who asks the ontological question and in whose self-awareness the ontological the answer can be found» [7, p. 168-169]. Furthermore, Tillich adds that the principles that constitute the universe are expressed through mythology, mysticism, poetry, and metaphysics, however he insists that they are essentially ontological. Furthermore, they must all be sought in man. Interestingly, Tillich points out that his contemporary affirmation of the crucial role of ontology is closely related to the «Philosophers of Life» and the «Existentialists». According to Tillich, Heidegger is a leading thinker in this respect. His method as elaborated in «Sein und Zeit» is an example of the place where the structure of being is manifest (Dasein). Commenting on the meaning of «Dasein», Tillich concludes that it is given to man within himself: «man is able to answer the ontological question himself because he experiences directly and immediately the structure of being and its elements» [7, p. 168-169]. As to the translation of the term «Dasein», Tillich follows the traditional way. It is «a being-here» [7, p. 168-169];

The next point of contact with Heidegger is Tillich's use of the category of nothingness. He writes, «recent existentialism has `encountered nothingness' in a profound and radical way» [7, p. 189]. Tillich emphasizes that Heidegger's «annihilating nothingness» portrays man's situation of being threatened by nonbeing in an ultimately inescapable way, that is, by death. The anticipation of nothingness at death gives human existence its existential character [7, p. 189].

Additionally, Tillich describes Sartre's interpretation of nothingness, that the threat of nothingness equals the threat of meaninglessness. To overcome nothingness means to take courage upon oneself. There is, however, no way in existentialism to conquer this threat, and the dialectical character of nonbeing is inescapable. The root of this problem is finitude. Finitude unites being with dialectical nonbeing. Therefore, man's finitude, or creatureliness, is unintelligible without the concept of dialectical nonbeing [7, p. 189].

Along with this, Tillich mentions the fundamental Heideggerian term «Geworfenheit» (thrownness). He explains its connotation in the following way: «The question of the cause of a thing or event presupposes that it does not possess its power of coming into being. Things and events have no aseity. This is characteristic only of God» [7, p. 196]. Tillich argues that finite things are not self-caused because they have been «thrown» into being (Heidegger).

It is essential to point out that Tillich makes use of the concept of «Geworfenheit» in a highly speculative way. He affirms that thrownness is closely related to the concept of causality: «...because everything is driven beyond itself to its cause, and the cause is driven beyond itself to its cause, and so on indefinitely...» Causality, Tillich adds, expresses the abyss of nonbeing in everything [7, p. 196].

In the second volume of the «Systematic Theology», Tillich emphasizes that the Heideggerian «Geworfenheit» expresses finitude and uncertainty. Tillich states that it is an expression of the general insecurity of the finite being, the contingency of his being, and the fact that he is not by himself but is «thrown into being» (Heidegger). Further, Tillich adds that thrownness embodies a lack of a necessary place and a necessary presence. Interestingly, he associates thrownness with a mental event. Additionally, he lists its following connotations:

1. Insecurity in choices with respect to personal relations

2. Uncertainty in other parts of encountered reality

3. Indefiniteness of feeling and risk in every decision.

4. Appearance of doubt about one's self and one's world as such [8, p. 73].

Consider another example of Tillich's use of Heideggerian terms. In the third volume of the «Systematic Theology», he introduces the following concepts «Zuhandensein» and «Vorhandensein».

According to Tillich, language grasps encountered reality in terms of «being at hand». In the literal sense, he states, it becomes an object for «handling» or managing to reach ends (which may become means for other ends). Heidegger has called this «Zuhandensein» (being at disposal) in contrast to «Vorhandensein» (being in existence). The first form, Tillich states, denotes a technical relationship to reality. The second is a cognitive one. Moreover, each form has its particular language not excluding the other but trespassing on it. The language of «being at hand» is ordinary, primitive, and limited, and others borrow from it [9, p. 59].

Further, in «Courage to Be» Paul Tillich employs the following concepts: «Das Nichts» and «Entschlossenheit». Concerning the first, Tillich writes: «Recent Existentialists, especially Heidegger and Sartre, have put nonbeing (Das Nichts, le neant) in the center of their ontological thought» [4, p. 33]. Note that in discussing Heidegger's terminology Tillich locates it in the context of Existential philosophy. Interestingly, Heidegger himself never claimed to be an existentialist. So, what did Existentialism contribute to philosophical knowledge? And why does Tillich value Heidegger's terminology as elaborated in «Sein und Zeit»? With respect to the concepts noted above, Tillich clarifies his concern by referring to the theoretical formulations of Existential philosophy.

Furthermore, he states, we can see in Existentialism the courage of despair as it manifested in art and literature. Tillich goes on to say that Heidegger in «Sein und Zeit» (which has its independent philosophical standing whatever Heidegger may say about it later in criticism and retraction) describes the courage of despair in philosophically exact terms. Moreover, he carefully elaborates on the concepts of nonbeing, finitude, anxiety, care, having to die, guilt, conscience, self, participation, and so on. Also, Heidegger analyzes a phenomenon that he calls «resolve». Tillich explains this term in the following way. The German word «Entschlossenheit» indicates the symbol of unlocking «what anxiety, subjection to conformity, and self-seclusion have locked. Once it is unlocked, one can act, but not according to norms given by anybody or anything» [4, p. 149].

Here it is essential to pay particular attention to Tillich's interpretation of the «Entschlossenheit» concept. First, he claims that nobody can give directions for the actions of the «resolute» individual no God, no conventions, no laws of reason, no norms or principles. Only man is the creator of his destiny and the path he walks. Second, conscience is the call to ourselves. Contrary to Christian Ethics, it is neither the voice of God nor the awareness of eternal principles. Furthermore, conscience calls us to ourselves out of the behavior of the average man, out of his daily talk and his daily routine. What we see here is Tillich's interpretation of Heidegger's definition of authentic and inauthentic being in man [4, p. 149].

Further, Tillich considers guilt not as a moral weakness, but as located in the context of man's existential situation. Thus, having the courage to be ourselves leads us to guilt, and we are asked to take this existential guilt upon ourselves. According to Tillich, meaninglessness in all its aspects can be faced only by those who resolutely take the anxiety of finitude and guilt upon themselves. Following Heidegger's perspective on morality, Tillich writes: «.. .There is no norm, no criterion for what is right and wrong. Resoluteness makes right what shall be right. One of Heidegger's historical functions was to carry through the Existentialist analysis of the courage to be as oneself more fully than anyone else and, historically speaking, more destructively.» [4, p. 149].

What remains significant and worth commenting on is Tillich's analysis of Sartre's affiliation with Heidegger. According to Tillich, Sartre draws conclusions from the earlier Heidegger which the later Heidegger did not accept. Needless to say, this is a fundamental point of difference between Sartre and Heidegger. Tillich claims Sartre was not historically correct in drawing these conclusions. Since Sartre had no concern for Heidegger's mystical restrictions, he found them insignificant. Consequently, the French thinker became the symbol of Existentialism, a position which is deserved not so much by the originality of his basic concepts as by the radicalism, consistency, and psychological adequacy with which he has carried them through.

It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss in detail Sartre's interpretation of Heidegger's thought, or his early philosophy. However, it is interesting to trace here Tillich's appraisal:

1. Sartre's idea that «the essence of man is his existence» is emphasized. Tillich presents its interpretation in the following way: «Man creates what he is. Nothing is given to him to determine his creativity. Man is what he makes of himself». Tillich concludes that the courage to be as oneself is the courage to make of oneself what one wants to be» [4, p. 149-150].

2. In contrast to some of the more moderate existentialist teachings (Tillich mentions Karl Jaspers and Gabriel Marcel), Heidegger and Sartre represent Existentialism's most radical form [4, p. 149-150].

Take another example of Tillich's utilization of Heidegger's terminology. Unlike the «Systematic Theology» and his «Courage to Be», Tillich's «Theology of Culture» contains a direct reference to «Being and Time». Interestingly, this chapter of the book was initially written in 1944 and called «Existential Philosophy» [6].

Before we go any further, it is important to emphasize that Tillich considered Existenzphilosophie as a specifically German creation that goes back at least a century and is led by Heidegger and Jaspers. This cultural background is extremely important in order to understand its language and context. Tillich appeals to Heidegger's «Sein und Zeit» claiming that its terminology has been largely determined by the genius and often by the demon of the German language. This fact makes the translation of Heidegger's magnum opus so difficult [11, p. 76].

The first Heideggerian concept found in «Theology of Culture» is «Dasein». Commenting on its meaning and the implications Tillich writes, «Dasein», a word which has received a pregnant meaning in Heidegger's «Sein und Zeit», adds the concrete element of «being in a special place», being «da» or «there» [11, p.80]. According to Tillich, Heidegger denies the possibility of approaching being through objective reality. Contrary to the scientific optimism of Enlightenment, he insists that Dasein (Existential Being), or self-relatedness, is the only way to being itself. Furthermore, the objective world (Das Vorhandene) is a late product of immediate personal experience [11, p. 94].

The next concept found in the «Theology of Culture» is «Zeitlichkeit» (temporal or finite existence). In considering this term, Tillich notes it is a description of Dasein. The well-known Heideggerian concept of «Sorge» (care) is presented as a general way of existence. In addition, Tillich portrays «Angst» (anxiety) as the relation of man to nothingness. It is also a fear of death, despair, guilt, loneliness, and daily routine.

These repeated concepts in Heidegger's «Sein und Zeit» are not ontic. Instead, they refer to the very structure of being. Tillich summarizes that they all point to human finitude, the ultimate theme of the existential viewpoint on man. It should be noted in this respect, that Heidegger didn't clarify the difference between the psychological meanings of the above concepts and the ontological ones. Tillich makes an interesting remark here, claiming «.. .Heidegger has implicitly admitted that he was unable to explain the difference clearly, and that he himself has increasingly emphasized human nature as the starting-point of the Existential ontology.» [11, p. 95]. Undoubtedly, Heidegger's language in «Sein und Zeit» was rather more figurative than the rigor we see in the analytic philosophers of the twenties of the twentieth century. Its difficulties are a brilliant example of the new Heideggerian strategy, of speaking about the unspoken.

«Verfallenheit» is another Heideggerian concept found in Tillich's analyses. It means a state of being lost and a prey to the necessity of existing. To a great extent «Verfallenheit» constitutes guilt. Interestingly, Heidegger is far from the traditional interpretation of guilt as an inner moral voice. There is no moral guilt as a breaking of religious commandments or ethics. Rather, it is the initial state of a human being.

Personal existence is another crucial Heideggerian element. He calls it «Jemeinigkeit» (personal being). Tillich interprets this concept in the following way: «Existence, its belonging to me and nobody else. Men usually live in the common experiences of daily life, covering over with talk and action their real inner personal experience. But conscience, guilt, and having to die, come home to the individual only in his inner loneliness» [11, p. 103]. It should be noted that Tillich's analysis appeals to the following passage taken from «Sein und Zeit»: «Das Sein, darum es diesem Seienden in seinem Sein geht, ist je meines» [2, s. 57].

In reference to the terms mentioned above, Tillich makes an interesting remark, claiming that Heidegger and Jaspers returned to the Kierkegaardian project of Existential philosophy. They both reintroduced the term «Existential» to designate a philosophy that appealed to immediate personal experience, and they cooperated with a theology that was profoundly influenced by Kierkegaard, especially by his attack on the secularized bourgeois churches [11, p. 110].

In addition, Tillich comments on the Heideggerian dichotomy of authentic and inauthentic existence («Eigentlichkeit» versus «Uneigentlichkeit») and the concept of conscience (Gewissen). Inauthentic existence, Tillich claims, is a falling into the average existence of conventional thought. It is the state of a man who has lost himself [11, p. 121].

Concerning Heidegger's viewpoint on conscience (Gewissen), Tillich observes: «It is neither the infallible voice of God, nor the infallible awareness of the natural law, rather it is the call of man to be himself» [11, p. 138].

Along with the «Systematic Theology», «Theology of Culture», and «Courage to Be», Tillich considers Heidegger's terminology also in his paper «The Nature and the Significance of Existentialist Thought», published in 1956. Interestingly, Tillich defines existentialism as a protest against the dissolution of the existing subject into the objects of its own creation, into the world of things and essences [10, p. 405]. Also, he distinguishes the key concepts of the existential approach to man. It is important to list them in the following order:

1. Finitude.

2. Anxiety.

3. Freedom.

Considering anxiety, Tillich makes a brief reference to Heidegger and especially his distinction between objectively measured and existentially experienced time. Following Heidegger, he states that existential time is closely related to «Sorge» (the restlessness of care) and runs ahead of the existential subject toward death. Moreover, because of this quality of time, we experience anxiety, which is the awareness of the threat against the existential subject as such [10, p. 407].

Conclusions

We have touched on some of the Heideggerian categories most commonly found in Tillich's writings. As a rule, Tillich articulates categories taken from «Sein und Zeit». It is crucial to list them in the following order:

1. Angst.

2. Dasein.

3. Das Nichts.

4. Das Vorhandene.

5. Geworfenheit.

6. Entschlossenheit.

7. Eigentlichkeit / Uneigentlichkeit.

8. Jemeinigkeit.

9. Vorhandensein.

10. Verfallenheit;

11. Sorge;

12. Zeitlichkeit;

13. Zuhandensein.

It is, however, outside the scope of this paper to explore fully Heidegger's influence on Tillich. It is generally agreed among scholars that this influence was undoubtedly critical. Tillich's interpretation of «Sein und Zeit» demonstrates his deep involvement in the existential analysis of the human condition. Being a brilliant historian of philosophy, he discovered the roots of Heidegger's fundamental ontology. According to Tillich, Heidegger's methodology in «Sein und Zeit» relies heavily on Kierkegaard.

Having surveyed Tillich's interpretation of Heidegger's categories taken from «Sein und Zeit», it can be concluded as follows:

1. Despite the lack of a single consistent representation of Heidegger's philosophical terms, Tillich demonstrates particular concern for their content.

2. The most complete presentation of the «Sein und Zeit» terminology is to be found in Tillich's «Theology of Culture».

3. Tillich's approach to Heidegger's categories is more descriptive than analytical. This could be due to the orientation of his writings toward a more general audience.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Bultmann R. Jesus Christ and Mythology. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958. 96 p.

2. Heidegger M. Gesamtausgabe I. Abteilung: Veroffentlichte Schriften 1914-1970. Bd. 2. Sein und Zeit. Frankfurt Am Main : Vittorio Klostermann, 1977. 583 s.

3. Tillich P Autobiographical Reflections of Paul Tillich. The Theology of Paul Tillich / edited by Charles W. Kegley & Robert W. Bretall. New York, 1952. P 3-21.

4. Tillich P Courage to Be. New Haven : Yale University Press, 1952. 197 p.

5. Tillich P Dynamics of Faith. New York : Harper & Row, 1957. 176 p.

6. Tillich P. Existential Philosophy (1944) / Paul Tillich. Paul Tillich: Main Works = Hauptwerke / ed. by Carl Heinz Ratschow. With the collab. of John Clayton. Berlin, New York, 1989. Vol. 1. P 353-380.

7. Tillich P Systematic Theology. Volume I. / P. Tillich. Paul Tillich: Systematic Theology: Three volumes in one. Chicago, 1967. P 3-289.

8. Tillich P Systematic Theology. Volume II. / P.Tillich. Paul Tillich: Systematic Theology: Three volumes in one. Chicago, 1967. P 3-180.

9. Tillich P. Systematic Theology. Volume III. / P.Tillich. Paul Tillich: Systematic Theology: Three volumes in one. Chicago, 1967. P 3-423.

10. Tillich P The Nature and the Significance of Existentialist Thought (1956) / P Tillich. Paul Tillich: Main Works = Hauptwerke / ed. by Carl Heinz Ratschow. With the collab. of John Clayton. Berlin, New York, 1989. Vol. 1. P 403-410.

11. Tillich P Theology of Culture. Oxford : Oxford University Press, 1959. 213 p.

REFERENCES

1. Bultmann, R. (1958). Jesus Christ and Mythology. New York : Charles Scribner's Sons.

2. Heidegger, M. (1977). Sein und Zeit. Gesamtausgabe I. Abteilung: Veroffentlichte Schriften 1914-1970. (Bd. 2, 583 s.). Frankfurt Am Main: Vittorio Klostermann.

3. Tillich, P (1952). The Theology of Paul Tillich (Eds.), Autobiographical Reflections of Paul Tillich (pp. 3-21). New York, NY : The Macmillan Company.

4. Tillich, P (1952). Courage to Be. New Haven : Yale University Press.

5. Tillich, P (1957). Dynamics of Faith. New York : Harper & Row.

6. Tillich, P. (1989) Paul Tillich: Main Works = Hauptwerke (Eds.), Existential Philosophy (1944) (Vol. 1, pp. 353-380). Berlin, New York : De Gruyter Evag. Verlagswerk.

7. Tillich, P. (1951-1963). Systematic Theology. 3 vols. (Vol. 1, pp. 3-289). Chicago : University of Chicago Press, Digswell Place.

8. Tillich, P. (1951-1963). Systematic Theology. 3 vols. (Vol. 2, pp. 3-180). Chicago : University of Chicago Press, Digswell Place.

9. Tillich, P. (1951-1963). Systematic Theology. 3 vols. (Vol. 3, pp. 3-423). Chicago : University of Chicago Press, Digswell Place.

10. Tillich, P (1989) Paul Tillich: Main Works = Hauptwerke (Eds.), The Nature and the Significance of Existentialist Thought (1956) (Vol. 1, pp. 403-410). Berlin, New York : De Gruyter Evag. Verlagswerk.

11. Tillich, P (1959). Theology of Culture. Oxford : Oxford University Press.

Размещено на Allbest.ru