Split between Russia and Ukraine: a cardinal change in modernization process of post-soviet area

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Some 500 years ago, a race for power started amongst Western European countries, which led eventually to replacement of old agrarian society inherited from Neolithic era with a fully new type of society.

Favorable conditions -- dynamic pre-democratic institutions and a context of frantic competition between countries comparable in terms of power [1] -- resulted in an unprecedented social change -- «from traditional, agrarian, village-centered, patriarchal, holistic [society] to modern, industrial or 'postindustrial', urban, democratic, individualistic» [2] one.

This transition -- that we will call «modernization» hereafter, following in this Prof. A. G. Vishnevsky -- could not be without consequences for the rest of the World, which experienced first and foremost consequences of economic and military dynamism it enabled.

When it comes to Muscovy and its successor state, the Russian Empire, reaction to this challenge started at the beginning of 18th century, using a characteristic Russian pattern -- the «reform led from the top».

With totalitarian experience, 20th century was a climactic moment in this respect, which enabled indeed to reach a no return point in the modernization process. Yet it led notoriously to quite a mixed result, either in terms of economic, social, demographical or political conditions.

This somewhat unfinished modernization inevitably sets the problem of its completion. Will the «reform led from the top» remain the driving force of modernization in the coming decades? Will ups and downs of the State set up the pace of public life, as they used to do during 20th century?

It is important, before entering the discussion of these questions, to insist on the necessity to put both Russia and Ukraine into its scope. Whereas the current Russian-Ukrainian crisis may be seen as Kiev's attempt to get out of Moscow sphere of influence and reject any concept of Russian world, it does not mean in any way that Ukraine can ignore the problems set by Russian style modernization.

Indeed the legacy of some 300 years of russification in all spheres of life could not be wiped away in only 25 years of independent rule [3]. Actually, one might even say that the painful divorce in progress is an unambiguous sign of how much these two countries share the same problems. In short, the legacy of the «reform led from the top» cannot be ignored either on the Russian or the Ukrainian side.

The persistence of «reform led from the top» pattern cannot be separated from very specific geographical and strategic conditions that have been influencing the course of Russian history until today [3].

Actually exceptional dimensions of the territory where expansion of empire took place do play a part in social inertia that has been a headache for rulers of all times.

Indeed the whole of Russian history takes place in a context where population density is very low: level of 30 inhabitants per square kilometer is reached in France on 13th century, and in Western Russia only today, let alone Siberia and Far East.

This cannot be without consequences for social dynamics, as it hampers development of horizontal links and market economy, as well as connections with Europe.

For the same reason, interaction between people and the State has always been quite loose, which actually did not enable to establish a constructive relationship between them. Two well-known patterns of Russian history are here to illustrate this fact: the first is the famous Potemkin village; the second is the escape into the wild, allowing to evade constraints set by a notoriously heavy-handed State -- this escape being made possible precisely by the size of territory.

In addition to this context, one must have in mind the lack of roots of rural private property linked with abundance of land, the authoritarian traditions inherited from Mongol rule, and the thorough effort of the rulers to eradicate any kind of urban self-government -- from conquest of Novgorod to abolition of Magdeburg rights in Kiev in 1835 [4].

All this together enables to understand the development of a State that does not tolerate any kind of limitation de jure and takes all possible profit from its position of isolated continental power. Accordingly, the main features of modernization in this area are the key role of the imperial ruler, submitted to pressure of modernizing Europe and mainly concerned with increase of military power, the absence of checks and balances, and reluctant social forces, in connection with absence of visible incentives.

Doubtlessly this authoritarian modernization in a confined space left deep traces in ideas and attitudes in respect to Europe: it must indeed be seen as the very cause of long lasting predominance of conservatism and Russian messianism in politics [5; 6].

The Bolsheviks had actually no choice but to cope with this legacy and revert to old style «reform led from the top». Yet they did it their way; indeed under imperial rule, the confined space was not perfectly closed and was limited in practice by possibility to travel abroad, by international commitments of the government and by its concern with reputation [4]; all of these mitigating factors disappeared after 1917, enabling an unprecedented speeding up of modernization -- under totalitarian conditions.

It does not mean in any way that Lenin and his comrades could ignore the local context: indeed «in Russia of 1920s, the only change strategy that could reach success was one which would allow to combine a really revolutionary 'instrumental' modernization with safeguarding of many fundamental institutions and values» [2]. expansion empire russia ukraine

In other words, modernization was limited from the very beginning by its initial conditions; it actually «enabled the USSR to adopt (...) many instrumental achievements of Western societies (modern technologies, external forms of life, sciences, instruction, etc.), but could not create relevant social mechanisms for their self-development (market economy, modern social structure, modern civil society institutions, political democracy, etc.)» [2].

Today successor States of the USSR have to deal with a World power race more intense than ever, where new competitors such as China and India have emerged. They also have to cope with the mixed legacy of this conservative modernization and the structural problems it did not enable to solve, in particular dependence on export of raw materials, dependence on foreign technologies, decay of infrastructures, corruption, social and political stagnation. It means that modernization, although having already reached a no-return point, is not over.

When it comes to its next steps, the current revival of Russian military power, combined with authoritarianism, could make one believe in a comeback of the «reform led from the top». Yet the conditions that have given this mechanism its exceptional permanence have started to change significantly.

As discussed above, the «reform led from the top» results from the combination of uncontrolled State monopolizing initiative, passive society and confined space of continental dimensions.

Obviously the confined space cannot disappear in one day, let alone the legacy it left in mindsets: let us consider an individual living somewhere in lower Volga valley, speaking only Russian, having not enough money to travel outside former USSR and getting information exclusively through Russian State TV; this individual, who is far from being the only one of his kind, can hardly have an accurate perception of far-abroad World.

Yet the tightness of confinement has started to decay, as indeed freedom of travel does exist and mass transportation has dramatically increased mobility of populations; on top of this, in spite of considerable access restrictions in Russia, the Internet also plays its part in linking its inhabitants with the rest of mankind.

Moreover, as a consequence of freedom of travel, emigration and brain drain are today a massive fact in both Russia and Ukraine [7; 8]. Whereas emigrants can have a positive impact on the economy thanks to transfer of currencies to homeland, their departure deprives it of talents needed for its necessary modernization. In particular, unless energetic policies are put in place to limit the brain drain and attract the talents, opening the confined space could well have a negative impact on growth and economic diversification that are yet urgently needed.

This massive emigration illustrates unambiguously individuals' ability to vote with their feet, hence showing that societies are today far from being passive when facing Globalization. The incomplete modernization of former USSR was actually complete enough to give people expectations in respect to welfare and standards of life. This is also the very cause of turmoil that can happen when rulers do not pay enough attention to these expectations, as dramatically shown by Ukrainian political crisis of 2014.

Whereas its autonomy and energy are more visible in Ukraine than in Russia, it does not mean that civil society is passive in the latter case: it just operates in conditions where the internal balance of power is more favorable to the State than in Ukraine. The echo met by Alexey Navalny's initiatives is sufficient in itself to remind that the State monopoly on public life is over.

Moreover the latent power of civil society in Russia is undoubtedly one of the factors, which led to over-reaction of Moscow during the Ukrainian crisis. The overthrow of Viktor Yanukovich entered in direct conflict with nationalistic storytelling designed by the Kremlin to divert people from social criticism [9]. For muscovite elites with uncertain social and functional legitimacy, the annexation of Crimea and the destabilization of Donbass enable to hide the explosive social potential the Ukrainian revolution may have at home [10].

The State cannot ignore the social expectations mentioned above, yet it is not actually best placed to fulfill them, due to historical legacy. Indeed the well-anchored pattern of «reform led from the top», combined with deep- rooted authoritarian habits and absence of checks and balances led to a highly dysfunctional type of State, invaded by corruption and hardly able to provide «healthcare, education, infrastructure management, law and order» [11] to the population, let alone conditions that would enable to take full profit of entrepreneurs' creativity.

Besides, as anywhere else, the State is challenged and its position is weakened by the development of horizontal links, inside the population as well as with the outside World. It means in particular that full-scale destruction of these horizontal links is no more possible and that, if authoritarianism can make a comeback, totalitarianism cannot. Moreover, in spite of lurches of Russian foreign policy, Moscow cannot fully disconnect from Globalization.

In other words, in both Russia and Ukraine, the State is today challenged by emergence of civil society and oligarchs, and it is in a quite difficult position to answer this challenge. The situation is made more complex again with the recent split between Russia and Ukraine: there are now two competing powers in what used to be earlier the confined space placed under the rule of Russian empire, and, as noted above, any shift of modernization process in one country has and inevitably will have an echo in the other one.

The comeback of Russian power orchestrated in 2014 aimed at fulfilling latent expectations of almighty power that centuries of «reform led from the top» have deeply rooted in mentalities. Yet, when having a look behind the scenes, the possible role of the State in 21st century is far from being obvious; actually, it is easier to say what will not happen than what will in regard to its contribution to reforms that are still urgently needed.

State-led instrumental modernization has been achieved in 20th century, with a huge economic and human cost. The half-modernized societies it produced have pressing expectations for more welfare and higher standards of life, whereas they have to cope with highly dysfunctional State, which can hardly be seen as the driving force of next steps of modernization.

The Ukrainian revolution of 2014 highlighted the importance civil society has taken in social and political games; it has also made them more complex, as the split between Moscow and Kiev has resulted in a political competition between these two poles of power.

In short, the multiplication of autonomous players makes for sure the modernization process more complex than what it used to be; in particular, how the State and civil society could cooperate in the future remains largely a pending question -- especially if one thinks about the disrepute the State has to face, in connection with its dysfunctional character and its poor ability to have a fair discussion with social forces. The only certain point is that the era of «reform led from the top» is over.

References

1. Kennedy, Paul M. The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000. New York: Random House, 1987.

2. Vishnevsky, Anatoly Grigorevich. Serp i rubl'. Konservativnaya modernizacija v SSSR [The Sickle and the Rouble. The Conservative Modernisation in the USSR]. Moscow: OGI, 1987.

3. Chamontin, Laurent.L'empire sans limites -- pouvoir et sociйtй dans le monde russe [The empire without limits -- power and society in russified World]. La Tour d'Aigues: Les йditions de l'aube, 2014.

4. Pipes, Richard.Russia under the Old Regime. London: Penguin Books, 1997.

5. Niqueux, Michel.«Le conservatisme russe : une longue tradition» [Russian conservatism: a long-lasting tradition]. Diploweb, March 12, 2017. Accessed September 1, 2017. <https:// www.diploweb.com/Le-conservatisme-russe-une-longue-tradition.html>

6. Besanзon, Alain. Sainte Russie [Holy Russia], Paris: Йditions de Fallois, 2012.

7. Shorich, Miodrag and Filatova, Irina.«Utechka mozgov iz Rossii: kuda i pochemu uezzhajut specialisty» [Brain drain from Russia: where and why specialists go]. Deutsche Welle, March 9, 2017. Accessed September 1, 2017. <http://p.dw.com/p/2Yujm>

8. Charrel, Marie.«Les travailleurs ukrainiens au secours de la croissance polonaise» [Ukrainian workers rescuing Polish growth]. Le Monde Йconomie, June 17, 2017. Accessed September 1, 2017. <http://www.lemonde.fr/economie/article/2017/06/17/les-travailleurs-ukrainiens- affluent-en-pologne_5146238_3234.html>

9. Laruelle, M. Le Nouveau Nationalisme russe. Des repnres pour comprendre [New Russian nationalism : some landmarks to understand]. Paris: L'њuvre Йditions, 2010.

10. Chamontin, Laurent. Ukraine et Russie: pour comprendre -- retour de Marioupol [Ukraine and Russia: to understand -- return from Mariupol]. Vincennes: Diploweb, 2017.

11. Mendras, Marie. Russie, l'envers du pouvoir [Russia : the back of the power]. Paris: Йditions Odile Jacob, 2008.

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