The Interpretation of Husserl’s Time-Consciousness in the Reconstruction of the Concept of Anthropic Time

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The Interpretation of Husserl's Time-Consciousness in the Reconstruction of the Concept of Anthropic Time

V.B. Khanzhy

D.M. Lyashenko

Abstract

The purpose of the article is to comprehend the Husserlian model of constituting temporal modes through the ability of intentional "retentional-protentional" consciousness, as well as to clarify the possibility of interpreting its positions in the reconstruction of the concept of anthropic time. Theoretical basis. The theoretical framework of the research includes: 1) the interpretation of the phenomenological reflection of "time-consciousness" by E. Husserl in the context of solving the problem of phased-differentiation of this form of temporality; 2) the concept of anthropic time (V. Khanzhy). Originality. For the first time in research literature, the possibilities of applying the ideas of Husserl to the reconstruction of the concept of anthropic time are considered through the interpretation of the phenomenological solution to the problem of temporality, proposed and specified in Husserl's "time-consciousness" concept. Conclusions. The comprehension of the Husserlian model of intentionality of consciousness through the "grasping-from-now" and the constitution of phases of phenomenological time through the component of "exiting- from-now" showed that solving the problem of phased-differentiation of phenomenological time leads to the observation of the impossibility of isolating the modes of past, present, and future as self-sufficient and unconditional. More accurate indications, based on the constitutive intentionality of consciousness on the "grasping-from-now" phases of time (as conventional), are as follows: a) the abilities of retention and recollection are the foundation for the constitution of the past and its connections to the present; b) the perception establishes the basis for the phase of the present itself; c) the possibilities of protention and anticipation (as forms of imagination) constitute the future and its connections to the present. By the concept of retention, Husserl fixes a certain primary memory (the present "now" of a past interval), which enables retaining the past in the present. The category of recollection or secondary memory is used by the philosopher to refer to the self-sufficient reproduction of past experiences (without being joined to present perception). The fundamental difference between recollection and retention is that the former represents a temporal interval, grasping its content and reproducing it as it was in the past, while in the latter, the perceived duration is presented as a fragment of time that has just passed. According to the German philosopher, the "grasping" of the present phase is performed by perception. Through the constitutive intentionality of consciousness, perception synthesizes the results of primary-actual activity and retentional holding of duration. The second part of the article will present solutions to the following research tasks: 1) analysis of the possibilities of protention and anticipation in constituting the future and its connections with the present; 2) understanding the possibility of using interpreted forms of Husser's ideas in reconstructing the concept of anthropic time.

Keywords: Edmund Husserl; anthropological paradigm of time; "grasping-from-now"; epoche; intentionality of consciousness; ability of human consciousness; temporal phases; retention; recollection; perception; concept of anthropic time

Human time... is nether the subjective time of consciousness, nor the objective time of the cosmos

S. Gallagher & D. Zahavi

В.Б. Ханжи, Д.М. Ляшенко

Інтерпретація гуссерлівського time-consciousness в реконструкції концепції антропного часу

Анотація

husserlian model anthropic time

Мета. У статті передбачено осмислити гуссерлівську модель конституювання часових модусів через здатності інтенційованої "схопленням-з-тепер" свідомості, а також з'ясування можливості інтерпретації її положень у реконструкції концепції антропного часу. Теоретичний базис. Підґрунтям дослідження є: 1) інтерпретація феноменологічної рефлексії "часу-свідомості" Е. Гуссерля в контексті розв'язання проблеми пофазової диференціації цієї форми темпоральності; 2) концепція антропного часу (В. Ханжи). Наукова новизна. Уперше в дослідницькій літературі через інтерпретацію феноменологічного розв'язання проблеми темпоральності, запропонованого та конкретизованого Гуссерлем у концепції "часу-свідомості", розглянуто можливості докладання ідей німецького філософа до реконструкції концепції антропного часу. Висновки. Осмислення гуссерлівської моделі інтенційованості свідомості "схопленням-з-тепер" та конституювання фаз феноменологічного часу через компоненту "виходу з теперішнього" показали, що розв'язання проблеми пофазової диференціації феноменологічного часу призводить до констатації неможливості виділення модусів минулого, теперішнього та майбутнього як автономних і безумовних. Доречнішими, виходячи з того, що свідомість є сутнісно інтенційованою на конституювання фаз часу (як умовних) через "схоплення-з-тепер", є такі ключові позиції: а) можливості ретенції та спогаду виступають підставою конституювання колишнього та його зв'язків із теперішнім; б) через сприйняття фундується фаза самого теперішнього; в) здатності протенції та антиципації (як форми уяви) конституюють прийдешнє та його зв'язки з теперішнім. Поняттям ретенції Гуссерль фіксує певну первинну пам'ять (нинішнє "тепер" колишнього інтервалу), що дає можливість утримувати минуле в теперішньому. Категорією спогаду, або вторинної пам'яті, філософ позначає самодостатнє відтворення минулих переживань (без приєднання до теперішнього сприйняття). Принциповою відмінністю спогаду від ретенції є те, що перший ре-презентує часовий інтервал, схоплений у його змісті, відтворюючи такий із колишнього, тоді як друга сприйняту тривалість презентує як фрагмент часу, що дійсно мав місце і тільки-но минув. Схоплення фази теперішнього, на думку німецького філософа, виконує сприйняття. Через конститутивну інтенційованість свідомості у сприйнятті відбувається синтез результатів первинно-актуальної активності та ретенційного утримання тривалості. У другій частині статті буде представлено розв'язання таких дослідницьких завдань: 1) аналіз можливостей протенції та антиципації в конституюванні майбутнього та його зв'язків із теперішнім; 2) осмислення можливості використання інтерпретованих форм гуссерлівських ідей у реконструкції концепції антропного часу.

Ключові слова: Едмунд Гуссерль; антропологічна парадигма часу; "схоплення-з-тепер"; епохе; інтенційованість свідомості; здатності людської свідомості; фази часу; ретенція; спогад; сприйняття; концепція антропного часу

Introduction

For centuries, the study of the problem of time has been carried out in several fundamental directions, which can be reasonably typified as paradigmatic. When assessing the scope of the fixation, explication and spectrum of interpretations of the role of temporal characteristics, as well as the use of the relevant conceptual apparatus of the philosophy of time in relation to humans and various aspects of their existence and activity, the significance of the so-called anthropological paradigm of time should be especially emphasized (Khanzhy, 2014). This model is much younger than, for example, the ontological paradigm of time, but this state of affairs is natural given that the relevance of the problem of human existence has strangely faded for certain periods, and when history has demonstrated its vivid revivals, thinkers, inspired by the Delphic- Socratic "Know thyself!", often stated: "I know that I know nothing". A contemporary researcher V.B. Okorokov (2022) points to this very aptly, noting that the "clarity and evidence in the understanding of the external world" achieved by man nevertheless "turned into a complete unclarity of oneself' (p. 137) - the inner nature of the subject, above all, the depths of his consciousness, constantly seemed to elude him, "as if it is covered with some kind of secret code (illusion, appearance, maya)..." (p. 138).

However, persistent searches for the grounds and characteristics (in this case - temporal) of human existence resulted in the mentioned fundamental model, within which the conceptual emphasis is placed precisely on the considerable role of man in the transformation of the world in terms of the formation of its temporal conditions. The concept of anthropic time proposed by one of the authors of this article, which is his contribution to the development of the anthropological paradigm of time, has already undergone several stages of interpretive transformations (Khanzhy, 2014; Zaporozhan, Donnikova, & Khanzhy, 2020). Nevertheless, at each of the stages, a number of provisions remain insufficiently clarified or only declared. Thus, in the proposed article, we intend to address the problem that was formulated at the end of the monograph, which summarised the first stage of developing the concept of anthropic time. Its solution, which is seen as the prospect of further research work, will be achieved through the solution of certain research tasks, namely: 1) expanding the range and rethinking the historical and philosophical presuppositions of the anthropological paradigm of time in general and the concept of anthropic time in particular; 2) analysing and deepening the understanding of the essential characteristics of anthropic time as a system that belongs to the type of complex, self-organising ones (Khanzhy, 2014, p. 314).

This article attempts to solve both problems simultaneously by analysing the doctrine of time of the outstanding philosopher-phenomenologist Edmund Husserl. However, the fundamental scientific originality of the study is that we do not limit ourselves to the stated historical and philosophical analysis (the intensity of such interpretations has not diminished decades after the death of the German thinker), but seek to trace and comprehend the possibilities of applying Husserl's ideas to the reconstruction of the concept of anthropic time. Indeed, the aforementioned monograph did not analyse Husserl's doctrine, since the concept of anthropic time was built on ontological and methodological grounds other than those of the German author. Nevertheless, as it is seen today, the philosopher's ideas, in particular, regarding the constitution of time phases and temporal characteristics of objects through certain capacities of consciousness, can be very productive in catalysing the development of provisions of a specific order that were previously imagined rather intuitively. Obviously, at this stage of the research work, the possibility and necessity of their deeper consideration has matured.

Overview

Since the works of W. James, A. Bergson, and E. Husserl on the topic of the phenomenology and psychology of time-consciousness, the area continues to be very much alive and vibrant. The famous 'two-times' problem, i.e. how the physical, objective time of the cosmos is related to our experience of time, has not been solved, despite some new interesting developments.

From around the middle of the 20th century, several new angles of consideration on the problem were proposed, including the development of Husserl's ideas on embodiment (e.g. M. Merleau-Ponty) and intersubjective, social, and historical aspects of consciousness (A. Schutz, P. Berger, T. Luckmann, P. Ricoeur etc.), more recently, these have been followed by the development of a plethora of approaches including phenomenology of cognitive embodiment and social interactions, enactivist approaches, and neurophenomenology, which research the way our experience of time-consciousness is structured and shaped by different factors, such as our bodily interactions with the physical and biological environment, the structure of our nervous system, and our social and cultural interactions with others (Gallagher, 2017; Gallagher & Zahavi, 2012; Thompson, 2011; Varela, Rosch, & Thompson, 2017); on the methodological complications of different approaches to consciousness (Lyashenko, 2021).

Nevertheless, aside from these obviously externalistic approaches, the phenomenology of time-consciousness as an internal time-consciousness remains a hotly debated area where can be delineated several main models. These are the so-called retentional and extensional models (compare with intentional and extensional models D. Huang (2022), or retentional, extensional, and cinematic models by M. Dorato and M. Wittmann (2020)) which consider the particular structure of the temporality of consciousness, focusing mainly on the structure and nature of the so-called 'specious present'. If we distinguish between objective (not necessarily physical or cosmic time) and subjective (not necessarily psychological) time-modes, then extensionalists would suggest that a subjective time-mode is grounded (or must be explained) or based on the objective time-mode (Almang, 2021; Dainton, 2000, 2011; Dorato & Wittmann, 2020). Husserl's (1991) development of the topic showed that time-consciousness can and actually should be considered independently of any objective stipulation of the time flow (p. 345). Retentionalism does not put time-consciousness on any objective basis; it considers consciousness itself to have the temporal structure of the primal impression-retention-protention, which grounds the temporality of the time flow with its past, present, and future.

In recent years, there have also been a number of works by Ukrainian researchers that directly or indirectly address issues that are in tune with the problem we have chosen. For example, the article by A.M. Malivskyi (2016) presents rather extraordinary results of comprehending Husserl's reconstruction of Descartes' rationalism. The author traces Husserl's significant step from underestimating the anthropological potential (even "deanthropologising") of the Cartesian basic model to putting the anthropological dimension in the key positions ("reanthropologising") in the course of radicalising Cartesius' approach. In the work of V.V. Khmil and I.S. Popovych (2019), the possibilities of applying E. Husserl's phenomenology as an approach to the study of social expectations of the individual are interpreted in the extensionalist spirit. The authors, considering the potentialities of the philosophical and psychological dimensions of such studies, analyse the impact of social expectations on the activities and behaviour of human units of various scales and their founding of norms, requirements, and values cultivated by certain social entities. Thus, in the language of phenomenology, the intentional object (in the modes of hope, expectation or anticipation) constitutes the expected future in advance (Khmil & Popovych, 2019, p. 59). The aforementioned work by V.B. Okorokov (2022), in the context of considering the early M. Heidegger's idea about the property of temporality to determine the depth of both being and consciousness, actualises and emphasizes the question of which concept - Heideggerian or Husserlian - is more appropriate for the task of modelling the temporal conditionality of the depth (p. 145).

Purpose

The purpose is to comprehend the Husserlian model of constituting temporal modes through the ability of intentional "retentional-protentional" consciousness, as well as to clarify the possibility of interpreting its positions in the reconstruction of the concept of anthropic time.

Statement of basic materials

The analysis of the problem of time carried out by Husserl within the framework of phenomenology involves the understanding of the immanent consciousness of time. The problem of time for Husserl is not just another problem among others. Even if we take into account the distinctions between the so-called genetic and static phenomenology (Zahavi, 2003), we should keep in mind that his lectures on the "Phenomenology of Inner Time-Consciousness" were conducted historically inside the period of static phenomenology. But intentional acts are temporal acts through which intentional objects are constituted. Thus, Husserl's approach to time-consciousness intrinsically depends on his approach to consciousness. There are more or less common misconceptions of Husserl's view on consciousness (Gallagher & Zahavi, 2012; Zahavi, 2003, 2017): that Husserl's phenomenology is a form of subjectivism, introspectionism, psychologism, its main object of study is consciousness abrupted from the real world and so on. And of course, all these are readily extrapolated from consciousness in general to time-consciousness. The key to Husserl's (1960) phenomenology (from our point of view) is the procedure of phenomenological reduction, which starts from the epoche or 'bracketing' of the natural or dogmatic and non- critical stance toward the world as something pre-given and continues through several steps into the depths of the cogito-cogitatum relations.

'Bracketing' (or epochb) is a procedure of suspending the dogmatic, non-critical, so-called 'natural' or naive stance towards reality (compare 'bracketing' with the so-called structural- ontological neutrality (Lyashenko, 2019, 2021)), and accepting the 'phenomenological stance', which opens the possibility of concentrating on the givenness of things rather than on our prerequisite assumptions, thoughts, intuitions, or feelings about them (Husserl, 1960, 1970, 1983).

"In short, the epochb entails a change of attitude towards reality, and not an exclusion of reality. The only thing that is excluded as a result of the epochb is a certain naivety, the naivety of simply taking the world for granted, thereby ignoring the contribution of consciousness" (Gallagher & Zahavi, 2012, p. 25).

Thus, the direction of phenomenological reflection is not inside consciousness; rather, it is a direction of our consciousness towards the world experienced through consciousness. It is important to note that the epoche is not something accomplished once and for all. "The epoche is an attitude that one has to keep accomplishing" (Gallagher & Zahavi, 2012, p. 25; Husserl, 1970, p. 150). Epochb makes it possible the phenomenological reflection as "...the discovery and investigation of the transcendental correlation between world and world-consciousness" (Husserl, 1970, p. 151). Phenomenological reduction proceeds as the transcendental reduction further into the sophisticated details of the cogito-cogitatum correlations (Husserl, 1960). Once the transcendental epochb is accomplished, the phenomenologist stands as the only apodictic pole of the co- gito-cogitatum system before the primordial world of intentional objects (further, according to Husserl, a phenomenologist, following several steps (including appresentation) leaves as a methodologically necessary step of phenomenological reflection the solipsistic stance). During the examination, the phenomenologist begins to find some structure: some intentional objects are more persistent, such as the body of the researcher, while others are more temporal (Husserl, 1960, IV and V Meditations). This structuring of the cogito-cogitatum system occurs through the horizons of the transcendental subject's time-consciousness, which appears to be the very structure of consciousness itself. In the inner time-consciousness, the synthesis of the ego of the transcendental subject occurs. Husserl (1960, 2001) calls it the genesis of the ego, which can be active (related to the cogitationes and their volitional realizations) and passive (non-controlled structures of consciousness responsible for its persistence as such and such). Here emerges another crucial phenomenological concept, 'passive synthesis', which can be considered as one of the key concepts to the topic of time-consciousness (Husserl, 2001). It refers to the process of integrating particular experiences into a meaningful whole (correlative to the binding problem' in current neurobiology or Kant's transcendental unity of apperception). This synthesis is considered to be the foundation of all experience, a necessary prerequisite for higher-order cognitive activity.

The threefold structure of time-consciousness (impression-retention-protention) is intrinsic feature of passive synthesis functioning. In retention and protention, passive synthesis enables past and future experiences to be considered as if they were present. Through these structures, passive synthesis is involved in the genesis and experience of stability of the identity of self and in coherent continuity of time-consciousness.

Thus, despite the fact that the concepts of phenomenological reflection (epochb) and passive synthesis were semiotically explicated at chronologically different stages of Husserl's creative activity, we use these constructs as belonging to a single conceptual field. Therefore, without unnecessary historical-philosophical discussions, these concepts are part of the theoretical premises of our research, in particular, when it comes to the role and functions of the "now" ("grasping- from-now ") in the constitution of modes of phenomenological time.

'Bracketing' of objectivization

Husserl presuppositionally distances himself from the study of objective time (nevertheless, he used to claim around 1904, that consciousness, duration, and succession of time are themselves in need of time, duration, and succession (Husserl, 1991, p. 192)). The philosopher as a retentionalist (Husserl's analysis of retention is more detailed than that of protention, which is why the term 'retentionalism' was coined (Gallagher & Zahavi, 2012, p. 95)) is not interested in time, which reflects a certain process of the phenomenal world, or in which the prolongation of events is grasped Nor is the subject of his research how the time of consciousness correlates with objective time. The thinker "brackets" ('bracketing' or 'epochb') even the objective time of experience, including the experience that constitutes time. All these, in his opinion, are not phenomenological tasks (Husserl, 1994, p. 6). It is worth noting that, by the way, the German philosopher is inclined to criticise the objectivist worldview in principle, and this is his main claim, for example, to the position of his famous predecessor, Renb Descartes, which Husserl himself qualified "...as stubborn and persistent adherence to the guideline for an objective vision of the world..." and fixed with the term "physicalist rationalism" (Malivskyi, 2016, p. 99). Nevertheless, as the contemporary Ukrainian author A. Malivskyi (2016) insists, despite the paradoxical nature of Husserl's approach, it was he who attempted to combine ".the denial of the presence of anthropology in the basic project and the rediscovery of its key role in the course of radicalising Descartes' position" (authors' transl.) (p. 101).

So, Husserl does pay attention to experience, but, so to speak, from a different - immanent - angle. He writes that a person always deals literally only with experiences, which underlie the knowledge of time. Therefore, objective time, as well as space, and thus the entire world of objectively existing things and processes, turn out to be transcendent. However, unlike Kant, Husserl does not seek to fundamentally separate transcendental time from its phenomenon, the experiential given. Whereas Kant contrasts the "thing in itself" with the "thing for us", for Husserl it is more important to distinguish between the time of a phenomenon and the experience of this phenomenon, and, most importantly, a number of connections that are manifested in experiences, in particular, experiences of time, may not be present in empirical data, in phenomena as such.

The concept of phenomenological time developed by Husserl (1983) captures the "unified form of all experiences" that structures the stream of consciousness of the transcendental Ego (p. 192). It is the disclosure of the temporal essence of the objects of perception, memory, and expectation, i.e. the comprehension of time consciousness, that is the core idea of the phenomenological approach to the problem of temporality. In contrast to the time of natural phenomena and events, phenomenological time appears as a kind of temporal autonomy, not correlated with the procedural nature of the objective ("cosmic") world. This thesis naturally follows from the phenomenological reduction, because within such a framework consciousness itself, which is the domain of "inner" time, is not connected with the objects of material existence, is not marked by measurability in the parameters of space and cosmic time. Therefore, there is no way to measure it - neither through direct observation of objective processes (for example, changes in the position of the Sun in relation to the Earth), nor indirectly, using the necessary devices.

'Bracketing' ofpsychologization

By analogy with Husserl's distancing from the objectification of time, epochb is no less fundamental in relation to its (time) psychologization. In this context, the discussion between the thinker and his teacher, Franz Brentano, is very noteworthy, in particular, regarding the primary formations of consciousness-time. Clarification of this issue allows us to identify the grounds for the constitution of primary differences of what is temporal. Brentano drew attention to the special role of fantasy in producing ideas about time. He rejects the opinion, which is quite widespread among psychologists, that duration (temporal characteristic) is a parameter of the same order as, for example, colour quality or intensity and that, like other qualities and different degrees of their intensity, it is an immanent component of sensation. The position under criticism, when delving deeper into its essence, reveals a too obvious conceptual substitution, because it identifies, on the one hand, the duration and sequence of sensations and, on the other hand, the sensation of duration and sequence, which is logically incorrect (Husserl, 1994, p. 14). Duration and sequence, considered in the second context, as the content of sensations, are the parameters that define the temporal essence of everything that is felt.

To explain this, Brentano gives a musical example. Thus, if, despite the fact that sensations last and follow each other, this was not reflected in the psyche in the form of a sense of duration and sequence, then two variants of the final psychological picture would be possible. In one scenario, if the sensations disappeared together with the stimuli that caused them, instead of the usual melody dynamics, we would be dealing only with single tones, since the new sensation of the tone would completely replace the old one. In the other case, in which the earlier sensations were retained in the psyche unchanged, the listener's perception would be a cluster - a pile-up of tones, not a sequence of tones. Human fantasy constitutes the temporal characteristic of sensations, and precisely thanks to this the content of each previous sensation is not replaced by a new one entirely, but is pushed back into the past. However, one circumstance is important here. The transformation of the present content of a sensation into the past content is not a consequence of the action of a direct stimulus, because only the present content can be evoked by such a stimulus. Later on, the sensation itself begins to show a creative character: it develops a derivative in- tensional likeness of itself, saturates it with temporal intention, and, constantly "multiplying" by this kind of "budding", creates a temporal structure in the consciousness. The thinker denotes such an intra-psychic creative process - the process of constant connection of "daughter" (temporally modified) ideas to the original ideas - as the concept of "primary associations" (Husserl, 1994, p. 16).

Fantasy also plays a key role in the intuitive formation of the future. The intuitive experience of time (Zeitanschauung), based on the primary association, being transformed, makes it possible to imagine the future as a kind of - expected - copy of the past. However, this process cannot be called a blind copying and representation of the past: fantasy, based on what has already been given, is capable of stringing together new meanings (which were not present in the past experience).

Returning to the question of the differences between the psychologisation and phenomenologisation of time, we note that, according to Husserl, it is the Brentanian model of the origin of time that should be criticised for its psychological orientation. Nevertheless, he sees this concept as a prerequisite for the phenomenological analysis of the consciousness of temporality and its conditions. If we change the emphasis in Brentano's doctrine from considering how temporal objects evoke corresponding sensations to analysing consciousness itself, which reveals the temporal structure, then this will be the approach that the phenomenologist Husserl insists on developing. Phenomenology is not just interested in a chain of experiences that produce each other, the temporal saturation of which is determined by this formation ("primary associations"). The subject of its interest is the ability of consciousness to reveal the duration and sequence of the course of sensations through integrity and unity. Thus, in this context, the sequence is not a mathematical set of links of the "now" (present sensations), but a synthesis of the particular "now" with the past ("then") (Husserl, 1994, p. 18).

Psychological time is founded on sensations that are based on life experience. These processes of contemplation of time (as well as space) in Husserl's doctrine are denoted by the concept of empirical genesis. Phenomenological time as a product of immanentisation is fundamentally different from psychological time in that it appeals to the very foundations of experience ("primi- tiven Gestaltungen") as sources of primary ideas (Husserl, 1928, p. 373). The phenomenologist is interested in "experiences in their subject matter and their descriptive content", his goal is ".. .to bring clarity to the a priori of time by investigating the consciousness of time, revealing its essential constitution and highlighting the specifically inherent contents of perception and properties of acts to which the a priori laws of time essentially belong" (authors' transl.) (Husserl, 1994, pp. 11-12). Such an approach is not aimed at ordering experiences in any reality, but at their substantive study.

Modes of phenomenological time

Husserl's (1994) fundamental search for ".how, along with 'temporal objects', immanent and transcendent, is time itself, the duration and sequence of objects, constituted?" (p. 25) inevitably leads to the need to solve the problem of perhaps the greatest difficulty - the problem of the phase-by-phase differentiation of phenomenological time, its representation in the phases of past, present and future. Let us say more: the traditional attempt to distinguish these phases in the course of phenomenological time as self-sufficient is unpromising, since all these modes involve "now-consciousness" (the actual present), which centres the temporal continuum in a subjective way. Thus, in distinguishing between temporal modes, it is more correct to speak not of "pure" phases, but of the constitutive intentionality of consciousness to "grasp-from-the-now " the conditional past, present and future. Taking into account the above, we note that, according to the philosopher's doctrine: a) the capacities of retention and recollection underpin the modus of the past and its relations with the present; b) perception lays the foundations for the phase of the present itself, as well as the continuum of the entire temporal sequence; c) the possibilities of protention and anticipation (as forms of imagination) constitute the future and its relations with the present.

First, it is necessary to clarify the key role played by the category of "now" in Husserl's concept, as well as to find out how the interconnectedness of different "nows" in the duration of time is built. This is very relevant given that, according to the philosopher, the past and future in the retentive and protentive modes (respectively) are passively synthesised in the present (see above for an explication of the concept of "passive synthesis"). In other words, the "now" not only establishes its connections with other phases, but also paradoxically provides an "exit from the present", due to the nature of the above-mentioned capacities of consciousness.

In ancient times, a similar question was raised by Aristotle (even earlier, its acuteness and contradictory nature was shown in the Eleatic Zeno's Aporias). In his work "Physics", the ancient Greek thinker shows that the statement of the passage of time is made by distinguishing between the former, present and future states of an object, which he designates as the category of "now" (Aristotle, 1991, pp. 370-377). Different "now" turns out to be simultaneously different from each other (as being in different periods, "parts" of the continuum) and identical to each other, if we proceed from their substrate, because moving in time, changing the definition of the moved, does not change its essence. Such searches have not lost their relevance to this day. Thus, considering the research on this issue in the analytical metaphysics of the last century, the contemporary Ukrainian researcher M. Symchych (2012) conducts a comparative analysis of two theories ("A-theory" and "B-theory"), which propose different approaches to solving the problem of the status and role of "now" (these terms denote models that emerged as a result of generalising the respective "A-features" and "B-features" (McTaggart, 2001)). The developers of the "A-theory" (the author agrees with them) assert the uniqueness of the "now" and its attachment exclusively to the present, which is thought of as real existence. The proponents of the "B-theory" believe that the "now", as Aristotle's "moving", is capable of specifying the correlation of an event with its statement and fixation by an observer in any time phase. And since this can be done not only in the present, but also in the past and future, the fundamental differences between these temporal modes are erased: the space-time continuum becomes homogeneous (Armstrong, 2012, pp. 101-104).

Returning to Husserl, we note that his solution to the problem of the status and functioning of the "now" realises the idea of the dialectical unity of identity and the acquisition of changes. The German philosopher emphasises that a) any duration, such as a sounding tone, "...is built up in the temporal flow by means of its phases" (Husserl, 1994, p. 68); b) each phase of proceduralism (the phase of any "now" in the sequence of grasping), according to the law of continuous modification, retains the identity of its object meaning (Husserl, 1994, p. 68); c) ".every new Now is exactly new and is thus characterised phenomenologically" (authors' transl.) (Husserl, 1994, p. 68). So, the essence of the awareness of the emerging object is in the unity of meta-temporal semantic identity and phenomenological updates, fundamentally attributed to time. Thus, on the one hand, "the constant modification of grasping in a constant flow does not affect the 'als was' of grasping, ... it does not posit any new object and any new phase of the object..." (authors' transl.) (Husserl, 1994, p. 69). However, on the other hand, each actual "now" is each time constituted as phenomenologically renewed (i.e., new in relation to the previous actual "now" that has gone into the past), although in this perspective, rather, ".it is not a question of novelty, but of a permanent moment of individuation in which the temporal position has its source" (authors' transl.) (Husserl, 1994, p. 69).

Retention, recollection, perception

Let us analyse the above-announced abilities of consciousness, which constitute the temporal structure, in more detail. Articulating the notion of retention (which, as we know, captures a certain primary memory that makes it possible to hold the past in the present), Husserl explains that it ensures the prolongation of awareness of the interval that lasted, after its course has ended. In the later period of his work, the thinker would insist on the mistake of underestimating both phases of retentive consciousness, past and present, which are miraculously intertwined in the genetic unity of phenomenological time (Husserl, 2001). Given that primary memory is oriented towards the contemplation of the past, it is the past that is the content of its constitution. "The just-before, the 'Before'", we read from the phenomenologist, "as opposed to the Now, can only be directly seen in primary memory; this is its essence - to bring this New and Original to the primary direct contemplation." (authors' transl.) (Husserl, 1994, p. 45). At the same time, Husserl emphasises that in it the past acts as a presentation, not a representation, so that retention reveals not the past as such, but the actual "now" of the past interval. For example, if we are talking about a tone that lasts for some time, then a certain time point, which becomes the starting point of the fragment of duration "immersed" in retention up to the original tone, is still perceived as a "now-point". The entire fragment shown is perceived as past, based on this "now-point". Its transparency and phase delineation lose their expressiveness as one moves away from it.

The dynamics of constant replacement of the passing moments of the "now" with new starting points causes a gradual fading of the initial impressions and, ultimately, their disappearance from the retentive field. The described retreat of a temporal object into the past, when it "shrinks" and loses its concreteness and clear delineation, is very well explicated by the German author through the concept of temporal perspective, the effect of which is similar to that of spatial perspective (Husserl, 1994, p. 29).

Retentive proceduralism has another interesting feature. It has already been mentioned above that retention is a synthetic unity of the actual (determined by the correlation with a specific "now") and the past (if we proceed from its content). It should be understood that the "pushing back" of the old "source point" into the past through the actualisation of a new "now" that changes it, the retention that was associated with the first one, is transformed into the content of the retention that is associated with the second - the next "now". Moreover, the next retention becomes not just a modification of the previous one, but a continuum of modifications of the entire series of retentions of the starting point ("continuum of retentions") (Husserl, 1994, p. 32). The flow of continuity demonstrates how, due to the dual nature of the intentionality of consciousness ("primary memory" as the retention of an episode of a particular "now" is involved in a single continuum within the retention of another level), retentive grasping and holding increase in scale. As a result, any phase of the stream of consciousness is characterized by a continuity of retentions, each subsequent one being a meta-level retention in relation to the previous series ("retention of retention" or "meta-retention"), and "...the last one is the retention of the cumulative continuity (our italics - V. KH, D. L.) of the moments of the continuously preceding phases of the flow." (authors' transl.) (Husserl, 1994, p. 85) - thus, the attribute of the constitutive unity of immanent time is founded.

The described complex formation, in which there is ".a new primary sensation with the retention of the second primary sensation and the retention of the retention of the first, etc." (authors' transl.) (Husserl, 1994, p. 86), continues until the primary temporal object disappears. After that, instead of the newest phase of perception joining, the phase of the so-called "fresh memory" joins. Husserl (1994) refers to this formation with the figurative concept of "immersion in time" (p. 68). Therefore, the entire complex of the remembered, which has been formed, gradually weakening (this function is "prescribed" in retention along with the function of modifying continuity), goes into the distant past - until the temporal field complex completely disappears, until the state of imperceptibility is reached.

Clarifying the concept of recollection, i.e. secondary memory, Husserl (1994) emphasises the inherent possibility of autonomous reproduction of past sensations (recall that primary memory, retention, involves the connection of past experiences to the actual present) (p. 38). The "nowpoint" also plays a leading role here, performing the function of centring the processes of constituting the temporal being. It grasps a specific episode of duration (for example, a particular tone of a melody) that is reproduced in consciousness. At the same time, the "now-point" of consciousness acts as an attractor that (as in the dynamics of retention) keeps the past unbroken for a certain time, and also (potentially) "attracts" the expected subsequent fragments of the temporal sequence. The ability of memory to continuously grasp and interweave the resulting continuums into a single field is precisely what gives the resulting images a temporal frame (Zeithof).

However, first of all, memory differs from retention in the ability to re-present the experienced fragment: its content reproduces not what was directly perceived, but what is mediated through recollection. In turn, retentive processes capture and present the "just past being" that has barely transformed into the past, the really perceived duration. It is also worth noting that in memory, as in retention, a certain connection between the temporal phases of the past and the present is constituted, but according to a fundamentally different scenario. First, in the present, which corresponds to the act of recollection, the past is reconstructed, which later also becomes the past. Then the recollection is intertwined with the continuum of initial data and subsequent retentions and constitutes a higher order, in which the entire subject sequence becomes holistic and unified. Retention, as the German philosopher writes, has no function of production ".neither primordially nor reproductively, but only keeps what has been produced in the mind and gives it the character of 'just passed'" (authors' transl.) (Husserl, 1994, p. 40).

It is interesting that from time to time there is a situation where two images of the same "now" are superimposed on each other - the retentive one, which still lives in the primary memory, and the recalled, reproductive one. In this recapitulation, what was experienced is enriched by the interpretations of secondary memory. Nevertheless, the resulting image of the "now" does not appear as a kind of indefinite "synthetic mass": the identity and originality of each of its species is preserved through the function of the so-called identifying consciousness (Husserl, 1994, p. 65).

In the "Addenda and Supplements to the Analysis of Time-Consciousness from the Years 1905-1910" Husserl, by analogy with the concept of meta-retention, discusses the appropriateness and possible contextuality of using the concept of metamemory, referring to the recollection of a memory. However, based on the fact that the substrate of the memory remains unmodified, the thinker does not consider phantasm, which is its (memory's) modality, to be a second-level phantasm. In other words, since a certain phenomenon that is imagined is "...identically the same [phenomenon] in both simple memory and in the recollection of a memory" (authors' transl.) (Husserl, 1994, p. 117), this means that it is impossible to identify a difference between metamemory (the phantasm of memory) and simple memory, which was modified by the former (qualitatively, they are identical).

Husserl assigns to the ability of perception the function of constituting the present (in the first place). However, as will be shown later in the additional corrective comments, its role is much richer - to link past, present and future phases into a coherent temporal continuity. The philosopher reminds us that the concept of perception is interpreted in at least two senses: it is applied both to a "grasped-in-the-now" moment of a certain duration (for example, a tone in a melodic sequence) and to the proceduralism as a whole (a complete melody). Here again, it is worth noting the dominant significance that synthetic constitution receives in the foundation of the second option: the results of both the primary-actual activity of consciousness and the past duration grasped and retained through retention in the unity of its components are reflected in holistic perception. Noetically, passive synthesis ".gets expressed as the way in which a present perception passes over into a retentionaly lingering perception and fades back as a fundamental form of the past, linking up with previous retentions, motivating protentions or futurally directed intentions" (Husserl, 2001, p. xxxviii).

Here we come to an important question: how, given that perceptions as such are intentionally aimed only at the perception of the immediate "now", do we get not discrete fragments but continuity, prolongation of perceived images? The answer becomes clear through a detailed analysis of the "now" itself. The boundary constituted by the "now" in grasping is ideal. In fact, it is more correct to speak not of a set of graspings, but of a single continuum that is in continuous modification. Each "now" is essentially heterogeneous (in Husserl's words, "coarse"), because in its complex structure there are "the finer Now and the Past" (Husserl, 1994, p. 43). It is precisely because of the ideality of the above-mentioned boundary that the research methodology based on the elementary approach cannot be applied in the cognition of the temporal essence of perception. Otherwise, it would be possible, by simply combining the impression that constitutes the pure "now" and the memory that constitutes the past phases, to obtain a comprehensive picture of the procedural nature of perception. But this, as has already been shown, is impossible, because ".the Now is not something toto coelo different from the Not-Now, but is continuously mediated by it" (authors' transl.) (Husserl, 1994, p. 44). The ideal border of the "now" and its constant flow into the "not-now" provide the continuum of the process of transition of images of direct perception into the "retentive tail" (primary memory).

Originality

For the first time in the research literature, an interpretation of Husserl's solution to the problem of temporality is proposed through the structuring of "time-consciousness", which demonstrates the unity of differentiation and monolithicity of phenomenological time. This methodological step is a presupposition to the possibility of interpreting E. Husserl's approach to understanding temporality as largely correlated with the "nesting doll" principle of modelling in a specific way to clarify the mereological structure of anthropic time. Thus, this remark is appropriate in relation to retention, the structure of which is formed as multilevel, given that the retention that goes back in time becomes the content of the retention that replaces it. This is also the case with recollection: the "now-nesting doll" in which the past is reconstructed undergoes the same procedure on the part of the "nesting doll" of the next "now". Finally, this modelling can be applied to the analysis of perception, since the structure of the present is a synthesis of the primaryactual activity of consciousness, retention and protention. Based on the fact that the principle demonstrated is consonant with the methodological foundations of the concept of anthropic time, the article considers the possibilities of applying the ideas of the German philosopher to its new reconstruction (as will be demonstrated in more detail in the second part of the article).

Conclusions

The article reconstructs Husserl's model of intentionality of consciousness through the "grasping-from-the-present" and the constitution of modes of phenomenological time through the component of the "exiting-from-the-present". Within the framework of Husserl's phenomenological approach, the understanding of the problem of temporality is based on the presuppositional setting regarding the temporal being of consciousness, through which the temporal essence of objects of perception, memory, and expectation is revealed.

Solving the problem of phased-differentiation of phenomenological time leads to the observation of the impossibility of isolating the modes of past, present, and future as self-sufficient and unconditional. More accurate indications, based on the constitutive intentionality of consciousness on the "grasping-from-now" phases of time (as conventional), are as follows:

The abilities of retention and recollection are the foundation for the constitution of the past and its connections to the present.

The perception establishes the basis for the phase of the present itself.

The possibilities of protention and anticipation (as forms of imagination) constitute the future and its connections to the present.

By the concept of retention, Husserl fixes a certain primary memory (the present "now" of a past interval), which enables retaining the past in the present. The category of recollection or secondary memory is used by the philosopher to refer to the self-sufficient reproduction of past experiences (without being joined to present perception). The fundamental difference between recollection and retention is that the former re-presents a temporal interval, grasping its content and reproducing it as it was in the past, while in the latter, the perceived duration is presented as a fragment of time that has just passed. According to the German philosopher, the "grasping" of the present phase is performed by perception. Through the constitutive intentionality of consciousness, perception synthesizes the results of primary-actual activity and retentional holding of duration.