The inter-regional diffusion of Russian protest repertoires in an international context, 2008 - present

4.4. Occupy Abay

4.4.1. Applying the Diffusion Model

Occupy Abay, which began on the 9^th May 2012, was a deliberate citation of the 2011 Occupy Wall Street (OWS) protests. Rosenburg, p. 27.

Jonson, p. 207. First, the Global Financial Crisis caused a CULTURAL SHIFT and a recognition of shared economic INTERESTS. DIFFUSION then occurred on a trans-national level. International media reports facilitated non-relational Diffusion between OWS and Russian protestors, with the latter undertaking DELIBERATION in order to abstract the innovation from its original context so as to adapt it to their own. Moscow protestors then ADOPT the `Occupy' format. Relational and Non-Relational DIFFUSION then occurred on a domestic level through the reporting of the Occupy Abay by Russia media and namarsh.ru, the creation of the VKontakte page. `#ОккупайАбай' < https://vk.com/occupyabay > [accessed 27 March 2019] 11 other regions then ADOPT the format.

4.4.2. Global or Domestic Framing?

Occupy Abay is an example of Moscow activists adopting a foreign protest tactic which is then taken up by the regions, representing an intersection of Global and Domestic framing: It did not target economic inequality, distancing it from the other Occupy protests spawned by OWS while, simultaneously, the label suggests participation in the international movement. Moreover, it is interesting that the other locations that mimicked Occupy Abay did not use the English word `Occupy', instead opting for either `Indefinite Protest' or `People's Festivities'. These phrases demonstrate that, while Moscow protestors deliberately situated themselves within the international context, the regions situated themselves within a primarily national one.

5. Inter-regional dynamics

On 15^th March 2012, Astrakhan officials began a hunger strike to protest the results of the local Duma elections. On the 16^th, Oleg Shein - unsuccessful candidate in the mayoral elections - began a hunger strike to protest his loss. Although the causes were local, both tied into the national call `For Fair Elections'. Namarsh.ru records 6 actions by other cities in support of the Astrakhan hunger strikers: 3 in Moscow (10/04/12 & 15/04/12), and 1 each in Tver (17/03/12), Volgograd (18/04/12), and Voronezh (21/04/12). Slogans included `We need fair elections in Astrakhan' (Tver), `For fair elections in Astrakhan and all Russia' (Volgograd), and `Oleg Shein and `Astrakhan, we are with you!' (Voronezh). In this example, Moscow does not lead in repertoire development - instead replicating the Astrakhan hunger strike - and nor is it the first city to take up the cause. The clear discourse of inter-regional solidarity contrasts with the ambivalent attitude towards international solidarity.

6. CONCLUSION

This chapter has demonstrated that the 2011/12 protest cycle exhibits an unprecedented, if ambivalent, engagement with international protest - citing the Orange Revolution, the Arab Spring, and Occupy Wall Street. Focusing on the Astrakhan hunger strikes, it has also shown that this cycle includes greater inter-regional dialogue than Case Study 1. Numerical data demonstrates, once again, that Moscow and St. Petersburg witness the greatest protest frequency; however, the online emergence of the White Ribbon Campaign problematises their predominance in repertoire development.

CASE STUDY 3 ANTI-PENSION REFORM PROTESTS 2018-2019

1. INTRODUCTION

The final case study is the Anti-Pension Reform (APR) protest cycle sparked by the decision of the Russian Government to raise the retirement age from 55 to 63 for women and from 60 to 65 for men. Prime Minister Medvedev announced the reform on 14^th June 2018, and the Government submitted the proposal to the State Duma's Labour, Social Policy, and Veterans' Affairs Committee for consideration as legislation two days later. It then underwent two readings in the State Duma before being signed by President Putin in a moderated form - women's retirement age had been changed to 60 - on the 3^rd October. The time period is from 16^th June 2018 - 23^rd February 2019. It is not clear whether the cycle has definitively ended, thus the cut-off date simply reflects the time of writing. Given the very current nature of the Anti-Pension Reform protests, there is almost no academic literature on the topic. This chapter demonstrates that this most recent protest cycle exhibits very little repertoire development, and that it differs significantly from both Case Studies 1 and 2 both in terms of data availability and protest form.

2. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS

2.1. Locations

Once again, Moscow and St. Petersburg experience the greatest number of protests: 11 and 8 respectively. Novosibirsk is the third most active region, with 7 recorded protests. As in Case Studies 1 and 2, there is a sharp divide between these cities and the rest, with most of the latter witnessing 2 protests or less.

2.2. Repertoire

Repertoire is overwhelmingly conventional, with 81% of protests taking the form of march, rally, or picket with no reported `innovation at the margins.' There are only two examples of new and repeated repertoire development:

· `Shameful Regiment': Yekaterinburg (24/08/18) Komsomolsk on Amur (26/08/18) Samara (20/10/18) St. Petersburg (01/11/18), (10/12/18).

· `Indefinite Protest': Moscow (10/09/18) St. Petersburg (14/09/18) Yaroslavl (19/09/18)

The limited diffusion of the `Occupy' style protests of 2011/212 highlight the weakness of this repertoire. Compared to both Case Studies 1 and 2, the data shows little deployment of humorous or satirical repertoire. Moscow artist Nikolay Nikolayev's Yekaterinburg graffiti (26/07/18) - an image of a pensioner holding a sign with the inscription `completely cancel [ the reform] - which satirises Russia's law allowing only single pickets to be held without authorisation, is the only instance of such repertoire.

2.3. Organisers

In contrast to Case Studies 1 and 2, the organisers of the APR protest cycle are far less varied. The team of Alexei Navalny account for 30% of the protests, and the CPRF for 28%. Namarsh.ru records only 3 instances of multiple forces across the ideological spectrum as organisers: Moscow (19/07/18), St. Petersburg (28/07/18), and Penza (09/09/18). There are 3 instances of two organising forces: Kirov (09/09/18), Moscow (26/09/18), and Samara (20/10/18). Compared to Case Study 2, Liberal forces are relatively absent, and Nationalist participation is not recorded at all. If we combine the CPRF percentage with that of the non-specified communist forces, these account for 36% of the protests - even more than Navalny.

3. ANALYSIS

3.1. The Shameful Regiment: Applying the Diffusion Model

The most striking example of repertoire development is `the Shameful Regiment'. Notably, it originated neither in Moscow nor St. Petersburg. The title evokes the `Immortal Regiment', launched in 2012, in which participants commemorate family members who participated in World War II. Anon., `Russia's Immortal Regiment marches across the world: In Pictures', The Moscow Times, 9^th May 2018 < https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2018/05/09/russian-immortal-regiment-marches-across-world-pictures-a61404 > [accessed 10 March 2019]

Firstly, the launch of the Immortal Regiment in 2012 created a domestic CULTURAL SHIFT, establishing a new expectation of how WWII should be commemorated. A 2016 Levada Centre survey demonstrates the extent of this cultural shift: 91% of Russians held either a `definitely positive' or a `probably positive' view of the Immortal Regiment. The Levada Centre, 10^th June 2016 < https://www.levada.ru/en/2016/06/10/13544/ > [accessed 10 March 2019] Secondly, the announcement of the pension reforms created a POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY SHIFT by providing political parties and opposition organisations with a new protest focal point. August 2018 saw the EMERGENCE of the new `Shameful Regiment' repertoire. Tatyana Voltskaya & Robert Coalson, `Underground Uprising: Petersburg Activists Take Guerrilla Message To Russian Masses', RFE/RL, 12^th November 2018 < https://www.rferl.org/a/underground-uprising-petersburg-activists-take-guerrilla-message-to-russian-masses/29596375.html > [accessed 28 November 2018] Local activists marched with photographs of politicians who supported the reform. According to the blog of journalist Ilya Varlamov, local movement `People's Strength' organised the action. Ilya Varlamov, `In Komsomolsk-on-Amur was “Shameful Regiment”', varlamov.ru, 26^th August 2018 < https://varlamov.ru/3067117.html > [accessed 10 March 2019] After the march, participants placed the photographs in a cardboard box labelled `garbage can'. However, according to this article, the placards did not display the term `Shameful Regiment'. Namarsh.ru suggests that this term arose two days prior in Yekaterinburg, during a CPRF-organised march. Non-Relational and Mediated DIFFUSION then occurred, potentially through online sources such as Varlamov's blog. The format is then ADOPTED by groups in other regions such as Yekaterinburg and St. Petersburg. Agit Rossii, in contrast, abstracts the `Shameful Regiment' from its origin by deploying it as street agitation, rather than in the conventional march: In St. Petersburg (01/11/2018, 10/12/18), activists posted the photographs to metro cars. Agit Rossii's VKontakte page has 5,360 followers. < https://vk.com/agit_ru > [accessed 10 March 2019] The VK page acts as a BROKER for the tactic by allowing users to download standard `Shameful Regiment' posters for their own street actions.

Given the frame's resonance, the adoption of the Shameful Regiment format is surprisingly limited, and is never adopted by Navalny's team. When asked how protest tactics were selected, Stepanov stated: `We have a very simple principle: The means of protest that we use is that which is most uncomfortable for the authorities.' Interview conducted by author. His statement makes the decision not to adopt the Shameful Regiment format all the more striking given that its high degree of popular resonance seems `uncomfortable' for the regime's patriotic narrative.

3.1.2. Repertoire & Resonance

SM scholars employ the term `framing' and `resonance' to refer to the way in which activists present an issue so that it chimes with the values and attitudes of the target population. Evans (2018) applies these concepts to Russia's Blue Buckets Society - which protested the abuse of road-related privileges by officials, writing the group employed a `justice frame' that resonated with the tendency toward socio-economic protest. Evans, p. 6-8. Campbell (2005) defines a frame as: the `metaphors, symbols and cognitive cues that cast issues in a particular light and suggest possible ways to respond to these issues'. John L. Campbell, `Where do we stand? Common mechanisms in organisations and social movements research', in Social Movements and Organisation Theory, ed. by Gerald F. Davis, Doug McAdam, W. Richard Scott, Mayer N. Zald (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 41-68 (p. 48-49). Interestingly, however, neither Campbell nor other scholars explicitly link these concepts to that of repertoire. The Shameful Regiment exemplifies how repertoire contributes to resonance.

3.1.3. Problematising repertoire geography

Significantly, like Belaya Lenta, Agit Rossii does not affiliate themselves with a particular location, instead identifying as a `Federal Channel for Street Activism' which problematises the association of this repertoire development with St. Petersburg (i.e. while the action may have occurred there, the geographical origin of the idea remains unclear).

3.2. International context

In contrast to the 2011/12 protest cycle, neither Putin nor Medvedev have directly referenced the anti-pension reform protests in official statements. During his December 2018 press conference, Putin warned against protest in general, referencing France's Gilets Jaunes movement:

`We do not want events in our country similar to those in Paris where people are tearing up paving stones and burning everything, and the country is plunged into a state of emergency.' Mandraud

Navalny's video - `Yes, Vladimir Putin, we want like in Paris' - compares this statement with one made by the President in 2017: `Do you want a situation like in Ukraine? With tens of […] Saakashvilis running in the streets?'. Alexei Navalny, `Yes, Vladimir Putin, we want like in Paris', 13<sup>th</sup> December 2018 < https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Y3Jpe6x6si8 > [accessed 01 March 2019] Neither Putin's statement nor Navalny's video references the APR protests. Nonetheless, their occurrence during the protests is significant. Putin's threat of foreign chaos infiltrating Russia recalls the accusations of U.S. interference in 2011/12. In contrast, Navalny's direct evocation of the Gilet Jaunes and, indeed, Ukraine's revolutions are unique to Case Study 3. Yet, according to namarsh.ru data, none of the APR protests organised by Navalny's team deployed repertoire evoking these events. Agit Rossii is the only group who directly linked these protests to an international cause, timing one St. Petersburg action to coincide with the UN-established International Anti-Corruption Day (09/12/18). Interestingly, the CPRF published an article on their APR actions entitled `CPRF supports mass protests against liberal reforms'. Anon., `CPRF supports mass protest against pension reform', cprf.ru, 31<sup>st</sup> July 2018 < http://cprf.ru/2018/07/cprf-supports-mass-protests-against-liberal-reforms/ > [accessed 03 February 2019] The term `liberal', and the fact that the article was published by the `International Department' employs a Global Frame, situating their actions within an international anti-Capitalist struggle.

3.3. Inter-regional context

As discussed in 3.1, the Shameful Regiment is the only example of inter-regional repertoire diffusion during the APR protests. Nonetheless, among protest organisers, inter-regional discourse is widespread. Navalny's Team is particularly interesting in this regard. During the 2018 Presidential Elections, 81 Navalny Headquarters existed across Russia; During the APR Protests, 31 remained open. The website navalny2018.com includes a map visualising their spread which is reminiscent of the namarsh.ru map of the protests on 10^th December 2011. Navalny2018 < https://2018.navalny.com/en/ > [accessed 31 January 2019] In a blog post from 1^st July 2018, Navalny writes: `Only our network of headquarters today organized (or helped organize) them in 39 cities.' Alexei Navalny, `How the protests against raising the pension age took place', navalny.com, 1^st July 2018 < https://navalny.com/p/5898/#cut > [accessed 03 February 2019] He also stresses the `All-Russian' nature of the protests. Stepanov also emphasised the equality of the HQs, objecting to the term `regional' as a descriptor for those outside of Moscow and St. Petersburg: `Moscow is also a regional headquarter'. Interview conducted by author. Navalny2018.com includes a timeline of the presidential campaign. On 29^th August 2017:

`Shtabicon took place in a boarding house near Moscow - a training event for coordinators of regional HQs. It was attended by […] 150 people from 76 HQs across the country. Over two days they were sharing their experiences, attending lectures and seminars.' Navalny2018

This statement suggests conflicting attitudes regarding the capitals/regions dynamic. On the one hand, it emphasises their equality - participants learn from one another - while, on the other, the hosting of the conference in Moscow evokes a hierarchical relationship between Moscow coordinators and those of `regional HQs'.

While this statement does not refer to the APR protests, this ambivalent relationship forms their organisational backdrop. Namarsh.ru records all Navalny protests as `rallies' with little other detail. In July 2017, the Federal HQ printed `millions of agitation materials' to be distributed in 60 cities, suggesting a centralised approach to repertoire choice. The APR protests, too, present a uniform aesthetic. A majority of rally photographs on namarsh.ru show participants with Russian flags and red, white, and blue balloons. The use of the Russian flag and its colours stress inter-regional unity, but also imply little flexibility in repertoire choice.

Just Russia and Yabloko also stress the protests' national scope. Like Navalny, Sergei Mironov employs the term `All-Russian' calling for a national referendum on the reform. Anon., `Sergei Mironov: People are shocked by the pension reform', spravedlivo.ru, 27^th September 2018 < http://www.spravedlivo.ru/9144010 > [accessed 03 February 2019] Yabloko underscores this yet further, stating on their website that their protests spread `from Pskov […] to Kamchatka'. Anon., `Yabloko against the pension reform: rallies, pickets, flash mobs and provision of an alternative', yabloko.ru, 4^th June 2018 < http://eng.yabloko.ru/?p=19853 > [accessed 03 February 2019] Examining CPRF articles on the APR protests published 16^th June - 31^st December 2018, one of the most common adjectives describing the reform is `Anti-people' (антинародная). The repeated use of this term, like the unified aesthetic of Navalny's protests, bolsters the discourse of inter-regional unity by creating a dichotomy between the Government and `the people'.

3.4. `Crooks & Thieves': Navalny & The CPRF

The CPRF and the team of Alexei Navalny dominate the organisation of Anti-Pension Reform protests. Navalny's attitude towards the former, however, is cynical: On the 1^st July 2018, he wrote on his blog that the recent CPRF rallies in Moscow were `directly organised by the city hall' who helped bus participants in from the regions. Navalny, `How the protests against raising the pension age took place'. Stepanov echoed this sentiment, claiming that many CPRF rallies were `not genuine', and that they were organised by people who participate in `non-independent politics.' Interview conducted by the author. He also deemed the CPRF part of the `systemic opposition'. Given the discursive divide perpetuated by Navalny and his team, it is striking that, in the APR protest cycle, the CPRF appears to adopt the image of UR as `crooks and thieves' popularised by Navalny in 2011. On 22^nd September 2018, the CPRF published three tweets referring to the reform as `pension robbery' (пенсионное ограбление).* The account also twice featured the meme `Едим Россию' (`We eat Russia') featuring the UR bear chasing a family.* Both are strongly reminiscent of Navalny's 2011/12 frame: The adoption of this trope by a `systemic opposition' party suggests its strength as discursive repertoire.

*screen-shots of the tweets featured at end of chapter.

3.5. Interactive Diffusion

Della Porta & Tarrow (2012), Ash (2011), and Koesel & Bunce (2013) analyse how protestors and authorities interact. Della Porta & Tarrow introduce the term `interactive diffusion': `the reciprocal adaption between police and protestors'. Della Porta & Tarrow, p. 142. This concept is salient for Case Study 3. Hemment (2012) studies how State-sponsored youth organisation Nashi deliberately used `orange' tactics to counter the threat of a Colour Revolution in Russia. Julie Hemment, `Nashi, Youth Voluntarism, and Potemkin NGOs: Making Sense of Civil Society in Post-Soviet Russia', Slavic Review, 71.2 (2012), 234-260, p. 247. Case Study 3 demonstrates a similar tactic. The national protests on the 9^th September 2018, organised by Navalny, occurred on the same day as mayoral, local representative, and State Duma elections across the country. Alexei Navalny, `Live until your pension. 09.09. Come join the protest', 7<sup>th</sup> August 2018 < https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fGhGMhSd99w > [accessed 01 March 2019] On Election Day, the authorities created a `festival-like atmosphere at polling stations', featuring pop music, face-painting for children, and other entertainments. Evan Gershkovich, `Navalny's Pension Protest Steals Limelight on Election Day', The Moscow Times, 9<sup>th</sup> September 2018 < https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2018/09/09/navalny-pension-protests-steal-limelight-on-russia-election-day-a62826 > [accessed 01 March 2019] This atmosphere recalls the `carnivalesque' techniques deployed in 2011/12. It is possible to view the authorities' actions as the appropriation of repertoire observed during the previous protest cycle.

4. Conclusion

This chapter has analysed the Anti-Pension Reform protests, September 2018 - January 2019, demonstrating the relative lack of repertoire development during this cycle compared to the previous case studies. Firstly, it illustrated how the single example of repertoire development arose not in Moscow or St. Petersburg, but rather in Yekaterinburg and Komsomolsk on Amur. Secondly, it analysed the differing degrees to which regime and protestor discourse linked the APR protests with international protests. Thirdly, it demonstrated how protest organisers highlighted the national scope of the protests, with particular attention to the ambivalent inter-regional relations suggested by Alexei Navalny's website. Fourthly, it suggested the adoption of Navalny's `Crooks and Thieves' from 2011/12 frame by the CPRF, and, finally, it hinted at the possibility of Interactive Diffusion in which the authorities appropriate the carnivalesque tactics of the protestors in 2011/12. Having completed the individual case study analyses, the next chapter considers all simultaneously in order to sketch preliminary conclusions regarding overall patterns and observations.

APPENDIX: CPRF Tweets

COMBINED ANALYSIS: ALL CASE STUDIES

1. INTRODUCTION

This chapter offers a combined analysis of all case studies: Firstly, it compares the distribution of protests within the case studies to existing studies. Secondly, it highlights the significance of certain regions in repertoire development. Thirdly, it contends that, in the last decade, no `paradigmatic shift' has taken place in Russian protest repertoire, and highlights the trend in all case studies towards the domestication of Russian protest. Fourthly, it underscores the role of spatial politics in Russian repertoire development. Fifthly, it examines the impact of organisational structures, such as political parties and local movements - on repertoire diffusion. Finally, it offers an overall assessment of Diffusion Theory.

2. REGIONAL PROTEST FREQUENCY

As stated in the Literature Review, Lankina offers the only macro-analysis of protest frequency across Russian regions. Her data establishes Moscow and St. Petersburg as the most protest-prone cities. Samara, Voronezh, Penza, Novosibirsk, Sverdlovsk, and Kaliningrad appear among the 15 most active cities. Lankina (2015), p. 26. These results support those of her 2009 study with Alexei Savrasov. Lankina & Savrasov Both highlight the low protest frequencies of the ethnically-defined republics, particularly those of the North Caucasus (excluding Dagestan). Lankina (2015), p. 31, Lankina & Savrasov, p. 8. However, it is also possible that namarsh.ru's network does not extend to these regions, or that they do not have correspondents in the area to record protests that may have occurred. The results of this study conform with Lankina's findings. In all case studies, Moscow and St. Petersburg exhibit the highest protest frequency, while the North Caucasus is absent from the data. The ranking of Samara and Novosibirsk within each case study does not always conform to Lankina's data, but this is likely due to case anomalies.

3. DOMESTICATION & INNOVATION AT THE MARGINS

In all Case Studies, we observe a general tendency to domesticate, rather than globalise, Russian protests. This is particularly noticeable in Case Study 1 because these protests expressed discontent with the impact of the Global Economic Crisis which initiated transnational movements such as the `Transition Movement'. Noha Shawki, `Understanding the Transnational Diffusion of Social Movements: An Analysis of the U.S. Solidarity Economy Network and Transition US', Humanity & Society, 37.2 (2013), 131-158, p. 149. In Case Studies 1 and 2, authorities cite international context in order to undermine domestic protestors. Case Studies 1 and 3 exhibit less than three direct references to the international context by the protestors. While Case Study 2 contains more references, they are not widely adopted within the cycle.

Tarrow defines `paradigmatic [repertoire] change' as: `Breakthroughs in how people mount claims and how authorities respond e.g. invention of the strike, development of non-violent resistance.' Tarrow, pp. 116-117. This definition refers to global breakthroughs, i.e. those that have not been seen before in any country. For this study's purposes, it is more useful to think of national paradigmatic change, i.e. repertoire breakthroughs that have not been seen before within post-Soviet Russia. As the Case Studies show, the majority of recorded protests take the conventional forms of marches, pickets, or rallies. The developments noted are largely `innovations at the margins' that enliven these familiar forms of collective action. The use of White as the symbolic protest colour during 2011/12 is the most vibrant example of such innovation. In Case Studies 1 and 3, neither Moscow nor St. Petersburg initiate major repertoire developments: In the former, Vladivostok initiated the `motor rally' format while, in the latter, Yekaterinburg and/or Komsomolsk on Amur initiated the `Shameful Regiment' march. In Case Study 2, the White Ribbon appears to first emerge in Moscow. However, as discussed in that chapter, the symbol actually emerged online, thus complicating its association with the capital.

4. SPATIAL POLITICS & REPERTOIRE DEVELOPMENT

Tarrow's definition of `strong repertoire' entails the continued resonance of a tactic within popular memory. In no Case Study does such a tactic emerge. A potential reason for this is the spatial control exerted by the authorities. Federal Law on Assemblies, Meetings, Demonstrations, Marches, and Picketing No. 54-FZ of 19 June 2004 of the Russian Federation (and its amended 7^th August 2012 version) includes the following rules on protest:

8.1.1. The executive authorities of the Russian Federation constituent entities shall determine common sites specially designated or adapted for collective discussion of publicly significant questions and the expression of public sentiment and also for mass gatherings of citizens for the public expression of public opinion on topical issues of a primarily socio-political nature (hereinafter - specially designated sites). Anon., `FEDERAL LAW ON ASSEMBLIES, MEETINGS, DEMONSTRATIONS, MARCHES AND PICKETING NO. 54-FZ OF 19 JUNE 2004 OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION* AS AMENDED BY FEDERAL LAW No. 65-FZ OF 8 JUNE 2012', European Commission for Democracy Through Law, 7^th August 2012.

8.4. The procedure for holding a public event in the territory of "the Moscow Kremlin" state museum-preserve of history and culture, including Red Square and the Alexander Garden, shall be such as determined by the President of the Russian Federation.

Although not a focus of the Case Studies, many of the articles on namarsh.ru record the changing of protest location by the authorities, usually to a less central location. Francisco (2010) introduces the notion of Space as a `resource' for both dissidents and the State during periods of contentious action: Dissidents, he writes, choose protest locations in order to `minimise the probability of repression.' Francisco, p. 57.

A comparison with another Post-Soviet state - Ukraine - is useful here. In contrast to Russia, Ukraine does not have specific legislation regulating public assembly, relying on Article 39 of the Constitution and various international treaties. Anon., `Ukraine: EU Mission holds conference for legislation on public assembly', EU Neighbours, 14<sup>th</sup> October 2016 < https://www.euneighbours.eu/en/east/stay-informed/news/ukraine-eu-mission-holds-conference-legislation-freedom-assembly > [accessed 13 March 2019] Ukraine's three major periods of contentious action - The Granite Revolution, the Orange Revolution, and the Revolution of Dignity - all took place on Independence Square. The absence of legislation, arguably, allowed the square to become the symbolic centre of Ukrainian protest. Russian law, however - which allows the authorities to determine protest location, and places special restrictions on protesting on Red Square - prevents the emergence of an analogous symbolic space. The emergence of `Occupy' style protests in Case Study 2, and their failed re-emergence in Case Study 3, illustrate this problem. In Case Study 2, the Occupy protest takes place by the monument to Abay Kununbayev; In Case Study 3, on Moscow's Strastnoy Bul'var and St. Petersburg's Fields of Mars. While it is not clear whether the authorities specifically prohibited holding these protests in the same locations as in 2011/12, the changing of location nonetheless reduces their symbolic resonance.

5. THE ROLE OF ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURES

5.1. National Parties

In Case Studies 1 and 3, political parties - particularly the CPRF - play a major organisational role. Their ability to do so may be attributed to Putin's attempt in the early 2000s to create a national party system. Richard Sakwa, Russian Politics and Society: Fourth Edition (New York: Routledge, 2008), p. 142. The 2001 Law on Parties, the 2002 Federal Law, and the October 2004 Law gradually tightened the rules on party formation: The 2001 Law stated that a party must have a minimum of 100 members in no less than 45 regions, and no less than 50 in others, in order to register; The 2002 Law stated that regional parliaments must be formed on the party principle; and, the 2004 Law stated that parties are the only organisations permitted to contest elections. Sakwa, p. 143-144 The national reach of political parties, arguably, facilitated the national scope of each protest cycle.

Notably, however, almost none of the new and repeated repertoires in the case study are initiated by national structures. In Case Study 1, regional trade unions initiate the motor rally; In Case Study 2, the White Ribbon first appears online; and, in Case Study 3, a local group initiates the Shameful Regiment.

5.2. Organisational Heterogeneity, Homogeneity, and Diffusion

Shawki contends that Diffusion is more likely to occur in `polycentric movements' which `have no permanent and central leadership structure.' Shawki, p. 138. The data shows that the 2011/12 cycle featured the most organisational/ideological coalitions and the most repertoire development and Diffusion of all three case studies, suggesting that Shawki's argument likely applies here. If, as Walsh-Ruso argues, constructed similarity facilitates Diffusion, then the greater degree of Repertoire development and diffusion in the 2011/12 Election Cycle may be attributed to the broad cooperation between opposition groups which constructed a tenuous umbrella identity `against United Russia.'

By contrast, Case Studies 1 and 3 exhibit relatively homogenous organisational structures. This homogeneity complicates the analysis of repertoire diffusion. The definitions in the Literature Review all conceive of Diffusion as a process that occurs between distinct groups or organisations. Thus, the repeated occurrence of a particular protest tactic in different locations - but initiated by the same political party - is problematic because it represents Diffusion within, not between, groups.

6. ASSESSING DIFFUSION THEORY

From the outset, this study has highlighted the predominantly Western-centric development of Diffusion Theory. The findings from the Russian case studies demonstrate how integrating non-Western evidence interrogates, and facilitates the improvement of the theory. Highlighted below are two examples.

6.1. How Useful Are Diffusion Categories?

All cases problematise Tarrow's categories of Relational, Non-Relational, and Mediated Diffusion. Particularly in Case Study 2, the prominent role of Social Media blurs the distinction between the categories. The White Ribbon campaign's emergence on Facebook, for example, combines all three: The public page facilitates Non-Relational Diffusion, allowing those who do not know the initiators to `join' the group and emulate its example. Facebook's algorithm, which shows users content liked by their friends, facilitates Relational Diffusion (if, for example, a friend joins the White Ribbon group, the user receives notification of this on their timeline). The appropriation of the online White Ribbon campaign by known activists, meanwhile, exemplifies Mediated Diffusion in which third parties act as brokers between the initiators and groups to whom they have no pre-existing ties.

6.2. The Fallacy of `Old' and `New' Repertoires

The Literature Review briefly touched upon Tarrow's distinction between `Old' and `New' repertoire, but this is now explored in greater detail. `Old Repertoires' refer to `direct action' by local populations on behalf of parochial interests, targeting local authorities even on national issues. Tarrow, p. 39. `New Repertoires' refer to actions easily transferable between locations that represent cosmopolitan interests, targeting a national centre of power. Tarrow, p. 39. The former, Tarrow characterises as `Early Modern', and the latter as `Modern'. The Astrakhan hunger strikes in Case Study 2 exemplify the confluence of `parochial' with `cosmopolitan' interests targeting both local and national authorities. This study has shown these temporal labels are highly problematic: In all case studies, `parochial' and `national' demands coalesce. In Case Studies 1 and 3, direct action - for example, the blocking of roads - occurs alongside `New Repertoires' such as rallies and petitions. The interaction of `Old' and `New' repertoires in the Russian context underscores the need to rework Tarrow's Diffusion theory.

7. CONCLUSION

This Chapter has offered a combined analysis of all three case studies: Firstly, it highlighted their corroboration of existing studies on protest frequency. Secondly, it demonstrated the tendency in all cases to domesticate rather than globalise protest. Thirdly, it considered the role of spatial politics in the development of strong repertoire. Fourthly, it assessed the overall relevance of Diffusion theory to the Russian context, highlighting problematic elements of each case study in order to suggest the need to rework existing theoretical frameworks. The next and final chapter will conclude the study, suggesting further avenues of research.

CONCLUSION

1. FINDINGS

Employing process tracing and discourse analysis to namarsh.ru data, this study has interrogated the Diffusion of Repertoire Developments in Post-Soviet Russia. It has concomitantly analysed the extent to which Moscow and St. Petersburg have initiated such developments. Analysing the 2008/9 Global Financial Crisis protests, the 2011/12 Election protests, and the 2018/19 Anti-Pension Reform protests, the study finds that - in the past decade - Russia's capitals have not acted as repertoire initiators to the extent originally hypothesised. All case studies clearly refute the image of `restive capitals vs. quiet regions' propagated by the Russian authorities. The study has also found that, in the delineated time period, activists tend to domesticate rather than globalise their protest: References to foreign protests are largely sporadic and implicit in repertoire choices rather than consistent and directly stated - as exemplified by the similarity of the White Ribbon tactics to those of Ukraine's Orange Revolution.

As stated in the Introduction, the purpose of this study was not to establish quantitative evidence of why certain locations initiate repertoire development and others do not. Rather, using qualitative methods, it has sought to use Diffusion Theory to elucidate Russian protest cycles, and to analyse how inter-regional and trans-national Diffusion are represented in discourse. No previous studies have offered a detailed analysis of these concepts within the Russian context. More broadly, analysis of this context has allowed the identification of areas of Diffusion Theory which could be developed. It is, therefore, hoped that this study will provide a basis for future research, for which I now lay out five potential pathways.

2. FURTHER AVENUES OF RESEARCH

2.1. Historical Repertoire Development

The limited scope of the study has prevented detailed historical analysis of Russian protest repertoire. Future studies might look to the 1990s, and even the Soviet period, in order to situate protests post-2000 within a longer history of repertoire development. Hornsby's (2013) study of protest in the Khrushchev era offers a rich starting point for such an endeavour. He writes that:

`Dissent under Khrushchev was not simply about liberal intellectuals in Moscow `awakening' and beginning to question the regime's moral authority. It was also about Gulag returnees and workers hurling political abuse at the police, miners forming underground groups in Rostov, Party and Komsomol members both attacking and defending Stalin after the Secret Speech, forestry workers distributing anti-Khrushchev leaflets in Arkhangelsk, and students all over the USSR protesting against the bloody suppression of the Hungarian rising.' Robert Hornsby, Protest, Reform and Repression in Khrushchev's Soviet Union (Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, 2013), p. 3.

Conducting case studies from this period - or earlier/later - would permit a greater understanding of the resonance of repertoire choices in modern Russia. One might, for example, look at examples of `direct' protest actions during the 2005 Social Protests and compare these with the instances of direct action mentioned by Hornsby. Braithwaite, Maves & Kucik (2015) argue that societies without recent histories of non-violent action are more dependent on foreign examples, and that emulation of these examples depends on the intensity of domestic protest history. Braithwaite et al., p. 704-705. Understanding Russia's protest history would, therefore, allow a more informed analysis of modern activists' reference - or lack thereof - to the international context.