The latest experience of statutory regulation of lobbying in Europe

Promoting public engagement and awareness. Easy public access to lobbying registers and reports should be ensured, using user-friendly interfaces and searchable databases to facilitate engagement and verification. Public awareness campaigns should be conducted on the role of lobbying in the democratic process, the importance of transparency, and how to access and interpret lobbying data.

Continuous evaluation and adaptation. Lobbying legislation should be regularly reviewed to assess its effectiveness, identify areas for improvement, and adapt to changes in lobbying practices and technologies. Part should be taken in international cooperation to share best practices, experiences, and lessons learned in the field of lobbying regulation, using a global perspective on the problems and solutions.

Effective lobbying regulation is crucial to ensure that lobbying activities contribute positively to the democratic process by strengthening, rather than undermining, public trust in government. Our recommendations and best practices are based on research in the UK, Germany, and France and aim to provide a roadmap for countries seeking to improve their lobbying frameworks. By adopting a comprehensive, transparent, and adaptive approach to lobbying regulation, countries can better navigate the complex landscape of modern lobbying, ensuring that it serves the public interest. Thus, the experience of the UK, Germany, and France shows that it is necessary to strike a balance between the legitimate role of lobbying in a democratic society and the need to protect the public interest from undue influence. As lobbying practices evolve, the framework that governs them must also change, ensuring that lobbying stays transparent and accountable.

Conclusions

Thus, based on the findings of the study of the key provisions of the regulatory framework for lobbying in the UK, Germany, and France, conclusions can be drawn about the effectiveness of the existing systems. The UK legislation is often considered as having a narrower scope than German and French legislation, as it focuses on lobbyist consultants. This leaves a potentially significant portion of lobbying activity unregulated. In contrast, Germany and France have adopted broader definitions of lobbying, seeking to cover a wide scope of activities and actors within their legal frameworks. The enforcement mechanisms differ substantially in these three countries. The UK's Register of Lobbyist Consultants, the German Federal Ministry of Justice and Consumer Protection, and the French HATVP play a crucial role in overseeing compliance with the law. However, the effectiveness of these bodies depends on their ability to monitor, investigate, and punish non-compliance with the law. France, with its dedicated body (HATVP) and comprehensive set of sanctions, may have a more robust enforcement mechanism. All three countries have made efforts to increase the transparency of lobbying activities through public registers. However, the effectiveness of these registers as tools for public engagement and oversight depends on their accessibility and completeness of the information provided. France's digital registry, which is overseen by HATVP, stands out from the rest with its user-friendly interface and comprehensive data. The dynamic nature of lobbying requires that the legal framework be adaptive. The recent adoption of the German Lobbyist Register Act and the ongoing evaluation of the French law demonstrate a commitment to continuous improvement and to responding to new and emerging challenges. The United Kingdom, which has made considerable progress, is facing calls for further reforms to broaden the scope of its regulatory framework.

A comparative analysis of lobbying regulation in the UK, Germany, and France shows a common desire to increase transparency and accountability in the lobbying sector. However, differences in scope, enforcement mechanisms, and approaches to public engagement highlight the diversity of strategies adopted by each country. The effectiveness of these regulations in achieving their objectives depends on their ability to adapt to the changing landscape of lobbying activities and to respond to criticisms and challenges as they arise. This analysis highlights the significance of a robust, flexible, and transparent legal framework to ensure that lobbying contributes positively to the democratic process.

Further research will be aimed at identifying best practices in the regulation of lobbying activities, which will help to develop effective European lobbying legislation and ensure greater transparency and efficiency in decision-making processes.

References

1. Bismuth, R., Dunin-Wasowicz, J., & Nichols, P.M. (Eds.). (2021). The transnationalization of anti-corruption law. Great Britain: Taylor & Francis.

2. Blackwell, J., Fowler, B., & Fox, R. (2019). Audit of political engagement 16: The 2019 report. Hansard Society.

3. Chardeau, A. (2017). Sapin II Law: The new French legal framework for the fight against corruption. Anticorruption Compliance. Dentons.

4. Chari, R., Hogan, J., Murphy, G., & Crepaz, M. (2019). Regulating, lobbying: A global comparison. Manchester University Press.

5. Crepaz, M., Junk, W.M., Hanegraaff, M., & Berkhout, J. (2022). Viral lobbying: Strategies, access and influence during the COVID-19 pandemic. Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter.

6. Dautzenberg, B. (2018). Tobacco lobbies organize “Anti-prevention of smoking”. Les Tribunes de la Sante, 58, 91-102.

7. Dinan, W. (2021). Lobbying transparency: The limits of EU monitory democracy. Politics and Governance, 9(1), 237-247.

8. Eschmann, A., & Lange, T. (2024). Lobby report. Major progress in lobby rules ... and what the traffic lights still have to do.

9. Fisher, J. (2018). Party election expenditure election effects: National vs district level and the regulatory challenges. In Handbook of political party funding (pp. 55-67). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing.

10. Fisher, J., & Savani, M.M. (2022). Who's in charge? The impact of delivery and perception of risk on the willingness to voting online. The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 25(4), 676-700.

11. Gerdemann, S. (2023). Europe's new whistleblowing laws. Deutschland: Gottingen University Press.

12. Ismar, V.G. (2023). More transparency - within limits. SUddeutschen Zeitung.

13. Koehler, S. (2019). Lobbying, political uncertainty and policy outcomes. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan.

14. Kolbel, R. (2019). “Revolving Doors” as institutional corruption in the legislative field. In Commemorative publication for Martin Morlok (pp. 261-276). Tubingen: Mohr Siebek.

15. Krol, B. (2022). Lobbyists. Planet know.

16. Lange, T., Deckwirth, C., Jahnert, M., & Sawatzk, A. (2021). Lobby control - initiative for transparency and democracy. Cologne: Centre of justice.

17. Lefort, R. (2010). Four labour MPs implicated in “cash for influence” scandal. London: The Daily Telegraph online.

18. Lobby register for the representation of interests vis-a-vis the German Bundestag and the Federal Government. (2024).

19. Matuschek, K., Lange, V., & Kiesel, V. (2021). Lobbying for the good cause. Bonn: Brandt GmbH Druckerei und Verlag.

20. McKay, А.М., & Wozniak, А. (2020). Opaque: An empirical evaluation of lobbying transparency in the UK. Interest Groups & Advocacy, 9, 102-118.

21. Neate, R. (2023). What is the Greensill scandal overshadowing David Cameron's return to cabinet? The Guardian.

22. Official website of the Lobbyregister. (n.d.).

23. Open Data Barometer. (n.d.).

24. Phillips, R.D., & Power, S. (2022). Lobbying in the United Kingdom. In A. Polk & K. Mause (Eds.), Lobbying handbook. Wiesbaden: Springer VS.

25. Pietrancosta, A. (2017). The “Sapin II” law taken at face value: Transparency - anti-corruption - modernization. Paris: Fauves editions.

26. Polk, A. (2021). More transparency with the lobby register? Wirtschaftsdienst, 2, 121-126.

27. Porta, C., & Vithenian, S. (2020). Survey results Sapin II Law. Experience feedback 3 years after its enactment. KPMG.

28. Rueland, A.L., & Rueffin, N. (2024). A comparison of British and German parliamentary discourses on science diplomacy over time. Global Policy, 00, 1-13.

29. Sinha, K. (2013). Three more heads roll in Britain's cash for questions scandal. The times of the India.

30. Solaiman, B. (2023). Lobbying in the UK: Towards robust regulation. Parliamentary Affairs, 76(2), 270297.

31. Soo, N., Weinberg, J., & Dommett, K., (2020). One moment, please: Can the speed and quality of political contact affect democratic health? The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 22(3), 460-484.

32. Storbeck, O. (2021). EY and Wirecard: Anatomy of a flawed audit. Financial Time.

33. Taczanowska, K., Latosinska, B., Brandenburg, С., Leisch, F., Czachs, C., & Muhar, A. (2023). Lobbying in social media as a new source of survey bias. Journal of Outdoor Recreation and Tourism, 44(2), article number 100689.

34. The French Anti-Corruption Agency Guidelines. (2020). AFA.

35. The High Authority for Transparency in Public Life. (n.d.).

36. The Office of the Registrar of Consultant Lobbyists. (2024).

37. The Office of the Registrar of Consultant Lobbyists. (n.d.).

38. Tudor, S. (2016). Lobbying and political campaigning: Charities and trade unions. House of Lords, Library Note.

Размещено на Allbest.ru