The question of philosophy and Georgia

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THE QUESTION OF PHILOSOPHY AND GEORGIA

Lasha Kharazi

Tbilisi State University

Abstract

Whenever the question of philosophy is asked a tacit sense of not-yet necessarily reminds itself. It is because of this everlasting delay that a thinker recurrently comes back to the domain of this question, so that the passage of one's innermost time is gathered in it. The text below is an attempt to think this question together with Georgian experience of being; but to think not within appropriated generality or in itself of philosophical meditation but with a principal consideration of the State suffering from the radical lack of philosophical; for it is the political responsibility of philosophy ever again to examine the truthfulness of such consideration.

Key words: philosophy, something, responsibility, sleep, perseverance, nonresponsiveness, Georgia

Something of the present times

How to ask the question of philosophy when the times we are Living in, and theoretico- practical conditions implied in it, (as if) Leave no possibility for this? The conscious insight of the pandemic of Covid-19 for obvious reasons-and properly so-calls for the medically authorized ethics of reality. In front of the unveiled sovereignty of death, of its unexpectedly recollected absolute presence, pandemic with its institutionalized apparatuses urges for survival. It narrows the heterogeneity of worldly things to the prevailing idiom of contagiousness and only in a full accordance with its axiomatic shapes and commands the sum of the living spheres. The concept of sovereignty used in this context has nothing to do with its politico-legal connotations. It was George Bataille's fragmentary thought from his meditative book, Guilty which served as the source for speaking about the sovereignty of death. Bataille writes: “The autonomy - sovereignty - of man is linked to the fact of his being a question with no answer.” This linkage between the essence of human life and its ontological givenness to be a question without answer constitutes the sovereignty of man insofar as death itself, in its essential understanding is a question always already left without whatever answer. So that whenever the sovereignty of death is spoken of, therein the sovereignty of man is implicated. See, George Bataille, Guilty, trans. Bruce Boone (Venice CA: The Lapis Press, 1988), 133. No doubt that from the perspective of its historical exposition there is nothing extraordinary in such arrangement of things. It is the regular status of infected times in general, or of the times composed of homicidal viruses to produce the grand tendencies of reduction, the organized blocks of simplifications, of banalizations, in the realm of which the possibilities or the chances (as the philosophically actual pseudonym of the later) for explicating the essential elements of thought are weakened till their extreme point; degraded, exhausted, excluded, superseded, immobilized in their innermost necessities, thus letting the inadequate forces of life to categorize and dominate.

Nonetheless, the text below is not about pandemic. The first and foremost question implicated in it is the question of philosophy; at once and possibly the most immediate and elusive of all the questions. There is something in this facticity of unveiled sovereignty of death, commonly referred as pandemic, which appears to us as thoughtfully demanding. Nobody can say with sufficient rigor and precision to what specifically this something calls for. It is far beyond the first time that the only thing given as a fact of knowledge in relation to it is that we know nothing about it; and still, whatever might be the general truth of this something, the spontaneity of impression formed in a very literal here and now, designates it as the real object of experience, the instantaneous affirmation of a relation between the actual being of a living and a life of the world in its present condition. But as it is (nearly) axiomatically considered in philosophy, predominantly in its Kantian variation, the truth of impression is hardly ever a viable ground for knowledge; the receptivity of impressions [die Rezeptivitat der Eindrucke] is the necessary half but never the sufficient source for cognition; though impressions justify the subjective autonomy of intuition, through which as Kant himself emphasizes in the first critique, object is given to us [uns ein Gegenstand gegeben], it is never enough for constituting the knowledge of objects, for supplying these objects with spontaneity of cognition i.e. understanding (Kant 1998: 193). What essentially matters in this regard and we also need to explicate is that impression we are speaking of principally differs from the Kantian type of sensible intuition; so far as by the fact of pandemic the unveiled sovereignty of death is encountered, the sensible content composing the reality of this impression not necessarily in the sense of fundamental quality but as of the general sign of present times, discloses itself as an essential disinterestedness with knowledge of object and therefore with the empirical possibilities of a given. What is asked of this impression as of the intuitive thread surrounding the concrete fact of encounter is not to cognize the pandemic as a given, as a certain kind of knowledge, as an empirical fact if you want (with its scientifically experimented “objectivities” and socially deliberated positions), but to guide us in our attempt to actualize the being of the sensible born out of this very encounter; for it is sensed truthfully that this something as a thoughtfully demanding of our times should be looked for in the very being of the sensible and not in the sensible being.

It is because of this fundamental relatedness of something with the being of the sensible that we need to keep the certain closeness with philosophy of Gilles Deleuze, with this remarkable thinker of encountered experiences. As we have already pointed out, through the reality of pandemic the unveiled sovereignty of death is encountered and therefore and very naturally so, we are affected by it. But the current pandemic is not one of the regular objects of encounter, for whatever consciousness you might think of now; it is the pandemic per se, which substantiates any object of encounter in our days; every possible encounter in present times is mediated by the encounter with unveiled sovereignty of death. Primarily it is by reason of this uneasy presence of death that something we consider to be a thoughtfully demanding belongs to the sphere of an encounter with it.

In his 1967 book Difference and Repetition, in the chapter about the image of thought, Deleuze writes: Something in the world forces us to think. This something is an object not of recognition but of a fundamental encounter. What is encountered may be Socrates, a temple or a demon. It may be grasped in a range of affective tones: wonder, love, hatred, suffering. In whichever tone, its primary characteristic is that it can only be sensed. (Deleuze 1994: 139)

For Deleuze the essential determination of this something as of an encountered object is that it is never recognizable by the joint coordination of faculties. What it does initiates in the reality of experience is the very being of the sensible, the crystal of the sensible, sentiendum; the virtual and yet the real source of every sensibility developed till the very limits of its actualization, which as Deleuze writes “moves the soul, `perplexes' it” (Deleuze 1994: 140). The sense for the something we are interested in and partly defined by speaks through this being of the sensible, through this sentiendum of transcendental empiricism which is always and principally only sensed. Experience while being synthesized with it ceases to be the lived similarity of recognized facticities; what instead the encountered object commences is the necessitated sensibility for the newly invented possibilities of thinking, affective implications intensifying ever newly regained explications of soul, of its infinite movements, which in difference from the cliches of lived experience, the temporal structure of which by its very consistency is overburdened with the elements of empirical past, is inscribed with the sign of a life contemplated in the dynamisms of that which is given. And nevertheless, if following Deleuze what in principle matters in reference to the object of encounter, i.e. something, is never to identify it with the given itself:

The object of encounter, on the other hand, really gives rise to sensibility with regard to a given sense. It is not an aistheton but an aistheteon. It is not a quality but a sign. It is not a sensible being but the being of the sensible. It is not the given but that by which the given is given. It is therefore in a certain sense the imperceptible [insensible]. (Deleuze 1994: 139-140)

But at this point have not we gone too far from the Journal's conception for which the text itself is being written? The conception of an issue goes as follows: Philosophy in Post-Soviet Countries. At first sight the inappropriateness seems to be obvious. The conception unambiguously asks to think the localized reality of philosophy with its very concrete spatiotemporal locus; while the sense for something we have been following shortly, as if mystifies the distinctness of the formulation and even more so, by the grip of a first sight it might even provoke the appearance that the written above does not have much to do with the proposed conception. But appearances by their very nature are preliminary and dubious; philosophy is hardly ever content with their representations. For it is the question posed in the perseverance of demanding thoughtfulness which examines the truth of any appearance whatsoever.

The question of responsibility

How to think philosophy in its localized determination (unless we are not entrapped in an automatic depiction of self-gathering and self-gathered similarity of past) when thoughtfully demanding which something keeps in itself speaks of the silence of philosophy, of philosophical, of philosophizing? Before all other things the prima facie evidence of this something to hover over the present times, to persist virtually in a life amongst us, is the growing silence of philosophy.

Summoning the silence of philosophy in the midst of this something essentially calls for demanding thoughtfulness.

The urgency of such call matters every time whenever the question of philosophy is asked to be thought in a spatiotemporally circumscribed way; whenever philosophy is set out from its innermost self, out of its essentially pensive abodeness. Once the question of philosophy is localized, it is inevitably politicized. It is because of this structural parallelism between philosophy and politics that the sense for something with its factual imperceptibility albeit with the immediacy to be addressed as a sign to the living being must be explicated.

From the very beginning philosophy possesses the responsibility of politics; the symbol of Socrates will always suffice in this regard. Every possible philosophy, however disengaged it might seem to be from the conceptualized stance on political is destined to carry the immanent sense for this responsibility, for its immediate directedness to the living things; is destined to be bitten by the gadfly of Socratism if you will. And even so, philosophy conditioned with the responsibility of politics is not the same with politicized philosophy. Whereas the later justifies philosophy in favor of the descriptive aspects of power, the ones being authorized by political cognitions above all, the former examines the ontological composition of this responsibility in whatever times and spaces one may think of.

In a certain sense to speak about responsibility, of its practical value is one of the most regularly repeated motives for philosophy. And nevertheless, in difference from the average jargon so mistakenly embedded in the contemporary regime of humanitarian sciences, which is to neglect the object of thought on account of its already accustomed knowledge status, it is precisely because of this regularity that we need to think responsibility. Collected tendencies of familiarization with the object of thought, the passed processes of traditionalizing it or even a concrete experience with its already traditionalized image is never the sufficient reason for disregarding it; the complete opposite is true. There is something truthful in saying that philosophical constancy of the repeated relatedness to one and the same object of thought never wears out the object of thought itself; it is we who are easily deluded, dispassionate, disinterested in the process of this relatedness. Therefore, what is asked of us in the immediacy of this relatedness is a little bit of perseverance in the commonality of sense, in the weakness of a critical hope, in the non-responsiveness of response, the sensible material for which is born out from the empty ground of this very responsibility.

How otherwise in the age of willed nothingness to give an ear to the silence of philosophy?

And yet, despite of all these complications, what are we responsible for? The response is vainly expected to be in any way tangible. The silence of philosophy as the fundamental sign of our age is at once the concentrated expression and the principal determination of this non-responsiveness. For this question has no direct responsive reference at all; and even more so, any attempt to attach its content to the empirical evidence of whatever being, of one's particular biography or to the intellectual history of sociality in general, distorts its always already and yet to be discovered actuality. What paradoxically matters in the domain of this question is that it is the essential concomitance of human existence even under the yoke of nihilism, always and everywhere to let this distortion take place. Expected response imagined even within the profundity of “ideal” responsibility is already a distortion in itself. What a genuine response stands for in every true experience of responsibility is the non-responsiveness of response.

Nevertheless, the “response” is never delayed for too long, it comes timely, it distorts.

Perseverance in every true experience of responsibility is maintained by the consciousness which fully comprehends the non-responsiveness of response as the only actual reality of responsibility, of its necessary emptiness. What remains as a minimum of being in the singularity of such perseverance is its ability to force us to think, to appear as something, as the pure object of encounter which instead of expanding the space of a given, for an always already falsified reality of the later, paves the way towards the intensities of encountering the emptiness of responsibility and yet of its fullness in the non-responsiveness of response. It is in this context that Jean-Luc Nancy, the philosopher who has carried this sense all along his philosophical experience, in his essay, Responding to existence, writes:

This responsibility is as empty as it is absolute. This emptiness is its truth: the opening of sense. This emptiness is everything, therefore, everything except nothingness in the sense that nihilism understands it. Nihilism affirms that there is no sense, that the heavens of sense are empty. In a sense, absolute responsibility says the same thing: that there is no given (present, available, configured, attested, deposited, assured) sense, that sense can never be given. It says that existence is engaged in this absence of the given in order to give sense every chance-indeed, perhaps sense is made up of nothing but chances. (Nancy 2003: 300)

If the silence of philosophy is wished to be summoned together with the responsibility of politics, what opens up as an essentiality on this path is our preparedness to give a sense to this absence of the given, to the non-responsiveness of response. Not going any farther but even the brief questioning of philosophy in post-Soviet Georgia calls for the immediacy of such preparedness. But what Georgian experience of philosophy reveals in an over-extended and certainly over-exhausted duration of postSovietness is its radical impossibility to become in any way prepared vis-a-vis this nonresponsiveness. Empirically observable ground of this impossibility fully corresponds with deinstitutionalized image of scientific domain (predominantly modeled as a socially concrete equivalent of “knowledge” entirely commanded by market powers); the only tendency pushed forward by apolitical impositions spread all over the exploitative structures of governance is the proletarianization of knowledge and of living sphere in general. In difference from the StiegLerian notion of proletarianization which defines the later as the process of loss of knowledge due to the reduction of cognitive activities to the cal.cul.abil.ity, what we have experienced and are in fact still experiencing in Georgia is the loss of knowledge (mainly of economically productive nature) because of the regressive transformation of the general composition of economy, viz. from the industrially producing one to the low level service oriented. Because of this difference the proletarianization we refer to in a greater extent merges with the process of pauperization than it does in case of Stiegler's conceptual model. See, Bernard Stiegler, For a new critique of political economy, trans. Daniel Ross (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010).

What we need to think at this point in no way should be the matter of politicized philosophy, ordinarily identified with the sphere of political theory. Instead, we need to try and follow the sense for philosophized politics, i.e. politics according to philosophy. Apart from and in a certain sense before being the discipline of theoretical knowledge, philosophy is the embeddedness in a life, in all the possible variations of a life, including a life of politics i. e. a political life. Philosophy embeds a life in its virtual infinity. It is not due to the sudden circumstances that in the common parlance philosophicality, unless the term is not simple-mindedly narrowed to the books of philosophy or to the jargon of petty academism, may be encountered anytime and everywhere. Posture of an old man sitting on the bench, vineyard in the evening garden, flow of the river or a gaze of the animal, all might be encountered philosophically if only the virtuality of a life is thought in effectuation with the being of a sensible; and the sphere of politics is not an exception in this regard. It is because of this vital immanence of philosophy that thinking the possibilities for philosophized politics is essentially interested with the idea of political life. Political life viz. living a life politically is thought to belong to the immanence of philosophy. The essential reality of this belongingness speaks of the responsibility of philosophy to philosophize politics; and yet, what is recurred every time whenever this disposition is explicated is the politicization of philosophy, in the constancy of which (of this reversal) history in its totality is composed. Is not it the ever-repeated motive of history to demonstrate the imperative of political power outweighing the philosophical immanence? The question is obviously rhetorical and nevertheless, it is in the midst of this self-responsiveness that we need to think the political responsibility of philosophy. For the perseverance into the non-responsiveness of response as the highest gesture of philosophy is defined by the willingness to transcend the limitations of whatever rhetoric.

philosophical georgian meditation

The necessity of philosophy

So far as the immanence of philosophy is emphasized, there is no sense in following the requirements set by the formalized documentation of things; what we should propose instead is rather an awkward thought-for the past three decades the radical lack of philosophical has been the prevalent motive for Georgian way of being. The awkwardness of this thought lies in its fundamental impossibility to be apprehended without and to a certain extent beyond the sphere of philosophy. It is so due to the sense of philosophical implicated in it, which precedes but never contradicts all kinds of ex post certainties constituting the lived domains of reality. What the later i. e. empirically constituted regime of reality confirms is the mere fact of philosophical kept in the permanency of absence. Otherwise, where from to trace that sense for an apodictic intuition, which in its autonomous truthfulness manifests the absence of philosophical as the universal ground of global capitalism? Is not it thoughtfully demanding that the only regime of lack capitalism never axiomatizes, never even utters a word about is the absence of philosophical? Even the absence of solidarity, of compassion or of whatever virtue one might think of can be easily and are in fact massively spectacularized by discursive machines of capitalism, but never the absence of philosophical... For capitalism is very consciously all too disinterested with philosophy; for capitalism is the powerful enterprise of dephilosophization.

In Georgia what is given as an immediate evidence of its philosophicality is the question of philosophy being posed as the rarest question of all. The planetary silence of philosophy abodes here in its uninterrupted lethargy. All along the past three decades the systemic anti-politics has been gradually and methodically disassembling the immanent philosophicality of people; what has been in fact brought by the neoliberal promises of individual freedom and of self-realization is the dynamism of enslavement fully appropriated by the apparatuses of integrated spectacle. The integrated spectacle is the concept developed by Guy Debord in his book Comments on the society of the spectacle. It is the synthesis between the concentrated (based on the authority of dictatorial personality) and diffused (organized by the ensemble of commodity representations) forms of spectacle. From five essential features by which Debord characterizes the integrated spectacle (incessant technological renewal, integration of state and economy, generalized secrecy, unanswerable lies and eternal present) except the first one, all (with their specific modifications) have its share in Georgian experience of being. For instance, the process of integration between the economy and State proceeds through the instrumentalization of State by the actors of speculative economy. The lie has become the central tenet of whatever discourse in public space, up to the point where the possibilities of differentiating it from the truth are inexorably fading away. The present times are eternalized by the abyss of status quo, and generalized secrecy is the faithful guardian of the later. See, Guy Debord, Comments on the society of the spectacle, trans. Malcolm Imrie (London. New York: Verso, 1990).

Obviously enough we need to think these complications specifically in the light of philosophy, that is to say in the light of philosophical responsibility understood in its social phenomenality. Socratic sign of philosophy or simply the sociality of philosophy, in whatever times you may think of it, implicates this power of perseverance into nonresponsiveness of response. Is not the Socratic affair itself, with an episode of his trial symbolized as the dramatic kernel of it, the grand illustration of this? Socrates defending himself; his unusually extended responses to the accusations constitute the paradigmatic image of philosophical responsiveness with regard to the absoluteness of non-response. Historicized time is sufficiently well aware that responsiveness as far as it weakens and exhausts, comes only after, post festum, when an arrow thrown from the imperceptible spheres of untimely crosses the physical sight of Minerva's owl. And yet, despite this fundamental incompatibility it is the highest task of philosopher or of philosophical as of the impersonal form for the later, to persevere in the midst of this non-responsiveness. The trans-historical, you may say onto-political insight explicated by Socrates, if following his own words, warns of the ever recurring preference of man to live the days in asleep (Plato, 31a). And whatever might be the conceptual transfigurations for this trope of sleep in the history of philosophy, (Spinozian inadequate ideas, Kantian immaturity, Nietzschean ressentiment, Heideggerian inauthenticity, Deleuzian stupidity...) the foremost question being at stake here, above all from the view of philosophized sense of political, concerns the principal reasons for such preference. Where from this ever recurrent sleep, this eternal slumber in front of philosophicality is maintained? Might be the figure of Anytus, this epitome of decaying mediocrity, lackey of the status quo considered as the arch-source of it? Or is it the transcendental determination of whatever sociality to necessitate the powerful structures of misosophy as the necessary element for its historical existence?

In any case, the silence of philosophy opened up as the universal plight of our times, which by force of this very universality demands thoughtfulness from us, reactualizes the politicality of these questions. What is structured problematically in such a disposition of things is the tyranny of capitalistically appropriated appearances being synthesized with all-powerful figures of nothingness, thus and through this very hazardous combination precipitating the worldly sleep. For it is all too well-known for capitalistic rationality in its nihilistic stage of decomposition that it is the political responsibility of philosophy to resist the somnambulation of man; for it is the accompanying sign of philosophy as of the perseverance in the non-responsiveness of response never to be in consent with present times; so far as responsiveness always comes after, philosophy, at Least in its politically conditioned responsibility, essentially knows only of the permanency of sleep, of perseverance into this sleep, of resisting to its omnipotence, of bearing its non-responsiveness.

The silence of philosophy is the universal plight of our age. It is not the news that day after day, in the immediacy of our eyes and ears the world ceases to be the object of thought, of contemplation, of communal experience, and more and more, almost with a lunatic automatism becomes the prey of thoughtlessness guised under the guidance of petty calculations. Georgian way of being primarily in the sense of its ontological phenomenality, shows no signs of resistance to these tendencies of obscure automatism. So far as to speak about any countries way of being before all means to explicate the reality of its people, what we need to keep in mind with reference to such passiveness, tiredness and even exhaustion of people of Georgia is the fact of a fully realized, and yet repeatedly and systematically re-exploited sphere of its life. So that whenever the question is asked about the concealment of philosophically from the Georgian way of being, the way of thinking it without further ado must be very concrete and uncompromising. Until the cloud of mass exploitation hovers over the Georgian mode of social synthesis, there is no possibility for people to regain the philosophical sense of a life. In this context we follow the difference conceptualized by Alfred Sohn-Rethel between societies of production and societies of appropriation. Whereas in the former the social synthesis is composed of the free labor relations, so that people create their own society as producers, in the former the non-laborers i.e. capitalists either by unilateral or reciprocal forms of appropriation, appropriate the products of labor. See, Alfred Sohn-Rethel, Intellectual and manual labor -- A critique of epistemology, trans. Martin Sohn-Rethel (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1978), 83-84. For we affirm that philosophically as a social faculty of man is the sine qua non for demystified, debanalized, disillusioned existence of people. Therefore, and without further complications it is explainable enough why newly born class of Georgian capitalists, principally the only organized class of the country, which in essence is the class of radical proprietors is strategically interested in concealing the philosophicality from people.

At first glance and that to a large extent due to the forces of ideological interpellation, our proposition seems to be nonsensical and in fact remains to be so unless we don't differentiate philosophy taught in the walls of stillborn auditoriums of modern academia and philosophicality as the social faculty of man. Whereas the former degenerates the infinite movements of thought, deprives thought of its immanent potentiality to think ever more, ever continuously, the later as the transcendental structure of social multiplicity maturates the understood necessity for being otherwise, unfolds the real possibilities of otherwise. So that at any moment whenever the socially established normality in its status quo is suspended, whenever the consciousness circumscribed by existing order of things obtains the sense for the surplus being, viz. the sense for the possibilities of being otherwise, of being in otherwise, therein the philosophicality as the social faculty of man is essentially exercised.

It is because of this essentially transformative nature of philosophy, that it's socially implied faculty in the era of alliance between capitalism and nihilism is all the time and everywhere marginalized. Georgia is not an exception in this regard; in its innermost way of being Georgia in the dynamism of its historical actuality longs for the sense of philosophicality as for the certain attunement, as for the certain drive of resistance to its current condition. For what is immediately witnessed from the reality of this condition is the spectacular sleep imposed and prolongated by the machines of capitalistic enslavement. The ultimate object of enslavement is a life itself. Powerful tendency of degrading a life process to the entropic structures of market universalism dominates the entirety of things in Georgia. A life of anything one might think about, either of some organic unity or of an immaterial existence from the very first instants of its entrance into the domain of pseudo-publicity is impoverished by these structures. Formulating shortly, the modus operandi of the violence authorized by these structures is binomial, which is to enslave through impoverishment. It is for the reason of this anonymous, hardly ever personalized system of violence that impoverishing the life of thought is its chief priority. Not by sudden circumstances the possibilities to think otherwise is its horror and nightmare. To primitivize and de-problematize, to falsify and oppress, to de-socialize and segregate, to de-base and stupefy with all other vicissitudes permanently reproduced in its arsenal are methodically adjusted instruments first and foremost for impoverishing the life of thought; for to think otherwise, to produce the materialized sensibilities for its actualization at the end of the day is to mature the real possibilities for being otherwise.

As a result and in overall what Georgian way of being manifests in its contemporary condition is the radical dephilosophization of its existence. We are living the days of scattered emotions, of decaying love and suffocated imagination, of partial and never fully appropriated cognitions and interests, wherein the sense for community, tacit readiness for sharing a grace is only seldomly felt as the strange figure calling from the nowhere. Certainly, we have lost the taste for the perseverance into nonresponsiveness of response as for the ultimate sign of philosophicality; that sign which devotedly sheltered the Georgian experience of being even during the darkest times of its history.

But lamentations, you may say sadness have never bettered the things even a jot. With reference to the problems of philosophicality they mainly deteriorate the infinite movements of thought, potentiality of the later to become in partial equivalence with the virtuality of a life; is not it ever repeated motive of philosophy, of its Socratic sign, never to be overburdened with the baseness of living reality, but to go through them with perseverance regained from the immanent materials of a life itself...? And whatever might be the historically conditioned impossibilities for these materials to be actualized, it is the responsibility of philosopher to gather them up in approximation with an angle of a virtual life; that angle with two practical rays substantiated from its endpoint-the one being the sense for the fullness of impersonal life and another-the singular experience of philosophicality. If the former unfolds itself as an incredible device for transcending the mediocrities of whatever subjectivity, it is only with the later as with the faculty of human sociability, that blindfold passivity imposed by the tyrannical imageries of capitalism is resisted by the perseverance into philosophicality. What demands thoughtfulness is to know that content of such perseverance before all other things speaks the language of love and solely of love towards philosophical; it is the love which loves in its selfless activity, in its critically contemplated hope in and for the otherwise.

As for the conclusive remark let this text itself be proposed as the possible response to the non-responsiveness of philosophy in post-Soviet Georgia. Although the propositions of this kind in their evident prematurity dwell in the reality of a mere attempt, so that partiality becomes their innermost determination, still, we feel and know that evading reality of experience for the sake of abstracted ideals has never done any good for anybody, for anyone. The thing attempted here was to think the possibility of philosophy within Georgian experience of being; and whatever might be the results of it, the immanent impulse of philosophy demands from us ever again to step in the sphere of such an attempt.

Bibliography

1. Bataille, George. ([1961] 1988). Guilty. Venice CA: The Lapis Press.

2. Debord, Guy. ([1988] 1990). Comments on the society of the spectacle. London, New York: Verso.

3. Deleuze, Gilles. ([1968] 1994). Difference and repetition. New York: Columbia University Press.

4. Kant, Immanuel. ([1781] 1998). Critique of pure reason. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

5. Nancy, Jean-Luc. (2003). A finite thinking. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

6. Plato. (1993). The apology. London: Penguin Books.

7. Stiegler, Bernard. ([2009] 2010). For a new critique of political economy. Cambridge: Polity Press.

8. Sohn-Rethel, Alfred. (1978). Intellectual and manual labor - A critique of epistemology. New Jersey: Humanities Press.

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