Russia’s shadow foreign policy: "Soft power" and international education

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INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL SCIENCE

RUSSIAN PRESIDENTIAL ACADEMY OF NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

Russia's shadow foreign policy: “Soft power” and international education

Vincenzo Ligorio - Ph.D in Politics, Associate Professor

Abstract

This paper examines Soft's power concept, with a particular focus on Russia's strategy. The sources of Russian new foreign policy are investigated. This work discusses the evolution of Russia's foreign policy during last twenty years, what led Kremlin's analysts investigate and explore the possibility to adopt, in alternative to hard power, the soft power. The article describes Russia's soft power resources from the origin till today, its instruments and institutions. Special attention is given to the education dimension of soft power and its application within Russian foreign policy framework.

Keywords: soft power, foreign policy, Russia, hard power, world order, international system, international relations, international education.

ВНЕШНЯЯ ТЕНЕВАЯ ПОЛИТИКА РОССИИ: «МЯГКАЯ ВЛАСТЬ» И МЕЖДУНАРОДНОЕ ОБРАЗОВАНИЕ

Винченцо Лигорио

Аннотация

В этой статье рассматривается концепция мягкой силы, с особым вниманием к стратегии России. Исследуются источники новой российской внешней политики. В этой работе обсуждаются эволюция российской внешней политики за последние двадцать лет и причины, побудившие кремлевских аналитиков исследовать и изучать возможность использования в качестве альтернативы жесткой силе мягкую силу. В статье описываются ресурсы мягкой силы России от истоков до наших дней, ее инструменты и институты. Особое внимание уделяется образовательному измерению мягкой силы и его применению в рамках российской внешней политики.

Ключевые слова: мягкая сила, внешняя политика, Россия, жесткая силы, мировой порядок, международная система, международные отношения, международное образование.

foreign policy soft power

Introduction

The publication of numerous papers regarding the role of Russia in the world and its policy-(ies) through Putin's psychological analyse - assuming that it will represent a sufficient if not complete work to understand and explain Russian Policies - provide use with a useful occasion to clarify here several misunderstanding that are hovering today over the ground of Western countries feeding that political wing spreading “Russo-phobia”. [1]

We do not claim that other approaches - on the opposite extreme - had been used in order to describe Russian policies correctly, but what we would try to do in the following pages is to walk in the middle of both these extremes and provide a critical and objective analysis of the subject under investigation, even capturing those arguments which we believe have elements of truth.

Before to explore the core part of the above theme, we would underline - adopting a Weberian approach - that when we look at socio-political characteristics of contemporary Russia we do it with impartial eyes.

To briefly list the main misunderstanding, whose we had already properly investigated in other works, it will be useful to start with the main of them, so that the evaluation of contemporary Russia adopting the same approach used to investigate fact and characteristics of Soviet times. [2]

The second is the myth of Russia's propensity to over react, according the consolidated Soviet modus operandi. This point it can be considered one of the most debated within Western Russia's experts creating a short circuit when in some of the most relevant crises - Syria, Turkey etc. - Moscow did not respond rashly or instinctively.

The third point - to which we will partially come back later - is the simplistic interpretation of the Russian institutional structure as a country fully centralized with a lonely man ruling the whole state. This interpretation then shows its basic limits every time is recalled to explain Russia's decisions in foreign policy as well as in domestic one.

1.0 The Art of Soft Power

Nearly thirty years ago, with the end of Cold War, the United Stated seemed on the eyes of experts to be weaker that it had been at the end of the WWII; despite this belief the Country had still an impressive source of power to be used.

This sort of power had been defined by Joseph Nye, American political scientist and former presidential official, as “soft power”. [3]

Beyond continuing to use military power to administrate current things - abroad - and to take control over others, Nye explained that “ to get others to do what they otherwise would not “ the American administration could draw its non-coercive power - as above defined soft power - in order to reaffirm its political leadership position around the world.

If hard power was always easy to be defined and counted - how many divisions, tanks or missiles we have - the soft power was including uncountable and in some case intangible content.

Three are the categories into which we can embrace soft power: cultural, ideological and institutional.

As putted by Nye, in all these areas the world want to be like the US, in turn it would help the United States to shape the world. Adopting a psyco-neurological concept, if someone can make its power seem legitimate in the others opinion, it will help to find less resistance to its wishes. That is, if culture, ideology are attractive, then a country would find easy to shape others willingness to follow it.

According the idea developed along post-war/cold war era, the basis of US soft power was what we could define the American Dream, such us, liberal democratic politics, free markets economy, developed and ensured fundamental values and human rights - what in political science we would call the essence of liberalism.

In the years following Nye's conception of soft power, it seemed his forecasts and analysis reflected world affairs. The end of Cold War, and the establishment of a new era of supremacy for the United States, lead to an unpredictable appeal of the world toward the American liberalism.

Everyone wanted to be part of the decision making process - vote - express their ideas and identity - free speech - everyone wanted to be recognised as free just with their outfit - American brands.

Under this wave of liberalization the US led the international relations establishing new institutions and paradigms that would support its “new order”, changing as well its sys tem of alliances turning into partner former competitors.

Something similar happened in Europe, where the European Union was seen as an ideal to follow more than a regional organization. This occurred because the EU played on the same ground of US, adopting a soft power approach toward those countries that collapsed the soviet block had the physiological need to target a need existential ideal to believe to.

Until the world order was not shacked by the 11/9 fact with the consequent hard power approach assumed by the US and the end of undisputed paradigm of capitalism, it really looked alike the new century would belong to both American and West global soft power empire.

2.0 the end of American soft power paradigm and the rise of Russia foreign policy.

The above mentioned events aborted de-facto the initial idea of soft-power theorized by Nye and then applied by US and EU during the first two decades of the post cold war era.

The idea that all the answers were within the market, which would provide growth, good governance and well-being, providing the immunity barriers against crises and economic turmoil, was more an illusion than a real fact. [4]

What we would define “ the globalization of soft power” led to a world with debt-crises, inequalities and unstable growth more in general a crisis of the global political-economic system as the rise of anti-system/liberal government is demonstrating to us.

Another factor/mistake that led to the fail of the western soft power ideology stay in the American - first - and European- then - over confidence of the potency of their soft power that went into overdrive converting the rest of the world into their systems. The main example of this confidence and supremacy was the America's idea of promoting democracy abroad, which touched its pick under [G.W. Bush selfproclamation of America as moral nation.

The legitimacy - created - together with the self-confidence became so great in the Western establishment that they deployed a new hard power model in its name.

The hubris of the combination of soft with hard-power led to the illusion that the first could in somehow exist on its own. But as the facts show(-ed) us, the soft power is not other then an extension of hard power.

The last aspect we want to underline here is that soft power is actually more fragile than hard power. We believed for more then twenty years that soft power was unstoppable, this because it was compounded by the internet. Examples of this are all the “coloured revolutions” spread from Tahrir Sqare till the latest Maidan but that created general frustration when Russia was accused to use the same tool in order to subvert politics in the West.

When the confidence around soft power was still strong, the idea in the West was more open - a society - the better, turning now toward censorship in the media as well as internet due to the feeling of being victim of their own weapon.

Now, hard power came back in the international arena, increasing the feelings of tensions among states and allies.

The return of hard power as main instrument of international politics - with all the consequences which led to - de facto did not extinguish the function of soft power. Indeed, it is in this contest that had been developed new model of soft power - or as we would define reverse soft-power - by emerging powers - see Russia and China - in order to escape from the Western pressure and acquire consensus from those Countries that faced or are facing a transition from the “western” toward “national” ideology.

The fallen of American/Western ideology has coincided with the rise of Russia's role in international relations.

Dissolved the Soviet Union and with a wide transformation of the influence system within the post-soviet space - see the alignment toward Nato and EU of Baltics and others -

Russia's domestic politics took the place in term of importance in Kremlin's agenda. As we had already have the opportunity to explain in other papers, the main issue to focus on - after a dramatic post-soviet transition - was to ensure a State re-Building first and society building then.

Erected these two pillars, Russia's could think to come back in the international arena among those actors such as US and EU. This intention was already evident during Putin's second presidency (2004-2008) when a series of “colour” revolutions rocked the post-soviet space (Georgia in 2003,Ukraine in 2004 and Kyrgyzstan in 2005), opening an internal debate on the opportunity to re-think the approach toward the as called post-soviet space.[5] Moreover, another fundamental input was given by Putin's speech during the Security Conference in Munich in 2007 when firstly remarked the will to cooperate to develop a multilateral world consensus instead of unilateral which was dominating the way how to conduct the system of international relations. In other words with his long speech, Putin was rejecting the basis on which both American soft and hard power were based on. [6]

Since that very moment we see a shift in the foreign policy of Russia, this change of direction was evident with the emerging of what we defined in the past the elite of “diplomats” and more incisively when Kremlin decided to take back the position of donor in international aid policy.

Despite this transition - of course it did not occurred immediately - from recipient to donor re-designed the global politics asset, bringing with itself a serial of consequences on the global alliances chessboard.

What we want remark here one more time is that all the actions taken by Russia in term of foreign policy had been misinterpreted by western side, in so that had been read adopting a soviet point of view. This misunderstanding led to an over-reaction not - as expected - from the Russian side but from US and its partners leading to an uncertain and unstable period, with mutable alliances as quicksand.

Understanding Russia's foreign policy philosophy

In the western international relations schools often to explain the foreign policy behaviour of a state is applied the “power transition theory” (PTT), designed and mainly associated to Organski [7] and after the end of the cold war adapted to the new world order by others - see Kugler[8] and Lemke.[9] But despite some of the variations applied, its theoretical pillars remain more or less unchanged.

According the PTT there are two types of world powers - status quo and revisionist. In the first category are identified those states who participated in the designing of the “rules of the game” and gain benefits from those rules.

So that the main interest of these states is to keep the status quo in the international system.

On the other side we find those who Organski et al. defined Revisionist or Challengers, including those uprising powers looking for a new place within the international system in accordance with their power.

The main challenge of revisionist states is to redraft the rules, often showing dissatisfaction with their position in the system.

Russia often had been included in this last group by western analysts, especially when presented new projects such as the customs union with ex-soviet states to quote just one example.

We together with others believes that the models suggested in the PTT do not much fit to today's Russia. Rather than the above categories, we would define Russia and other emerging powers as reformists state. The main different between this and the above category lay in their methods and motivation.

Such states are characterized by their avulsion with the existing rules of the game but they do not want to change them radically. Their aim(s) is to reform them in order to make them fitting to the new global order/reality.

A reformist state play is role using the existing rules and norms rather then challenge them, claiming that the proposed reforms would be done according the necessary timetable to be fully gradually absorbed by all actors. They proposal of reform-s are generally negotiated and aim to provide benefits for all the parts involved in order to not re-create - again and for others - those dissatisfaction conditions. Of course in the range of these reformists we do not find an unique and dry model but all of them apply their characteristics and peculiarities.

If we consider the PTT as a Weberian idealtype then it is pacific that those theories/model help us to give an allocation to different states in the global chessboard. If we take it then - as many western analysts do - as a pure and given model we would face the risk to do not fully understand and then explain - as we remarked previously - those mixed/hybrid cases whose are more common in the reality of today international system.

Indeed if we take the case of Russia we can define it as reformist when it plays at global level and status quo for what concern its regional (post-soviet space foreign policy - with of course some exception according to particular events.

If we apply PTT to the current relationship with the Ukraine we would define Russia as a revisionist state.

Considering Russia as reformist and status quo, finds its fundament in another concept of foreign policy, “peaceful coexistence” - PCC. Indeed according a common opinion idea among Russia's government foreign policy advisors, countries with a different socioeconomic and political system can coexist peacefully. Abiding themselves to the existing rules, all the international players believe in the fact the only certain rules need to be adapted to the current situation challenges and global political environment. They do not believe in an unipolar world - with dominant-s (one or few more) power, but they prefer a multipolar or polycentric model - idea that became predominant in the Russian discourse.

Despite the PCC in Russia may be associated with the same developed since 1992 by Lenin, the current differ from the Soviet one because it is not based on an ideology, communist/socialist in the case of Soviet model.

Russia's PCC find is source in Putin's speech in Munich - as said above - were he expressed his concerns regarding the direction taken by international system, with a lonely superpower leading the world.

We want here clarify that in that speech Putin did not want to undermine the existing world order but called all “partners” to adjust the system in order to make it more secure, compatible and comfortable with the existing legal norms.

His suggestion indeed was to develop a multipolar system based on the current international law.

As we remarked several times in our papers, the 2007 and in the specific the Munich Conference represented for Russia's leadership the moment of its new international course. This was the turning point when Russian foreign policy integrated Nye's concept into the range of policies, accounting it as relevant.

Despite this step, Nye's model took a different interpretation within Russia's political leadership. As stated by Nye “ the development of soft power need not to be a zero-sum game; all countries can gain from finding each other attractive”.[10] This was according his point of view the main misinterpretations of his theory, in so that Russia took soft power as a very pragmatic instrument more interest-based goals than aim to take into account the interests' of all international partners. According Nye this was not only a Russian mistake but was a pathway followed by other reformist/status quo countries - see BRICS.

Adopted in its first version as an instrument toward Russians compatriots living abroad with a focus on the post-soviet spaced, it is in 2012 with the new Putin's presidency that Russian moved versus a wider idea of soft power - despite the concept was still pragmatic.

Quoting the document called Russian Policy Concept (2013):

“Soft power has become an indispensable component of contemporary international politics, which is a complex set of instruments for resolving foreign policy tasks backed by potential of civil society, information and communication, humanitarian and other methods and technologies, alternative to a classic diplomacy”.[11]

It is in these terms that Kremlin focused to develop a Russia's positive image abroad adopting the above means as well as the support of the Russian speaking community abroad.

Russia's soft power resources

In addition to these just mentioned resources, among Russian academic and experts circulate the idea that it should be added an economic dimension, which can be used - as western theorists believe - ad the need as hard power instruments. [12]

Since Russia became an emerging market and a top power, the economic dimension took more relevance in Moscow's soft power strategy especially toward those states belonging to the post-soviet space. Several are the example of this move, such ad the custom union, strategic projects included new pipelines in some case oriented even versus those new partners like the European Union. As often discussed the Ukrainian crises changed or better to say forced Russia to shift both policies and partner to who address those initiatives.

Of course as mentioned in the previous paragraph a lot resources were spent - not only in financial terms - on the cultural component of the Russian soft power. This dimension in which we can include the higher education sector - as we would see in the following section - was developed even before the 2007 when Russia's leadership under the impulse of its strategists became aware of the importance of soft power.

Continuing on the resources at disposal for Russia's foreign soft policy, a great role was played before the Ukrainian crises by its diasporas. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, quoting Putin's words “millions of Russians speaking people became foreigners at their homes”. With a particular focus on Baltics, where despite Russian speaking people are historically integrated, they have to face daily difficulties due to internal controversies and cultural conflicts with not Russian speaking nationalities. These communities represents for Moscow an immense resource in so that being considered minorities in those countries they see Russia as the main protector of their instances, influencing de facto internal politics by rising pro-Russia issues in front of local and national institution.

Education as soft power: Analysis of a new instrument offoreign policy

All the Governments around the world are aware to the fact that one of the main factor in order to strength and create favourable long-term socio-economic conditions within their border is foreign policy. To achieve this, each state uses a variety of tools that can fall in two categories: hard and soft power.

However, since the new world order may be defined as multipolar, many governments prefer to use soft power in order to achieve their foreign policy goals. This tendency is due to the fact that achieve those goals adopting hard power actions may not be costless in term of side effects.

Today's world is characterize by the tendency of an increase of interdependence among states, in this context soft power instruments are occupying a more effective role within others in the foreign policy of countries and we may affirm that this position will continue to rise in the coming years - without fully substitute hard power at all.

As above explained, soft power is a concept theorized and develop in the beginning of 90s by Nye to describe the ability of a state - in his main example US - to attract and co-opt rather than coerce and use cultural, economic and political forces as means of persuasion.

We already mentioned in this paper that culture represent and education are among the most effective soft power instruments.!] Nowadays, the leadership in the world politics is acquired if a state demonstrate to have the ability to help develop - see international aid in many sectors and forms - its partners as well as its competitors.

In Today's world competition between different values and socio-economic models created a trend toward the cooperation and adaptation between them rather that homologation of one into another. This process is quite impossible without taking into consideration the human development - the basis of the formation and consolidation of new socio-economic and political models. That is why many states - see China, Russia, EU et. al. - are paying a particular attention on the internationalisation of their national education systems.

We must emphasize that beside being considered of the main engine of prosperity, the number of countries that are using the education system to promote their national interest in the international arena is increasing at high rate.

Countries or entire regions - see the EU - rose up generations of young people under the umbrella of international education programs - i.e. Erasmus - reinforcing ties between those states.

The high attractiveness of the cultural Russian model within the post-soviet space - but not only, see for example the success obtained by the Bolshoi Theatre ballet around the world - with several activities coordinated by the Minister of Culture and the support of local Embassies it always represented an important instrument for Russia's soft power strategy.

Despite that, the education dimension became very relevant in the support to Moscow's foreign policy in so that the central administration paid more attention in financing all those program orbiting in what we can call education soft power dimension.

The Russian higher education it have been always very attractive for those students coming from ex-soviet republics or those countries aligned with the soviet block - see the popularity of the Peoples' Friendship University of Russia (RUDN University). Many of the current presidents or high officers in the former soviet republics had been educated in Moscow as well as many of the kids of European communist parties. This always represented a good net especially in the beginning of the new Russian foreign policy course.

The interest of Russia in the education dimension began already a decade ago with the NGO the Russian World (Russkiy Mir, in Russian), which had as main function that of spreading/ promote the language, culture and the education system outside Russia. [14]

Briefly, the philosophical idea of this project found its bases on the fact that enlarging the audience of speakers and people who would need more Russia due to the deepened interest on it, would work as force in order to strength the sustainability of the statehood.

Russkiy Mir established several fellowship and internship oriented to foreign academic and students, organizing as well conferences and competitions to be hosted in Russia. This initiative is quite similar to those taken between the end of 90's and the beginning of the new millennium by the Moscow's city administration that had always on that time develop its own form of foreign policy.

The process of development of the Higher Education system was gradual and was build up simultaneously with the soft power, strengthening then its potential.

Introducing and developing the Bologna Process allowed Russia created a new wave of incoming students - coming not only from the post-soviet space and not being interested in the language - providing also an additional visibility to other universities that were in the shadow of the Moscow State University. The success of the Bologna Process increase as well the financial support from different department of the Russian Administration; if in the past scholarship were supported by the Minister of Education or private foundations, an great effort had been profuse by the Minister of Foreign Affairs that re-distribute hundreds of scholarships between the embassies as well as facilitating the procedure of obtaining students and teaching visa.

In addition to the above initiatives, the Russian academic community - being considered in some discipline a good source of soft power - was stimulated and encouraged to open toward foreign grants and cooperation as well as other scientific and not scientific activities.

In this framework we find the increase of bilateral agreements signed all over Russia with respected Universities from all the part of the world. These agreements works in the reality as memorandum of understanding between the countries of the parties involved in the cooperation, without involve the - directly - the political dimension.

Several are the example that can certify how these agreements work as an instrument of the soft power. To list some, we can see how despite the worsening of the relationship between Russia and the EU consequence of the Ukraine's crisis, the numbers of bilateral agreements between Russian and Italian universities multiplied obtaining good results.

On the other side to report also negative example(s), as consequence of the incident with a Russian military plane in the Turkish airspace, several agreements that were going to be signed had been freeze or blocked and many Turkish students saw their scholarship - temporarily - suspended.

One of the example which - for biographical reason - we would like to mention is the case of the implementation of several parallel degree program with the University of London (which include some of the best London's Universities), that in one of moment when the relationship between the UK and Russia are touching negative picks - due to Salisbury's events - can represent a mean to realise the tension between these two countries.

Conclusions

It has been argued in these paper that the soft power did not appeared accidentally but found its sources in the evolution of the international system and with the need for the US to find alternative instruments to those related to the hard power.

The evolution of this instruments and the involvement of more actors in such shift have provoked a situation where an internal (to the US leadership) misunderstanding in term of use - if or not together with hard power tools - and in the belief that the international system could be unipolar.

In contrast to this situation with the emerging of new actors, the soft power assumed a fundamental role for those states victim of the stereotypes held along the past decades.

This is the case of Russia that as we said in the introduction had been “victim” of a series of misunderstanding leading to a misinterpretation of its real intentions in the international arena.

Despite Russia's application of soft power deviates from Nye's one, we can say that Moscow's adopted it as an instrument to reclaim first and maintain then Russia's great power status and restore a multipolar system abiding the whole system to the international law.

We argued that between all the resources in the range of a super power as Russia in order to attract and influence other countries, the international education played and still play a great role. We agrees we other authors that many step need to be done in order to give to the international education the same value then other instruments of soft power in Russia's foreign policy. Nevertheless, we believe that this tool in combination with others - such as cultural dimension - allowed Moscow to obtain important results in very critical moments.

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