- “a desire of particular states and interstate groups to disparage the impact of the existing mechanisms of the international security maintenance, especially the UN and the OSCE”;

- “the threat of a forcible attenuation of the political, economic, and military influence of Russia”;

- “the NATO expansion”, which, driven by the influence of the US, could be interpreted as an underlying reference to the threat of the initial US's expansionism, especially while being “raised to the rank of a strategic doctrine, being backed by a legitimate permission to use military force» See [4], Appendix 1 for an original translation.;

- “a spread of weapons of mass destruction”, combined with the heightened danger of terrorism, seems to be among shared points of concern with the US.

An emphasis is made concerning the information wars See [5], Appendix 1 for an original translation.. Here also a latent reference to the US could be observed with its extensive media coverage on the Russia-US bilateral relations, involving not only positive aspects of cooperation but also negative ones dealing with a variety of issues that gathered pace at a time. Additionally, an increased technological abruption among global leaders as well as growing demand for the extension of their military capabilities in terms of building up a new generation of weapons and military equipment impact, in turn, on a shift to a new stage on the already existing arms race, which raised some security concerns among Russian representatives.

The Strategy of National Security of Russian Federation till 2020 (in force since 2009) Стратегия национальной безопасности Российской Федерации до 2020 года // Официальное Интернет-представительство президента России. URL: http://kremlin.ru/supplement/424 (дата обращения 30.04.2020)

The renewed and updated following the global international system changes, the Strategy raised more concerns regarding both safety and security of Russian citizens and state prosperity respectively, referring to the exacerbation of previously existing, as well as emerging, interstate conflicts See [6], Appendix 2 for an original translation.. These factors made the new version of the Strategy more strict and self-defensive, as Russia already has obtained enough capabilities to sustain global contention for power.

By referring to the US, Russia showed its geopolitical concerns over the US's decision on the deployment of the missile defense system in the territory of Europe, meaning, territorial proximity to Russia, thus posing a security threat to it. Accordingly, there is also an assumption that there is “the overall risk of an increase in the number of states possessing nuclear” See [7], Appendix 2 for an original translation. - in this context, Russia will opt for any defensive measures necessary for a proliferation of self-defense.

In the section “Strategic stability and equitable strategic partnership”, the desire for a stable economic and political cooperation on a multilateral ground is extensively elaborated. This becomes especially relevant under the assumption of assessment of the US as an external threat, which is embedded in the narrative of the Strategy. This could be interpreted as a fact that if there would be any cooperation with the US, then only at the lowest cost, simply to maintain the secure distance between two states, aimed, as a maximum, a well-balanced strategic partnership.

“Russia will make all necessary efforts at the least costly level to maintain parity with the United States in the field of strategic offensive weapons in the context of their deployment of a global missile defense system and implementation concepts of a global lightning strike using strategic carriers in the nuclear and non-nuclear equipment.” See [8], Appendix 2 for an original translation. (The Strategy of National Security of Russian Federation till 2020, 2009)

“Russia will strive to build an equal and full-fledged strategic partnership with the United States of America on the basis of common interests and taking into account the key influence of Russian-American relations on the state of the international situation as a whole. The priorities will remain the achievement of new agreements in the field of disarmament and arms control, strengthening confidence-building measures, as well as resolving issues of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, building up antiterrorist cooperation, and resolving regional conflicts.” See [9], Appendix 2 for an original translation. (The Strategy of National Security of Russian Federation till 2020, 2009)

7. Conclusion and further implications

`Not in his goals but in his transitions man is great.'

Ralph Waldo Emerson

It seems that in general discourse rhetoric presented in the academic and media articles, both Russia and the US have been genuinely pursuing the opposite - to show the goals they placed to achieve in domestic, as well as in foreign, affairs, rather than thinking about the initial process of transition towards it. Regarding the overall dynamics in the depiction of the bilateral Russia-US diplomatic relations, on the one hand, both academic and media sources depict a certain kind of fluctuations between the extent of openness, competitiveness, willingness to collaborate between both states, starting from a relatively peaceful collaboration in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War and then gradually transferring into the aggravated confrontation striving for the pursuit of global dominance in the international arena. As a result, Russia has shown an increase in the so-called “anti-Americanist views”, the same has done the US towards the former one.

Concerning the media representation of the Russia-US bilateral relations, different patterns could be identified. What is interesting here is the way how the mentioned fluctuations differ in their stages. A case in point, from the representation retrieved from the NYT, the year 2016 was marked with severe accusations over hacking. This could be explained by the increased value for information brought by its rapid spread in the informational age of globalization. At the same time, it should be noted that Russia began to raise and express its concerns over the mistrust of the US much earlier (the articles for the year 2005 depict this pattern). However, this was conducted in a more orderly manner, contrary to the US's side. Another pattern which was revealed by the discourse analysis of the presented media narrative has shown that while the NYT has a wide range of authors dedicated to the research in the sphere of Russia-US bilateral diplomatic relations, Kommersant has a more limited number of authors engaged, which suggests a possible subjectivity of the narrative.

Another interesting pattern has to deal with the discoursive representation of diplomacy, which is connected to the personification of politics and the creation of contiguity with a specific event. As it could be seen from a Graph 2, presenting a word cloud based on a selection of words that are used more frequently in the narrative analysed, an overwhelming majority of vocable applied depicts either relation to a personality, namely, a state leader, or to a particular agenda feature, for instance, surveillance Detailed auctorial classification of the agenda can be found in Graph 1..

Graph 2 Word cloud Scholium: For the purpose of the presented paper, the adverbs, prepositions, pronouns, and country names were excluded. based on the reference mentioning in the media articles used The New York Times and Kommersant.

The problem also lies in a fact that by striving for the achievement of individual pragmatic goals, such as greater number of issues sold, increase in the citation index, both of the approached publishing houses were trying to denunciate the impact of each other, by presenting a more skeptical image of an opponent, rather than a neutral one. Generally, this is unavoidable as, additionally, both publishing houses have a latent obligation (although not stated clearly) to reflect the official state's position in the political agenda, on which they specialize.

Concerning the official documents applied, which for the purpose of the presented paper were narrowed to the Strategies of National Security of Russia and the US, here similar patterns of the representation of the image of bilateral diplomatic relations could be depicted. Specifically, that could be explained by egoistic preservation of the national security by each of the presented states, as, otherwise, with any kind of security intervention, they would be immediately placed at risk of losing power.

In terms of the narrative used, the world cloud illustrated in the Graph 3 depicts that those are less personified and more oriented on specific patterns, which may be interpreted as the focus areas of the document's orientation, including maintaining stability, dealing with a global threat such as terrorism, and measuring aspects of cooperation with other members of the international community.

Graph 3 Word cloud based on the reference mentioning in the official documents used Strategies of National Security of Russia and the US.

Nevertheless, as it was bluntly stated in the analysis, both sides are willing to denunciate and condemn the actions of the opponent, presenting themselves respectively in an image of global threat. This could possibly be substantiated by a desire to produce a negative adducing of a rival within the international community, which has its strategic significance in reacquiring the opponent's power to thyself. Correspondingly, a similar desire is chased when it comes to the influence on the public opinion on the agenda, which, in turn, answers the general research question.

By considering the results of the empirical analysis, this point leads to the theoretical conclusions dealing with the hypothesis stated at the beginning of this work. Diplomacy truly is a form of mediation between two states, as well as the policies implemented within the frame and rules of the diplomatic conduct. This could be extensively supported by applying the constructivist model of analysis, as this allows to depict the socially produced patterns through the discourse analysis, interpreting the latter with a peed consideration of the methodological imagination. Similarly, approaching diplomacy from the perspective of its `common sense' also reflects its demand for constructivist discourse analysis, while being reluctant to any type of strict theoretical approach.

The choice of such a reflective tool is explained with the patterns of personification and subjectivity, identified in the course of the research. The latter was backed by a Foucauldian argument, reflecting on an operational significance of language and speech in determining the narrative direction of the power-relational discourse. More importantly, the fact that Foucault has referred to the discourse as a tool for creating truth also makes sense in the context of a presented paper. The reason for this is its impact on the formation of public opinion that presents a subjective Scholuim: It is subjective in a sense that it is created by an individual. Hence, there is a certain extent of a personal reflection on the issue, lacking objectivity and independence of attitude-related interpretation. reflection as a truth, suitable for a public audience, performing the role of the observer in this sense. Additionally, the ideas of Foucault coincide with the auctorial hypothesis, the one which predominantly relies on the Hobbesian notion of a social contract, indicating the realist patterns of the distribution of power, as he combined the reflective constructivist logic with realist assumptions, from the methodological side. What is more important, Foucault did not strive towards the complex and absolute objectivity of the knowledge presented, which also endorses the argument of the subjectivity of the discourse.

Keeping in mind these critical caveats, within the introspection of the theoretical and empirical parts of the presented research, both parts of the applied hypothesis, including H1, dedicated to the opportunity of discoursive subjectivity to impact public opinion due to the persuasiveness of the narrative tools it uses, and H2, covering the methods for the visualization of public opinion, were confirmed. Accordingly, coined with the notion of the media malaise, these findings prove the ability of media sources to impact the overall spectrum of political awareness among citizens (Norris, 2000), impacting it from the emotional and psychological perspective. Notwithstanding, according to Norris (2000), such a pattern has a negative impact, as the data presented in this work proves this statement by depicting negative and skeptical rhetoric of the narrative covered.

As a further elaboration on the topic presented, deeper content analysis could be suggested as a metric to work. A case in point, the detailed profiling of authors of the media articles, necessary to depict its biographical background, could be provided, as well as broader coverage of the resources applied. Similarly, while developing this idea, the timeframe applied could be extended till the present time, therefore, allowing to conduct particular individual biographical interviews with the people working under the different publishing houses specialized in the political agenda. Another possible extension of this work is the analysis of the impact of digitalization on the spread of fake news by continuing to analyse the agenda of media sources, however, in a slightly different manner - by deepening into metrics, applied to measure the veracity of information.

8. References

8.1 Academic literature

1. Blumler, J. G. (1997). Origins of the Crisis of Communication for Citizenship. Political Communication, 14(4), 395-404.

2. Bull, H. (1977). Diplomacy and international order. In The Anarchical Society (pp. 156-177). Palgrave, London.

3. Butler, J. (1997). Excitable speech: A politics of the performative. Psychology Press.

4. Constantinou, C. M. (2015). Everyday diplomacy: Mission, spectacle and the remaking of diplomatic culture. In Diplomatic Cultures and International Politics (pp. 35-52). Routledge.

5. Der Derian, J. (1987). Mediating estrangement: a theory for diplomacy. Review of International Studies, 13(2), 91-110.

6. Giddens, A. (1982). Hermeneutics and social theory. In Profiles and critiques in social theory (pp. 1-17). Palgrave, London.

7. Given, L. M. (Ed.). (2008). The Sage encyclopedia of qualitative research methods. Sage publications.

8. Grice, H. P. (1957). Meaning. The philosophical review, 377-388.

9. Fleming, M. (1996). Working in the Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Habermas, Foucault, and Derrida. Philosophy Today, 40(1), 169-178.

10. Fine, M. (2007). Expanding the methodological imagination. The Counseling Psychologist, 35(3), 459-473.

11. Fish, S. E. (1976). How to do things with Austin and Searle: Speech act theory and literary criticism. MLN, 91(5), 983-1025.

12. Foucault, M. (1984). Space, knowledge and power. The Foucault reader, 239(256).

13. Friedman, T. L. (2005). The world is flat: A brief history of the twenty-first century. Macmillan.

14. Hampton, J. (1988). Hobbes and the social contract tradition. Cambridge University Press.

15. Hey, V. (2006). The politics of performative resignification: Translating Judith Butler's theoretical discourse and its potential for a sociology of education. British Journal of Sociology of Education, 27(4), 439-457.

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17. Jackson, R. (2002). Martin Wight's Thought on Diplomacy. Diplomacy and Statecraft, 13(4), 1-28.

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19. Kant, I. (1785). The categorical imperative.

20. Kendall, G., & Wickham, G. (1998). Using Foucault's methods. Sage.

21. Levin, A. (2010). Foucault: Power, Discourse, and the State. The Cost of Free Speech, 119-138.

22. Lewis, S. C., Kaufhold, K., & Lasorsa, D. L. (2010). Thinking about citizen journalism: The philosophical and practical challenges of user-generated content for community newspapers. Journalism practice, 4(2), 163-179.

23. Nicolson, H. (1961). Diplomacy then and now. Foreign Affairs, 40, 39.

24. Norris, P. (2000). A virtuous circle: Political communications in postindustrial societies. Cambridge University Press.

25. Online Etymology Dictionary, https://www.etymonline.com/word/diplomacy

26. Orwell, G. (2014). Why I write. Penguin UK.

27. Rana, K. S. (2018). Bilateral diplomacy. The Encyclopedia of Diplomacy, 1-11.

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29. Russell, P. (1989). Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition. Journal of the History of Philosophy, 27(4), 620-622.

30. Sending, O. J., Pouliot, V., & Neumann, I. B. (Eds.). (2015). Diplomacy and the making of world politics (Vol. 136). Cambridge University Press.

31. Sharp, P. (1997). Who needs diplomats? The problem of diplomatic representation. International journal, 52(4), 609-634.

32. Sharp, P. (2009). Diplomatic theory of international relations (Vol. 111). Cambridge University Press.

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35. Wendt, A. (1992). Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics. International organization, 46(2), 391-425.

36. Wiseman, G. (2005). Pax Americana: Bumping into diplomatic culture. International Studies Perspectives, 6(4), 409-430.

37. Wohlforth, W. C. (1999). The stability of a unipolar world. International security, 24(1), 5-41.

8.2 Newspaper articles

1. Baker, P. (2014, December 19). U.S. Tightens Crimea Embargo to Pressure Russia. The New York Times. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/20/world/europe/us-tightens-crimea-embargo-to-pressure-russia.html?searchResultPosition=1

2. Can Russia Make Peace as Well as War? (2016, December 31). The New York Times. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/31/opinion/can-russia-make-peace-as-well-as-war.html?searchResultPosition=3

3. Damsey, J. (2007, June 7). Calmer Talk From U.S. and Russia. The New York Times. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/07/world/europe/07shield.html?searchResultPosition=26

4. Friedman, T. L. (2014, December 20). Who's Playing Marbles Now? The New York Times. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/21/opinion/sunday/thomas-l-friedman-whos-playing-marbles-now.html?searchResultPosition=6

5. Herszenhorn, D. M. (2007, December 25). `Russian Says Ban on U.S. Adoption Flouts Treaties'. The New York Times. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/26/world/europe/russian-official-says-adoption-ban-violates-treaties.html?searchResultPosition=30

6. Lieven, A. (1999, April 26). Let's Help Russia Help Us. The New York Times. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/1999/04/26/opinion/let-s-help-russia-help-us.html?searchResultPosition=2

7. Malia, M. (1999, December 23). Good News From Russia (Yes, It's True). The New York Times. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/1999/12/23/opinion/good-news-from-russia-yes-its-true.html?searchResultPosition=28

8. New York Times Company 10-K (2017, February 22). In The New York Times. Retrieved from http://d18rn0p25nwr6d.cloudfront.net/CIK-0000071691/37d516f5-b9da-4ca8-a50f-d70630760094.pdf

9. The New York Times, https://www.nytimes.com/

10. Risen, J. (2001, February 10). Spy, Not Diplomat, U.S. Officials Say'. The New York Times. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2001/02/10/world/russian-defector-was-spy-not-diplomat-us-officials-say.html?searchResultPosition=33

11. Risen, J. (2003, January 20). Russia Helped U.S. On Nuclear Spying Inside North Korea. The New York Times. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2003/01/20/world/threats-responses-weapons-monitoring-russia-helped-us-nuclear-spying-inside.html?searchResultPosition=16

12. Russians Say Times Report Is Untrue. (2003, January 22). The New York Times. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2003/01/22/world/threats-and-responses-russians-say-times-report-is-untrue.html?searchResultPosition=7

13. Sestanovich, S. (2001, October 5). The Challenges of Alliance With Russia'. The New York Times. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2001/10/05/opinion/the-challenges-of-alliance-with-russia.html?searchResultPosition=12

14. Tam, P. (2016, December 30). Russia Is Punished for Hacking, but for How Long? The New York Times. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/30/technology/daily-report-russia-is-punished-for-hacking-but-for-how-long.html?searchResultPosition=2

15. Tavernise, S. (2001, November 14). Russia Seeks Belated Peace Dividend. The New York Times. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2001/11/14/business/russia-seeks-belated-peace-dividend.html?searchResultPosition=18

16. Weisman, S. R. (2006, April 9). Russia Is Needed, But It's Not There. The New York Times. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/09/weekinreview/the-world-russia-is-needed-but-its-not-there.html?searchResultPosition=31

17. Габуев А., «Россию уличили в глобальном антисемитизме» // «Коммерсант». 2008. №42 С 1.

18. Корзун, А. «Мы полны решимости использовать новые возможности для сотрудничества с Россией» // «Коммерсант». 2010. №168. С. 7.

19. О «Коммерсанте» // ИД «Комменсант». URL: https://www.kommersant.ru/about/kommersant (дата обращения 27.04.2020)

20. Сидоров Д. «Противоракетная дипломатия. Россия и США вступают в генеральное сражение за ПРО» // «Коммерсант». 2007. №181. С 9.

21. Строкань С. «Генеральное наступление демократии»// «Коммерсант». 2005. №246. С 1.

22. Строкань С. «Как им обустроить Россию. США обозначили цели внешнеполитической пятилетки» // «Коммерсант». 2007. №64. С 1.

23. Строкань С. «Поучать и грозить пальцем другим -- не наш стиль» // «Коммерсант». 2009.

24. Черненко, Е. Перетягивание сети. Россия и США сражаются за интернет // «Коммерсант». 2012. №22. С. 8.

8.3 Official documents

1. “A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement.” Historical Office of the Secretary of Defence, The White House, 1996, history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/nss/nss1996.pdf?ver=2014-06-25-121234-233.

2. “A National Security Strategy for a Global Age.” Historical Office of the Secretary of Defence, The White House, 2000, history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/nss/nss2000.pdf?ver=2014-06-25-121312-560.

3. “Convention on the Rights of the Child.” OHCHR, www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/crc.aspx.

4. Federal law of Russian Federation no. 272-FZ of 2012-12-28 "On Sanctions for Individuals Violating Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms of the Citizens of the Russian Federation"

5. “National Security Strategy of the United States.” Historical Office of the Secretary of Defence, The White House, 1993, https://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/nss/nss1993.pdf?ver=2014-06-25-121210-297

6. “National Defense Strategy 2008.” National Security Strategy Archive, 2 Nov. 2017, nssarchive.us/national-defense-strategy-2008/.

7. “National Security Strategy.” Obama White House Archives, 2015, obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015_national_security_strategy_2.pdf.

8. “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America.” Historical Office of the Secretary of Defence, The White House, 2006, history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/nss/nss2006.pdf?ver=2014-06-25-121325-543.

9. Концепция Национальной Безопасности Российской Федерации // Совет Безопасности РФ. URL: http://www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/1.html (дата обращения: 30.04.2020)

10. Стратегия национальной безопасности Российской Федерации до 2020 года // Официальное Интернет-представительство президента России. URL: http://kremlin.ru/supplement/424 (дата обращения: 30.04.2020)

Appendix 1

Концепция Национальной Безопасности Российской Федерации Концепция Национальной Безопасности Российской Федерации // Совет Безопасности РФ. URL: http://www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/1.html (дата обращения 30.04.2020)

(утверждена Указом Президента Российской Федерации от 17 декабря 1997 г. № 1300)

(в редакции Указа Президента Российской Федерации от 10 января 2000 г. № 24)

(в соответствии с Указом Президента Российской Федерации от 12 мая 2009 г. № 537 утратила силу)

Appendix 2

Стратегия национальной безопасности Российской Федерации до 2020 года Стратегия национальной безопасности Российской Федерации до 2020 года // Официальное Интернет-представительство президента России. URL: http://kremlin.ru/supplement/424 (дата обращения 30.04.2020) 13 мая 2009 г.

Appendix 3

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