The phenomenon of post-truth in national media as a structural factor in russian-american relations

Table 2. The dichotomy of message and target of post-true media reactions of the United States and Russian Federation

It is interesting to see how post-true world allows for the key messages of the two contradicting positions be very much alike: the actions of own country are framed as a response, as means for protection, thus, constructing the image of the country as a defender rather than as an aggressor. Both sides claim to be on the side of the so-called `justice', which signifies that justification, both domestic and global, is important for both countries: for the States, such legitimation is needed to preserve own role as the leader of the international liberal order, for Russia, it serves as a basis for openly contesting American hegemony and trying to self-construct as yet another pole in the long-desired multipolarity, a country that has finally recovered from the painful fall after the Cold War.

International tool and international factor. While the previous two sections examined the essence of post-truth in the context of Crimean crisis, there remains a question of whether this tool is as effective in changing the opinion of the international society as it is in reshaping the self-constructed identities of the selected countries. The answer to it would be somewhat ambiguous: the post-true rhetoric is actually persuasive only when there are preconditions for it to be so. The European Union reacted so vividly primarily because such an action from Russian side was a significant threat for the countries of Eastern Europe and the Baltic states. It had no choice but to adamantly condemn the `forceful intervention and annexation' for two reasons: of concerns for own security and because Ukraine was strategically an important asset once it shook hands with EU. However, since European Union was never a united front, and it had significant troubles in understanding how to react to this situation in general - a military response could have had disastrous consequences, an economic response had to be carefully formulated and could have taken too long to implement. In this sense, the identity of the United States as the leader of the Western world serves as a guiding beacon for the EU countries: the US-initiated U.N. Security Council resolution, though expectedly vetoed by Russia, in much served as a unifying point that gave the Western powers a chance to understand the US position and to express their solidarity and readiness to oppose the country that has broken the adopted international norms. The identity of Russia as an international aggressor going rogue was propagated most of all by the American media, like The Washington Post, USA Today, and others, and so was the urge to `punish' this aggressor through both political and economic means: sanctions, political bans, expulsions. Nonetheless, it is clear that the European Union (and most of the liberal democratic world along with it) was more than ready to adopt the American post-truth take on Crimean crisis. Ukraine quite suddenly became everybody's concern, which was quite likely aided by the United States' media channels, which called Ukraine the `front lines' of protecting the democratic world from the USSR's evil heir - a position which even the American politicians now share as their own.

For Russian Federation, as previously noted, justifying the intervention was more of a matter of national stability and public solidarity rather than an attempt to persuade the global society in own pure thoughts and best intentions. The European Union or the NATO countries certainly would not accept the rhetoric of `Russian genocide' and `US-sponsored fascist revolt', and any attempt at conveying such a position would fall on deaf ears. At the same time, Russian media and the Russian government readily used the created post-truth discourse to accuse the West of downplaying Russian point of view, which in part was truly so (Brenton, 2014). Nonetheless, the messages conveyed by the Russian media channels gave those willing to hear an idea of how to support Russian position in this question: the countries which traditionally rejected the United States hegemony and the Western dominance acknowledged Crimean as Russian with a rhetoric very much resembling one seen in Russian media. For instance, Afghan president Hamid Karzai, when announcing the support for Russian claims on Crimea, called the referendum the “free will of the people”, and Venezuelan leader Nicolas Maduro, in his statement acknowledging Crimea as Russian, claimed that the revolution in Ukraine was anti-Russian and was perpetrated by the Western powers. Indeed, it would have been undesirable for any government to side with an aggressor, a violator of international order, an `uncontrollable beast', as Russia was framed in the Western media. However, supporting a country seeking to protect a part of its legacy and revolting against Western schemes is much more appealing. It seems as though the Russian post-truth position was readily accepted by the countries opposing the Western camp, just like the American position was adopted by its long-trusted allies.

In a sense, the effectiveness of post-true discourse as a tool of international politics depends on the set preconditions. Post-truth per se appears to be unable to significantly change the existing opinions of the international society, yet it is a factor that helps to reinforce the chosen line of behavior and justify it with a certain degree of success, as it clarifies the chosen identity traits of a particular actors and helps other actors to empathize or reject them with clarity, as demonstrated by the Crimean case.

Unlike Crimea, Syria still permeates international consciousness as a proxy war unfinished, a problem unsolved. The military actions in Syria continue up to this date, and it is a strategically vital point for many global actors. The conflict in Syria is also notable for it is a case where the identities of the two countries discussed clash at their sharpest. Additionally, unlike Crimea, Syria is a strictly foreign policy matter for both Russia and the States: a matter of influence, a matter of international prestige, and a matter of values. It is not surprising then that national media of both countries continue to cover the developments in Syria with almost frightening consistency. War in Syria translates to the continuous war on terror, to a clash between two largest nuclear powers in history (albeit an indirect one), to a clash between the Western democracy model and the pride and values of its opposition from the East. For Russia, the potential loss of an ally in Middle East, dangerously close to its sphere of control, could be a serious blow after Ukraine. For the United States, Syrian regime is one in a long list of undemocratic Middle East governments, but an important one due to its close ties with Iran and Russia. For both, the spread of radical Islamism and the rise of Islamic State would be a disaster waiting to happen. When push came to shove, the two conflicting states had no incentives to back down, as this arena of confrontation was strategically and ideologically important for both. And the national media of the two countries were there once again to promote the cause.

The identity and the position. In Syrian civil war, there is more than two sides of the coin. However, the main battle was waged between the Syrian opposition, represented by the National Coalition, and the Syrian government led by President Bashar al-Assad. What started as an uprising against al-Assad's government quickly escalated into a hot battle for power. Initially, the United States intervened in the country torn apart by war to prevent the then Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) coalition from spreading its roots where the governmental power became weak. The first point of entry was, as it seems, the failed mission to rescue American hostages held by Islamic State (IS) forces, according to the official reports and media coverage (“James Foley: The Subject of Failed U.S. Rescue Mission in Syria”, 2014). After the hostages were beheaded publicly, the situation became a matter of honor as much as a matter of protection and strategic dominance. The official reason for the NATO powers to enter Syrian soil was the fight against ISIL (“Joint Statement Issued by Partners at the Counter-ISIL Coalition Ministerial Meeting”, 2014). Under the same pretext, the United States chose to train and support the opposition and, later, to go into full offense by resorting to airstrikes. However, it never did say that it was happy with the current regime in Syria.

Russian Federation, on the contrary, joined the fight by the request of Bashar Al-Assad, fulfilling the role of an ally of the incumbent regime. In this sense, its presence was legitimized by the state, as Russian power was almost the `backbone' of further Assad's government military successes, though also executed under the pretext of ISIL containment. For Moscow, it was a large victory, since its interference practically reversed the tide of the war. It was a large geopolitical achievement as well, since Kremlin seemingly `overpowered' Washington in the political sense, stopping the momentum sparked by the Arab Spring. At the same time, Russia wished for US acknowledgment of the Russian-led anti-terrorist coalition as a legitimate partner in the Syrian war, “which would have amounted to a recognition of Kremlin as Washington's geopolitical `equal'”, as noted by Kofman and Rojansky (2018). Yet for Russia the fight against terrorism was in much connected to the fight against opposition. Once again, the positions of the two superpowers clash over the same reality.

Table 3. Key points explaining Russian and US positions on Syria

The positions summed up above are once again aligning neatly with the identities adopted by Kremlin and Washington in the past decades: for the United States, Syria is a stage of its continuous War on Terror and a democracy in the making; for Russian Federation, Syria is an ally and a fellow anti-Western regime, yet it is also an opportunity to show own global importance and weight. Syria was a collision `by chance', since the two countries had quite different initial interests in the region (Kofman and Rojansky, 2018), but this collision developed into a new proxy war, to which both Russia and the States had to react accordingly. However, it appears as though this clash came out as a shock for both sides, since they had to believe own post-truth paradigms to guide their actions.

The target and the message. Since Syria is a very complicated case of war on many fronts, determining the actual targets of the post-truth rhetoric permeating the media outlets and specific messages that are designed for them appears virtually impossible. In fact, it seems as though Russian and American behavior was based on the preset post-truth identities and values, which dictated their further communication, once the conflict brought them together. The post-truth discourse was used more by the high officials themselves, and this discourse basically repeated the previously constructed ideas of self. The Syrian successes allowed President Putin “to address many of Russia's problems--namely its post-Ukraine political isolation and long-standing desire to force the United States to deal with Moscow largely on its own terms” (Weiss & Ng, 2019).For the United States, in turn, the conflict was a chance to demonstrate the need for supporting democracies worldwide with `guns and arms', and also a justification for the ongoing programs aimed at fighting global terrorism. Nonetheless, after President Trump took office, the values the States attributed to the Syrian war became smudged: the US seemingly has interest only in destroying the IS and erasing its presence from the region, yet it still rejects the very possibility of Assad remaining in power once peace ensures. The media discourse over Syria is no clearer, though it certainly represents the existing post-true paradigm of international communication.

Table 4. The dichotomy of message and target of post-true media reactions of the United States and Russian Federation

From the brief formulation of the target and message dichotomy in Syrian case, it almost seems as though the tides have turned, and Kremlin came out victorious, with the States finally loosing its footing. However, this discourse is not unpredictable and follows the general lines of identities formulated by Russia and the States. For Washington, a direct offense aimed at al-Assad forces would have gone in contradiction with its image of a country that does what is right. After all, the legitimacy of al-Assad was backed by Russia, which already tried to cooperate on the joint goal of IS extermination. Additionally, President Trump's own values prioritized the image of America as a great leader which fulfills its promises; one such promise was to fight the global terrorism, not to overthrow legitimized governments (especially considering how President Trump had to constantly legitimize his own rule after the 2016 turmoil). For Kremlin, Syria was close to an ideal context for restoring international image - the intervention was ratified by the current elites in power, it had an additional justification in the form of the necessity to combat ISIS. The Syrian crisis gave Russia the acknowledgement it so desperately desired - both local and international media placed Russia on par with the States, noting how it `fills the American void' in the region. Though previous studies showed that both Russian and American media tended to cover news about terrorism as local rather than global issue (Storiea et al., 2014), the media discourse during the second half of the 2010s actually framed the fight against terrorism as a global issue of high importance. It was beneficial for both the United States, as it would justify a forceful intervention, and Russian Federation, since it would then create a context for mending the broken international rapports. Just as the two countries shared a common enemy, the Islamic State, their national media outlets shared the conceptualization of the fight against this enemy.

The major point of disagreement here remains Bashar al-Assad and his position of power. It is a conflict of values and perceptions more so than of the choice of Syrian leadership. Dethroning al-Assad is unacceptable to Russia, as it would set a precedent for a (yet another) successful coup dangerously close to its own borders and destabilize the region by overthrowing the fragile balance in the Middle East. However, al-Assad staying in power is out of terms for the USA, as it would mean complete and utter defeat of its `bringing democracy' ideology; moreover, al-Assad has been framed as a criminal by the American media and American government, which makes his candidacy all the more revolting. Though the United States has lost its chance to support the opposition, marked by a large failure, while it may accept the fall of the opposition, it will not accept al-Assad's claims for continued presidency, keeping own image of the world leader and democracy propagator. It seems as though the only viable solution to this dilemma would be the post-truth rhetoric agreed upon by both countries: until the war is finished, until the peace is signed, Bashar al-Assad will remain a great and strong leader for ones and an evil criminal-like dictator for the others.

International tool and international factor. From the discussion above, it should be clear that post-truth discourse, co-created by Russian and American media, serves more as a factor underpinning current status quo. The American elites and public would never brand the now scarce Syrian opposition as `terrorists', no matter how Russian media outlets would try to prove them being such. In the same manner, Russia will never condemn Bashar al-Assad for his inhumane ways of suppressing protests in the earlier stages of the Civil War, even though the American media often remind of the atrocities perpetrated by Assad regime. The actors of the global international society shall be more likely to choose the position which coincides with their identity and the existing disposition. However, in this particular case, the post-true rhetoric may also serve a tool in the sense of establishing a connection between the countries by setting the basis for a dialogue. For instance, by publicly explaining own take on Assad regime importance and its role in containing the IS, Russia created a possible route for new collaborations with the Western states, just like it happened with France last year. For Kremlin, the post-truth take served as a point of re-entering the global society.

For Washington, the post-truth rhetoric (its ability to swiftly change in particular) served as a peculiar `escape route'. Faced with inability to effectively support, organize, and lead the opposition, the USA could still argument its continuous presence in the region by the fact of IS problem being unresolved. The fact that it could explain its previous actions as directed at combatting terrorism and the Islamic State shows the importance of post-truth discourse of national media in modern international relations, for it helps to keep together the complex self-constructed image and relate it to the images of other actors. Though it was proven rather ineffective as a tool of shaping others' perceptions, it is tightly connected to the modern constructed reality of global affairs as a factor in much determining the reactions and positions of international actors. It also remains an important asset in establishing connections based on reinterpretations of objective reality, as it was in case of Russia.

The post-truth world is a world full of peculiarities, half-truths, and double meanings, yet it is also a world which allows for more than one point of view to be transmitted and received openly. The case studies presented above demonstrate well that post-true discourse of national media serves as more than just a tool of communication or conveying a belief. It affects the construction of identity by and of the state, just as it plays a role in preserving the status quo desirable for a formulated identity without the need to conflict openly. While it is largely unable to sway the opinions of the international society or even one particular actor in favor of the state without the pre-existing bond, once a post-true position is successfully formed by the conjoined efforts of the political and media elites, it becomes a guiding light for the state in question and its allies, allowing to quickly organize a response to any new arising circumstances or to coordinate the efforts with those willing to support a particular point of view.

Post-truth rhetoric leaves a space for maneuver, as can be seen from the Syrian case; it also gives room for justification and legitimization of state actions, giving one the ability to reject condemnation and work around negative sentiments, at least to some degree, as shown by the Crimean case. Nonetheless, it is doubtful that such hardly tangible matter can be fully controlled by the state elites or the media channels themselves. The need to follow the chosen path to the end limits and shapes the identity formulation, and it soon becomes almost interchangeable with objective reality, since it is much more pleasing and harder to abandon half-way. Such nature of post-truth makes it an inseparable part of modern global politics, with identities, policies and actions being built upon post-true notions - a fact that is hard to deny and even harder to accept.

Conclusion

The relations between Russian Federation and the United States have gone through many stages. The identities and images formulated through this history change continuously, just like their interaction does. To keep these identities and support them, the two superpowers had to slowly build a cocoon of silent half-truths and semi-lies by learning to interpret objective reality in a beneficial way through sentiments and national values. What Tsygankov (2014) calls Russian `inferiority complex' and American `superiority complex' are the finest examples of these post-true identities, fed by deluded perceptions of self, and also the reasons behind such a rapid spread of post-truth discourse. Both Russia and the States had to uphold the constructed image against harsh reality and resorted to the subjectivity, which bore more misconceptions and biased determination. What is more, much like Hannah Arendt predicted in her works, the political elites of these countries managed to believe in their own lies, so much that their decisions in domestic and foreign policy are now informed by the identity constructed upon post-truth inputs.

Nonetheless, in terms of international relations, the post-truth world seems to be quite stable - for the possibility of multiple interpretations of each and every event marks the plurality of information interpretation and paves the way for clear agenda-setting and understanding of the opponent's claims and interests. Indeed, this perceived stability is achieved at the expense of objectiveness and miscommunication, as well as stranded possibilities of reconciliation (it is much harder to agree upon anything if two sides have drastically different understandings of the matter at hand). The two opposing positions over the same issue rarely come together as one. On the opposite, the divide furthers, bringing forth new discontent and potential areas of conflict. In case with Russia and the States, the reconciliation and peace are unlikely primarily because of the post-truth identity of `evil nemesis' they have attributed to each other, augmented by the national media.

These post-true identities simply pave the way for more post-true discourse, creating a self-sustaining rut, getting out of which is harder with every new statement based on the previous dialogues. For American political and media elites, it is the mania of own greatness and the alleged necessity to be the world leader (or the world watchdog, depending on the situation). For Russian people in the position of power, it is the unquenchable desire to be an equal to the American political giant, not an asset or an underling, coupled with the imperialist ambitions instigated by the heritage of the lost Cold War. The justification for actions aimed at fulfilling these self-written prophecies is required on local, regional, and global levels simultaneously and is hard to achieve without the deliberate falsehoods permeating the governmental positions. These falsehoods, in turn, must be supported by something more than the opinion of one politician or official (especially considering how drastically the course of foreign policy may change with the change in office); at this point, the media enter the game by propagating the selected line of behavior and normalizing it in the eyes of the nation and the international community.

Once such normalization occurs, however, all the actors of the international relations must acknowledge the newly constructed reality - either in the form of `playing by the book' and following the previously institutionalized lies, or in the form of refuting the claims of the opponent and building own picture of the world by playing with the facts which the opposing side has already used to support own position. It is essentially an epistemological tug-o-war, where objective facts are attributed sentimental values they initially did not have with the goal of either legitimizing own identity or attacking the identity of the immediate competitor. To break out of this vicious circle of spitting falsehoods and then responding to those of your adversary in this system would amount to acknowledging own political impotence and forfeiting the grand game of politics altogether. For countries like Russian Federation and the United States of America, it is an option out of question. Therefore, the system dictates the continuation of post-truth polemics in the hopes of wearing each other out eventually.

While post-truth has a mitigating effect by rounding the sharp corners of irreconcilable identities of Russia and the US, it is a limiting factor nonetheless, for it robs the countries of the options which would contradict the chosen paradigm. According to the most recent psychological studies, it takes as little as 45 minutes for a person to believe his or her own lies; once one is committed to his or her lie, it becomes a powerful source of self-misinformation and produces false memories, which would be almost indistinguishable from the truth (Paige et al., 2019). Of course, it is a question of how long it takes for a country and the government to believe the lies spread by its main information outlets. However, once these post-true lies come the full circle, they become more than a misinformation tool designed to fool everybody else - they become a systemic factor of fooling own self, a kind of self-inflicted curse. Such an example would be President Trump, who had to follow the road paved by his predecessor, Barack Obama, in relations to Ukraine and Syria, even though the two political leaders are nothing alike in terms of priorities, values, and mode of leadership. Though he used the two crises to try and demonstrate his superiority and political toughness, he was pressed by the official rhetoric built up long before he took the office from the media channels, criticizing his every move (like CNN). It was especially visible when Trump decided to withdraw from Syria, in line with his own priorities, but had to immediately change his decision under the burden of the image of US presence there (hence the shift in the rhetoric that stressed the fight against terrorists as the main goal of the Syrian campaign).

For Russian Federation, the chosen line of post-truth now might pay off dearly. The identity of a great power helping those attacked by the West requires significant economic and political costs. The Syrian campaign, though relatively cheap (Aleksashekno et al., 2015; Kofman&Rojansky, 2018), saps the resources of Russian militia, especially now, with the fight now getting close to Idlib, and Turkey has no wish to back down. The continuous media campaigns are also something the Kremlin has to spend for. The 2020 year begun as a disaster for the global community, yet it is even more so a disaster for Russia: amid the COVID-19 pandemic, the oil prices fall to the all-time low, and the oil war with Saudi Arabia threatens to make a visible dent in Russian GDP. For Russia, the year of 2020 should have been a deciding year in terms of domestic policy, as the Russian government prepared the project of modifying the Constitution, along with resetting the term limit, which would allow President Putin to remain in power after his current, sixth, term would come to an end. The project was designed to be as swift as possible, perhaps, due to the pressing necessity of the changes which would allow the current regime to hold some more. However, the pandemic halted the process that would have otherwise been passed with flying colors past the public notice so there was little room for opposition maneuver.In addition, President Putin's public image has been worsening significantly for the past several years due to unpopular social policies and economic recession after ruble depreciation. Under these circumstances, the public and media focus inevitably shifts back to the domestic sphere, which has been much less successful than Russian foreign policy of the recent years. Russian post-truth identity of a formidable global power and a potential world leader would contrast starkly with possible economic crisis and the potential further depreciation of ruble if the oil prices will hold.

Just as it has been speculated at the beginning of this work, the post-truthmedia rhetoric, propagated first and foremost by national media outlets, is a systemic factor that was born out of the necessity to preserve status quo in the relations of the two antagonizing powers with drastically different identities, values and goals without damaging own image and the images of others. It is virtually ineffective in changing the positions of the direct opponent or the other actors on the global arena since its purpose first and foremost is to secure and justify the actions of the country in question from its own perspective. Those willing to adopt the said position (presumably the states that already had points of contact, shared identities, or common interests) will gladly share the post-true rhetoric of the country in question for it would allow for cooperation consistency and eased communication. Though in part an ineffective tool, it is a fact and a factor of modern international relations, which serves as a buffer point in a situation where objective reality can have more than one outlook. In this new constructed realityof global politics, it serves as a basis for formulating state identities and values, while also limiting the options of international communications to the strategy of the `big lie', forcing the governments of both the United States and the Russian Federation to desperately strive to uphold the post-truth images initially formulated to justify own actions. The additional role of media channels as sentiment-bearers boosts this process by equating emotional with rational in the context of international communication.

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63. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/02/world/middleeast/cia-syria-rebel-arm-train-trump.html

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77. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/15/world/middleeast/kurds-syria-turkey.html

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82. https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2020/03/13/starting-the-presidency-all-over-again-a69613

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Appendix

Table 5

Table 6

Table 7

Table 8

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