The phenomenon of post-truth in national media as a structural factor in russian-american relations

Now, what is a post-truth, based on the previous philosophical and theoretical accounts used in this paper? Is it a form of emotional deception turned on self to reinforce a national myth, or is it a more novel form of international communication that allows for the preservation of a fragile status quo that would otherwise crumble under the weight of irreconcilable positions? Truth is, it seems to be both. Post-true messages are often centered on ideas that give an emotional response to rational questions; while they certainly deceive all the parties participating in a communication, they are often so useful or agreeable that it is easier for the actors to consider these positions as a solid basis for the further arguments. After all, the field of global politics is not a children's playground - there is no room for screaming and accusing your opponent of lies and falsehoods, especially when the ground is shaky and the issue of concern can have more than one point of view. Ideas, ideals, and identities of one actor cannot really be disproved by facts alone. If the United States still wishes to see itself as the sole world hegemon with no other power to contend its dominance, it may very well do just so, and further this pleasant self-misconception through the stances of its national media, which would gladly find suitable arguments to prove how it is so. The opposite is true as well: should any other rising power, for instance, Russia, claim that the world is no longer unipolar, just as President Putin did at his annual conference in 2019 (TASS, 2019), it would be no harder to justify such claims and promote them, once again, through national media channels of the said state. The international world constructed by such conflicting perceptions is inevitably post-true, for each country is more willing to follow its own created bed-time story than to try and figure out one sole `realistic' view on present affairs that would work for all of its counterparts. It would simply go against the interests of such conflicting powers as, for instance, Russian Federation and the United States.

A constructivist take on the relations between these two countries makes the evolution of post-truth not only relevant but also logical and needed, for it is more of a constraining factor (`constraining' here is used in a positive sense, rather than a negative one) than a liability that hinders communication. After all, even the communication itself between the two states (which is, to note, often conducted through the positions of national media) is based in much on these post-true self-constructed images that the other party has to recognize and respect if it wishes to have at least somewhat of an adequate dialogue. Practically speaking, Russia and US communicate with each other through national media releases based on the previous releases, based on the previous releases, and so on, and so forth. Direct communication between these two states has been quite stranded since the happenings of 2014, and so their positions regarding each other are mostly based on the pre-constructed perceptions that the two countries wish to use. For the United States, that would be the leader of the Western world (and, with a certain degree of disagreement on the Russian side) the world `watchdog', for the Russian Federation, one would be immediately thinking in the lines of a rising, or resurrecting, superpower, or a `revisionist empire' even. The States cannot proceed as lightly as they did some twenty years ago, and Kremlin has to balance between aggressiveness and readiness for dialogue, as open confrontation is not in the interests of both players. Bounded by these self-constructed images, Russia and the States are practically forced to re-use these post-true assertions, reinforcing them bit by bit. As to why and how much it influences the actual relations between these selected states, the next chapter shall cover the history of the US-Russian relations and the place post-truth in the national media channels have to take there.

2. Russo-American Relations - The Post-Truth in Bloom

A Brief History of US-Russian Relations.

Without a doubt, a more thorough understanding of the meaning of post-truth in international relations in general is seemingly impossible without an overview of the history of US-Russian communication through the ages. After all, it is the modern situation which dictates the circumstances in which the post-truth rhetoric becomes a factor of bilateral communication and a track of sorts that predetermines much of the actors' behavior in response to certain events or actions of the other side. The word `modern' in this context refers to the span of the past twenty to thirty years or so and covers the long Russian quest for self-identity and assertion in the post-Cold War (or post-bipolar) world and the American uneasy seating (albeit a short one) as the world hegemon. Nonetheless, after a thorough discussion of post-truth from different onlooks, part of the focus must be shifted to the more practical knowledge related to the topic of the study, that is, the Russo-American bilateral relations; and, to do this part of the study justice, a brief introduction is in order. For the sake of clarity and non-digression, this sub-chapter will cover the history of US-Russian complex relations, which aims at showing the pre-conditions for the observable reality created by these two actors, and the developments of the recent years, which, as is going to be discussed later, in much illustrate the inexorable presence of the post-true connotations and their influence on both Kremlin and the White House.

From Tsarism... Now, for the sake of this work, it is surely not even close to necessary to venture into the history of the US-Russian animosity versus kinship dated back as far as the imperial times. However, it should be noted that the word `kinship' used before is not some elaborate sarcastic joke - prior to the 20th century, the relations between the two future, then, superpowers were nothing short of friendly. However, this situation took a turn for worse, surprisingly, almost two decades before communism took a hold over the largest continental empire in history, claims Ziegler (2014) in his short overview of the Russo-American relations for the two centuries before now. In his recollection of the threads that have weaved the iron curtain between these two countries, the author tries to explain why and how the positions of the two powers became opposite, noting, that the simple `balance-of-power' theory is not enough to draw a lesson from this history. He proposes own view on this regression: “in the late nineteenth century, the two sides constructed hostile, competing images that often obscure what in many respects might have been a mutually beneficial relationship. These hostile images have continued to shape relations to the present” (Ziegler, 2014, p. 673). Though Ziegler chose to use a neoclassical realist approach to advocate for his take on the US-Russian history, his recollection of the gradual deterioration of the positions of the two countries towards each other from beneficial partnership to appalling confrontation can be tied to the constructivist theory as well, since what Ziegler calls `images' are in much the identities assumed by the state or attributed to it by the other actor in constructivist view, and the writer does well to explain how precisely these identities appeared and how they began to dictate the actions of the two states pitched again each other.

To begin this short, in the perspective of the overall history of humanity, yet very eventful story, Ziegler chooses to trace back to the times of the American Revolution and the Founding Fathers, which seems to be a reasonable decision - every tale worth listening has to have a point that deserves to be marked as the beginning. At the end of the 18th century, the thirteen `rogue' states seeking independence from the British king George III were in desperate need of support in the face of at least somewhat illustrious allies against the threats posed by the three large European monarchies, all having pretty solid interests in the large territories on the continent abroad the Atlantic Ocean. The Russian Empire, a large country both in territory and power, far from the newly formed United States, seemed to be a good bet to balance out the said predators, especially with the “Britain's overwhelming naval superiority” keeping the neonate country frail and isolated (Ziegler, 2014, p. 676). Though the relations between the two countries were not officially established for a long time after the first diplomatic mission reached the St. Petersburg, due to many reasons (like the bribery policies spread in Russia in the Catherine's times and Tsarina's unwillingness to openly confront the Great Britain), none of which included actual amity between the two states, it brought forth the first naval treaties, mostly aimed at promoting uninterrupted and neutral naval trade, beneficial to both the United States and the Russian Empire. In all truth, the relations of the young and rebellious country and an old and traditionalist empire were more than promising, which led to the eventual formal diplomatic ties being established in 1809, with the two states exchanging formal representatives (Ziegler, 2014). In fact, the promise of bilateral cooperation was strongly reinforced by the above-mentioned British maritime dominance, as both the United States and the Russian Empire were in a need of a balancing anchor. What is more, during these years the trade between the two countries surged rapidly, which promoted the stability and acceptance between the two actors in the beginning of the 19th century, and even the forthcoming crisis over Alaska did not overcome the two states' desire to preserve this beneficial balance of power, as demonstrated by the Russian-Union ties during American Civil War and the subsequent deal on Alaska.

…through communism… Over the mid- and late-nineteenth century, the United States of America was a rapidly developing and industrializing country with even more briskly changing interests and priorities. The States became an increasingly morality-oriented country infatuated with own self-righteousness; power-wise, by the end of the 19th century the United States of America already closed the gap between itself and the great powers of the previous century, becoming equal to the Concert of Europe in terms of economy and military potential. Though its main priority, undeniably, was international commerce, the young American nation adopted more colonialist-like foreign policy strategy. Indeed, for a country that was built upon the idea of presidency and the power of a strong but changeable leadership, the identity of the President also played an important role. Even before the revolution shook the Empire, the United States no longer regarded its former business partner as an ally. On the contrary, the difference in the worldviews, along with the States' necessity to assert its newly found position as one of the centers of power. At the same time, the Russian Empire abruptly ceased to exist. In its stead, formed a country built upon socialist-communist ideals, a country that suddenly rejected its religious, cultural, and international legacy, much to the dismay of its neighbors near and far, including the United States and, in particular, its president Woodrow Wilson, who, as many of American citizens, feared the Bolshevik's ruthlessness and the possibility of the communist ideas spreading further West. Wilson was so adamant in his rejection of the newly consolidated Soviet Russia that he severed all the diplomatic ties with Bolshevik government in 1917, and the United States only formally recognized the USSR in 1933 (Ziegler, 2014). It is clear that at that point of time not only the interests of the Russian and American positions clashed (for instance, the Soviet Russia surely would like to neglect the debts of the broken Empire, whereas the Western capitalist world was astounded and refused to acknowledge this debt repudiation), but also the identities - for a highly religious capitalism-oriented country that owed its economic miracle to capitalist principles, the United States, the `godless' Bolshevist plan of world revolution that would topple the capitalist system was utterly destructive and very much threatening to its own existence. This clash quite nimbly escalated to a clash of `images' over the clash of interests, and the whole 20th century was essentially a stage of unyielding confrontation of the two superpowers that represented two initially incompatible identities built upon conflicting ideologies and worldviews. The difference in their positions was reinforced through media coverage as well, yet it would be a whole other discussion that, perhaps, can serve as a topic for another thesis.

…to Putinism. The fall of the Soviet Union after many decades of relentless Cold War was expected by many to settle the confrontation, at least on the outside. At the same time, the loss of identity by the former USSR led to a sort of confusion on both parts, just as previously mentioned in the recollection of Wendt's (1992) constructivist overview of the first decade of the post-Cold War order. Russian post-communist identity has to be practically formed anew; for the United States it was a chance for triumphant welcoming of the old enemy into a favorable addition to the Western liberal democracy camp. However, this promise was flawed from the very beginning, since Russia was not a democracy mature enough to be considered an equal partner by the States, as demonstrated by the 1993 Yeltsin's coup (Nation, 2012). However, Russian Federation was not ready to accept its inferior position, in much inspired by its national pride and Soviet legacy. The NATO expansion during the 90's and the US intervention in the wars in Yugoslavia were especially alarming to the weakened Russia. Such developments gradually swayed Russian elites and national perception against the Western world, since the mode of integration that did not acknowledge Russian sovereignty, legacy, and power did not coincide with Russia's perception of its possible role in the Western world (Bratersky, 2014). Vladimir Putin, who rose to power at the brink of the millennia, was a leader that embodied the hopes for democratization, modernization, and `new times' - for the nation, tired of the `wild nineties', and for the Western society alike, and certainly for the United States, which at that point successfully assumed the identity of a beacon of democracy and freedom (and the one and only supreme hegemon). However, the developments that followed suit quickly dispelled any frantic dreams of a `Westernized Russia' that were deemed as more than possible prior to the first decade of the new century. The following sub-chapter shall discuss the reasons behind this turn, as well as the context of the US-Russian relations in the last twenty years.

The beginning of the twenty-first century proved to be very controversial in many ways. It was so for the relations between the States and Russia as well, since both were preoccupied with own identity concerns and position in the world. The United States suddenly felt uncomfortable, to say the least, as the `world's policeman', and, after the 9/11, its hegemony was contested, yet not by an adversary that could be pinpointed territorially or politically. International terrorism was perhaps the most important matter that the world community had to face in the 00's. For both states in question, terrorism was a national priority and an international concern, and its threat even served as one of the key topics for electoral campaigns in both the United States and the Russian Federation in the years 2003-2004, though more shall be said on the topic a bit later into discussion (Oates, 2006). The threat of terrorism also brought these states together at some point, or, at the very least, negated their prior tensions. President Putin was the first world leader to telephone President George W. Bush with words of support after the 9/11 terrorist attacks; he was also one of the first to support the States in the infamous war on terror campaign (Roberts, 2004). For President Putin, it was in part a matter of mending the somewhat broken rapport after the Chechen campaign and, for the other part, a way of upholding Russia's international image on the world arena, in much tied to the situation in the domestic sphere. Russia and the States connected over being the victims of terrorist attacks, yet the two countries had quite different incentives: for the US, the “War on Terror” was a question of thwarted international prestige, since it's role of the world hegemon and the sole superpower was put under question by the attack on its citizens on its own soil; for Russia, it was `haps a possibility (to which, as can be noted, the United States was a direct impediment) to return to the plethora of great powers that are the decisive force in the global decision-making and prove that its former imperial glory was not far gone, contrary to the beliefs of the Western community and the post-Soviet space. The significantly different interests of the two countries lead to the fact that the relations were not exactly amicable, as opposed to the expectations of many international scholars, who practically counted on the “new era” of the relations between the two worst enemies for the past half-century or so.

The reasons for the discord between the two countries are truly numerous and are born of their positions and their self-envisioning. First of all, Russian policy towards the States was, and in much remains, reactionary - dissatisfied with the American claims for world hegemony, the main heir to the Soviet superpower was incapable of admitting defeat and sought to remain on par with the Western giant; Russia was ready to pose itself as a partner, not as a third-rate loser country that has to do American bidding. While this self-imposed identity was not received well by the United States, the rise of the former was, in turn, perceived by Russians as a rise of “Western Imperialism” and, unsurprisingly, was a reason for many speculations and worries, especially in the context of being on the `losing side'; as a result, everything `American', `liberal', `democratic', and `Western' was tinted with a strictly negative connotation (Roberts, 2004). It was reinforced by the rapid NATO expansion closer to the Russian territories - such action could not be perceived as friendly for the power concerned about its security above all, especially considering how Russia emphasized its preferences for a new, multilateral world order, not for an America-centric one. These contradictions came to the first of its many peaks in 2008, after the Ossetian war, which was in part sparked by the American intentions to integrate Georgia and Ukraine into NATO (Bratersky, 2014). Second, for the United States, the Russian history of autocratic and even totalitarian governance was quite disturbing, to say the least, and, even though initially there was much hope for the Russian Federation to become a consolidated liberal democracy, such aspirations became less and less realistic closer to the second decade of the 21st century. In this sense, the 2011 election campaign was a clear statement of Russian authoritarian tendencies returning in full power, which US had no choice but to condemn. However, in this case, the condemnation was met with aggressive backlash from Russian side: future President Putin called these remarks unacceptable and even destabilizing (Nation, 2012). Notably, Putin's stance towards the United States and the West in general gradually became more and more hard-lined and contentious, and so did the Russian policy in general, being a combination of Russian newly found identity as a potential revisionist leader, of Russian's reactions to the Western expansionism and attempts to exhort the influence, and, quite likely, of Putin's own predisposition towards the West and the United States in particular. Third, the more powerful the Russian Federation became politically and economically, the more its strategic priorities conflicted with that of the United States. Russia became pro-active in setting and achieving own political goals: if some decade ago it was more than ready to integrate in the EU and take the path of westernization, later on it became obvious that Kremlin had to rethink its geopolitical strategy and geo-economic perspectives (Bratersky, 2014). Another issue in this context would be the question of nuclear arsenals in connection with state security. Both states can boast an unspoken number of nuclear warheads, which keeps a certain `status quo' between them, at least in terms of hard power. For the United States, evidently, any form of nuclear limitation would be favorable, as the Mutually Assured Destruction is a policy that has become outdated for Washington long ago, as the main focus of foreign policy is centered on economic collaboration and is generally more open. On the contrary, for Russia, any form of nuclear cuts is undesirable to say the least, as it “maintains a traditional view of the centrality of strategic deterrence, fears the potentially destabilizing effect of a functional missile defense capacity controlled by the U.S., and relies heavily on its tactical nuclear arsenal as a foundation for territorial defense” (Nation, 2012). Such positions on the number of key questions seem utterly irreconcilable in combination with each other, coupled with the identities these countries attribute to themselves and to each other.

In the past years, the relations between the two countries deteriorated at an alarming speed. The Crimean crisis and the situation in Syria both dictated extreme confrontation between Russia and the US, which further sharpened their conflicting identities. The conflict in Ukraine is a topic large enough to be discussed as a completely separate work (and it would not surprise me if some of my colleagues did choose to write a thesis on it), yet its influence on the communications between the two states is hard to overestimate: from sanctions to the significantly worsened perceptions of each other. While Russia under strengthened President Putin and took a bolder stance on the global arena, ready to support its stance on purely realist terms, by military interventions and unyielding political position informed by self-identification as a rising global power that wants to pose a challenge to those it considers adversaries, the United States under Barak Obama was not prepared to take the risk and reply in kind, as it lacked any substance of the `world hegemon', the role of which the States readily assumed in the previous years (Gardiner et al., 2014). Through Russia is predominantly a reactionary power, in the case with Ukraine (and with Syria, as well), it was the States who had to react to a development which was hard to predict and even harder to cope with. Suddenly, Russian identity in the eyes of the US shifted from that of a possible cooperation interest with little real power to public enemy number one, a `crazed bear', a revisionist empire, which must be contained. Such a change from the Georgian War can be explained from the perspective of constructivism, as Bцller and Werle (2016) claim. The Georgian crisis was perceived as a threat to democratic values, where the democracy of Georgia clashed with autocracy and dictatorship of Russia. Yet the Crimean crisis was framed by the United States as a violation of international law that put under question the very principles of state sovereignty (Bцller and Werle, 2016). It appears as though the decision (and the possibility) to intervene in the Ukrainian case and secure international support was drawn from the Russian image of vile law-breaker that attacked a bordering country which wished to democratize and, additionally, from the self-imposed identity of the liberal democratic leader assumed by the States, which resulted in the Western sanctions against Russia and an ongoing stalemate, where both the United States and Russian Federation are not willing to acknowledge the positions of each other. In a sense, current ambiguous situation with Crimea, where the peninsula is a literal embodiment of Schrodinger's duality, belonging to Russia from Russian (and its allies) point of view and belonging to Ukraine from the Western perspective, is an ideal case-study for post-truth coverage, where post-truth from a tool transformed into a factor defining the positions of the two particular countries on the said issue and explaining the possibility of the two, being mutually exclusive, existing on the global arena together (and even being recognized as valid by the other actors).

It is clear that this new reality constructed by the two conflicting countries is not an extension of a Cold War, as some suppose, but a new image in making. The Syrian front has become a chessboard for these two superpowers in this sense, as it is a place where the United States and the Russian Federation have staged their clash for the past many years, yet it is also a region where these two countries, surprisingly, share certain interests in regards to Middle East. For instance, both Russia and the States would want to see the Islamic State and Al-Qaeda contained, weakened, if not destroyed - after all, for both countries the threat of the terrorist powers in Syria gaining ground was a jus ad bellum reason for intervention, which legitimized their presence in Syriaboth domestically and internationally. Shapiro (2017) explains this interesting position by showing that the long-lasting hazard of an `unbeatable foe' is, apparently, common for the two states identifying themselves as enemies:

For the U.S., preventing their spread south into countries that it counts among its allies is of prime importance. For Russia, preventing their spread north into the Caucasus is the bigger priority. Either way, the two sides share an interest in keeping these religious wars confined, as much as possible, to the deserts of the Middle East, rather than the streets of Manhattan or the subway stations of St. Petersburg.

This wariness explains in part why there is little hope for the Syrian war ending soon: both the US and Russia wish for the containment of the situation but are not willing to compromise on the current balance of power, risking an explosion in a region that is strategically important for both. For the United States, its presence in the Middle East has a long history, and not a pleasant one, to say the least. The States' identity as a world peacemaker was challenged by the numerous fights against terrorism, which led to destruction, ongoing, seemingly endless battles, and a plethora of negative connotations, contrary to the American ideals of spreading liberty and democracy. For Russia, the question of Middle East is less pressing than the questions of local territories and immediate neighbors; however, it is a way of keeping the attention of the United States on the region it considers primary in own foreign policy formulation and away from own points of concern, like in Ukraine (Shapiro, 2017). In essence, the two countries bare fangs at each other in national media and on this small international military arena, long ago transformed into a fight pit for superpowers, and their interests are not as incompatible as their identities and self-built image.

Considering the brief overview of the US-Russian relations above, it is at first hard to see what role the national media could possibly play in such tense and quite realistic, if one might say, bilateral relations. Yet, even if one is to omit the numerous theories and approaches of international relations, it should be remembered that the national media are most often the main, if not the sole, suppliers of information for the actors of global arena. Information, in turn, is essential for the functioning of any government. Information provided by the national media is used as a basis for decision-making and threat assessment, as a megaphone that is used by politicians to convey their positions, and as a tool of influence (see the discussion of the CNN effect and Al-Jazeere effect above). This paper, quite obviously, focuses more on the influence the national media have on the interactions between the countries, since it is the perspective in which the post-true positions of national media become factors rather than tools in active usage. One should not forget that the post-true positions of media in US-Russian relations and the behavior of the Russian and American politicians are tightly knit together. One inevitably leads to the other: as officials seek to state their claims through the means of national media, which are not protected from personal sentiments of both the politicians and the newsmakers, these statements formulate a new reality that twists the perceptions of those who are to receive these messages. All further claims made by the parties in the same dialogue shall be made in the context of the made “reality alterations”, as one may call them; not to mention that these parties are also not protected from making such post-true assertions themselves. In a long-run situation, where both parties are tied to the images made by the perceptions which are formed upon the information in much taken from national media of their opponents, this snowball of post-truth imagery and identification becomes a reality in which the states have to react according to their perceptions of the identities of others they have built upon the post-truth messages of others. This reciprocal post-truth changes the very essence of the national media in global affairs, as the national media assume a new role, that goes beyond the traditional roles attributed to it by many scholars, that is, the controlling one, the constraining one, the intervening one, and the instrumental one (Gilboa, 2002). Though this assertion is bold and can be overturned with especially adamant realist-bound argumentation, it is still clear that modern policy making has changed significantly in favor of soft power and information-sharing. At times, both the United States and Russian Federation behave more on terms of their identity rather than on their real abilities, and the formulation of the said identity happens through a dialogue that is constantly being built through national media channels.

2. 3. 1. The sentiment-bearers.While all the aforementioned roles of the national media are indeed important to the policymaking, for the sake of this political analysis, they would not be enough. There is another function of national media, quite post-truth-like one, that would in part explain why post-truth is a vortex with no way out. It would be best to call such a function a `sentiment-bearing' one. Just as the name implies, the national media serve as a kind of transmitter that reinforces strong post-true sentimental claims by spreading them through the masses like a wildfire. The sentimental appraisal of the relations between Russia and the States would show quite negative (though expected) results. Anti-Russian sentiments in the United States are at points even worse than during the last years of the Cold War. Russian media sources, for instance, had been working on creating an image of Russian Federation as a rising power of significant importance, asserting its `great power status' (Petersson& Persson, 2011). In the last years, the attitude between the two countries has declined practically in tandem (Poushter, 2018), with a very sharp plunge immediately after the situation in Crimea. To no surprise, over the course of a single year, Russia suddenly became one of the top priorities for US foreign policy, and a major threat to world peace to boot, as it seemingly rejected all the set norms of international behavior by `returning Crimea home'. Indeed, the media of the two countries reflected this paradigm shift: whereas American information outlets framed Russia as a nuclear power `going rogue', the Russian media vehemently celebrated the tough stance their country was able to take after years of `Western humiliation'. From that point onward, Russo-American relations were as strained as were the sentiment surrounding their dialogue. This preference for biased discourse in media, upped by their sentiment-bearing nature, is, mayhap, the best soil possible for the post-truth to bloom vividly in the international communication between these two countries.

One of the main roles in this deterioration was played by the sentiment-bearing function of the national media of these two countries. For Russia, the Anti-American sentiment in media coverage became a normality: the United States were often framed as the public enemy number one, the reason for economic disdain and the crisis in Ukraine.The general rhetoric of the Russian media was that the States is trying to undermine and destroy Russia as a rising power. Whether it was truly so mattered less than the fact that Anti-American sentiment actually helped to bind the nation together by creating a specific, very real and very powerful enemy, standing up to which should be the national priority. The Anti-Russian sentiment in the States, indeed, pales in comparison. USSR was the public enemy number one for a long time, yet the Cold War ended, and the USA emerged as the one last standing. Russian Federation, a heir to the ruins of the glorious superpower, was not perceived by the West as a real threat - nor was it considered an `equal' in matters of global governance. Nonetheless, as Russia pursued own geopolitical goals and began to formulate the ideas of multipolarity and equality to the incumbent hegemon, its actions made the States worry. The Crimean annexation, the military intervention in Syria, the alleged meddling in the 2016 elections, the aggressive Russian stance as a superpower equal made the US reconsider its assessment of Kremlin. By the year 2019, the opinion polls suggested that the majority of American citizens believed that Russia was a critical threat to the United States. The Pew Research Centre statistics suggest that the Crimean crisis and the subsequent events sparked significant decline in the favorability of Russia by the American citizens (Bell et al., 2014). These tendencies were readily framed by the Russian media channels as a sign of `russophobia' in the West, only strengthening the sentimental animosity between the two countries.

The theory and literature overview presented in this chapter have shown the nature of post-truth and its roots, deeply buried in philosophy, yet they also explained the difference between blatant lies (i.e. disinformation), propaganda, and post-truth rhetoric per se. Though it is premature and, perhaps, too bold to say that the United States and Russian Federation are both twelve feet deep in self-deception and pseudo-imagery designed for consumption by both allies and arch-enemies, it is still more than evident that both countries are significantly dependent on the own constructed perceptions of self and the opponent, and that, in part, at least, the blame on this post-true `trap' of sorts can be attributed to the national media that served as imperfect communication channels that were not initially designed to be used as such, granted their emotional attachments and, at times, their dependency on the commands of the government, to put it mildly. Tied in this cobweb of warped truths and sweet not-lies, the United States and Russian Federation are forced to maintain the fragile status quo and balance each other out not by the means of raw military strength or the number of nuclear warheads in their yards but by the identities constructed along the lines of a `Schrodinger's cat'-like picture of the world, where own self is the one and only true `hero', and the opposing actor is the `villain', no matter the circumstances; in other words, for these two countries, in each particular situation, both can come out as right or wrong - it is just the matter of perspective. That is, the perspective of their national media outlets. Virtually, the post-true rhetoric adopted by these national media becomes a very tangible factor of the aforementioned countries' bilateral relations, one that is constantly present in their policy formulation.

One, that is easily discernable from the two case studies presented below.

3. The Case Studies - Crimea and Syria Revisited

What choice does one have when selecting a topic of Russo-American relations in the past decade but to turn to the two most notable (and, as a fact, still ongoing) clashes between these great powers. The crisis in Crimea and the failed rebellion in Syria along with anti-terrorist campaign in the Middle East are, by far, the most pressing issues in the relations between the United Sates and Russia. For one, these two conflicts are still unresolved, and it is highly improbable that they shall be concluded in the nearest future. Even among other global affairs, these two crises still remain in the attention span of global and national media, since they also happen to be the two points of collision of ideas, ideologies and identities for both Russia and the States, though the two countries certainly attribute different roles to the stages set and have different strategic preferences, as previously mentioned. It makes the selection of the case studies all the more appropriate, since the two cases are similar only at a first glance and have little in common when one is to take a closer look. It would explain the divergence in the way the media of the two states cover them, as well as the post-truth rhetoric that has formed through these media channels.

For a long period after the Crimean crisis happened, the world had little understanding of how to react to such a development. By no international standards it was an easy task to determine the status of the peninsula: Russian behavior contradicted the norms of international society that were set almost five hundred years ago by the Versailles treaty. The very concept of sovereignty was destroyed in a matter of days, and the largest nuclear power basically signed its ability to do as it sees fit. At least, from the American perspective it was so. From Russian perspective, Ukraine fell prey to the `Western vultures', and it was Kremlin's primary responsibility to protect its borders and the people that wished for its help. The status of Crimea is still under question, with 19 UN members and 4 non-UN members currently recognizing the peninsula as a part of Russia, and with 112 UN members (including all the core Western countries) condemning Russian actions and recognizing Crimea as part of Ukraine. The Schengen Visa board even refused the Crimeans who received Russian passports the right to enter Europe (“No Schengen Visas for Crimeans Who Obtained Their Passports After Crimea's Annexation”, 2019).What is more, the conflict was accompanied by an information war of a span previously unseen, which significantly affected the world press freedom (“World Press Freedom Index 2015”). The situation is as post-true as it can only be.In reality, Crimea continues to live as a functioning territory, its citizens mostly have two passports, speak two or more languages, and many transnational corporations, seeking to please their markets, take a dual stance on the questions: for instance, on Russian Google Maps, Crimea is marked as belonging to Russia, whereas on US Google Maps, it is marked as Ukrainian. The media coverage of this peculiar situation has diminished a bit over time (after all, much time has passed, the world keeps on turning, and Crimea keeps on living as a part of Russian Federation, and there are no signs of it changing its mind soon), yet there are valuable lessons to be taken from the post-true connotations that can be found once one compares US and Russian media stances, especially since it would be easier to analyze the outcomes in retrospective.

The identity and the position. It is clear that this crisis has two clearly defined `camps' of international actors (if one omits the states that chose to remain at least somewhat neutral): the Western one, led by the United States, which sees the crisis as a breach of all fathomable norms of international law and etiquette, and the Russian one, which is mostly represented by the Russian Federation itself, claiming its right and adequacy in `returning Crimea home”, and its few political allies, who share the perception of the `West' as an enemy - Venezuela and Cuba, for example. The positions of two countries can be formulated in several key points presented below

Table 1. Key points explaining Russian and US positions on Crimea

In much, these stances on all the four key points fall in line with the overarching identities of Russia and the States previously discussed. The self-built images of the Washington and the Kremlin are transmitted successfully through media channels covering the Crimean crisis. The United States, for instance, considers Russian invasion in Ukraine and the following Crimean annexation as an attack on democratic values, which can be seen from the sentimental epithets like `imperial', `bully', aggressive'; from this point onward, Russia is also regarded as a serious threat to the States on international arena, one that the States should watch out for, since it is out of the Western bounds of influence and can act quite independently, promoting own vision of multipolarity and constantly challenging US dominance.

For Russia, however, it is the point at which the previously gradually worsening sentiment towards the West (and the United States in particular) reached its peak.Russian media essentially demonized both the new political elites in Ukraine and the West, who, in Russian media terms, `orchestrated' the revolt and sabotaged the previous government. Though it was quite certainly more of a vivid journalistic tale that would exemplify the dangers the Western camp presents to Russia as a rising power, at some point this rhetoric transformed into an actual identity the Russian officials attributed to the United States and its allies. The idea of the States trying to undermine Russia and re-create the `Ukrainian scenario' were strong in media, in governmental speeches, and in public, the ideas of any sort of opposition to the existing regime being sponsored by foreign agents (obviously, quite hostile), the concept of the `fifth column' were not only the instruments of propaganda but also the actual beliefs of the politicians in power (as reflected, for instance, by the round of `foreign agents' laws). In essence, the identities were reformulated and reinforced in the Crimean crisis in part through the media channels, but the post-true sentiments the media brought for various reasons (from the appeal to the voters to the justification of the governmental actions) affected those identities much.

The target and the message. It is almost undeniable that post-truth rhetoric in this situation was used as a tool by both governments. However, just as it was mentioned previously, the end target of this tool may be different for the two states. For instance, it shall be supposed here that Russian post-true message was aimed first and foremost at Russian citizens and, in part, at the inhabitants of Crimea. Most media channels focused on what the West called `aggressive propaganda', underlining the importance of holding own ground against the States and necessitating the war in Ukraine. Additionally, as some experts note, the war in Ukraine and the `return' of Crimea were necessary for Putin to raise the morale of the nation and his own approval ratings: for President Putin, the annexation of Crimea to Russia, covered in strictly patriotic and positive colors by the national media,radically strengthened his own legitimacy, cementing his image as a strong leader and father of the nation with no political alternatives (Aleksashekno et al., 2015). The image of `strong and independent Russia returning poor Crimeans home' was intended to first and foremost justify the war and the war spending, to overpaint the economic stagnation of the previous years and to soften the public discontent born from the 2011-2012, when Putin returned to his position as the President.

Additionally, the Russian media campaign had to justify the Referendum (and to sway the public opinion in favor of the `yes' answer) on the Crimean soil, since the point of international legitimacy had to be taken into account - else, Russia would have little ground to defend its own actions. According to media accounts, the main reason for Russia's military intervention in Crimea was “the persecution of Russian speakers, a fact they say has been ignored by the West” (Sukhov, 2014). The rhetoric of a `fascist power sponsored by the United States' was designed for local consumption, whereas the image of Russian-speakers harassed and Russian borders threatened was aimed at the foreign public, since it gave the otherwise internationally unacceptable behavior a fleur of justice and adequacy of Responsibility to Protect, which translated into a sound position worth defending. Under such circumstances, the intervention was almost a necessity to stop Russian genocide. This image also worked on the Crimean citizens, as they were essentially given the choice of joining a `strong and stable' Russia, which would protect them, and a `poor, destabilized' Ukraine, branded a `fascist' puppet of the Western countries. This undeniably post-truth choice, constructed by the Russian media, seemed to have actually worked: according to the polls presented by the Pew Research Centre, as much as 88% of Crimean resident considered the referendum just and thought that Kyiv should recognize the results (Bell et al., 2014). The same research also indicates that Russian and Crimean confidence in President Putin soared high immediately after the Crimean secession. For the West and Ukraine in particular, not so much.

For the United States, the identity of Russia as a dangerous adversary did not come out as a surprise. The national concerns about Russians as a danger, however, came much later, during the 2016 election campaign, with the hackings and media manipulation theories permeating the national discourse. Before that, the critique was more so in the sphere of agenda-setting media function, especially after the Malaysian flight downing: the US media channels reminded how President Putin was favorably compared to President Obama as being `brilliant' and `competent', accused Kremlin of being deluded and dangerous, living by the `19th century standards', and even urged the politicians to support Ukraine militarily to `deter Russian aggression'. The general sentiment of the time was along the lines of “please, do something!”, directed more at the politicians and people in position of power, not at the general public per se. Even now, the question of Ukraine is not silenced, despite the Crimean peninsula problem being almost completely pushed out of the agenda for the lack of development and a strong Russian position on the matter. Ukraine is now called an important strategic ally of the United States, one that has a `long and deep history' connecting the two countries together, and its future in large is seen by media outlets as `deciding' the future of American hegemony, thus justifying the continuous military aid to Ukraine as being vital to stopping Russia dead in its tracks. Such is the post-truth position predominant in the United States.

Considering how the question of Ukraine is now at the limelight of the impeachment and the coming elections drama, this post-truth image was readily adopted and promoted by the US political elites. It also serves as yet another support to the American self-constructed identity as the world leader and the `savior of the damned', since Russia is attributed the identity of an aggressor and a villain. The crisis gives the States a reason to once again take the reigns and lead the witch hunt, punishing the one who broke the international liberal order and inciting the others to follow suit. For President Trump, the question of Ukraine is also a matter of personal prestige, as he has the ability to contrast himself to Barack Obama as a more potent leader able to answer complicated international challenges and make America great again (Gaouette&Borak, 2018). Seeing the Ukrainian crisis as the possibility to restore own credibility, Washington continues to promote the necessity of sanctions and support to Ukraine. As such, the post-truth rhetoric found in American media outlets is aimed to strengthen the States' international role as the world watchmen more than it tries to persuade the nation in the necessity of acting as one.

The overarching dichotomy of positions represented in national media can be summed up in the following below.