Terrorism serving geopolitics. The russian-ukrainian conflict as an example of the implementation of Alefsandr Dugin's geopolitical doctrine and Evgeny Messner's concept of "Rebel war"

The events taking currently place in Ukraine are a model example of the use of theoretical aspects of the Russian asymmetrical activities presented above. It is then worth to study every single stage of the conflict in comparison with the theory. On 28 February 2014 and operation was launched in Crimea aiming at taking the military control over the peninsula by Russia. The operation was participated by the local troops of «Crimean Self-Defen- ce» supported by unidentified formations of the Russian army. They took control over most of the strategic facilities such as airports, communication junctions and passages as well as the buildings belonging to the Ukrainian army and the Security Service of Ukraine. Within a week the whole peninsula was under control. Though some buildings stayed under the Ukrainian army control, the were blocked and deprived of any ability to conduct military activities through cutting off energy, water and other supplies. The most significant fact is that the whole operation was conducted without an open fight between the parties of the conflict. Self-appointed authorities from Simferopol started forming the autonomous armed forces on the basis of the local self-defence troops and the buildings taken away from the Ukrainian army. Armed soldiers with hidden faces wearing uniforms without any emblems, called «green people» or «gentle people» surprised the world media and analysts ironically commenting the conflict. They took over the airport in Sevastopol claiming that they had come to defend it against the «Bandera troops from Kiev». However, they did not inform anyone who they were and what country they come from. When it was clear that the alleged troops did not pose any threat to the airport, they were withdrawn. At the very moment the information was publicized they came back and took the airport over again Because of the information warfare going on in both Russian and Ukrainian media, the primary source allowing for the reconstruction of actual events of the conflict are the analyses prepared by the experts of the Centre for Eastern Studies in Warsaw. See: A. Wilk, Rosyjska interwencja wojskowa na Krymie [online], http://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/analizy/20 14-03-05/rosyj ska-interwencja-woj skowa-na- krymie [availability: 16 VIII 2014]; T. Iwanski, W. Rodkiewicz, A. Wierzbowska-Miazga, A. Wilk, Rosja wobec Ukrainy: nie tylko Krym [online], http://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/ analizy/2014-03-12/rosja-wobec-ukrainy-nie- tylko-krym [availability: 16 VIII 2014].. These activities are evident enough to be referred to as the so-called psychological special operations (Russian: психологические специальные операции) being within the competence of special operations troops GRU. One of that formation's ex-members Col. Vladimir Kvaczkov explains that their goal is to manipulate people's (both servicemen and civilians) consciousness and emotions, by means of confusion and demoralization, in order to make them feel friendly towards the Russian army В. В. Квачков, Применение Войск. This was reached by removing all the emblems from the soldiers' uniforms, making it unable to identify the country (so-called crypto-operation) and the formation they serve for, as well as by forbidding to communicate, in any form, with the civilians. All this led to many contradictory interpretations of «green people», «soldiers in uniforms» or «gentle people» and inability to define the enemy and taking the right actions. What is more, the effect of surprise was achieved, which allowed Russia for its own interpretations of events: during the peaceful demonstration in Maidan over one hundred people died, whereas during the military intervention in Crimea no one was hurt. This operation was also described as strategic provocative information- driven operation (Russian: стратегическая наступательная информационная операция) aimed at preceding the military intervention with preparations based on the use of information Non-Standard Uniform, w: International Law Studies. Issues in International Law and Military Operations, J. B. Jaques (ed.), Newport 2006, pp. 69-121..

concerning contemporary special operations carried out by the troops of the Russian Federation armed forces see: idem, Некоторые положения теории специальной операции и необходимость Сил Специального назначения в составе ВДВ, in: Спецназ ГРУ. Очерки истории. Кн. V: Новейшая история 19992010 гг, C. B. Козлов и др. (ed.), Москва 2010, pp. 393-404. Compare: И. Н. Воробьёв, Информационно-ударная операция, «Военная мысль» 2007, issue 6, pp. 14-21.

⁷⁷ Г. Почепцов, Информационные операции и Крым: базовые причины для манипуляций [online], http://psyfactor.org/psyops/ in- fowar_krym.htm [availability: 16 VIII 2014]; idem, Информационные операции и Крым: причины и следствия. Часть 2 [online], http://psyfactor.org/psyops/infowar_krym2.htm [availability: 16 VIII 2014]. For regulations concerning the international law on wearing uniforms and emblems during armed conflicts see: W. Hays Parks, Special Forces' Wear of Thus the Russian activities in Crimea confirm one of the rules of a «rebel war» - the one concerning the use of rebelling masses put over the years under the adequate psychological-information pressure (so-called intoxication) J. Darczewska, Anatomia rosyjskiej wojny informacyjnej.., p. 20; P. Nord, L'in- toxication par une intoxicateur, w: La disinformation: Arme de guerre, V. Volkoff (ed.), Lausanne 2004, pp. 87-111. supported by regular army. To reach that goal multidirectional and mass activities were initiated: federal TV and radio channels, newspapers and the Internet sources. This was supported by diplomats, politicians, political scientists, experts as well as the elites of science and culture. The arguments were given that the real threat to Crimea comes from the «Bandera troops invading the peninsula», «the NATO troops taking control over the Black Sea Fleet» or «derussification of the Ukrainian citizens». It was also said that the government in Kiev was established by foreign special services, especially American and Polish ones, whose espionage network (being the property of the Military Information Services, WSI) had been for years the tool of the American interests in Ukraine, especially in the petrol-energetic sector Л. В. Савин, Украина в сетевой. As it was mentioned before, participation of activists from the Eurasian Youth Union in the Crimean operation was also confirmed, which complies with the definition of the «rebel columns». As Evgeny Messner predicted, the army was played a secondary role. The first line belonged to the «rebel masses» and the «rebel co- lumns» taking over individual buildings and facilities. The goals were reached by the information-psychological pressure, sabotage and economic sanctions, without any armed struggle, taking over an intact infrastructure and avoiding casualties among soldiers and activists, as well as among the inhabitants of the peninsula. An important element was also president Vladimir Putin's attitude, who stayed calm and misinformed the western leaders войне, «Информационные войны» 2008, issue 3, pp. 50-51..

The Crimean scenario was repeated in the next months. On 6 April 2014 in Donetsk, Kharkiv and Luhansk groups consisting of several hundred to two thousand pro-Russian activists rebelled, which ended with taking over government buildings. In Kharkiv and Donetsk local government buildings and the buildings of SBU were also taken over. The activists made similar political demands, which confirms that the action had been planned before and it was coordinated by and consequently directed from Russia. On the Eurasian Youth Union's website one could find the instructions on «self-organization» and taking buildings over by crowds ⁸¹. The establishment of the Donetsk People's Republic and the Kharkiv People's Republic were proclaimed and in Luhansk people refused obedience to the government of Ukraine. On 11 May 2014 a referendum on sovereignty of the Donetsk and Luhansk Districts was organized. On 12 May 2014 a resolution on the Luhansk People's Republic and the Donetsk People's Republic sovereignty was passed and negotiations on establishing Novorossiya were started. This was a breaking moment and passing to another stage of the conflict when the authorities of the self- appointed republics established armed militia with an important role of instructors from Russia ⁸². The example of Igor Strielkov vel Girkin is quite significant in that context. On 15 April 2014 the SBU Press Service announced that one of the leaders of the subversive group of separatists occupying government buildings in Sloviansk was indentified. It appeared to be the abo- vementioned Igor Strielkov who, according to the SBU, was a soldier of the GRU Spetsnaz, which made it obvious that the separatists were instructed and supported by the Russian military intelligence. Strielkov soon became the subject of information warfare between the parties of the conflict:

Ukraine exposed his connections to the Russian special services in order to prove the engagement of those services in the separatist activities, whereas the Russian propaganda made Strielkov a hero of national fight for freedom. Thus a historian and historical reenactments enthusiast was to become a soldier in the fight for the freedom of Novorossiya - voluntarily, as a patriot P. Скоморохов, Портреты века: Игорь Стрелков, «Военное обозрение» dated 20 V 2014 [online], http://topwar.ru/48026- portrety-veka-igor-strelkov.html [availability: 16 VIII 2014].. Strielkov himself admits that has never been a member of the GRU, but the FSB. His real name is Girkin and «Strielkov» is his false name Д. Виноградов, Боевые заслуги: кто научил воевать Игоря Стрелкова, «Свободная Пресса» dated 5 VII 2014 [online], http://svpressa.ru/society/article/89194/7rssM [availability: 16 VIII 2014]: Я - Игорь Гиркин. Стрелковым я стал по документам прикрытия для работы. Я никогда не служил в ГРУ, я был сотрудником ФСБ. Сейчас в отставке - рассказывает о себе глава донецкой обороны. За этими скупыми словами - судьба человека, прошедшего три жестокие военные кампании и много раз рисковавшего собственной жизнью. Aleksandr Czerkasov, the President of the Foundation of Human Rights «Memorial», exposed interesting details concerning true activities of Igor Girkin. Basing on relations of the witnesses he revealed that in 2001 Girkin participated in murders and kidnapping of the Chechen citizens, at that time serving for the 45 Independent Regiment for Special Operations of the Airborne of the Russian Federation Armed Forces (Russian: 45-й Oтдельный полк специального назначения Воздушнодесантных войск Вооружённых Сил Российской Федерации) ⁸⁵. The main task of the military formations of that type was special intelligence (Russian: специальная разведка) with all available means - from observation, through combat actions aiming at the seizure of the demanded persons or facilities, to radio-technical intelligence ⁸⁶. An important part of their activity is also special operations concerning formation, support and combat use of irregular forces (Russian: специальные операции по формированию, поддержке и боевому применению иррегулярных сил). According to Kvaczkov such operations aim at establishing irregular formations performing the tasks of armed forces, which Russia is vividly interested in. They include intelligence tasks for the guerrilla groups and insurgent troops, as well as for the organizations involved or likely to get involved in a given conflict. It also includes any kind of help, especially in the area of training and logistics, as well as the use of numerous means of operational protection with the help of the espionage network available ⁸⁷. So it can be concluded that the example of Strielkov is a vivid confirmation of the Russian support for the Luhansk and Donetsk militia and separatists, both during preparations and during the conflict itself. The SBU accused Strielkov of directing the operational activities in Crimea aiming at preparation of the invasion and liquidation of the Ukrainian espionage network in Sloviansk and Krama- torsk P. Скоморохов, Портреты века: Игорь Стрелков... [availability: 16 VIII 2014].. It should however be underlined that the front line of armed activities belongs to the militia, the Russian special forces playing a supportive role. An interesting example of that is a telegram from Strielkov in which he reports that his personal source of information from Kiev informed him about an attempt of making a reportage by the Ukrainian TV station. The reportage was to be about «the alleged crimes of the Russian soldiers». Next Strielkov asks Dugin to publicize that information in the Internet, which is supposed to give the Russians advance and discredit the Ukrainian attempt Сводки от Стрелкова Игоря Ивановича. Сообщение от ополчения [online], http://vk.com/strelkov_info?w=waU- 57424472_5439 [availability: 16 VIII 2014].. So here we have a vivid example of providing the separatists with information support by the Russian special forces. The militia consists of several- people groups carrying out guerrilla activities. Their leaders come from the military environment, very often from Russia or having been trained in that country. It should be considered that they had precise knowledge about the theatre of armed activities and its character, since many veterans of special forces serving in Ukraine left to Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Russia Compare: С. В. Козлов, Противостояние, w: Cпецназ ГРУ. Очерки истории. Кн. IV: Безвременье. 1989-1999 гг., C. B. Козлов и др. (ed.), Москва 2010, pp. 151-161.. After starting an open fire with the Ukrainian army those troops very often withdrew trying to drag them into the street fight. They also organized traps which were very effective. A good example and confirmation of that could be the operation carried out on 22 May 2014 under the town of Wolnovacha, in which separatists shattered the 55 Mechanical Brigade of the Ukrainian Armed Forces killing 18 and injuring 32 soldiers, which was the biggest loss for the Ukrainian army in its 23-year history. The separatists were supported by civilians who blocked the Ukrainian columns. So here we have a clear example of cooperation between «rebel masses» and «rebel militia» described by Evgeny Messner P. Zochowski, A. Wilk, P. Kononczuk, Konflikt w Donbasie - wymuszona deeskalacja? [online], http://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/ analizy/2014-06-11/konflikt-w-donbasie- wymuszona-deeskalacja [availability: 16 VIII 2014]; Noworosja: «Jowan Szewicz» rosnie w site; [online], http://xportal.pl/?p=15319 [availability: 16 VIII 2014]..

Equally important element of a «rebel war» is activating the «rebel co- lumns». The definition that Messner came up with may be referred to the groups of mercenaries and volunteers not only from Russia, but from the whole post-Soviet territory and even from the Balkans. It is widely known that among the «Novorossiya defenders» there is a Serbian troop of about 250 people called «Jowan Szewicz». The ascending number of mercenaries is accompanied by the delivery of military equipment and any other supplies from the territory of the Russian Federation.

It appears that supported by Moscow mercenaries took control over local separatists groups Aleskandr Matjuszyn nickname «War- jag», one of the leaders of the Donetsk People's.

Russian activities in the territory of Ukraine revealed the effectiveness of organizations of a new kind. One vivid example can be the Eurasian Youth Union, whose activists evidently supported separatists by organizing referenda in Moscow and ensuring

Republic's armed forces, can be an excellent example of ideological attitude characterized by Messner in his definition of «rebel columns». He gave an interview in which he revealed the backstage of his activities in Ukraine, where his main goal was to prepare an uprising. After graduating from university he started his political activity in the ranks of the Moscow skinheads, taking part in riots and street fights. Next he joined Dugin's National Bolshevik Party (NBP) LED by Eduard Limonov. After returning from Moscow he dealt with establishing the party structures in the Donetsk district. However, he left the party after «Limonov's selling himself to the liberals». During the «orange revolution» he was one of the founders of the campaign called «Ukraine without Yushchenko». After leaving the party he joined a new movement called the Donetsk Republic (Russian: движение «Донецкая Республика»). He directed its activities in the town of Makiejevka. He got arrested by the SBU. Since he dealt with training the youth groups of the Donetsk Republic in 2007 he was accused of leading illegal armed troops. Aleskandr Matjuszyn underlines a huge role of his cooperation with Dugin's eurasian movement supporters and the Russian nationalists at that time. He said that the establishment of the Donetsk People's Republic was not accidental - it was a long-time plan of the activists. His statements make it clear that they were supported by Moscow. After declaring the independence of the Donetsk People's Republic he was appointed as the commander of the Volunteer Battalion «Waijag» (Russian: Добровольческий батальон «Варяг»), subordinated to the Ministry of State Security of that republic. The main goal of that battalion, apart from the front fight, is also fighting and getting rid of «sabo- teurs» and «thieves». М. Учитель, Александр «Варяг» Матюшин: нам нужна республика нового типа [online], http://rossia3.ru/politics/ vatjag_matyushi [availability: 31 VII 2014].

information support, but most of all by coordinating humanitarian help ⁹³. On 14 May 2014 on the organization's official website one could spot an announcement about the recruitment to the volunteer squads fighting the Nazi American mercenaries and oligarchs in the territory of Novorossiya ⁹⁴ Pavel Karnishev, the present leader of the organization, informed that a group of about one thousand volunteers was formed. Paramilitary organization called the Eurasian Youth Union is a youth fraction of International Eurasian Movement. The Eurasian Youth Union was established during the convention that took place on 26 January 2005 in which about 600 participants took part. The present number of its members is unknown. The union's structures are active not only in Russia, but also in other countries belonging to the Commonwealth of Independent States as well as in Germany, Italy and Romania. Its strict leadership include Pavel Karnishev, Dmitri Jefremov, Arthur Dugin and Aleksey Bielajev-Gintovt - the organization's «stylist». The union has military-like organized structures, both centrally and locally Публичная интернет-библиотека Владимира Прибыловского, Евразийский Союз Молодежи... [availability: 31 VIII 2014].. The main leaders are called moderators. The idealistic profile of the union is characterized by radical anti-American attitude and the hostile attitude towards the West. However, the idealistic profile created by Aleksandr Dugin is also shaped by the occult references It is Worth mentioning that the emblem of the Eurasian Youth Union is a stylized «Cha- os Star», the symbol of magical rebirth in the West. The symbol, taken by Dugin from the works of an occultist Aleister Crowley, refers to the «magic of chaos». Since for Dugin the term «chaos» is a synonym of a different, opposite to the western culture term «order», creating new possibilities of action and reaching political goals. Dugin had a positive attitude towards Crowley's works (who, by the way, was an MI-6 agent) and wrote that radical revolutionary trends were perceived by Crawley as the realization of the equinox storm with the help of thepowers of chaos in order to wipe out the remains of the rotten civilizations, getting closer to the logical and cyclical end. See: L. Sykulski, Koncepcja Radykalnego Podmiotu i «czwarta teoria polityczna» Aleksandra Dugina w kon- tekscie bezpieczenstwa Polski i Unii Europe- jskiej, «Przegl^d Geopolityczny» 2014, issue 8, p. 236; A. G. Dugin, The Multipolar World and the Postmodern, «Journal of Eurasian Af- fairs» 2014, issue 2, pp. 11-12.. The main goal of the union is to establish eurasian army and carry out eurasian revolution. The Eurasian Youth Union has a network structure; it tries to influence the widely understood youth environment, using the arsenal characteristic for information warfare. The most important role here has the Information-Analytical Division, the so-called information cell of the KGB, which was directed by Valery Korovin Публичная интернет-библиотека Владимира Прибыловского, Коровин Валерий Михайлович [online], http://www.anticomp- romat.org/esm/korovbio.html [availability: 31 VIII 2014]; Катехизис члена Евразийского Союза Молодежи [online], http://www.rossia3. ru/katehizis.html [availability: 31 VIII 2014]. For more abot the network organizations see: J. Arquilla, D. Ronfeldt, The Adwent of Netwar (Revisited), in: Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy, J. Arquilla, D. Ronfeldt (ed.), Santa Monica 2001, pp. 1-25.. Without any doubts that organization is an information support to the Kremlin. Its members deal with information warfare in a scientific dimension. In 2007 the union's activists carried out a cyber-attack on the Ukrainian president's website. After that incident the Ukrainian structures of the organization were strictly controlled by the SBU, which led to many of its members leaving the union Евразийские боевики из Восточного Казахстана? [online], http://z001.kz/. It is however worth underlying that the Eurasian Youth Union is only one of many «rebel columns». Aleksandr Dugin and his supporters very quickly adopted the idea of «information warfare». Its concept was borrowed by Dugin from the ideologists of the so-called New Right movement. Getting political power (in the region, country or the whole continent) should be accompanied by imposing one's culture, the way of thinking and the system of values. In order to reach that one should carry out a cultura- lideological invigilation of university environments and representatives of such professions as doctors or lawyers, who influence the public opinion. Such an idea was postulated by Alain de Benoist, who is widely respected among the eura- sianists and strongly supports the «Fourth Political Theory» by Aleksandr Dugin. The Eurasian Youth Union is just a part of a bigger organization of a network character, which is a «conveyor belt» of ideology coming directly from Moscow news/view?id=1700 [availability: 31 VIII 2014]..

To sum up it should be underlined that Russia has presented its own concept of «information warfare» to the hole world. In this particular case we can talk about diversification and synchronization of many activities. Their common feature is the use of information and its processing as the main weapon based on the psychological factors supported by the use of modern technological solutions. Information warfare takes asymmetrical activities, which are skilfully directed. All the factors mentioned above create a unique, Russian concept of «hybrid warfare», which constitutes a serious threat for the security of the widely understood West.

Аннотация

Автор обработал результаты исследований А. Дугина и Е. Месснера и пришел к выводу, что отголоски геополитических последствий установки новых границ все еще живы в умах не только представителей российского политического класса, но и большинства российского общества.

Доказано, что российско-украинский конфликт является одним из этапов внедрения более широкой политической доктрины, направленной на стратегическую реинтеграцию постсоветского пространства, а в дальнейшей перспективе - на построение так называемого многополярного мира. Основной целью этого исследования было предоставить предположения по поводу Российской доктрины в отношении Украины и определение методов ее реализации.

Автор утверждает, что роль А. Дугина в российско-украинской конфронтации значительно шире, чем просто координация информации, финансовая и логистическая поддержка, предоставляемая сепаратистам его организацией. Предполагается, что А. Дугин - один из авторов окончательного решения украинской проблемы и создатель геополитической модели, принятой в действие, которая создает пророссийские государственные учреждения на территории Украины. Сделан вывод, что Россия представляет собственную концепцию «информационной войны» со всем миром посредством разнообразия и синхронизации различных видов деятельности.

Ключевые слова: геополитика, геополитическое пространство, геополитические методы, информационная война, мятежевойна.

Abstract

information warfare conflict geopolitical

The author worked out the results of A. Dugin and E. Messener's investigations and made a conclusion the reflection over geopolitical consequences of new border layout is still vivid in the minds of representatives of not only the Russian political class, but also the majority of the Russian society.

It was proved that the Russian- Ukrainian conflict is one of the stages in the implementation of the broader political doctrine aiming at strategic reintegration of the post-Soviet space, and in the further perspective - building of the so- called multipolar world. The main purpose of this research was presenting the assumptions of the Russian doctrine in relation to Ukraine and specifying the methods of its realisation.

The author claimed the A. Dugin's role in the Russian-Ukrainian confrontation seems to be much broader than just coordination of information, finance and logistic support given to the separatists by his organizations. A. Dugin is supposed to be one of the authors of the final solution of the Ukrainian problem and the creator of the geopolitical model of the actions taken, which is establishing of the pro- Russian state bodies in the territory of Ukraine. To sum up it should be underlined that Russia has presented its own concept of «information warfare» to the whole world by diversification and synchronization of many activities.

Key words: geopolitics, geopolitical space, geopolitical method; information warfare; rebel war.

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