Apart from the metaphorical comparisons, the author also reflects a certain kind of skepticism and ambiguity, assuming that the Russian side lost its political “games”. Another critical point is how provocative is the overall narrative of an article, reflecting the personal attitude of the author.

“Let us not mince words: Vladimir Putin is a delusional thug. He created, fell in love with and is now being disabused of a fantasy notion of his and Russia's power.” (Friedman, 2014)

At the same time, this contradicts with the further development of an auctorial position on the necessity of American (as well as European) partnership with Russia.

“I wanted -- and still want -- to see America partner with Russia to help stem global disorder, because in many places in the world we can't be effective without a Russian partner.” (Friedman, 2014)

However, this desire is presented in such a manner, that in comparison with it, the Russian image seems to be a discrediting one, literally expressing a neglection and disparagement towards the Russian side, criticizing Putin's professional conduct of politics.

“Along the way, Putin lied to the world and deluded himself. His big lie is that the popular toppling of the corrupt government of Viktor Yanukovych in Kiev was just a Western plot to bring Ukraine into NATO. <...> His big delusion is that his mindset is trapped in a 19th-century worldview, where Russia is entitled to and will always have `spheres of influence' on its borders.” (Friedman, 2014)

The article starts with an explicit reference to the previous accusation of invasion in cybersecurity, by stating that during the year 2016, hacking was among dominant foreign policy concerns not only of Russia and the US but also the rest of the world. Mainly, such a piece of news was backed by the announcement of President Barak Obama in 2016 that Russia has conducted hacking invasion in the US elections, as well as accusing the Russian side of the harassment of American diplomats there. The seriousness and severeness of such a decision are underlined in the presented article by several narrative patterns, including emphasis and metaphor.

“The response -- the strongest American action ever taken against a state-sponsored cyberattack -- is expected to have repercussions on the relationship between the United States and Russia that will play out for many months.” (Tam, 2016)

Another problem that started to raise concerns more radically from 2015 and aggravated in 2016 is the Russian contribution to the participation and flow of the Syrian war. The idea defended in the presented article deals with the assumption that it is the aid of major Syrian allies, Russia and Iran, which makes the war lasting for so long. The other issue concerned the overall attitude of Russia towards the US, along the same lines, accepting the power of Russia.

“Now, during a fraught transition of power in Washington, Mr. Putin has effectively marginalized the United States and maneuvered into position as the dominant international player in Syria.” (NYT, 2016)

“Russia moved into this role gradually as Mr. Obama held the United States back from direct military action in the civil war.” (NYT, 2016)

What seems to be an interesting titbit about this article is that it is written by the editorial board of the NYT, meaning that, as it does not associate with a single author, reflecting her(his) personal subjective viewpoint, but rather presents a group of people related to the publishing house. Although it states that the editorial board does not reflect mutually agreed and shared opinions and values of all fellow workers, still, a certain latent attribution to a newspaper's ideology should not be denied, by being backed by the effects of the professional socialization.

5.2 Russian case-study: Kommersant

Kommersant is a Russian daily newspaper with worldwide coverage, founded in 1989. As states the data available for the year 2015, its daily printing coverage equals to 100 000 - 110 000 (Monday to Saturday) О «Коммерсанте» // ИД «Комменсант». URL: https://www.kommersant.ru/about/kommersant (дата обращения: 27.04.2020).

Similarly to the case of the NYT, the case of Kommersant was selected for the `accessibility of knowledge' and its orientation on a broad category coverage of readers from university students to business leaders. The same applies to its availability for the comparison in the frames of presented research discourse, expressed in similar agenda issues on which Kommersant is targeting its publications. This will allow measuring the discourse applied to the analysis of the bilateral coordination between Russia and the US.

What should be emphasized here is that full digital versions of publications are available for the period starting from the year 2005. At the same time, it is worth highlighting the frequency of publications within the frames of the chosen theme, which is higher in the Russian publishing than in the US's one.

General narrative: The attitude towards the Russia-US bilateral diplomatic relations

The demand for the increased pressure on Russia, to a more considerable extent, relies on American dissatisfaction with the way how democracy is organized in the former state, meaning that it does not fit the expectations of the US. This especially is depicted with reference to the US newspapers, such as Washington Post, stating that Russian actions should be evaluated as a threat to the global community. Hence, strict policies should be applied to calm down Russian assertiveness.

“Meanwhile, on the eve of the New Year in the West, calls are increasingly being made to world leaders to use the future Russian presidency of the G8 so as not to turn the meeting in St. Petersburg into another "photoshoot with Vladimir Putin," but to hold a tough and a fundamental discussion about whether she intends to follow the values that Russia swore to Boris Yeltsin by joining the G8 - or she abandoned them completely and irrevocably.” See [10], Appendix 3 for an original translation. (Strokan, 2005)

The general narrative of the agenda is, although depicting the issue in a relatively neutral manner, is unsatisfied and skeptical, as the “Strategic plan” depicts Russian behavior on the international arena in at a disadvantage.

“For the first time since the Cold War, the United States openly called its priority a task to counteract the `negative behavior' of Russia in many areas -- from selling weapons to unreliable regimes to Moscow's pressure on the former Soviet republics, whose future the US associates with `color revolutions'. The new report promises to exacerbate relations between Moscow and Washington.” See [11], Appendix 3 for an original translation. (Strokan, 2007)

After a series of negotiations, Russia and the US decided to meet again to discuss the possible proposition on the issue of the missile defense. However, it is stated that this round of talks was evaluated as the last one in terms of an opportunity to reach a mutually acceptable compromise among both of the participants.

What also seems peculiar here is the way how the US represented the Russian side.

“The Russian military understands that in the near future the US missile defense system in Europe cannot threaten their missiles, but at the same time they are trying to slow down its deployment. This position has its own logic. They believe that in the future, in an expanded form, the US missile defense could harm the Russian retaliation potential.” See [12], Appendix 3 for an original translation.(Sidorov, 2007)

At the same time, the US in this document depicts itself as a peaceful actor, working to maintain global stability under the democratic regime.

“In Russia, according to the State Department, the authorities do not directly use anti-Semitic slogans, but they are obviously not doing enough to combat this phenomenon. `In Russia and other countries of Central and Eastern Europe, where xenophobia is widespread, traditional anti-Semitism is still a problem,' conclude American diplomats.”(Gabuev, 2008)

Such a position genuinely did not leave the Russian side with a satisfactory attitude on such a representation, and the article presents this in its narrative, by emphasizing the deliberateness of such vision, by stating that “the authors of the document do it deliberately <…>”. See [13], Appendix 3 for an original translation. This may be interpreted, and the article supports such a position, as an continuation of the anti-Russian politics, surrounded by heavy criticism and skeptical opinions.

Presenting himself as an “architect of Russian reset policy”, McFall presented some reflections from the American perspective on the civic society and rebuilt of democracy in Russian domestic and foreign affairs. The overall sentiment is positive, showing the satisfaction of an American side with the way how those institutions are developing in the Russian state and which forms they take as a consequence.

What was also emphasized is the promptitude towards dialogue on the mutually beneficial issues, thus, considering both sides of the debate.

“We have things that we want to talk about, the Russian government has its own issues for discussion. The key to the success of this group will be the opportunity to speak on all topics of mutual interest. And just talking about what interests only the American side, and the Russian side does not, or vice versa, this will only create difficulties.” See [14], Appendix 3 for an original translation. (Strokan, 2009)

The general narrative of an interview is quite optimistic: it stated that recently there is a certain kind of progress in the bilateral negotiations on a number os salient issues. Namely, the new START treaty was signed, agreement on cooperation in the sphere of atomic energy was in progress. Additionally, it emphasized that the US would support Russia in joining the WTO.

“Our central task at the new stage is to facilitate Russia's accession to the WTO.” See [15], Appendix 3 for an original translation.(Korzun, 2010)

Still, an extent of a condescendence can be depicted from a tone of a proposition, providing evaluative comments on the Russian experience in global affairs.

“Russia has made good progress in this direction by setting the task by September 30 to resolve a number of outstanding issues, and President Obama has proclaimed assistance in achieving this goal as one of his top priorities in relations with the Russian Federation. I think that now Russia is more than ever close to joining the WTO.” See [16], Appendix 3 for an original translation. (Korzun, 2010)

Despite those critical remarks, the overall narrative is peaceful, showing openness for cooperation.

The article focuses on the two contrasting views on the regimentation of the norms of online behavior. While Russia extensively favors the imposition of such kind of rules, the US strongly opposes this viewpoint by evaluating this as an attempt of strict censorship. A number of experts have already called such an adversarial process as the `Cold War 2.0'.

Russian assertiveness in those measures is explained by increased applicability of the cyberwarfare and socio-political influence through the social networks, as the latter has begun to work as a platform for the reset of the Russia-US bilateral relations. Regarding the narrative, an emphasis is placed on the astuteness of the side of the US.

“This does not prevent the United States from more actively preparing for cyberwar, building up the defense potential of structures such as US Cyber Command. In the Pentagon's cyberstrategy published in 2011, the US was the first to officially recognize cyberspace as a potential battlefield like land, sea, air and space. Then they declared their right to respond to cyber attacks by all available means - up to the use of nuclear weapons.” See [17], Appendix 3 for an original translation. (Chernenko, 2012)

Major accusations of the Russian side concerned the disregard of the Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances. The same applies to incompliance with the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. “Russia must abide by the agreement. For decades, it has contributed to security in Europe and Asia, and there is no reason to undermine these foundations now,” - cited Kommersant the words of John Kerry.

Russian response presented an opposing viewpoint, stating that it is the policy of the US on the agenda, which seems to de disruptive in this instance, as it is aimed at producing a unilateral control of the agenda.

6. Official representation of the Russia-US diplomatic relations

6.1 US Strategies of Security and Defence

From the perspective of the official sources of political and diplomatic agenda, the National Defence and Security Strategies are among prevailing documents dedicated to the depicting the objectives and aims in the preservation of national security and defense, essential while dealing both with the domestic and foreign policy issues, as it deals with the strategic guidance on force distribution.

The analysis presented above will look through the reference of Russia in the US's National Defence Strategy documents, the way it is represented, how the initial narrative and the context to which it is applied are framed.

The National Security Strategy of the US, 1993 “National Security Strategy of the United States.” Historical Office of the Secretary of Defence, The White House, 1993, https://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/nss/nss1993.pdf?ver=2014-06-25-121210-297

The document assumes the former Soviet Union no longer poses a threat with the defeat of communism, which also was among the significant dangers due to its ideological power, as well as the chances of the nuclear war are also reduced.

“The threat of thermonuclear war has been radically reduced and the danger that Soviet expansionism posed for forty years has disappeared as well.” (The National Security Strategy of the US, 1993)

More importantly, the US presented itself as the one being in charge of the successful and stable transition to democratic rule for the post-communist states, which gained independence after the collapse of the USSR, thus placing the global stability, the so-called “global zone of peace” among its key aims. What is more, the US expressed a desire to provide essential expertise to the post-Soviet states in an advisory manner on how to build economic and foreign policy objectives and programmes of its implementation.

“In crafting a post-war foreign policy based on containment, we defended the Free World against Communist expansion and aggression.”( The National Security Strategy of the US, 1993)

A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, 1996 “A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement.” Historical Office of the Secretary of Defence, The White House, 1996, history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/nss/nss1996.pdf?ver=2014-06-25-121234-233.

Here Russia appears as one of the security partners of the US, for instance, regarding the detarget of the ICBMs and SLBMs. Another important point is the position that the US has supported Russia in its desire for the democratic transition, at the same time emphasizing that “while our [the US's] relations with the other great powers are as constructive as at any point in this century, Russia's historic transformation will face difficult challenges”, hence, the US's side assumed that Russia would predominantly rely on its advisory.

“Russia is a key state in this regard. If we can support and help consolidate democratic and market reforms in Russia -- and in the other new independent states -- we can help turn a former threat into a region of valued diplomatic and economic partnership. Our intensified interaction with Ukraine has helped move that country onto the path of economic reform, which is critical to its long-term stability. In addition, our efforts in Russia, Ukraine and the other states support and facilitate our efforts to achieve continued reductions in nuclear arms and compliance with international nonproliferation accords.” (A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, 1996)

Generally, the cooperation between Russia and the US seemed to be relatively peaceful and providing hope for further expansion. Specifically, the START-1 treaty became effective in 1994, as well as certain shared values were endorsed, including actions against terrorism.

A National Security Strategy for a Global Age, 2000 “A National Security Strategy for a Global Age.” Historical Office of the Secretary of Defence, The White House, 2000, history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/nss/nss2000.pdf?ver=2014-06-25-121312-560.

The US places great hoped on strengthening the alliance with Russia, which mostly has to deal with the promotion of a democratic model, embedded in the US's policies. However, it seems that there is a hidden desire to thus fully control the Russian side, by making its norms and regulations of ruling similar to the one implemented domestically by the US.

“Just as we strengthen our alliances, we must build principled, constructive, clear-eyed relations with our former adversaries Russia and China. We must be mindful of threats to peace while also maximizing chances that both Russia and China move toward greater internal openness, stability and prosperity, seizing on the desire of both countries to participate in the global economy and global institutions, insisting that both accept the obligations as well as the benefits of integration. With Russia, that means continuing our work to reduce the nuclear danger, to assure strategic stability, and to define its future role in Europe, while supporting the emergence of democratic institutions and the rule of law.” (A National Security Strategy for a Global Age, 2000)

Nevertheless, particular aims seemed to be too assertive and even posing a risk for the Russian side of the US's intervention, as the extensive participation of the US in the Russian domestic and foreign policy may consequently result in an enormous unilateral control from the initiator's side.

“To that end, we continue to work with Russia to control possible leakage of former Soviet nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons materials and expertise to proliferant states.” (A National Security Strategy for a Global Age, 2000)

It is worth mentioning that “A National Security Strategy for a Global Age” (2000) also indicates a separate bloc for the propositions on how to work with “Russia and the Newly Independent States (NIS)” (see page 52 of the document referred “A National Security Strategy for a Global Age.” Historical Office of the Secretary of Defence, The White House, 2000, history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/nss/nss2000.pdf?ver=2014-06-25-121312-560.), which addressed several criticisms of the current intrastate order taken by Russia. A case in point is the one reflecting the lack of sufficient order and ability to control citizens. Notwithstanding, the US assumes to pursue the right policies towards Russia, thus, according to the document, de jure, preserving the notion of democracy there, but ideologically, de facto, preserving more its dominance.

“The United States strategy toward Russia and the NIS has made every American safer.” (A National Security Strategy for a Global Age, 2000)

The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 2006 “ The National Security Strategy of the United States of America.” Historical Office of the Secretary of Defence, The White House, 2006, history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/nss/nss2006.pdf?ver=2014-06-25-121325-543.

While outlining major threats, impacting the domestic and foreign policy objectives of the US, it appears to assume Russia to be among the list of states that are posing a major terroristic threat. Another accusation listed is the so-called “disrespect” of democratic values, which Russia ostentatiously shows, contradicting the US's genuine appeal to democratic freedoms and institutions.

At the same time, the US cooperated with Russia to oppose the pressure of Iran and several other issues and even accepted it to be among strategic accelerators of economic growth, hence, agreeing with its economic development.

“The United States has joined with our EU partners and Russia to pressure Iran to meet its international obligations and provide objective guarantees that its nuclear program is only for peaceful purposes. This diplomatic effort must succeed if confrontation is to be avoided.” (The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 2006)

What is more, the US emphasizes both the existence and the need for close cooperation with Russia on the range of questions, valuing its strategic significance due to the favourable geopolitical and geoeconomic agenda.

“We must encourage Russia to respect the values of freedom and democracy at home and not to impede the cause of freedom and democracy in these regions. <...> We will work to try to persuade the Russian Government to move forward, not backward, along freedom's path. Stability and prosperity in Russia's neighborhood will help deepen our relations with Russia; but that stability will remain elusive as long as this region is not governed by effective democracies. We will seek to persuade Russia's government that democratic progress in Russia and its region benefits the peoples who live there and improves relationships with us, with other Western governments, and among themselves.” (The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 2006)

The National Defense Strategy, 2008 “National Defense Strategy 2008.” National Security Strategy Archive, 2 Nov. 2017, nssarchive.us/national-defense-strategy-2008/.

Firstly, Russia is mentioned in the frame of the depiction of the global political environment, in the “Strategic environment” section. The general outlook on the section shows that the US accepts the existence of an international conquest for power and is quite cautious in framing relations with foreign colleagues. The narrative applied to the description is genuinely skeptical, especially in referring to the values and policy objectives that Russia seems to pursue in its actions.

“Russia's retreat from openness and democracy could have significant security implications for the United States, our European allies, and our partners in other regions. <…> Russia also has begun to take a more active military stance, such as the renewal of long-range bomber flights, and has withdrawn from arms control and force reduction treaties, and even threatened to target countries hosting potential U.S. anti-missile bases. Furthermore, Moscow has signaled an increasing reliance on nuclear weapons as a foundation of its security. All of these actions suggest a Russia exploring renewed influence, and seeking a greater international role.” (The National Defense Strategy, 2008)

It should not be denied that these assumptions accept the position that Russia has been strengthening its power in the international arena, posing a certain kind of threat to the global polarity and placing a competitive pressure on the distribution of power among dominant states. Among salient issues described is increased Russian reliance on its military resources and capabilities, as this was even compared to an instance of the provocation of the military confrontation.

However, those concerns and fears are framed by an assertion that the US will undertake sufficient effort to prevent such a situation, by urging Russia to work as an ally of the US, notwithstanding, by which means and related costs such path would be pursued.

“At the same time, we will seek other ways to encourage Russia to act as a constructive partner, while expressing our concerns over policies and aspects of its international behavior such as the sale of disruptive weapons technologies and interference in and coercion of its neighbors.” (The National Defense Strategy, 2008)

National Security Strategy, 2015 “National Security Strategy.” Obama White House Archives, 2015, obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015_national_security_strategy_2.pdf.

From the very beginning, the document emphasises on Russia as an image of threat and aggression, placing it among the priority to counter, highlighting that it is the Russian aggression that threats the future of international relations among the globe.

“Escalating challenges to cybersecurity, aggression by Russia, the accelerating impacts of climate change, and the outbreak of infectious diseases all give rise to anxieties about global security. We must be clear-eyed about these and other challenges and recognize the United States has a unique capability to mobilize and lead the international community to meet them.” (National Security Strategy, 2015)

Those concerns are were predominantly raised by Russian actions during the Ukrainian conflict. Apart from that, such fear was supported by the possession of natural resources, including oil and gas, which Russia extensively uses as a tool for maintaining the foreign policy, including not only supporting relations with its allies but also a tool of dependency-creation, as it is in the case of Europe, relying on Russian energy resources.

“Russia's aggression in Ukraine makes clear that European security and the international rules and norms against territorial aggression cannot be taken for granted. In response, we have led an international effort to support the Ukrainian people as they choose their own future and develop their democracy and economy.” (National Security Strategy, 2015)

“And we will continue to impose significant costs on Russia through sanctions and other means while countering Moscow's deceptive propaganda with the unvarnished truth. We will deter Russian aggression, remain alert to its strategic capabilities, and help our allies and partners resist Russian coercion over the long term, if necessary. At the same time, we will keep the door open to greater collaboration with Russia in areas of common interests, should it choose a different path--a path of peaceful cooperation that respects the sovereignty and democratic development of neighboring states.” (National Security Strategy, 2015)

6.2 Russian Concepts of National Security

Scholium: Before moving to the initial description and analysis, it is essential to point out that due to the lack of sufficient translation of the presented documents, the translation presented was conducted by the author for this paper. Original versions of these documents are given in the Appendix section of this paper.

The Concept of National Security of Russian Federation (in force 1997-2009) Концепция Национальной Безопасности Российской Федерации // Совет Безопасности РФ. URL: http://www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/1.html (дата обращения 30.04.2020)

It should be admitted that domestic security and maintenance of social and economic prosperity of citizens stand as the primary priority at that time. Nevertheless, the role of international cooperation is not denied. The emphasis is placed on the shared values, embedded in responses to mutually shared global problems, including the threat of terrorism, the existence of ethnonational conflicts, social and economic inequality, etc. Those are significant due to the remarkable changes which were admitted by the Russian side as ones “transforming the global system of international relations” See [1], Appendix 1 for an original translation., applied to a description of the Russian positioning within the global community of states. Such a trend gives ground to a strengthening of economic and political relations among a number of states, under which the objective of Russia was stated as an appeal to the contribution in the “formation of the ideology of the proliferation of the multipolarity” See [2], Appendix 1 for an original translation..

Regarding the relationship with the US, the document presented accepts the existence of the post-Cold war unipolar order with the clear dominance of the US, mostly supported by its extensive military capabilities. However, the rhetoric of this Concept indicates a desire to challenge such a position. Although not stated directly, meaning that there are no specific foreign states included in the narrative, the Strategy elaborated on the existence of external threats, including See [3], Appendix 1 for an original translation.: