Terrorism serving geopolitics. The russian-ukrainian conflict as an example of the implementation of Alefsandr Dugin's geopolitical doctrine and Evgeny Messner's concept of "Rebel war"

³³ A. Г. Дугин, О Новороссии и вводе войск. Геополитический анализ [online], http://novorossia. su/ru/node/3321 [availability: 29 VII 2014]. Compare: Группа экспертов во главе с Сергеем Глазьевым, Украина: между Западом и Россией, «Изборский клуб» 2014, issue 4, pp. 6-28; Z. Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard. American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives, New York 1997, pp. 3048; 87-118. the conflict A. Г. Дугин, Украинцев я очень люблю, я сам - украинец [online], http://evrazia.org/article/ 2469, [availability: 29 VII 2014]. His role in the Russian- Ukrainian confrontation seems to be much broader than just coordination of information, finance and logistic support given to the separatists by his organizations. Aleksandr Dugin is supposed to be one of the authors of the final solution of the Ukrainian problem and the creator of the geopolitical model of the actions taken, which is establishing of the pro-Russian state bodies in the territory of Ukraine. There is evidence for such an assumption. During the Russian-Georgian war he was in the South Ossetia, advising the seizure of Tbilisi and overthrowing of president Mikheil Saakashvili. The next step was to be taking over the Crimean Peninsula, which, as Dugin put it, is a part of Russia anyway Д. Ньюман, Кто придумал аннексировать украинский Крым? Многие россияне. In an interview he admitted that the leaders of the Donetsk People's Republic and the Luhansk People's Republic are his close friends, who in the 90s of the last century took part in his geopolitical courses. He underlined that they took a thorough training and strongly support the idea of neoeurasianism. He also confirmed that he stays in touch with them. What is more, Dugin claims that the Donetsk People's Republic is the final stage of a political project, which was conceived as a response to the «orange revolution» during a training meeting of the International Eurasian Movement near Volodymyr in 2006 симпатизирует новому виду милитарист ского патриотизма авторства Александра Дугина [online], http://evrazia.info/article/4839 [availability: 31 VII 2014].. In the context of Dugin's statements it is worth remembering that in 2006 within the neo- eurasian school of geopolitics and idea of creating the Eurasian Uprising Army in Ukraine was born. Apart from that he also revealed that his son Artur, a prominent activist of the Eurasian Youth Union, took part in the Crimean operation, as many other activists of the neo-eurasian movement joining the «Crimean Self-Defence». During the operation he performed tasks involving blocking of the Ukrainian government buildings in order to prevent the leaks of sensitive information (he is also said to have taken part in blocking the Ukrainian party from giving information to the outside world or manipulating the information that was to be given out in the way favourable to the Russian party). Next he decided to become a journalist of Russia Today to take part in the information warfare ³⁷. One of the long-term activists of the Eurasian Youth Union was also Aleksandr Prosiolkov, who until his death on 31 July 2014 was the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Donetsk People's Republic ³⁸. It is worth underlying that the main leaders of state administration in the self-appointed republics and their armed forces - Denis Puszylin, Igor Strielkov, Aleksandr Bo- rodaj, Pawel Gubariev and Valery Bolotov - took part in a special gathering of the «Izborski Club» in Donetsk. It is toru/articles/2014/06/04/aleksandr-dugin-v- krymu-nado-vvesti-dukhovnuyu-cenzuru.html [availability: 31 VII 2014]: «И вот, мой сын Артур, услышав это, приехал в Крым. Он был готов записаться в самооборону, установил с ними контакты. Он приехал сюда воевать в полном смысле этого слова. Но поскольку на полуострове появились более подготовленные «вежливые люди», то он, работая на Russia Today, решил заниматься информационной войной. Артур уехал отсюда только после того, как побывал на Перекопе и убедился, что Крым это уже наша земля».

pointed that the organisation itself gathers the most infuential people from the Russian political scene and constitutes an intellectual background for the Kremlin. Aleksandr Prochanov - a writer, politician and the chairman of the «Izborski Club», together with Aleksandr Dugin, Valery Korovin and other experts prepared the project of a new country located in the south-eastern part of «ex-Ukraine». The new geopolitical phenomenon, including the Luhansk People's Republic and the Donetsk People's Republic, was proclaimed on 12 May 2014. This is how a new country, the Federal State of Novorossiya (Russian: Федеративное государство Новороссия, Ukrainian: Федеративна держава Новоросія) was created Александр Проханов разработает

идеологию Новороссии [online], http:// novorossia.su/ru/node/2386, [availability: 31 VII 2014]; В Донецке состоялось первое заседание филиала Изборского клуба - Новороссия, http://novorossia.su/ru/node/2783

[availability: 31 VII 2014]; Идеология Новороссии. Изборцы предлагают своё видение идейной основы для нарождающегося на юго-западных рубежах РФ государства, «Изборский клуб» 2014, issue 5, pp. 6-32. The name of the country is not accidental - it is supposed to indicate that the territory in the past belonged to the Russian Empire and the Russian Federation as its successor has the right to annex it The term «Novorossiya» was used between XVIII and XX century in the Russian Empire and meant the «wild steppe» - the territories located north of the Black Sea and the Azov Sea and south of the borders of the Republic of Poland (before 1793). Nowadays it is the area of the southern part of Ukraine, annexed to Russia in 1774 after the war with Turkey. Between 1764 and 1783 as well as between 1796 and 1802 that territory was the Novorossiya Pro-. Dugin underlines that the Donetsk District and the Luhansk District have always been an integral part of Russia and the people living there, who have always been strongly connected to the Orthodox Catholic Church, should be treated as the southwestern part of the eurasian civilization. Those people have always declared their strong connection to Russia. The lands of Novorossiya became a part of Ukraine by accident - in 1991 after the collapse of the Soviet Russia. Those territories may be a part of Ukraine only when Ukraine integrates with Russia. In Dugin's opinion the historical identity of the «etnos» from Novorossiya derives from the Russian- Soviet past influenced by Kievan Rus', the Russian Empire, the Orthodox Catholic Church and the Great Patriotic War. According to the authors of Novorossiya that country is to be subordinate to «sovereign authorities» and free from the influences of the oligarchs, whose wealth should be nationalized [online], http://dynacon.ru/content/ articles/ 3419/ [availability: 31 VII 2014]..

vince divided in 1802 into: Yekaterynoslavska Province, Chersonska Province (1802-1803 - Mikolayovska Province) and Taurydzka Province. Bessarabia (from 1812 a district and from 1873 the Bessarabia Province) and the The Province (Oblast) of the Don Cossack Host (Rostov-on-Don, Taganrog) were also part of Novorossiya. Source: Россия. Географическое описание Российской Империи по губерниям и областям с географическими картами, Санкт-Петербург 1913, pp. 58-64. Compare: H. Краснов, Материалы для географии и статистики России, собранные офицерами Генерального штаба. Земли Войска Донского, Санкт-Петербург 1863, pp. 1-596.

Those ideas were also reflected in the political programme of the Social- Political Movement the Party of Novorossiya (Russian: Общественнополитическое движение «Партия Новороссии»), established on 13 May 2014 by Pawel Gubariev Программа Общественно-политического движения «Партия Новороссии» [online], http://novorossia.su/ru/node/1753 [availability: 31 VII 2014]..

It should be underlined that some geopolitical concepts proclaimed by Dugin and connected to him the neo- eurasian environment are clearly visible in the Kremlin's activity and president Vladimir Putin's statements. First of all, the key element of the Russian policy towards the new Ukrainian authorities is the demand of the constitutional reforms, which would divert the country from unitary to federal, with a significant privilege of the eastern and southern regions. This can be confirmed by the statement of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs dated 17 March 2014 in which Moscow demanded that the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine establish a constitutional assembly with the equal representation of all regions belonging to Ukraine. This body would prepare and approve the project of the new constitution. According to the Russian concept Ukraine is to be a «democratic federal state» whose separate regions will have the right to choose independent legislative and executive authorities and will be given broad powers reflecting their historical-cultural specific characters. Extorting such solutions would guarantee

Russia the control over the Kiev policy through controlling the policy of the eastern regions of Ukraine. That would mean diverting Ukraine into a lose assembly of federal regions without uniform economic, cultural and social policy and the regions with their legislative authorities would not have to follow the central authorities, which would in particular concern the eastern regions T. A. Olszanski, Ukraina: suwerenna decentralizacja czy niesuwerenny federalizm?, «Komentarze OSW» 2014, issue 134, pp. 1-2; A. Moshes, More Stick, Less Carrot: Russia's Policy Towards Ukraine Following Recent Events, «Russian Analytical Digest» 2014, issue 146, pp. 2-3.. What is more, the president's statements concerning far-reaching geopolitical projects reflect the concept of neo-eurasianism. In one of his statements Vladimir Putin underlined that Russia is becoming the centre of the Russian World consisting of the Russian-Ukrainian-Belorussian core. Its main space will consist of the postSoviet space inhabited by the Russian- speakers. Belonging to the Russian World will be guaranteed by cultural aspects such as language, the Orthodox Church and common values no matter of nationality or ethnic origin M. Menkiszak, Doktryna Putina: Twor- zenie koncepcyjnych podstaw rosyjskiej dominacji na obszarze postradzieckim, «Komentarze OSW» 2014, issue 131, pp. 1-7; P. Panov, Nation-building in Post-Soviet Russia: Thus president Putin's views are equal to the definition of Valery Korovin's eurasian geopolitical pole being a part of so called multipolar world What Kind of Nationalism is Produced by the Kremlin? «Journal of Eurasian Studies» 2010, issue 1, pp. 85-94..

After the collapse of the Soviet Russia the country applied an idealistic vision of creating an international order based on the common interests of all great world powers. In the middle of the 90s of the last century this idea changed into a realistic vision based on multipolarity. The starting point for that concept became the theory of multipolar world formulated by Aleksandr Dugin. The theory assumes creating a configuration of many centres of power and influence having both contradictory and common interests. See: S. Bielen, Erozja mono- centryzmu w stosunkach mifdzynarodowych, w: Studia nad geopolitykq XX wieku, P. Eberhardt (ed.), Warszawa 2013, p. 110. Building the eurasian empire as well as geopolitical reorganization of Europe is a necessary response to the USA's victory in the cold war and the collapse of the Soviet Russia. On the ruins of that communist empire a new, stronger superpower reflecting traditional values of Eastern-Slavic, Turanian and Finn-Ugrian people is to be built. This requires elimination of the unipolar Western World dominated by the power of the USA and substitute it with the bi- or multipolar system. This will enable an expansive policy of the eurasian empire. The supporters of neo-eurasianism advocate leaving the unipolar world dominated by the USA behind, since in the present world order Russia is no more than a «black whole» placed between the Euro-Atlantic World and the Third World. One of the main goals postulated by the eurasian policy supporters is mobilization of the resources of the peripheral countries (of the Third World). This in turn is reflected in Dugin's philosophical views who indicates that postliberalism has blurred the differences between the left and the right. Communism stood against capitalism from the left side and fascism from the right one. He claims that one can stand in the middle, which means accepting the present order, or in the peripheries, which means standing against it. Thus the main Dugin's idea is to mobilize the peripheries, which means mobilizing what has been rejected. In practice it means metaphysical and political activation of the postindustrial society margins. See: А. Г. Дугин, Четвертая политическая теория. Россия и политические идеи XXI века, Санкт-Петербург.

Thus the annexation of Crimea to Russia and the activities of the separatists in the south-eastern part of Ukraine should not be treated as an authentic freedom-related aspiration of its inhabitants described by the Kremlin propaganda as the «Russian 2009, pp. 16-17. Next Russia should aim at a close, strategic union with most important European powers (mainly Germany and France). Geopolitical expansion and unions with regional powers such as China, India or Iran shall constitute the basis for consolidation of the potential of the countries belonging to the eurasian continent. New multipolar world order, in the eurasian theory supporters' opinion, should be based on creating four main spheres: Anglo-American, Pan-Eurasian, Euro-African and Pacific. The first one would include Anglo-sphere (USA, Canada, the UK, Australia and a part of Polynesia) and the Latin America. The Euro-African sphere would include the European Union and Africa. The areas of the Soviet Russia, Turkey, Iran and India would constitute the Pan-Eurasian sphere, whereas the areas of the East Asia and the South-East Asia would form the Pacific sphere. In further perspective, in the frames of the four mentioned spheres, the neo-eurasian theorists draw a more detailed division: twelve «enormous spheres» as a backward «ideal model» of the future. The twelve spheres include: North-American (USA, Canada, the UK, Australia and a part of Polynesia), Middle- American (the whole continent of the South America), European (the European Union and the European countries associated with the EU: Switzerland, Island and Norway), Arabian- Islamic (the countries of the Maghreb, Sudan the Arabian Peninsula), Transsaharian (the countries of the Transsaharian Africa), Islamic-Conti- nental (mainly Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan and Syria), Indian, Chinese, Japanese and the area of the «new Pacific» (South-Eastern Asia). See: Zob. А. Г. Дугин, Теория многополярного мира, Москва 2013, pp. 276-337; L. Sykulski, Integracja polityczna Eurazji we wspdlczesnej rosyjskiej mysli geopolitycznej, in: Studia nad geopolitykq XX wieku, P. Eberhardt (ed.), Warsaw 2013, pp. 349-365.

Spring». It appeared to be an artificially created geopolitical project implemented with the help of technological social control as well as information and military aggression. The project was created by the Russian geopoliticians supported by the Kremlin and connected with the eurasian environment identified by Aleksandr Dugin. The true goal, supported by the realization of Dugin's geopolitical doctrine, is most of all a close attachment of the south-eastern areas of Ukraine with Russia, which in the further perspective will deprive the Ukrainian nation of its sovereignty. The real possibility of realizing such a scenario is indicated in the analyses of the main Russian geopoliticians, who draw the vision of the future development of that situation. In that context a prognosis by Gen. Col. Leonid Iwaszov seems to be particularly interesting. In his opinion the Euro- maidan events started the process of Ukraine collapse. In the perspective of one or two years new referendum s - similar to the one that took place in Crimea on 16 March 2014 - are more than probable. Russia should actively support the activities which aim at returning the south-eastern regions to their home country. After «stabilizing» the socio-political situation in those regions, a step further should be taken in the form of a «rebel war» (Russian: мятежевойна). It should affect the western regions of Ukraine, especially where the religious-cultural border goes, which means the line between the Central Ukraine and the Western Ukraine. Thus it is necessary to provoke strong protests. It can be achieved by the use of, interalia, disputes on a religious ground, repressive activities of the new authorities and lowering the standard of living of the local inhabitants in comparison with the inhabitants of Novorossiya annexed to the Russian Federation. Thanks to such operations, through the process of the federalization of Ukraine, it will be possible to get the situation «stabilized». Four federal republics would then be established: the Western one with the capital in Lvov, the Central one with the capital in Kiev, the Eastern one with the capital in Kharkiv and the Southern one with the capital in Dnipropetrovsk. According to the general another scenario is also possible: the mentioned state bodies can be independent, however the economic crisis and the disputes between desiring power and influence oligarchs will lead to a crisis situation. In such circumstances some «independent countries» may aspire to a close integration with Russia. The Western Ukraine (Lvov) should be deprived of such a possibility. According to Iwaszov, in order to get this idea implemented strong activity of the Russian institutions and social organizations is necessary. That enigmatic statement should be of course understood as the «information warfare» ⁴⁶.

Aleksandr Dugin considers a similar scenario for Ukraine. In his opinion the left part of Ukraine and the regions neighbouring the Black Sea should stay under Russian control. Thanks to that it will be possible to support the resistance centres against «junta», i.e. the government in Kiev, without the necessity of a direct military intervention A. Г. Дугин, Крым в России. Что дальше? [online], http://dynacon.ru/content/ articles/2864/ [availability: 31 VII 2014]: Вся территория Украины вряд ли будет дружественной России, точка невозврата пройдена. Поэтому задача теперь запереть хунту в Правобережье (граница - русло Днепра, а на Юге к России отходит вся полоса Причерноморья - это необходимо, чтобы прервать черноморско-балтийский санитарный кордон). Параллельно естественному кошмару, который начнётся на Правобережье, в этой Киевской-галицкой державе, можно будет поддержать очаги сопротивления хунте и на Западе, но на сей раз точно без прямого участия войск.. Valery Korovin also does not consider the existence of Ukraine, as he predicts that it will be split between the Atlantic and Eurasian blocks B. Коровин, Гибель Украины, «Изборский клуб» 2014, issue 5, pp. 19-21..

The geopolitical plan that Russia has in reference to Ukraine seems to be obvious - it is about a permanent subordination of Ukraine through gaining control over its foreign policy, internal policy, security and economic processes. Thus keeping an unstable situation in Donbass is just an instrument applied in order to keep control over the whole Ukraine.

Evgeny Messner's «rebel war» as an element of the Russian «information warfare» on the example of the Rus- sian-Ukrainian conflict

According to Gen. Leonid Iwaszov, the main method of the realization of the Russian geopolitical goals in the territory of Ukraine is so-called «rebel war». Theoretical basics of that phenomenon were described by Colonel of the General Headquarters of the Tsarist Army and veteran of both world wars, who spent the last years of his life as a scientist of military academies in Argentina - Evgeny Messner (18911974). As early as in the 60s of the last century he warned the world against the era of unconventional wars, today referred to as asymmetrical or irregular Compare footnote 16 of this article.. Messner's scientific interests concerned psychological aspects of the art of war, soldiers' and officers' morale and different forms of conflicts Е. Э. Месснер, Лик современной вой. Basing on his personal experience and erudite knowledge supported by knowledge of a few foreign languages, Mes- sner published numerous monographs, articles and research, among which special attention should be paid to WorldRebel War (Russian: Всемирная Мятежевойна) published in Buenos Aires in 1971. Its integral part constitutes a study titled «Mutiny, or the name of the Third World War» (Russian: Мятеж - имя Третьей Всемирной) published in 1960 in the capital of Argentina as a separate study ны, in: Военная мысль в изгнании. Творче ство русской военной эмиграции, И. В. Домнин (ed.), Москва 1999, pp. 363-404. Detailed biography of Evgeny Messner can be found in: И. В. Домнин, От Первой мировой до «Третьей Всемирной». Жизненный путь Генерального штаба полковника Е. Э. Месснера, w: Хочешь мира, победи мятежевойну! Твор ческое наследие Е. Э. Месснера, И. В. Домнин (ed.), Москва 2005, pp. 18-51; К. Александров, Армия генерала Власова 1944-1945, Москва 2006, pp. 26, 41-42, 182, 248, 507; И. В. Домнин, Краткий очерк военной мысли Русского Зарубежья, in: Военная мысль в изгнании. Творчество русской военной эмиграции, И. В. Домнин (ed.), Москва 1999, пп 448-527.

Revolution in Russia, philosophy of the Sun Tzu art of war, both world wars and numerous regional conflicts are said to be the inspirations of Evgeny Messner's search for the genesis of a new way of waging war. Taking precise observation Messner concluded that regular soldiers' fight is often entwined with riots of political, social and economic backgrounds or with terror attacks and activities carried by secret organizations, sabotage groups and individuals. These activities are difficult to classify. It is also hard to point to their origin. He called the new phenomenon «fighting with a rebellion» (Russian: борба мятежом), shortly «rebel war» (мятежевойна, from Russian мятеж - rebellion, riots). In Messner's opinion psychological aspect was barely used in the past wars, but in «rebel war» it is to be the main tool. That is why «rebel war» is to be the psychological warfare. Messner underlines that in the future this will be the prevailing way of waging wars and his abovementioned study is just an exiguous one, not covering the whole problem ⁵².

The main rule of waging a «rebel war» is using national movements, rebellion etc. as the subjects of revolution ⁵³. According to Messner revolution is most of all a psychological phenomenon, which should be understood as a quick and radical change in people's consciousness. The art of revolution is based on creating and separating an active group led by revolutionary leaders from the society or a nation. Revolution is characterized by psychological processes taking place in masses stimulated by active groups. It bases on law instincts and psychology of the masses, as result of which a civilized man becomes a barbarian. According to Messner's concept, psychology of the «rebellious masses» is the main

It should be noted that waging wars using asymmetrical activities was the subject of deep study of the Nazi philosopher Carl Schmitt. In one of his works he suggested that such activities should be legally legitimized in international law. See: C. Schmitt, Theorie des Partisanen Zwischenbemerkung zum Begriff des Politi- schen, Berlin 1975; T. Kochi, The Partisan: Carl Schmitt and Terrorism, «Law Critique» 2006, issue 17, pp. 267-295. Schmitt's views became the basis of Dugin's statements, who claims that guerilla groups using terrorist methods of fight constitute the main tool in the conflict between the «Supercivilization of the Sea» and the «Supercivilization of the Land» and Russia, because of its traditions of the Napoleonic Wars and the Great Patriotic War, is an enormous guerrilla empire. Dugin's opinions are thus a trial (though only ideological one for the time being) to legitimize the asymmetrical activities applied in the Russian policy. See: A. Г. Дугин, Философия войны, Москва 2004, pp. 96-100. tool leading to victory or failure. The aim of a war is not only neutralization of the enemy's armed forces, but also destabilization of the whole country with the use of psychological factors: demoralization, fear and the feeling of uncertainty being the result of guerrilla and terrorist groups activities A. Schmid, Terrorism as Psychological Warfare, «Democracy and Security» 2005, issue 1, pp. 137-146. That is why a «rebel war» is often described by Messner as a «half-war», which should be understood as a transitional stage between peace and conventional war activities. «Rebel war» is also characterized by the impossibility of precise determination of the conflict parts, hidden behind and carrying out activities using irregular «non-state» groups Е. Э. Месснер, Всемирная мятеже- война.., pp. 46-59.. It is also hard to point the exact starting point and the end of such a war, in case of which there are no such terms as theatre of war or the front line in their standard meaning. The main goal of a «rebel war» - according to Messner - is gaining control over the enemy's soul. That is why in order to be successful it is necessary to make a psychological profile of not only people, but most of all the whole group, society or nation. That implies huge challenges for the new form of intelligence - the so-called psychological intelligence (Russian: психоразведка) Ibidem, pp. 105-116.. Activities are carried out not only in traditional space (land, sea, air), but also (most of all, in fact) in the human psyche. The concept of the front line in case of a «rebel war» refers to individual spheres of society's activities such as economy, politics, culture etc. An important goal of a «rebel war» is the process of your own nation's integration and winning a part of the enemy's nation over to your side. That is the task for journalists, saboteurs, provocateurs and propagandists. All social groups of the enemy should be put under psychological pressure. According to Messner, an important role in that activity have political parties and social organizations. The secret of keeping psychological control over the rebelled masses is based on defining their needs and shaping their new consciousness (neoconsciousness) in a way that they treat as expressing their own will ⁵⁷.

After general description of genesis, definition and aims of a «rebel war» Messner presents its main participants. He divides them into four groups:

1. «rebel masses» (Russian: мятежные массы) meaning disobedient citizens or revolting crowds, constituting the biggest in number and the most disorganised group taking part in a conflict. This group is characterized by unpredictability and radicalism of attitude passing from activity to passivity and vice versa, which is a big challenge for the operational command, in traditional art of war comparable to commanding coalition troops.

2. «rebel columns» (Russian: мятежные колонны), described also as «cryptoarmy» or «secret police», meaning individuals or groups chosen from the «rebel masses» whose main tasks concern terrorist and subversive activities. Members of such groups can be described as ideologists serving the idea they fight for. «Rebel columns» are mainly saboteurs, terrorists and provocateurs.

3. «rebel militia» (Russian: мятежное ополчение) meaning irregular, voluntary guerrilla groups or insurgent army. This group is strictly bound to the nation or ethnic group it comes from. «Rebel militia» is territorial, which means it stays active in the area its members come from and is usually supported by local population.

4. «army in a rebel war» (Russian: войско в мятежевойне) which constitutes an equally important element during a conflict. Activities of «rebel masses», «rebel columns» and guerrilla groups should be coordinated with the task of a regular army. In Messner's concept regular army plays only a supportive role to guerrilla groups, «citizen militia», revolting social groups or national minorities Е. Э. Месснер, Всемирная мятеже- война.., pp. 65-73. Compare: I. F. Beckett, Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies: Guerrillas and Their Opponents since 1750, London-New York 2o0l; J. Arquilla, Insurgents, Raiders, and Bandits: How Masters of Irregular Warfare Have Shaped Our World, Lanham 2011; M. Kennard, Irregular Army:.

Cooperation of the four above- mentioned groups should aim at reaching precisely defined goals, which Messner defined as:

• disintegration of the hostile nation's morale,

• disintegration of active parts of the country (army, guerrilla groups, social movements),

• taking over or deactivating objects of psychological value,

• taking over or deactivating objects of material value,

• implementing activities aiming at winning allies or weakening the enemy's allies,

• protection of your own nation's morale,

• saving your own armed forces,

• securing your own objects of psychological and material value,

• neutralising the factors that could potentially lead to neutral countries' reaction (it should be taken into consideration that not only governments, but also social groups may react) ⁵⁹.

It should be mentioned that Evgeny Messner's concept of a «rebel war» was reflected in the early 90s of the last century during the creation of

How the US Military Recruited Neo-Nazis, Gang Members, and Criminals to Fight the War on Terror, New York 2012; E. V. Larson, D. Eaton, B. Nichiporuk, T. S. Szayna, Assessing Irregular Warfare. A Framework for Intelligence Analysis, Santa Monica 2008; U. Svete, Asymmetrical Warfare and Modern Digital Media: An Old Concept Changed by New Technology? w: The Moral Dimension of Asymmetrical Warfare, Counter-terrorism, Democratic Values and Military Ethics, Th.A. van Baarda, D.E.M. Verweij (ed.), Leiden-Boston 2009, pp. 381-399.

the Russian asymmetrical activities doctrine, incorporated in the broad concept of «information warfare». The operation in Crimea and escalation of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict gave the possibility to evaluate the concept of Russian «information warfare», which became the subject of a thorough study by Jolanta Darczewska J. Darczewska, Anatomia rosyjskiej wojny informacyjnej. Operacja krymska - studium przypadku, Warsaw 2014.. She acknowledged that the Russian theorists understand the concept of information warfare as influencing the consciousness of the masses in the international rivalry of the civilisation systems in the information space, which can be achieved by the use of special ways of control over information resources, used as «information weapon». The Russian concept of «information warfare» refers to psychological warfare and specpro- paganda used during the times of the Soviet Russia. The author underlined that the technological dimension of information warfare in Russia has been marginalized and pushed out from the public space, at the same time giving place to cultural and ideological factors. The main task of «information warfare» is reaching precise aims in foreign, regional and internal policy, as well as securing geopolitical advantage. Nowadays in Russia there are two schools of «information warfare» established by Igor Panarin and Aleksandr Dugin - the main representatives of the concept of geopolitics and leaders of the public opinion, having connection with special services. The author claims that they try to sensitise their own society to information threats from the outside, at the same time formulating the Russian system of information counteracting. They deal with the concept of «information warfare» both in theory and in practice ⁶¹.

It is worth pointing to numerous studies by Igor Panarin, Aleksandr Dugin, Valery Korovin or Leonid Savin, which have popularizing, disinformation and propaganda function, discussing in detail mainly the American concept of information warfare. Its aim, as the authors claim, is disintegration of Russia and destabilization of the post-Soviet space. They also point to the alleged weakness of Russia and the necessity to build their own concept of «information warfare» in order to oppose the aggression form the West, which previously caused the Soviet Union collapse ⁶². Comparing studies of the abovementioned authors with theses of the American theorists lead to the conclusion that the definitions and methods of implementation of «infor- mation warfare», allegedly Russian, have been taken from the American works (not far from the abovementioned definitions) and have been adjusted to the Russian propaganda purposes. This could be confirmed by Dugin's journalistic activity, in which he recognized the American concept of waging Network Centric Warfare and being its integral part the C44ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance) formula as main tools of stirring «flower revolutions» in the post-Soviet territories. Basing on the American literature he created the model of «eurasian network», which is supposed to be a response to the American «Network Centric Warfare chal- lenge» A. Г. Дугин, Геополитика постмодерна.., pp. 333-347; idem, Теоретические основы сетевых войн, «Информационные войны» 2008, issue 1, pp. 2-10; idem, Cетевые войны (аналитический доклад), «Изборский клуб» 2013, issue 10, pp. 38-68. Compare: J. Ferris, Netcentric Warfare, C4ISR and Information Operations: Towards a Revolution in Military Intelligence? «Intelligence and National Security» 2004, issue 19, pp. 199-225; J. W. Kipp, `Smart' Defense From New Threats: Future War From a Russian Perspective. Back to the Future After the War on Terror, «Journal of Slavic Military Studies» 2014, issue 27, p. 36. Compare: А. В. Бедрицкий, Информационная война: концепции и их реализация в США, Москва 2008, pp. 54-86.. A similar concept was also formulated by Igor Panarin, who adopted the American theory called noopoli- tik into the Russian grounds И. Н. Панарин, Информационная война и геополитика, Москва 2006, pp. 163-172. Compare: J. Arquilla, D.R. Ronfeldt, The Emergence of Noopolitik: Toward an American Information Strategy, Santa Monica 1999.

Thus the concept of «information warfare» by the abovementioned authors, which is strictly related to the American original, is hard to be recognized as a real reflection of the practice applied in the Russian Federation. It is then worth to ask a question about the authentic theoretical assumptions of the Russian information warfare and its realization. While analyzing this problem it is also worth to pay attention to the achievements of the army in the subject matter. Theoretical and practical aspects of this kind of war have been studied by the armed forces of the Russian Federation from the beginning of the 90s of the last century. These activities were stimulated by the American achievements in the area of operations conducted on the basis of information during the war in the Persian Gulf, no matter how close they were to Evgeny Messner's concept of a rebel war based on the information-sociological factors ⁶⁵. Definitions of «rebel war» formulated by the Russian servicemen are quite universal and refer to activities conducted both during wartime and peacetime. It is to be pointed that they are not to be found in the studied by geopoliticians, political scientists and leaders of the public opinion. In the military nomenclature the term «information warfare» is not used. In Russia it is reserved for publicists, scientists and civil analysts. In the military environment the terms «information confronta- tion» (Russian: информационное противоборство) or «information fight» (Russian: информационная борьба) are preferred. Both terms are used interchangeably and the difference between them is not clear enough L. W. Grau, T. L. Thomas, A Russian View of Future War.., pp. 516-517. Compare: Л. В. Воронцова, Д. Б. Фролов, История и современность информационного противоборства, Москва 2006, pp. 3-5.. It is then worth to mention a few chosen definition as examples. In the 90s of the last century one of the pioneer theoreticians of this form of conflicts, Col. Sergey Komov, defined information warfare as information counteracting as well as protection of your own sources with the use information according to a uniform plan aimed at winning and keeping advantage over your enemy. He claims that should be just one of many diverse actions taken against your enemy C. A. Комов, Информационная борьба в современной войне: вопросы теории, «Военная мысль» 1996, issue 3, pp. 76-80. Compare: idem, О концепции информационной безопасности страны, «Военная мысль» 1994, issue 4, pp. 16-17; idem, О способах и формах ведения информационной борьбы, «Военная мысль» 1997, issue 4, pp. 18-22. Anonymous officer of the Military Academy of the Russian Federation Armed Forces Headquarters, quoted by Timothy Loyd Thomas, comes up with a similar definition of information confrontation. In his opinion it is just one of many forms of resolving conflicts between the parties, whose goal is to win and keep information advantage over your opponent. This can be achieved by applying information-technical and information-psychological means, through affecting the decision-makers, command and control system, people and information sources of a given country ⁶⁸. The opinion of Vladimir Cymbal - an analyst in the Russian Ministry of Defence, who considers the definition of information warfare in both broad and narrow senses, is equally meaningful. In his opinion information warfare in the broad sense is a set of activities applied by one country against the citizens of another country or group of countries during peacetime. These activities concern the influence on the society's consciousness through education, art, culture, education system, administration etc., which should be carried out by civil special services - the Federal Security Service and the Foreign Intelligence Service. The latter one's main task should be getting control over the information sources of other countries, sabotage of information technologies development in the countries treated as hostile and neutralizing communication systems and information networks of the enemy. An important task of that service is also building and implementing the systems guaranteeing the information security of Russia. On the other hand, «information warfare» in the narrow sense means military activities aiming at getting information advantage over the enemy in the scope of information spreading, use and processing as well as implementing effective decisions allowing for getting advantage in the battlefield. The realization of this sphere of information warfare should be the responsibility of the Ministry of Defence and the armed forces T. L. Thomas, The Russian View of Information War, in: The Russian Armed Forces at Dawn of the Millennium 7-9 February 2000, M. H. Crutcher (ed.), Carlisle 2000, pp. 338, 342-343; S. Blank, Russian Information Warfare as Domestic Counterinsurgency, «American Foreign Policy Interests: The Journal of the National Committee on American Foreign Po- licy» 2013, issue 35, no. 1, p. 41; K. Giles, «Information Troops» - a Russian Cyber Command?, w: Third International Conference on Cyber Conflict, C. Czosseck, E. Tyugu, T. Wingfield (ed.), Tallinn 2011, pp. 45-60. It should be underlined that the first of the definitions given by V. Cymbal refers to the Russian concept of the «ideological sabotage» or «ideological rebel- lion». See: Контрразведывательный словарь, Москва 1972, pp. 90-91. A lot of information concerning the «ideological sabotage» was revealed by the KGB officer and correspondent of RIA Novosti Jurij Bezmienow, vel Thomas Schuman. In his opinion the «ideological sabotage», which he associated with psychological warfare, ideological aggression and propaganda warfare, is a long-term process (lasting for the last 15-25 years) divided into four stages: «De- moralization», «Destabilization», «Crisis» and «Normalization». The goal of that process is to subjugate a given country without the need for starting an open armed conflict. See: T. D. Schu- man (J. Bezmienov), Love Letter to America, Los Angeles 1984, pp. 17-46. Compare: idem, No «Novosti» is Good News, Los Angeles 1985; idem, World Thought Police, Los Angeles 1986. The definitions presented here imply that the Russian «information warfare» is a set of diverse, coordinated in time activities carried out by both military forces and civil special services in many areas in order to neutralize the enemy with the use of information-technological and information-psychological tools. An American Col. Timothy Loyd Thomas, dealing with the subject matter for two decades, has tried to classify those activities. Basing on an extensive material confronted with the statements (which he knew from his own experience) of representatives the Russian military environment, taking part in conferences in Washington and Moscow as long ago as in 1996, he created a precise structure of the Russian «in- formation warfare», radically different from the one promoted by the Russian military technologists. According to T. L. Thomas the Russian «information warfare» is characterized by a diversity of means and flexibility of activities in many distant spheres, which is valid even today. It takes the following elements:

• philosophical aspect of «information warfare»,

• information security as an aspect of national and global security,

• information sources as government potential,

• the definition of information warfare,

• computerization of armed conflicts:

- electronic tools of armed conflicts,

- automation of armed conflicts,

- application of robots in armed conflicts,

- intellectual tools of armed conflicts (intelligent weapon allowing for precise strikes),

• fight computerization (operation preparation),

• battlefield computerization (battlefield digitalization),

• information-psychological warfare:

- military-patriotic education of your homeland citizens,

- moral-psychological preparation of the military staff,

- psychological operations against civilians and military staff of the hostile country,

• information-technical warfare:

- applying communication and control systems in a confrontation,

- the role and place of intelligence in information warfare,

- the use of special programmes aiming at:

1) destroying information sources,

2) redistribution of information sources,

3) protection of information sources,

• preparation of the personnel meant to take part in information warfare,

• aspects of the international law concerning information warfare Source: T. L. Thomas, Russian Views on Information - Based Warfare, «Air and Space Power Journal» 1996, issue 115, p. 34. Compare: idem, Dialectical Versus Empirical Thinking: Ten Key Elements of the Russian Understanding of Information Operations, «Journal of Slavic Military Studies» 1998, issue 11, pp. 40-62; idem, Nation-state Cyber Strategies: Examples from China and Russia, in: Cyberpower and National Security, F. D. Kramer, S. H. Starr, L. K. Wentz (ed.), Washington 2009, pp. 465491..

It should be mentioned that in the beginning of the 90s of the last century a net structure consisting of civil special services (FAPSI, FSB, SWZ) and a part of the armed forces was created. It was responsible for information warfare and perfecting its methods, which include both psychological and technical elements For more see: T. L. Thomas, Russia's Information Warfare Structure: Understanding the Roles of the Security Council, FAPSI, the State Technical Commission and the Military, «European Security» 1998, issue 7, pp. 156-172.. They refer to the Russian pattern of the «ideological sabotage» and Evgeny Messner's concept of «rebel war». Thus it should be concluded that promoting the image of the Russian Federation as a victim of the aggression form the West and a country completely unprepared to face «information warfare» is just disinformation aiming at justifying the «war against «information warfare» carried out against Russia». The Russian concept of «information warfare» is evolving and is constantly adjusted to a current geopolitical situation T. L. Thomas, Russian Information It could be confirmed by deliberations of two distinguished theoreticians associated with the Centre of War-Strategic Studies of the Russian Federation Armed Forces Headquarters (Russian: Центр военно-стратегических исследований Генерального штаба Вооружённых Сил Российской Федерации): Col. Sergey Czekinov and (retired) Gen. Lt. Sergey Bogdanov Warfare Theory: The Consequences of August 2008, in: The Russian Military Today and Tomorrow. Essays in Memory of Marry Fitzgerald, S. J. Blank, R. Weitz (ed.) Carlisle 2010, pp. 265-301; P.A. Goble, Defining Victory and Defeat: The Information War Between Russia and Georgia, in: The Guns of August 2008: Russia' War in Georgia, S.E. Cornell, S. Frederick Starr (ed.), New York - London 2009, M. E. Sharpe, pp. 181-196.. They have applied the term «asymmetrical activities» (Russian: асимметричные действия) into the Russian grounds defining it as complex and systematic activities of political, diplomatic, economic, information and military character. They show that the information confrontation should play an important role in the process of a given country's management system and control disorganization. It should also influence public opinion, resulting e.g. in anti-government demonstrations and destabilization of a given country or other entity being the target of those operations, whose essence is to be the use of intellectual advantage. In that context operating with the systems of presenting the world, the people, the essence of civilisation and directions of its development as well as the most important values, should be recognized as the contemporary «information war- fare» (Russian: информационное оружие). Apart from the information- technical and informationpsychological factors, scientific- technical and political-psychological instruments should also be used. These technologies help to influence the subjects of «information warfare». The main goal of that type of war is to manipulate the consciousness of a society or a nation with false visions of the surrounding world and thus directing and stimulating their activities. The subject of information confrontation is then the system of traditional values, ideals and myths constituting the basis of a given nation's culture and its self-identification. The ultimate goal is making the victim to accept the aggression and treating the imposed way of thinking and actions as their own. That is why geopolitics is so important in case of «information warfare» since it provides scientific argumentation serving as a weapon I waging this type of war. On the other hand, the meaning of asymmetrical activities in the military sphere should be reaching the goal without an armed struggle. This is to be reached through intimidating the enemy and making him realize, by demonstrating the military readiness in a strategic territory or destroying his most dangerous entities, that a potential armed struggle is useless С. Г. Чекинов, C. A. Богданов, Асимметричные действия по обеспечению военной безопасности России, «Военная мысль» 2010, issue 3, pp. 13-22; T. L. Thomas, Russia's Information Warfare Strategy: Can the Nation Cope in Future Conflicts?» Journal of Slavic Military Studies» 2014, issue 27, pp. 105-106; Я. Д. Короход, Информационно-психологические войны - оружие ХХІ века, «Актуальні проблеми політики» 2013, issue 50, p. 302; C. H. Бухарин, B. B Цыганов, Ю. Г. Бочкарева, Провокации в информационном противоборстве, «Информационные войны» 2013, issue 1, pp. 14-21; В. В. Цыганов, В. В. Васин, С. Н. Бухарин, Интеллектуальные механизмы информационных войн, «Проблемы управления» 2007, issue 1, pp. 25-30; С. Н. Бухарин, Ю. А. Матвиенко, Информационнопсихологическая война как одна из форм разрешения социально-политических противоречий в современном обществе, «Информационные войны» 2008, issue 4, pp. 2-9.