Judical interpretation as informal constitutional changes: questions of legitimacy in the aspect of the doctrine of constituent power

As stated in preliminary opinion CDL-PI (2015) 016 dated July 24 2015 (paragraph 47), Preliminary Opinion of the Venice Commission CDL-PI(2015)016 of 24 July 2015 `On the Proposed Constitutional Amendments Regarding the Judiciary of Ukraine' <https://www.venice.coe.int/ webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-PI(2015)016-e> accessed 05 February 2024. `under the amendments, the Constitutional Court retains the competence “to provide the official interpretation of the Constitution” (Article 147 and Article 150 § 1.1.2.), which is contrary to previous recommendations of the Venice Commission. It is about the Opinion of the Venice Commission CDL-AD(2008)029 of 24 October 2008 `On the draft laws amending and supplementing (1) the Law on constitutional proceedings and (2) the Law on the Constitutional court of Kyrgyzstan' § 18 <https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/ default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD(2008)029-e> accessed 05 February 2024.

Therefore, despite our commitment to the idea of judicial lawmaking and informal changes to the constitution by interpretation, we do not support a normative interpretation as a separate authority of the constitutional court unless it concerns the resolution of competence conflicts).

Today, while the law requires the constitutional submission regarding the official interpretation of the Constitution to include `substantiation of the grounds that caused the need for interpretation' (part 4 of Article 51 of the Law of Ukraine of July 13 2017 No. 2136-VIII), Law of Ukraine no 2136-VIII of 13 July 2017 `On the Constitutional Court of Ukraine' [2017] Official Gazette of Ukraine 63/1912. this requirement is extremely evaluative and its qualification as fulfilled or not depends entirely on the position of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine itself. Notably, the CCU is increasingly beginning to gravitate towards the tendency to avoid providing a normative interpretation (see, for example, the Ruling of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine on the closure of constitutional proceedings regarding the official interpretation of a separate paragraph of the fourth preamble of the Constitution of Ukraine of November 14 2023 No. 17-up/2023). Resolution no 17-уп/2023 Case no 1-7/2020(172/20) `On closing the constitutional proceedings in the case based on the constitutional submission of 142 people's deputies of Ukraine regarding the official interpretation of a separate provision of the fourth paragraph of the preamble of the Constitution of Ukraine' (Grand Chamber of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine, 14 November 2023) <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/vb17u710-23#Text> accessed 05 February 2024. This is not surprising given the inherent difficulty in implementing normative interpretation objectively.

Furthermore, one might question what the Constitutional Court of Ukraine would do if asked to give an official interpretation of the rule of law (Article 8 of the Constitution) without reference to a specific controversial situation. It seems more expedient to form the content of this principle on a case-by-case basis.

We now turn to the argument put forth by Michel Troper, who contends that interpretation in abstracto is inherently present in any solution in concreto (meaning casual review of constitutionality). According to Troper, an in concreto decision provides for a preliminary interpretation of one or more constitutional provisions, as the court must determine whether the act that is being challenged is contrary to the constitution. This preliminary interpretation always remains abstract in nature; it binds the legislator subject to constitutional control, not only in connection with this dispute but also regarding the further application of the interpreted provisions. Thus, Troper asserts that an interpretation is always abstract, whether it is given in a decision in abstracto or to justify a decision in concreto, and its author is always the constitutional legislator. Troper (n 71) sez 19.

In this regard, we believe that securing the authority to check specific acts for compliance with the constitution is quite enough. Therefore, as for us, we advocate reevaluating the concept of the `official interpretation of the Constitution' as a separate authority of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine. While this authority has certain analogues in foreign countries, we propose restricting it to the consideration of casual cases or tying it to the resolution of competence conflicts - tied to specific practical problems of law enforcement. In its most radical version, even a complete rejection of such an interpretation in general is possible. At the same time, interpretation by the Constitutional Court will necessarily be carried out casually - when considering a particular case through constitutional control (constitutional review of legislation).

CONCLUSIONS

As for us, it is impossible to be in captivity of classical democratic sovereign theories in light of modern realities. Traditional approaches to democracy can no longer be considered sufficient to criticise judicial legitimacy. While this does not remove all problems in the activities of the judiciary, especially in societies that lack stable constitutional democracies, the corresponding vector of development can hardly be ignored or deliberately stopped.

Judicial activity guarantees the protection of the material constitution, principles and human rights. That is, the judiciary prevents democratically made sovereign decisions from infringing on human rights. Thus, the text of the constitution is interpreted in a conformal way to individual rights.

Questions about the judiciary's role, the possibility for informal constitutional changes, and judicial law-making serve as pivotal indicators distinguishing authoritarian/totalitarian countries from democratic ones. In non-democratic regimes, the existence of an independent judiciary, as well as some real possibilities for interpreting the constitution, which is recognised by the courts of civilised countries, seems unnecessary and harmful. Only the dictator has the sole monopoly right to the constitution there. Such views conflict with modern ideas of law, human rights, and the dynamism of social life. Thus, judicial interpretation is a legitimate form of informal constitutional change.

Diverse approaches exist on the latitude for informal changes to the constitution, ranging from recognition of the corresponding changes in the form of a constitutional revolution, as proposed by Gary Jeffrey Jacobsohn and Yaniv Roznai, to narrower approaches that prioritise adherence to the text of the constitution. We consider the idea of the constitution's core as the limit, beyond which will mean the illegality of interpretation, the most justified.

Pierre Rosanvallon suggests an approach to addressing the legitimacy of the interpretation of the constitution by the constitutional courts by expanding the concept of democratic legitimacy and its inexhaustibility exclusively with the electoral model and the sovereign idea of constituent power. This connection between constitutional justice and constituent power is also seen in the practice of the Venice Commission. Thus, according to the appropriate approach, by the mouth of the constitutional courts, it is precisely the constituent power that shows the high degree of legitimacy of such courts. Moreover, public legitimacy of interpretation is very important, as societal support or dissent may or may not support this interpretation while having its own interpretation (Josef Isensee, Peter Haberle). This underscores the important of freedom of speech and interpretation of the constitution as safeguards against potential abuse.

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