Balancing European security governance: policy networks and correlates of deliberate harm

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Balancing European Security Governance: Policy Networks and Correlates of Deliberate Harm

Kostyantyn Zakharenko

Doctor of Political Sciences, Professor, National Pedagogical Dragomanov University (Kyiv, Ukraine)

Hanna Strohanova

PhD in Education, Associate Professor, National Pedagogical Dragomanov University (Kyiv, Ukraine)

The proposed study reveals the features of the pressure from policy networks on the safety and security governance of states and intergovernmental organizations. The authors explore the current definitions of "policy networks," which assert them as important actors in global, regional and national security, as well as correlates of deliberate harm, which are a consequence of policy networks activities. The authors developed and suggested a method for evaluating the pressure from policy networks on safety and security governance based on the dichotomy of non-malicious versus malicious intent. A rigorous model of accountability and evaluation ofpolicy network actors is proposed, which aims to balance the governance of European security and strengthen civil society control over the regulatory and executive actions of formal and informal policy networks actors.

Keywords: policy networks, risk and safety studies, deliberate harm, EU security governance, threat assessment

Introduction

Terrorism, espionage, migration, cyberattacks on government institutions, etc., are the harbingers of changes that redraw the state borders and redistribute the influence spheres of intergovernmental organizations. Geophilosophy is one of the scientific disciplines that shapes fundamental discourse on the nature of changes in the boundaries between civilizations and nations and, accordingly, determines the axiomatic of theories of war and peace (Bazaluk, 2017). Academic studies of the “stresses” created on the Earth's surface between the loci of different civilizations reveal many reasons for their occurrence. Science makes use of different approaches, methods, and tools to explain the nature of aggression, interethnic and interstate conflicts, and causes of threats. Knowledge of the nature of motives to inflict harm helps to develop the security concepts that protect states and intergovernmental organizations from a wide range of issues: terrorism, interstate conflicts, environmental issues, organized crime, etc.

The development of safety systems and security governance depends on the historical and political context. It is worth noting that over the past 50 years, the concepts of safety and security governance have undergone several stages of development (Contemporary, 2018). Initially, they were designed for the security of individual human. After the Second World War, security governance came to be understood as a defense of the nation-state's interests and its independence. During the Cold War, the first concepts of security of intergovernmental organizations were developed. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, security governance expanded to the Earth's entire surface. Theories of war and peace began to be created focusing their attention on peace, human rights and sustainable development of the entire space civilization (Bazaluk, 2017).

The emphasis on global sustainable development and prosperity of society has expanded the meanings of the concept of “security.” The concepts of safety and security governance have expanded to cover more sectors of society. It was understood that global security governance is possible only on the basis of effective management of regional security, international security, security of separate countries, macro and micro social groups, as well as individual security. At present, security is understood as a shared responsibility that spans different levels and sectors of society. National security is no longer limited to the duties of the police and army (Jore, 2019).

The proposed study examines the features of the pressure from policy networks on the safety and security governance of states and intergovernmental organizations. The authors investigate the modern meanings of “policy networks,” which assert them as important actors in global, regional and national security and correlates of deliberate harm, which are a consequence of the policy networks activities. The authors reveal the role of policy networks and a causal relationship between policy networks and security using the example of E.U. security governance, i.e., at the supranational level.

policy network deliberate harm security

Policy networks and issue networks

The development of the meanings of the term “policy network” began at the end of the twentieth century and was carried out in two directions. The first direction explored policy networks as kinship ties between bureaucrats, politicians, and interest groups. In this context, a policy network had definable and stable boundaries, and its analysis helped to predict the development of specific segments of the national and international policy. The second direction studied policy issues such as issue networks. Issue networks are less stable policy networks with a large number of stakeholders. In most cases, issue networks are composed of: (a) governmental actors: bureaucrats, politicians and their interest groups, and (b) nongovernmental actors: professional and/or academic experts and their interest groups. An important characteristic of issue networks is that membership in the network is constantly changing, the interdependence between network members is often asymmetric, so it is almost impossible to identify the dominant network participants and assess their motivation (Compston, 2017).

However, over the last decade, the typology of policy networks has become more diverse (Compston, 2017; Bossong, 2020). We use the term “policy network” to refer to a group of governmental (formal) and non-governmental (informal) political actors whose activities allow for constitutional and institutional changes at the state and interstate levels. A policy network in the context of our study is a group of actors whose political pressure leads to redrawing the boundaries of influence between civilizations on the Earth's surface, i.e., has a direct impact on safety and security governance at the global and regional level.

A policy network of this format consists of a relatively small number of participants who are granted authority. The actors in the policy network are linked by close personal and work relationship, as well as general agreements on scope, goals and general institutional processes aimed at achieving policy outcomes. Policy networks causing constitutional and institutional changes in states and intergovernmental organizations cannot consist of a large number of participants. The large number of actors in a policy network increases the likelihood of internal conflicts and, accordingly, reduces the effectiveness of political pressure. The research of policy networks of this format helps to explain the similarity of political decisions between nations with different political systems and disagreements in decisions between the nations that adhere to the same policy.

The most illustrative example of effective pressure from a policy network of this format is the network that we call “Berlin-Moscow-Paris.” The policy network was created by Vladimir Putin, Gerhard Schroeder and Jacques Chirac in the early 2000s and determined close cooperation between Russia, Germany and France until 2014. The Berlin-Moscow-Paris policy network has brought about constitutional and institutional changes in three influential states in Europe, European and world politics, as well as influenced the revision of the concepts of safety and security governance at the national and international level. However, until now, the existing approaches and assessment methods have not allowed assessing the threats that this network has caused to the European security system over the years of its existence and, accordingly, giving a legal assessment of the actions of policy network actors.

The Berlin-Moscow-Paris policy network has gone through two key stages in its development. Initially, the presidents of three nations with different political systems established formal relations, directly fulfilling their constitutional duties as state leaders. However, subsequently, after leaving the posts of the Chancellor of Germany and the President of France, Gerhard Schroeder and Jacques Chirac continued to exert informal political pressure in resolving issues of combining the security concepts and security governance of Germany, France and their allies, on the one hand, and the security strategy of Russia, on the other hand. The Berlin-Moscow-Paris network actors determined the unity of political decisions and E.U. security governance, guided by trust-based relationships.

According to the studies of Carsten Daugbjerg, Bert Fraussen, and Darren Halpin, common values and interests of the network actors are an important condition for the creation of a policy network and the effectiveness of its political decisions (Daugbjerg et al., 2018). When applying the study results by Daugbjerg et al. to the analysis of the policy network “Berlin-Moscow-Paris,” we found the following. The formal reason for the creation of a new political spectrum Berlin-Moscow-Paris was the unity of the position of Germany, Russia and France concerning the American invasion of Iraq (March 20, 2003). The political leaders of the three aforementioned states initiated categorical condemnation of the war in Iraq unleashed by the Americans. The actors of the newly created policy network based their argumentation on European security and E.U. security governance.

However, in reality, the creation of the Berlin-Moscow-Paris policy network, directed primarily against the U.S. hegemony in the world political arena, is due to informal reasons. The values and interests of German Federal Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder and French President Jacques Chirac focused their political activity on rapprochement with the political elite of Russia headed by President Putin. The actions of the United States as a world political leader were disapproved of by many European political leaders. However, the two leaders with a personal predisposition to an alliance with Russia decided to openly enter into an alliance with Russia and oppose the U.S. policy.

Here are the following facts that reveal the informal side of the relationship between Gerhard Schroeder and Jacques Chirac towards Russia. In 2004 (at the age of 60), Gerhard Schroeder adopted a three-year-old orphan girl Victoria, taken from an orphanage in St. Petersburg. In 2006, the Schroeder family adopted an orphan boy, Gregor, from the same orphanage. Gerhard Schroeder did not have children of his own; therefore, the two children adopted in Russia revealed the values of the Federal Chancellor of Germany. His political activity at that time (September 2005) was manifested in the signing of the agreement between Russia and Germany on the construction of the North European Gas Pipeline (NEGP) on the bottom of the Baltic Sea. Key partners of Germany in the European Union opposed the signing of this agreement. However, Schroeder signed the agreement, for the first time openly opposing the interests of Germany and Russia to the interests of key strategic partners in the European Union. Moreover, in December 2005, after leaving the post of the Federal Chancellor of Germany, Schroeder headed the committee of shareholders of North European Gas Pipeline Company, the operator of North European Gas Pipeline. The committee headed by Schroeder made all strategic decisions related to the production and transportation of gas between Russia and Germany. To this day, Schroeder continues to advance Russia's interests, including lifting sanctions on Russia and recognizing Crimea to be Russian territory.

In his youth, French President Jacques Chirac shared communist ideas, knew Russian well and, at the age of 18, translated Eugene Onegin into French. Vladimir Putin sincerely admired Chirac and called the President of France “our” Chirac.

Thus, initially, in the early 2000s, the Berlin-Moscow-Paris political triangle was created as a formal (governmental) policy network aimed at redistributing spheres of influence on the Earth's surface. By 2007, Gerhard Schroeder and Jacques Chirac did not hold public office, so the status of the political network changed to informal. However, the new status of the policy network did not reduce its activity and the degree of influence on E.U. security governance. The Berlin-Moscow-Paris policy network continued to exert political pressure on safety and security governance in Europe and the world. Gerhard Schroeder became a lobbyist for Russian interests in Germany and the European Union, and Jacques Chirac, due to health problems, limited himself to lobbying for Russian interests in France.

Policy networks, causing constitutional and institutional changes in states and intergovernmental organizations, perform three main tasks: 1. exchange of information; regulatory tasks; and 3. executive tasks. Their main difference from numerous policy networks of a different format is the predominance of regulatory and executive tasks over the exchange of information. In fact, such policy networks are created for effective policy and exist until the effectiveness of political pressure satisfies the interests of policy network actors.

According to Raphael Bossong, approximately 75-85% of all currently registered policy networks established under E.U. security governance are limited to the exchange of information in their activities (Bossong, 2020). These networks specialize in sharing the “best practices” and using “soft” coordination. The networks of this kind do not fulfill regulatory and executive tasks and, accordingly, do not exert real political pressure on the national security policy and security governance of intergovernmental organizations.

Bossong's research proves the need to study the policy networks that cause constitutional and institutional changes in states and intergovernmental organizations. “(...) public actors, whether they are representatives of security authorities, ministries or government agencies, remain central to European governance networks” (Bossong, 2020). In fact, safety and security governance at the global, regional and national level are determined by a small number of policy networks (25-15%), whose activities are isolated from civil society and its governance (control). These networks are created and controlled by political actors: representatives of security agencies, ministries or government agencies, representatives of large financial and industrial groups.

The conceptual distinction between security and safety

The study of policy networks causing constitutional and institutional changes in states and intergovernmental organizations is faced with the problem of assessing the results of their political pressure on global and regional safety and security governance. Many academic analysts have expressed a distrust of informal internal security governance in the European Union (Bossong, 2020). The main reason for this distrust is the lack of legal frameworks and publicly available administrative acts that regulate and allow assessing the performance of such networks. The models for accountability of political pressure from such networks are imperfect that gives rise to impunity for the actors of the policy network for civil society. For example, Gerhard Schroeder and Jacques Chirac, despite criticism and criminal prosecutions, continued to promote the interests of the Berlin-Russia-France policy network in national and interstate security concepts.

From our point of view, the assessment of the outcomes of policy networks activities at the supranational level should be based on a clear understanding of the meanings of the conceptual distinction between security and safety. The definition “security is a means to achieve safety” across civilization must achieve a clear interpretation that can be used as a baseline assessment of the pressures of policy networks on global and regional safety and security governance.

There are numerous studies that reveal the nature and relationship between the concept of security and the concept of safety. For example, Sissel Haugdal Jore suggested the following systematization (Jore, 2019):

Safety:

a) Protection against human and technical failure.

b) Harm to people caused by arbitrary or non-intentional events.

c) Natural disasters, human error or system, or process errors.

Security:

a) Protection against deliberate acts of people.

b) Loss caused by intentional acts of people.

c) Intentional human action errors.

The concept of security implies a sense of safety, absence of threats and management of future risks. In fact, the concept of security concentrates in itself the ability to combine being safe and the absence of danger under the presence of army and weapons, as well as the ability to use war technologies to maintain peace and safety in the region. The concept of security achieves this result by using the concept of threat as a base model.

The concept of threat, in contrast to the concept of security, has a developed methodology for assessing (a) expected opportunities to inflict harm, and (b) possible intentions of attackers to inflict harm. The approaches and assessments developed in the threat concept are used in the concept of safety and security governance as initial and defining.

The second edition of the International Handbook of Threat Assessment offers modern approaches to and best practices in threat assessment (International Handbook, 2021). The central place in identifying threats is occupied by the possible intentions of an attacker. The intention is the motivation or desire to inflict harm and the expected results. Threat assessment takes into account the attacker's capabilities in terms of resources and knowledge. Distinguishing malicious intent from non-malicious intent of an intruder helps to delineate the circle of criminals that fall under the security category.

From the point of view of possible security threats, the following types of criminal activities are distinguished (Jore, 2019):

1. Theft.

2. Vandalism.

3. Organized crime.

4. Sabotage.

5. Kidnapping.

6. Hackers.

7. Terrorism.

8. Espionage.

9. Political crises that disrupt safety and security governance.

All of the above threats are defined as the forms of criminal activity. Forms of criminal activity can be carried out on one's own (suicide bombers, hackers, spies, etc.) or by organized groups, including policy networks operating at the national and international levels.

The developed threat assessment approaches and methods help to develop and promote the concepts of safety and security governance as the ways to mitigate threats and risks. The concepts of safety and security governance are being developed as ways to overcome uncertainty about possible scenarios for infliction of harm on the state and international cooperation. The nature of threat often lies outside the state, is mostly of a dramatic nature for society. For example, Oleg Bazaluk and Svitlana Balinchenko examined the threats of migration and its impact on the safety and security governance of the state (Bazaluk & Balinchenko, 2020). Therefore, both states and intergovernmental organizations should create and develop institutions (strategies) specializing in assessing threats and preventing them.

Practice shows that static security measures and rules are not enough to create a reliable safety regime at the national and international levels. The threat and risk mitigation measures that are envisioned by the security concept must focus on proactive threat elimination and awareness of impending threats, not just assessing the likelihood of threats. An effective safety and security governance model is the one that creates a system that can adapt to and cope with changing conditions and various threats. The models of safety and security governance at the national and international levels should be built in such a way as to “see what one sees” and provide political institutions with remarkable resilience. Igor Linkov proved the need to distinguish between the concepts of “risk” and “resilience” and, accordingly, the construction of the organization security models and safety models (Linkov et al., 2018). Managing security threats (risks) involves assessing and reducing the likelihood and consequences of potential attacks by applying various types of threat mitigation measures. Such measures include protecting critical infrastructure and enhancing organizational and social resilience at the national and international levels.

The difference between security and safety is manifested in the tools, standards, and risk management in these two areas (Jore, 2019). The scientific literature contains several international and national standards, guidelines and recommendations on how to assess security threats (Contemporary security studies, 2018; International Handbook, 2021). Security threat analysis practices, security governance concepts and tools vary depending on the country or region. However, they are all usually based on one of three areas:

1. Normal Accident Theory.

2. The Theory of High-Reliability Organizations.

3. Resilience Engineering.

Security threats are different from safety risk assessment. Sissel Haugdal Jore argues that most of the literature in the field of security is based on the perspectives from safety science. Jore explains it with three reasons (Jore, 2019):

1. Security has historically been outside the scope of organizational responsibility.

2. Organizations that have a tradition of dealing with security risks were mainly the military and police. i.e., organizations whose activities are hidden from research and critical views.

3. Safety science was a broad research area encompassing many disciplines. However, at the same time, until recently, it has not belonged to the security area, which has been mainly the subject of research in criminology or international relations, i.e., the disciplines focused on national and international governance.

In modern academic literature, security is understood as a process that reduces threats and protects (increases) the stability of the system (state, intergovernmental organizations) against possible scenarios of inflicting harm. An example or “exemplary” model of safety and security governance in the U.S. National Security (Shifrinson, 2020). The National Security Council System is built on the consolidated work of the National Security Council, a Principals Committee, a Deputies Committee and interagency policy coordination committees.

The prerogative of national security over all other national strategies and programs is proved by the following fact. In the first two weeks of his work, U.S. President Joe Biden signed 4 documents defining the U.S. National Security:

1. United States Global Leadership to Strengthen the International COVID-19 Response and to Advance Global Health Security and Biological Preparedness (NSM 1) 01/21/21.

2. Renewing the National Security Council System (NSM 2) 02/04/21.

3. Revitalizing America's Foreign Policy and National Security Workforce, Institutions, and Partnerships (NSM 3) 02/04/21.

4. Advancing the Human Rights of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Queer, and Intersex Persons Around the World (NSM 4) 02/04/21.

The overall structure of the Biden National Security Council system is similar to that of its predecessors. However, the title “Renewing the National Security System” indicates the political aspiration of the new administration of the President of the United States to change the national security system of previous President Trump. President Biden added to the National Security Council the ambassador to the United Nations, the director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) and the administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). New and notable changes to the National Security Council System reveal the focus of the Biden administration on science, global engagement, cybersecurity and rule of law (Bellinger, 2021).

Thus, security is a risk-reducing process carried out through political, technological and physical protection. According to Jore, security is “the perceived or actual ability to prepare for, adapt to, withstand, and recover from dangers and crises caused by people's deliberate, intentional, malicious acts, such as terrorism, sabotage, organized crime, or hacking” (Jore, 2019). Security risk management provides preparation, adaptation, counteraction and recovery from threats and crises.

The results of the author's research completely coincide with the conclusion of Jore that “it is the malicious intent that separates safety from security. As a result, the demarcation between security and safety should be drawn in terms of the dichotomy of non-malicious versus malicious intent, not between intentional and unintentional” (Jore, 2019).

Therefore, assessment of policy networks causing constitutional and institutional changes in states and intergovernmental organizations should be based on the dichotomy of non-malicious versus malicious intent. However, how possible and objective will such an assessment be?

Correlates of Deliberate Harm

According to Bossong, up to a quarter of all policy networks and groups (182) operating in the European Union have a minimum legal or formal administrative basis (Bossong, 2020). These are mainly policy networks associated with E.U. institutions such as the Commission or agencies such as EUROPOL or FRONTEX. The rest of the policy networks operate outside the legal field or within the framework of formal decision-making processes, the documents of which, by themselves, cannot provide adequate legitimation of informal policy networks.

The authors' assessment of formal and informal policy networks, based on the dichotomy of non-malicious versus malicious intent, aims to enhance the accountability of policy networks. The policy network accountability model, based on the dichotomy of non- malicious versus malicious intent, allows for threat assessment approaches and methods to assess the pressure from the policy network within safety and security governance. For example, the basic agreement signed by the Federal Chancellor of Germany Gerhard Schroeder on the construction of the North European Gas Pipeline (NEGP) between Russia and Germany under the Baltic Sea (September 8, 2005) can be assessed as a form of criminal activity carried out by an organized group, i.e., policy network, conventionally designated by us as “Berlin-Moscow-Paris.” This assessment is based on the damage to the safety and security governance of the European Union. The assessment of the threat from Nord Stream construction to the security of the European Union is evident.

An assessment of the Berlin-Moscow-Paris policy network pressure, based on the dichotomy of non-malicious versus malicious intent, reveals the Correlates of Deliberate Harm caused by signing the basic agreement for the construction of Nord Stream. Namely,

1. Nord Stream bypasses the traditional transit countries of the European Union: Slovakia, the Czech Republic, and Poland, as well as Ukraine, whose interests are defended by the United States. The national security concepts of these states view Nord Stream as political pressure on national and European security from Russia.

2. On August 20, 2009, Russia officially refused to ratify the European Energy Charter, thereby retaining the right to make decisions on the transportation of energy resources to Europe.

3. Gas disputes between Russia and Ukraine over gas prices, as well as Russia's foreign policy towards Eastern Europe, have proven that gas supplies are used by Russia as an instrument of political pressure.

4. In a study by the Swedish Defense Research Agency, more than 55 incidents (threats) between Russia and European nations were registered, most of which were “both politically and economically motivated” (Solum Whist, 2008).

5. In April 2006, Radoslaw Sikorski, Polish Minister of Defense at that time, compared the construction of the North European Gas Pipeline (NEGP) between Russia and Germany to the infamous 1939 Nazi-Soviet Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact (Gustafson, 2020).

Thus, the current assessment of the activities of the “Berlin-Moscow-Paris” policy network proves the malicious intent inflicted by Federal Chancellor of Germany Gerhard Schroeder by the fact that he signed the agreement on the construction of the North European Gas Pipeline (NEGP) between Russia and Germany. The threat assessment of the signed agreement testifies to the violation of the safety and security governance of a number of European countries and the European Union. In 2006, like his colleagues from Poland and the Baltic states, the Swedish Minister of Defense expressed concern that Russia would use the pipeline to spy and build up its military presence in the region (Bakst, 2006). Time has confirmed his fears (Gustafson, 2020).

Conclusions

An example of the policy network, designated by us as “Berlin-Moscow-Paris,” made it possible to study the features of the pressure from policy networks on safety and security governance at the national and international levels, as well as to develop the criteria for assessing this pressure.

Various models of policy networks accountability are suggested within the framework of safety and security governance concepts. Their goal is to ensure civil society control over the activities of policy networks. Researchers are trying to develop approaches and methods for assessing safety threats and security governance by policy networks. For example, Bossong offered mandatory publication of annual work programs for influential formal and informal policy networks. According to Bossong, publishing programs and reports will make it easier to summarize different theoretical perspectives and practices. Mandatory printed reports will reveal the causes and sources of pressure from policy networks, which will ultimately balance the governance of European security (Bossong, 2020).

The authors complement Bossong's findings with the need to use the concept of threat assessment in evaluating the pressure from policy networks on the safety and security governance of states and intergovernmental organizations. The authors proposed an assessment method based on the dichotomy of non-malicious versus malicious intent. A more rigorous model of accountability and evaluation of policy networks will strengthen civil society control over policy networks and balance the governance of European security.

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