Влияние независимости советов директоров на рыночную стоимость российских компаний

36. Cornett M.M., Marcus A.J., Tehranian H. (2008), «Corporate governance and pay-for-performance: The impact of earnings management», Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 87, pp. 357-373

37. Cotter J., Shivdasani A., Zenner M. (1997), «Do independent directors enhance target shareholder wealth during tender offers?», Journal oi Financial Economics, Vol. 43, pp. 195-218

38. Cotter J., Silvester. M. (2003), «Board and Monitoring Committee Independence», ABACUS, Vol. 39 No. 2, pp. 211-232

39. Cybinski P., Windsor C. (2013), «Remuneration committee independence and CEO remuneration for firm financial performance», Accounting Research Journal, Vol. 26 No. 3, pp. 197-221

40. Daily C., Dalton D. (1994), «Bankruptcy and corporate governance: The impact of board composition and structure», Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 37, pp. 1603-1617

41. Dalziel T., Hillman A.J. (2003), «Boards of directors and firm performance: integrating agency and resource dependence perspectives», Academy of Management Review, Vol. 28 No 3, pp. 383-396

42. Dato M.H., Mersland R., Mori N. (2018), «Board committees and performance in microfinance institutions: Evidence from Ethiopia», International Journal of Emerging Markets, Vol. 13 No. 2, pp. 350-370

43. DeBoskey D.G., Luo Y., Wang J.J. (2018), «Do specialized board committees impact the transparency of corporate political disclosure? Evidence from S&P 500 companies», Research in Accounting Regulation, Vol. 30 No.1, pp. 8-19

44. Demb A., Neubauer F. (1992), «The Corporate Board: Confronting the Paradoxes», Long Range Planning, Vol. 25 № 3, pp. 9-20

45. Donaldson L. (1990), «The Ethereal Hand: Organizational Economics and Management Theory», Academy of Management Review, Vol.15, No. 3 pp. 369-381

46. Donaldson L., Davis J.H. (1991), «Stewardship Theory or Agency Theory: CEO Governance and Shareholder Returns», Australian Journal of Management, Vol. 16, pp. 49-64

47. Donaldson L., Davis J.H. (1994), «Boards and Company Performance - Research Challenges the Conventional Wisdom», Corporate Governance: An International Review, Vol. 2, pp. 151-160

48. Eberhardt-Toth E. (2017), «Who should be on a board corporate social responsibility committee?», Journal of Cleaner Production, Vol. 140 pp. 1926-1935

49. Eisenberg T., Sundgren S., Wells M.T. (1998), «Larger board size and decreasing firm value in small firms», Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 48, pp. 35-54

50. End L.L., Mak Y.T. (2003), «Corporate governance and voluntary disclosure», Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, Vol. 22, pp. 325-345

51. Erhardt N.L., Shrader C.B., Werbel J.D. 2003), «Board of director diversity and firm financial performance», Corporate Governance, Vol. 11 No. 2, pp. 102-111

52. Erkens D., Hung M., Matos, P. (2012), «Corporate governance in the 2007-2008 financial crisis: Evidence from financial institutions worldwide», Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol. 18, pp 389-411

53. Fama E.F. (1980), «Agency problems and the theory of the firm», Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 88, pp. 288-307

54. Fama E.F., Jensen M.C. (1983), «Separation of Ownership and Control», Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 26, pp. 301-325

55. Farber D. (2005), «Restoring Trust After Fraud: Does Corporate Governance Matter?», The Accounting Review, Vol. 80 No. 2, pp. 539-561

56. Ferraz D.P., Lopes I.T., Martins M.M. (2016), «The influence of diversity on boards on profitability: an overview across Iberian non-financial listed companies», Corporate Ownership and Control, Vol. 13 No. 2, pp. 454-460

57. Fich E.M., Shivdasani A. (2006), «Are Busy Boards Effective Monitors?», The Journal of Finance, Vol. 61 No. 2, pp. 689-724

58. Gani L., Jermias J. (2014), «The impact of board capital and board characteristics on firm performance», The British Accounting Review, Vol. 46, pp. 135-153

59. Gomez-Mejia L.R., Cuevas-Rodriguez G., Wiseman R.M. (2012), «Towards a Social Theory of Agency», Journal of Management Studies, Vol.49 No. 1, 202-221

60. Goyal V., Park C. (2002), «Board leadership structure and CEO turnover», Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol. 8, pp. 49-66

61. Green C.P., Homroy S. (2018), «Female directors, board committees and firm performance», European Economic Review, Vol. 102, pp. 19-38

62. Gregory-Smith I. (2012), «Chief Executive Pay and Remuneration Committee Independence», Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 74 No. 4, pp. 510-530

63. Greve P., Hu Y., Peck S., Ruigrok W., Tacheva S. (2006), «The Determinants and Effects of Board Nomination Committees», Journal of Management Governance, Vol. 10, pp. 119-148

64. Harrison J. (1987), «The strategic use of board committees», California Management Review, Vol. 109, pp. 109-125

65. Hauser R. (2018), «Busy directors and firm performance: Evidence from mergers. Journal of Financial Economics», Vol. 128, pp. 16-37

66. Heckman J.J. (1979), «Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error», Econometrica, Vol. 47 No. 1, pp. 153-161

67. Hitt M.A., Hoskison R.E., Johnson R.A. (1993), «Board of director involvement in restructuring: the effects of board versus managerial controls and characteristics», Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 14, pp. 33-50

68. Ho S.S.M., Wong K.S. (2001), «A study of the relationship between corporate governance structures and the extent of voluntary disclosure», Journal of International Accounting, Auditing & Taxation, Vol. 10, pp. 139-156

69. Hussainey K., Khlif H., Samaha K. (2015), «The impact of board and audit committee characteristics on voluntary disclosure: A meta-analysis», Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation, Vol 24, pp. 13-28

70. Iwasaki I. (2014), «Global financial crisis, corporate governance, and firm survival: The Russian experience», Journal of Comparative Economics, Vol. 42, pp. 178-211

71. Jaggi B., Leung S., Richardson G. (2014), «Corporate board and board committee independence, firm performance, and family ownership concentration: An analysis based on Hong Kong firm», Journal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics, Vol 10, pp. 16-31

72. Jensen M. (1993), «The modern industrial revolution, exit, and the failure of internal control systems», The Journal of Finance, Vol. 48 No. 3, pp. 831-880

73. Jensen M.C., Meckling W.H. (1976), «Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure», Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 3, pp. 305-360

74. Jiraporn P., Lee C.I., Singh M. (2009), «Ineffective corporate governance: director busyness and board committee memberships», Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol 33, pp. 819-828

75. Judge W.Q., Koutzevol N., Naoumova I. (2003), «Corporate governance and firm performance in Russia: an empirical study», Journal of World Business, Vol. 38 No. 4, pp. 385-396

76. Kaczmarek S., Kimino S., Pye A. (2012), «Antecedents of Board Composition: The Role of Nomination Committees», Corporate Governance: An International Review, Vol 20, pp. 474-489

77. Kashlak R., Maheshkumar J., Sherman H. (1998), «The effect of the board and executives committee characteristics on the degree of internationalization», Journal of International Management, Vol. 4 No. 4, pp. 311-33

78. Kesner I. (1988), «Directors characteristics and committee membership: an investigation of type, tenure, and gender», Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 31 No. 1, pp. 66-84

79. Kiel G., Nicholson G. (2007), «Can Directors Impact Performance? A caseЃ]based test of three theories of corporate governance», Corporate Governance: An International Review banner, Vol. 15 No. 4, pp. 585-608

80. Kэlэз M., Kuzey C. (2016), «The effect of board gender diversity on firm performance: evidence from Turkey», Gender in Management: An International Journal, Vol. 31 No 7, pp. 434-455

81. Klein A. (1998), «Firm performance and board committee structure», The Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 41 No. 1, pp. 275-304

82. Klein A. (2002), «Audit Committee, Board of Director Characteristics, and Earnings Management», Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 33, pp. 375-400

83. Krishnamurti C., Velayutham E. (2018), «The influence of board committee structures on voluntary disclosure of greenhouse gas emissions: Australian evidence», Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Vol. 50, pp 65-81

84. Landsman W., Shapiro A. (1995), «Tobin's Q and the relation between accounting ROI and economic return», Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance, Vol. 10 No. 1, pp. 103-118

85. Lau C.M., Tian J.J. (2001), «Board composition, leadership structure and performance in Chinese shareholding companies», Asia Pacific Journal of Management, Vol. 18, pp. 245-263

86. Laux C., Laux V. (2009), «Board committees, CEO compensation, and earnings management»,. The Accounting Review, Vol. 84 No. 3, pp. 869-891

87. Liao L., Luo L., Tang Q. (2015), «Gender diversity, board independence, environmental committee and greenhouse gas disclosure», The British Accounting Review, Vol. 47, pp. 409-424

88. Lipton M., Lorsch J. (1992), «A modest proposal for improved corporate governance», Business Lawer, Vol. 48 No. 1, pp. 59-77

89. Maggina A., Owusu-Ansah S., Zhou H. (2018), «Board of directors, audit committee, and firm performance: Evidence from Greece», Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation, Vol. 31, pp. 20-36

90. Muravyev A. (2017), «Boards of directors in Russian publicly traded companies in 1998-2014: Structure, dynamics and performance effects», Economic Systems, Vol. 41, pp. 5-25

91. Oxelheim L., Randoy T. (2003), «The impact of foreign board membership on firm value», Journal of Banking & Finance, Vol. 27, pp. 2369-2392

92. Palmer D. (1983), «Broken ties: Interlocking directorates and intercorporate coordination», Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 28, pp. 40-55

93. Pearce J.A., Zahra S.A. II (1989), «Boards of Directors and Corporate Financial Performance: A Review and Integrative Model», Journal of Management, Vol. 15, pp. 291-334

94. Pfeffer J. (1973), «Size, Composition, and Function of Hospital Boards of Directors: A Study of Organization-Environment Linkage», Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 18, pp. 349-364

95. Pfeffer J. (1983), «Organizational Demography», Research in Organizational Behavior, Vol 5, pp. 299-357

96. Pfeffer J., Salancik G.R. (1978), The External Control of Organizations: A Resource Dependence Perspective. New York: Harper & Row.

97. Piot C. (2004), «The existence and independence of audit committees in France», Accounting and Business Research, Vol. 34 No: 3, pp. 223-246

98. Rashid A. (2018), «Board independence and firm performance: Evidence from Bangladesh», Future Business Journal, Vol. 4, pp. 34-49

99. Turnbull S. (1997), «Corporate Governance: Its scope, concerns and theories», Corporate Governance, Vol. 5 No. 4, pp. 180-205

100. Vafeas N. (1999), «The Nature of Board Nominating Committees and Their Role in Corporate Governance», Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Vol. 1, pp. 199-225

101. Williamson O. (1984), «Corporate governance», Vale Law Journal, Vol. 93, pp. 1197-1229

102. Yermack D. (1996), «Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors», Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 40, pp. 185-211

Электронные ресурсы

103. Лукашев А.В. (2005) Фондовые биржи в США и требования к листингу иностранных компаний на основных фондовых биржах США

104. ПАО «Московская Биржа» (2018) Правила листинга ПАО Московская Биржа

105. РБК (2018) РБК 500 крупнейших по выручке компаний России

106. PwC (2013) Листинг на Лондонской фондовой бирже: Руководство по листингу акций в сегментах «Премиум» и «Стандарт» и размещению на AIM

107. Segal, T. (2018) Evaluating the Board of Directors

108. Spencer Stuart (2015) Российский индекс советов директоров 2014

109. Spencer Stuart (2016) Российский индекс советов директоров 2015

110. Spencer Stuart (2017) Российский индекс советов директоров 2016

111. Spencer Stuart (2018) Российский индекс советов директоров 2017

Приложение 1

Описательные статистики по годам

Приложение 2

Корреляционная матрица

*** - значимость на уровне 1%, ** - на уровне 5% *- на уровне 10*

Приложение 3

Коэффициенты уравнений для доли независимых директоров

*** - значимость на уровне 1%, ** - на уровне 5% *- на уровне 10*

Приложение 4

Коэффициенты уравнений для наличия комитетов

*** - значимость на уровне 1%, ** - на уровне 5% *- на уровне 10*

Размещено на Allbest.ru