As was mentioned, from a certain point, the expansion of South Korean soft power consisted in mediating attempts that would anticipate the dialogue with the North. Taking into consideration the possible escalation of the nuclear crisis, South may prevent the preemptive strike from American or Japanese sides. Since the US administration has a strong stance on North Korean nuclear issues, in Tokyo, some lawmakers are pushing the country to develop the capacity to preemptively strike North Korea and thus follow American suggestion. Ibid

Nevertheless, to keep amicable relations with the USA is a point to follow as well. South Korea still remains its strategic ally and a part of the hub and spoke system. However, to be political and economic partner and to share someone's political will is not the same. In that light, South Korea needs to define what policies it really pursues: either to be in partnership and support its patron in everything or to release its soft power tools and make others catch up with Korean point of view. Peculiarities of international system indicated that being enrolled into two policies simultaneously nowadays is practically impossible.

Nowadays, in East Asia booming processes of economic regionalism have become a worldwide phenomenon. Ahn C.Y., Baldwin R., Cheong I. East Asian Economic Regionalism: Feasibilities and Challenges. Springer US, 2005. P. 159. Since 1997-1998 Asian financial crisis, East Asian countries are opening their markets and institutionalizing economic integration. Whether East Asia can reach an East Asian FTA (EAFTA), which is the first step towards comprehensive institutional economic integration is a debatable issue.

Although economic integration is desirable economically, approach of South Korea differs from those of other East Asian economies and depends on the variety of conditions stipulated.

From the one hand, South Korea and its agile economy may benefit from comprehensive economic integration considering the fact that Korea is satisfied with the use of international trade standards suggested at integration platforms. From the other hand, there is a positon that prevails in South Korean government that the country benefits from bilateral agreements rather than from participation in multilateral projects on economic integration. Approach mentioned was suitable when Park's administration course was aimed at balancing strategy. South Korea was perceived as a mediator that combines the interests of major powers with national ones through entering into various bilateral deals. However, after some unpopular decisions, Park's political line failed and a power vacuum arose. Moreover, strained relations with China placed in doubt execution of China-South Korea Free FTA agreement as China put sanctions on the operations of South Korean companies. Under those conditions, South Korea cannot perform as a balancer but as a participant to multilateral agreements.

South Korean economy, though, is not the only factor when analyzing its developmental model. International audience recognized South Korean cultural aspect under a commonly used term “hallyu” which means “Korean cultural wave”. It was originated in 1999 by Beijing journalists who were surprised at the speed of the fast-growing popularity of Korean entertainment and culture. Cologne. Power of Culture - Hallyu, the Korean Wave. // Globeone. 2013. [Website]. URL: http://globe-one.com/power-of-culture-hallyu-the-korean-wave-4636/ (accessed date 07.05.2017) The “hallyu” includes K-pop, TV dramas, movies, and lifestyle along with South Korea's high technology and also means the growing aspiration to know more about Korean culture worldwide and especially in East and Southeast Asia.

Today, the popularity of Korean culture spreads fast and is mainly led by TV dramas and K-pop which are the main source of budget replenishment. According to the Korea Creative Contents Agency, the export of creative content industries in 2013 amounted to 4,923,100 million dollars. 2014 Korean Content Industry Statistics // Korea Creative Content Agency (KOCCA). 2014. [Website]. URL: https://www.google.ru/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=5&ved=0ahUKEwj7wZOk0t3TAhXCCJoKHaQRC88QFghDMAQ&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.kocca.kr%2Fcommon%2Fcmm%2Ffms%2FFileDown.do%3FatchFileId%3DFILE_000000000211919%26fileSn%3D1%26bbsId%3D&usg=AFQjCNG__gZuJ-ySOGtWXmlFPl_0VpeqFQ&cad=rjt (accessed date 07.05.2017) In a survey conducted by the Korean Chamber of Commerce & Industry, more than half of participating Korean corporations responded that “hallyu” enhanced the positive image of Korea and Korean products. Almost half of them mentioned “hallyu” actually increased the company sales especially in service industry including culture (86.7%), tourism (85.7%), retail (75%) and also in manufacturing industry including food (45.2%), electronics (43.3%), cosmetics (35.5%), and automotive (28.1%). Cologne. Power of Culture - Hallyu, the Korean Wave. // Globeone. 2013. [Website]. URL: http://globe-one.com/power-of-culture-hallyu-the-korean-wave-4636/ (accessed date 07.05.2017) It seems logical to assume that “hallyu” is a powerful South Korean tool used by chaebols and government to promote awareness about South Korean culture and to awake interest in the country.

Taking into consideration economic regionalism and cultural factor, we suppose that South Korea is culturally strong and despite some economic difficulties and Chinese sanctions, South Korean creative products will make their way on East Asian markets due to their high demand. As far as integration projects are concerned, new administration cannot pursue Asian and Pacific tracks simultaneously. Presidential administration may form a line indicating involvement in either Chinese- or American-led initiatives. At the moment, South Korean economy is not capable of setting world trends but it has the potential to choose whether to support them on the regional level.

3.2 Assessing South Korean policy towards East Asia: expectations, limitations, tasks ahead

During Park Geun-hye's presidency, South Korean government followed the policy “to satisfy everyone”. We should start from mentioning free trade deal with China in 2015 followed by doubts whether to join US-led Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP), the decision to enter it at the final round of negotiations and the agreement to deploy American missile system on South Korean territory. The outcomes of such policy echoed on the relations with its East Asia partners: China, Japan and North Korea.

Park was a moderate conservative whereas her opponents within the same political wing were in favor of more constructive stand. That is why she could not find any support from her party when she was executing large-scale political projects. There were not any clear positions on each of East Asian directions. Her policy toward North Korea shifted from the strong stance inherited from Lee Myung-bak to the beginning of negotiations and restoration of trust on the Korean peninsula. Asmolov K. Impichment Pak Kyn Khe: Prichiny i Posledstviya. [Park Geun-hye's Impeachment: Causes and Consequences] // Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC). 2016. [Website]. URL: http://russiancouncil.ru/analytics-and-comments/analytics/impichment-pak-kyn-khe-prichiny-i-posledstviya/ (accessed date 23.04.2017) Eurasian initiative was perceived as an attempt to extend relations with Beijing and Moscow at the same time. All those Park's unpopular decisions were made due to the lack of approval from her followers as well as lack of the unity within the Saenuri party that made impossible to conduct consistent foreign policy line. Conservatives have been predicting “DPRK's very end” for several years already, according to their actions and statements. Such a stance closed all possibilities for promoting dialogue and enhancing cooperation, caused a collapse in the regional security structure.

Following forth North Korean nuclear test at the beginning of 2016, Park's government closed the Kaesong inter-Korean industrial complex that laid the foundations of the “Sunshine Policy”, accusing the North of using South Korean cash from economic engagement projects to finance its weapons programs. The aim of South Korean government was to eliminate North Korea from the trade relations with third countries through banning the entry of foreign ships coming to South Korea via North Korea. Lee J. Why South Korea Should Reopen the Kaesong Industrial Complex // East Asia Forum. 2016. [Website]. URL: http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2016/03/15/why-south-korea-should-reopen-the-kaesong-industrial-complex/ (accessed date 21.04.2017) The closure of that complex became a way to make North Korea abandon its nuclear weapons program and to cancel any prospects for continued inter-Korean economic cooperation symbolized by the Kaesong Industrial Center. As we observe, it did not stop North Korea from developing further its nuclear program and conducting new nuclear tests. Such a radical approach turned out to be the least efficient way to promote security and peaceful coexistence on the Korean peninsula. The Industrial Complex located 10 kilometers north of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) and thus signified surviving initiative of economic cooperation between the North and the South, the only remaining `lifeline' connecting the divided nation. During the past two administrations even if there were political and military tensions between the two Koreas, it was operating and giving jobs to North Korean citizens and South Korean enterprises. It was an extension of South Korean influence that ensured two-way communication. Since the center was closed, the real link, combining the interests of both sides, seems to be broken. We cannot expect a change in North Korea's behavior especially if we are not giving it something in return. For that reason, we suppose that reopening of the Industrial Complex would be one step forward to the extension of South Korean soft power and one of the tasks ahead that would facilitate the comeback of North Korea to the negotiating table. As for limitations, there is a political vacuum in South Korea those days, attitude of presidential administration will be clarified after the elections. If Democrats win, the chances for the reopening will be higher as Moon Jae-in, the candidate, has said he would like to resume engagement with North Korea and would go to Pyongyang for talks with its leader. Fifield A. After Impeachment, South Korea may Reset Relations with China and North Korea // The Washington Post. 2017. [Website]. URL: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/afterimpeachment-south-korea-may-reset-relations-with-china-and-north-korea/2017/03/10/4e8af46e-050d-11e7-9d14-9724d48f5666_story.html?tid=a_inl&utm_term=.28a9325d4b2a (accessed date 21.04.2017)

However, the closure of the Kaesong Complex is not the only unpopular decision made by Park Geun-hye. The deployment of THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) on South Korean territory by the USA should be finished by the end of 2017, whereas the agreement itself was concluded in 2016. The criticism was pointed at two directions. First, political crisis and Park Geun-hye's impeachment ceased the execution of agreement which was protested inside the country, by half of South Korean population, and beyond its borders, by China whose aim was to cancel the realization of terms of agreement or, at least, to converse them according to Chinese interests. Harrison B. Mattis Pumps up THAAD, but China Likely to Keep `Bullying' Korea // The Diplomat. 2017. [Website]. URL: http://thediplomat.com/2017/02/mattis-pumps-up-thaad-but-china-likely-to-keep-bullying-korea/ (accessed date 20.04.2017)

Second, from the very beginning the agreement itself was hardly covering South Korean interests and protecting it from the Northern threat. Initially, the placement of the missile system was far away from the DMZ, thus it was not capable of protecting Seoul, the capital with the half of South Korean population. Kashin V. Rossiysko-Kitayskiy Otvet na THAAD. [Russian-Chinese Response to the THAAD Deployment] // Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC). 2017. [Website]. URL: http://russiancouncil.ru/analytics-and-comments/analytics/rossiysko-kitayskiy-otvet-na-thaad/ (accessed date 24.04.2017) What is more, according to the terms of the agreement on deployment, the THAAD system located on South Korean territory belongs to the USA. It means that in case of the armed conflicts between the USA and China, the complex will be put in place. Consequently, it goes against South Korean interests, because there is nothing in common between protecting the country from Pyongyang's actions and being involved in an armed conflict with China, the most influential state in the region and the most important economic partner of South Korea, according to statistics. South Korea Exports by Country // Trading Economics. 2017. [Website]. URL: http://www.Statisticseconomics.com/south-korea/exports-by-country (accessed date 24.04.2017)

The presence of THAAD in South Korea under mentioned conditions was widely criticized by the politicians, especially Democrats that obtain the highest chances to come to power after May elections. According to the presidential promises, Moon Jae-in has signaled an openness to reviewing the Park government's agreement to host the THAAD. However, that may be possible in the nearest future, what we have now is the political and economic pressure from China, a factor that could be a trigger for the reconsideration of the terms of this agreement.

Political angle means cooperation with Russia, Chinese strategic partner, in forming a military response to the THAAD deployment. In this vein, in 2016 Russia and China conducted joint exercises of ballistic missile defense forces as a computer simulation, and as was announced, those maneuvers were about to repeat in 2017. Kashin V. Op. cit. (accessed date 24.04.2017) It seems logical for them to promote cooperation on further expansion and development of ballistic missile defense forces thus forming a response to the potential threat coming from the THAAD. Those power transformations do not affect positively South Korea, which is being in the middle, in fact, is “removed” and cannot exercise any real influence in the major states “power game”.

What is more, from the economic perspective, Chinese pressure hits South Korea stronger and entails numerous economic sanctions on South Korean enterprises operating in China and exporting their products to Chinese markets. For South Korea, with its GDP generated by activities of transnational corporations, gained through the trade with China as a major partner, those sanctions tend to be the most powerful argument for reconsidering the terms of the THAAD placement.

Furthermore, there is one more player concerned with the Asia-Pacific power balance. Apart from China, Russian strategic nuclear potential is not directly suffering from the deployment of the THAAD in South Korea. Russian intercontinental ballistic missile and missile-firing submarine bases are located far away from the Korean peninsula. Ibid What Russia concerned the most is the approaching of American missiles system closer to its borders. That is why, Russia presents a united front with China and deepens cooperation with Beijing in military sphere. Russia considers to be a potential participant to trilateral economic initiatives and a part of the Eurasia project. There are several obvious advantages for South Korea to deal with Russian engagement. First of all, enhanced cooperation with the largest state in Eurasia could contribute to Russian involvement in logistics projects based on South Korean's agenda. Besides, Russia is not among the top trade partners with South Korea and, in terms of current Chinese restrictions, Korean products could be exported to huge Russian market. We should mention as well that Russia is a strategic partner to China so if there are some contradictions in Chinese-South Korean relations now, Russia may take on the role of mediator through organizing discussion platforms, expert meetings or round table discussions at the highest level or by efforts of Russian think tanks.

As far as limitations are concerned, some strategic projects initiated by South Korea were halted, for instance, trilateral logistics projects involving the North and Russia, due to unilateral sanctions introduced by Seoul to punish Pyongyang for the conduction of nuclear tests. The Korea Times editorial office. S. Korea Reaffirms Commitment to Eurasia Initiative // The Korea Times. 2016. [Website]. URL: http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2016/03/120_200085.html (accessed date 24.04.2017) That is why, there is a skepticism in the global community nowadays toward the ability of South Korea to create efficient multilateral platforms and to project its soft power on the dialogue partners.

Currently, relations between South Korea and China are in a diplomatic dilemma, there is no actual interaction with North Korea, existing projects with Russia were about to set back. Political line of Park's administration has led to the uncertainty around South Korea's future relations with its trade partners, neighbors and key players in East Asia. It seems logical to assume that new administration has to correct the country's external political course, to clarify its relations with East Asian countries and to elaborate more or less clear vision of South Korea in the regional structure of international affairs.

Besides challenges in Sino-Korean relations, ties with one more neighbor state, Japan, have further deteriorated under Park Geun-hye's presidentship. Although there was a slight progress when the “comfort women” deal was signed in 2015, the consequences of it remain controversial due to several reasons. First, the deal turned out to be unpopular and faced many negative responses from South Korean population and entailed demonstrations whereas some people have even called to reject Japanese compensation in the amount of 8.3 million dollars (1 billion yen). BBC News editorial office. Japan and South Korea Agree WW2 `Comfort Women' Deal // BBS News. 2015. [Website]. URL: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-35188135 (accessed date 29.04.2017) According to the deal, South Korean government should remove statues symbolizing “comfort women”, which activists erected outside the Japanese embassy in Seoul in 2011 but it has not been done yet. Second, Japan recalled its ambassador to South Korea, which indicates the poor state of bilateral relations. Lee B. South Korea's Dangerous Leadership Vacuum // The Diplomat. 2017. [Website]. URL: http://thediplomat.com/2017/02/south-koreas-dangerous-leadership-vacuum/ (accessed date 29.04.2017) Third, Park's administration was unable to implement the agreement due to the impeachment, which left the issue unsettled to the next president. Although by the end of Park's presidential term Korea-Japan arrangements have been strained, there is a chance to change the situation for the better as, according to the announcement of Japanese government, Japan's ambassador is coming back. Tomohiro O., Mizuho A. Japanese Ambassador to Return to South Korea // The Japan Times. 2017. [Website]. URL: http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/04/03/national/politics-diplomacy/recalled-comfort-women-row-japanese-ambassador-return-south-korea-tuesday/#.WQSJXfKmzow (accessed date 29.04.2017)

External policy of one more partner on bilateral agreements, ASEAN, remains complex. Some of them are part of US hub and spoke system, some of them join to China-led projects whereas others, like South Korea, tend to balance between Washington and Beijing. Advancement of bilateral cooperation happened at the summit in 2005 in Singapore when ASEAN-South Korea FTA issue was raised. It was in 2005 when dialogue partnership foundations were laid.

South Korean policy toward ASEAN is aimed at developing sustainable cooperation in order to assert itself on the Southeast Asian market and to become a logistic and transport center connecting Northeast and Southeast Asia. One important benchmark in the development of South Korea-ASEAN collaboration became the “new Asian initiative” proposed by President Lee Myung-bak in 2009. Proposals fixed at the “initiative” document support and strengthen bilateral relations which is of crucial importance to South Korea due to several reasons. For South Korea amicable relations with neighbor states permit to expand its developmental model beyond East Asia and facilitate the penetration of Korean goods and services on ASEAN market. At the same time, Korean corporations could benefit from entering into numerous business projects with local companies thus advancing Korean model of management and replace an established image of a mere borrower of Japanese technologies.

Currently, ASEAN tends to be second largest South Korea trade and investment partner after China. As of 2014, the total turnover became 4 times higher, in comparison with 1996, and amounted to 131,4 billion dollars. Celebrating 25 Years of Ties // Korea Magazine. 2015. Vol. 01. P. 34. For ASEAN states South Korea ranks fourth after China, Japan and the USA. Moreover, leaders of ASEAN member states and South Korean government speak in favor of advancing bilateral cooperation and increasing the amount of mutual investment.

There is a certain breakthrough in bilateral relations as economic integration between South Korea and ASEAN member states did not dominate Seoul's agenda and was perceived only as a tool for North Korea issue resolution and maintenance of peace on the Korean peninsula. However, nowadays South Korea realizes opportunities that it could take from Southeast Asia through free trade areas, enhanced exchange of goods, services and investment, culture, scientific and “green” technologies along with the coordination of labor force flows. Joint Statement of the ASEAN-Republic of Korea Commemorative Summit. Jeju Island, Republic of Korea, 2 June 2009. [Website]. URL: http://www.asean.org/archive/JS-AK-Commemorative-Summit.pdf , P. 5 (accessed date 07.05.17). As a result, the status of bilateral relations was raised from dialogue format up to strategic partnership in 2010 and was supported by ASEAN. Under such conditions, South Korea may export its economic developmental model to the ASEAN. On the one hand, South Korea may give ASEAN experience and technologies: in front of ASEAN states there would be an example of a country that jumped from the third world to the center of the world trade and economic processes. On the other hand, ASEAN may provide South Korea with the economic and political support in return: they are prospective markets for South Korean companies pushed off Chinese market and also they invite South Korea to participate in discussion forums organized by ASEAN such as ASEAN+3, East Asia Summit (EAS) and ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting (ADMM).

Opportunities that South Korea may grab in Southeast Asia abound, however, expanding its influence on other markets is troublesome without elaborating clear East Asian agenda. South Korean presidential administration is now facing challenges in its foreign policy agenda such as North Korean crisis and agreement on THAAD deployment which entailed tensions in Sino-Korean relations. Those factors undermined the ability of the country to project its influence on East Asian states and to export model of development. Nevertheless, political crisis in South Korea created the possibility to review its foreign policy and advance the components of the developmental state model that might be exported.

Dealing with North Korean crisis is possible when conducting some mediating attempts by South Korean government, i.e. setting minilateral formats of negotiation and inviting East Asian states concerned to negotiating table. If countries manage to sign a document that regulates maintenance of peace and security in the region then the mediator's rules of the game will be respected. The same goes for the THAAD deployment: if South Korean government is capable of balancing between satisfying Chinese requirements and commitments under an agreement with the USA and does not undermine the national interests, then Seoul may enhance its image of the developmental model exporter.

3.3 Emulating South Korean experience in East Asia: an assessment

The East Asian miracle or, in other words, eight high-performing economies of Northeast and Southeast Asia (HPAEs) achieved sustainable and export-led growth rates and rapid industrialization. Jomo K.S. Southeast Asian Paper Tigers? London and New York: Taylor & Francis Group, 2013. P. 257. First five HPAEs joined by other three Southeast Asian countries turned out to be successful examples for developing countries in terms of emulating their experience. South Korea found itself among the first five HPAEs, which indicated that the country's model of development proves to be prosperous and deserves to be exported to developing countries so that they follow South Korean way of modernization. We suppose that such a model might be efficient for those countries that are comparable with South Korea in terms of structural reforms, industrialization and growth rates. Such mechanism was confirmed by three Southeast states, Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia, that became other HPAEs. Though they followed Japanese ways of modernization, we can draw a parallel between the formation of three Southeast HPAEs and Korean developmental model as it was influenced by Japan in many aspects. Despite following virtually the same developmental path, the growth and industrialization rates of Southeast countries differed from those of Japan and South Korea. We suggest it happened due to several reasons. Southeast Asian HPAEs depended more on FDI and neglected domestic technological and industrial capabilities. Thus, they opened their markets for the FDI flows while South Korea protected national industries and referred to export-led growth. Southeast HPAEs later became less attractive for fur ther FDI as they did not invest that much into production processes and, as a result, sites that were more appealing became available. Despite the strong impact of foreign investment, in those three HPAEs the state positions are influential not only in economy but in social sphere as well. Public and private sectors are progressing and their relations sometimes take the form of competition.

However, the way in which modern market institutions are formed differs across Southeast Asia region. In countries like Vietnam, Laos and Myanmar the concept of a socialist modernization prevails. However, in practice socialist tradition is mixed with the capitalist way of modernization with a significant role of state adapted to the local realities. In those countries public sector is influential and private business is trying to flourish but the nature of such relations is drastically different from the one in HPAEs. In Myanmar, Vietnam and Laos, state and private business elites oppose each other and thus less efficient compared to the ones in Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand. Bulatov A.S. Mirovaya Economika i Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniya. [World Economy and International Relations]. 2nd ed. Moscow: Knorus. 2016. P. 563.

We observe that Southeast Asian states' achievements in socioeconomic field are not the same, nevertheless their primary goal tends to unite them. They strive to reach the level of development of the NIEs and especially Japan in the long term. In that case, South Korean model seems to be attractive for both HPAEs and other ASEAN countries lagging behind.

In Vietnam, modernization policy lies in building a market-oriented socialist economy. Such approach was adopted by the Communist Party of Vietnam Central Committee (CPVCC) in 1997 after planned economy course failed and led to the disastrous situation in Vietnamese economy. The initial objective though was not a transition to the market mechanisms and creation of a new economic system. Tselichtchev I., Debroux P. Asia's Turning Point: An Introduction to Asia's Dynamic Economies at the Dawn of the New Century. 2009. Singapore: John Wiley & Sons. P. 273. It lied in the fact of triggering technological change and industrialization growth. However, state directly controlled the activities of institutions and the majority of foreign economic operations until the end of 1990s. After that non-state and foreign-invested enterprises appeared and part of private sector increased. Despite the appearance of private business created by the workers of state enterprises, it has not been booming as South Korean corporations did. Vietnamese private sector is immature and entrepreneurs lack some experience whereas government often changes laws regulating the activities of businesspersons. The difference between Vietnamese and South Korean ways of development consists of the absence in successful examples of private business management. In South Korea as well as in other Southeast HPAEs those were Japanese companies that shaped the processes of South Korean management. Moreover, the aim of South Korean government was to modify its economic system and to open it not only to FDI flows but also to the export-led growth. Apart from this, Vietnamese authorities neglected technological and industrial capabilities and opposed private businesses rather than supported them. That is why, growth in non-state manufacturing was reached through the augmentation in the number of enterprises apart from South Korea where a few chaebols managed the country's domestic and foreign economic activities. Nevertheless, after ten years the reforms were announced, in 2007 Vietnam benefited from about 8 percent GDP growth and was put at the top of 20 emerging-market countries in terms of attractiveness for manufacturing investment. Ibid. P. 280.

Currently, Vietnam passes the process of industrial development and the transition to the first phase of the “knowledge based” economy and largely copies HPAEs developmental model. Mazyrin V. Economic Modernization in Vietnam: From Industrialization to Innovation Stage // Institute for Far Eastern Studies, Russian Academy of Science. Moscow. 2013. P. 88. South Korea is one of the major investors to Vietnam with the emphasis on heavy and chemical industries. Ibid. P. 89. Moreover, South Korean model of modernization appeals to Vietnam due to historic reasons, current economic situation and bilateral political relations. Thus, South Korea is able to create incentives for catching-up development and to influence growth rates in Vietnam through foreign trade and investment. Today, Vietnamese government realizes the need for collaboration with powerful East Asian corporations, in particular with South Korean ones as, currently, it is one of the ways to ensure economic competitiveness and modernization of Vietnam. Under those conditions, despite some time complexities such as tensed Sino-Korean relations followed THAAD deployment and Park's impeachment, Hanoi still regards Seoul as a model to emulate. The fact that bilateral trade and investment relations are progressing and new South Korean economic projects are launching in Vietnam tend to be a confirmation of the efficiency of South Korean developmental path.

South Korean interest in one more Southeast Asian country, Myanmar, is shaped around its economic assets. Economic presence in Naypyitaw is as important to Seoul as modernization to Myanmar which experienced political reforms and 2008 constitutional referendum followed by 2010 democratic elections. Myanmar perceives mutual cooperation as a way to elevate its economy and to finish the modernization with the transition to market operations. South Korea is among its top-donators with a total amount of 50 million dollars during 2013-2015 period and the sixth largest exporter to Myanmar with a trade turnover exceeding 850 million dollars in 2015. Fumagalli M. South Korea in Myanmar: Missing the Train to Naypyitaw? // The Diplomat. 2017. [Website]. URL: http://thediplomat.com/2017/03/south-korea-in-myanmar-missing-the-train-to-naypyitaw/ (accessed date 08.05.2017) However, there are other more influential states than South Korea compared to their assistance in Myanmar. The market of Myanmar is filled with various Western and Asian actors that seek to take the biggest equity in the country. In 2014, Myanmar's main import partners were China (42 percent), Thailand (20 percent), and Singapore (10 percent) while South Korea (3.8 percent) is clearly far behind. Ibid (accessed date 08.05.2017) After conducted reforms, political institutions of Myanmar are immature and, at present, it does not have the capacity to manage projects efficiently or even spend funds and remains one of the poorest states in Asia-Pacific. Myanmar welcomes further modernization and, like Vietnam, tries to emulate experience of NIEs. In fact, Myanmar may refer to South Korean model to firm the overall results of reforms and its transition to open market operations. Besides this, Myanmar may benefit from cooperation with South Korea in security sphere and, at the same time, through enhanced collaboration in experience-gaining programs. What is more, in political angle, South Korean experience of a country that made a transition from an authoritarian to a democratic state may be projected on Myanmar. Impeachment of Park Geun-hye confirms the theory as country managed to stage a silent coup and to dump the unwanted president.

Despite those factors, currently Chinese presence in Myanmar is more influential than South Korean which is confirmed by the statistics of mutual trade deals. Capacity-building programs initiated by China tend to compile better with Myanmar realities while South Korean balancing strategy does not suit Naypyitaw government political course. Seoul's relations with Naypyitaw show broader trends in South Korean foreign policy such as its ambitions and balancing strategy. At the same time, it also emphasizes the challenges of turning economic coordination into a strong political ties and therefore growing out of the role as an observer and a provider to one as a player, contributing to forming economic and political relations. Considering slight deterioration in China-South Korean relations and possible realization of the THAAD agreement conditions, Myanmar is more likely to support China and to follow its way of modernization.

Nevertheless, there is significant unfulfilled potential in an increasingly crowded space of Myanmar market where the number of foreign actors seeking to benefit from its opening is increasing steadily. With the political crisis -- and the vacuum of political leadership that accompanied it -- now finally over, the new South Korean administration will soon be confronted with a number of foreign policy priorities, including the articulation of a strategic vision for South Korea's role in its various neighborhoods, which were virtually ignored by the last administration and are now extremely pressing. Ibid (accessed date 08.05.2017) For now, South Korea opens new prospects of collaboration with Southeast Asia and thus cannot afford to miss the possibilities of spreading its vision of development.

South Korea's political crisis that is erupted recently coincided precisely with the growing threats from North Korea, deterioration of relationships with its regional partners, and an uncertain future with its allies. The situation on the Korean peninsula is escalating. While the nuclear potential of North Korea continues to grow and so does the threat in the form of a nuclear weapon that can be launched against the South or other East Asia states. The leadership vacuum in Seoul is making it more difficult for South Korea to coordinate and develop a coherent North Korea policy coordinating it with its regional partners. Regardless of whether the presidential administration in South Korea adopts a more hawkish or dovish approach to North Korea, THAAD deployment and its attitude toward external political agenda, policy coordination with regional partners is crucial for promotion of soft power tools. Lee B. South Korea's Dangerous Leadership Vacuum // The Diplomat. 2017. [Website]. URL: http://thediplomat.com/2017/02/south-koreas-dangerous-leadership-vacuum/ (accessed date 29.04.2017)

Conclusion

In the given thesis the notion of the “developmental state” was explored and analyzed through the thorough examination of the key assumptions made in publications of well-respected academics. It came to light that the developmental state concept is a highly debatable issue. However, the majority of academics estimated that the developmental state, in its nature, consists of two main components: ideology and structure. Ideology assumes state intervention in the economy to foster economic growth, higher rates of industrial and technological development and enhanced cooperation on the global scale. It is ideology that justifies the strong authoritarian state. The second component involves structure. It ensures the achievement of developmental goals and secures the government in case if market collapses. Those pillars, ideology and structure, combined support the implementation of such political stance which is directed at economic growth, rapid industrialization and technological advancement. The need to refer to East Asian, Japanese in particular, experience of modernization and economic progress classified East Asian economies as adhered to the developmental state paradigm.

As part of the study we evaluated the extent to which Japanese “flying geese” model influenced South Korean modernization processes. Strong and centralized development-oriented government which controls the strategic industries in the country was transferred from Japan to South Korea. Huge privately-owned groups in the forms of family holdings (keiretsu or zaibatsu in Japan and chaebols in South Korea) was delegated the responsibility to promote cooperation with foreign investors and thus enlarge their presence on foreign markets. The leading role of state in all spheres of economic activity in South Korea was also affected by North Korea which was an industrial center at that time. During the period of developmental reforms, South Korean leadership copied North Korean practices of mobilizing the capacity of huge plants to foster the industrialization. At the same time, significant contribution in terms of shaping effective economic and political systems was made by China. In that East Asian country the role of state was also definitive. The distinctive feature of Chinese model lied in the formation of Special Economic Zones with the aim to attract foreign capital.

South Korea implemented the major principles of foreign experience in building successful development-oriented state, however the adopted strategies were mixed with the rooted in the society Confucian values. As a result, the practical outcomes of the implementation of the developmental state differed from those in China, Japan and North Korea. The influence of chaebols extended so much that they transformed the state-business relations and began to influencing the governmental decisions. A practice that seems impossible in present-day China or North Korea. When South Korean government was executing modernization, it had a well-defined goal that is to open the country's economy and turn it into the market one. The more economy opened, the more obvious the transition from an authoritarian state to a democracy was observed.

In the present research after conducted analysis of relations between South Korea and East and Southeast Asian states, it was estimated that South Korea is now facing political and economic challenges in the relations with regional and non-regional actors. Those challenges might undermine the capacity of the country to export the developmental strategy to East and Southeast Asia. Despite the hardship in the bilateral aspect of Seoul's political agenda, the engagement into the dialogue on North Korean nuclear threat is possible. Under such conditions, the minilateral format of negotiations which should involve East Asian states concerned seems to be a promising dialogue platform. The case of Vietnam showed the appeal in South Korean experience that might be transferred to Vietnamese realities. The growing bilateral turnover of commodities, services and investment facilitates the adoption of South Korean modernization practices by the Vietnamese authorities. However, the example of Myanmar indicated that South Korean presence in the country is not influential enough to export its developmental potential.

The premises that have led to the current political deadlock of South Korea and the prospects of its resolution were properly examined. At the very beginning of Park Geun-hye's presidentship, South Korea slightly modified the stance of former administration, which was relatively pro-American. As China has become a crucial player in Asia-Pacific and in the whole world, there was a growing need for South Korea to perform as a balancer in the region combining American interests with the Chinese ones. There was a wide support that South Korea, with its economic capabilities, is able to strike a strategic balance between the two great powers of China and the USA. The issue of middle-power diplomacy was widely discussed during the election campaign and, especially, at the start of Park Geun-hye's presidential career. Sohn Y., Kang W. South Korea in 2012: An Election Year under Rebalancing Challenges // Asian Survey. 2013. Vol. 53. P. 199. What is more, in the middle of her presidency, in 2015, Park Geun-hye went further and strengthened the ties by entering into a South Korea-China free trade deal in June and by attending a September 3 military parade in Beijing. However, the eagerness to “satisfy everyone” in Park's middle-power diplomacy led to the decision of THAAD deployment, a decision that changed the image of the country in East Asia.

At the moment, countries find themselves in a diplomatic dilemma, an uncertain situation that no one knows to what result it could lead in the nearest future. Now China is dissatisfied with the THAAD being deployed on the Korean peninsula and is responding politically and economically.

If new South Korean administration does not change the attitude to its largest trading partner, China will probably stick to its stand, which may corner South Korea and undermine its regional middle-power diplomacy. Even if Moon Jae-in, is speaking about changes in approach towards China and North Korea, we do not suggest that there will be a dramatic change from the strained relations to the friendly atmosphere as newly elected South Korean government will not renounce its strategic partnership with the USA. Moreover, new president may face difficulties in ceasing the deployment of THAAD or returning to the “Sunshine Policy”. As far as THAAD is concerned, it was initially placed for protecting American forces on the Korean peninsula and, in case of backtracking it, South Korea may pay more costs for defensing US forces. Newly elected president, even one that is opposing THAAD deployment during the election campaign, will not seek any ways to worsen ties with the USA from the very beginning of presidential term in office. Nevertheless, one thing is clear is that the ongoing political vacuum in South Korea failed to influence North Korean agenda of the Trump's office. Newly elected American administration has already elaborated its own line on Pyongyang which includes bilateral coordination. As we observe, the role of SPT proved its inefficiency, minilateral formats took place instead. After electing the government and filling the vacuum, for South Korea is extremely important to be enrolled into those dialogue platforms. What is more, it is up to Seoul to take the responsibility to mediate talks and determine the participants, which, in our point of view, should be East Asia states concerned.

South Korea's relationship with Japan has experienced a slight deterioration. Deterioration happened due to the disregard of the “comfort women” contract conditions. The aggravation was slight because the comfort women issue remains a “hot button” in bilateral relations for many years. Nevertheless, Japanese ambassador returned to Seoul and for Japanese side it does not matter under which administration the provisions of the contract will be fulfilled. There is an opportunity to ease the strains in Japan-Korea relations and as Japanese Foreign Affairs Minister Fumio Kishida has said, Tokyo is prioritizing coordination with South Korea's next administration, especially in dealing with the developing North Korean threat. The Mainichi editorial office. Japan to Return Recalled Ambassador to S. Korea on Tues // The Mainichi. 2017. [Website]. URL: https://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20170403/p2g/00m/0dm/059000c (accessed date 29.04.2017) From the Minister's announcement, we may conclude that Japan is interested in participating in negotiating table on East Asia security issues and may be a potential participant of the minilateral format of talks. New president is responsible for reducing tensions in Korea-Japan relations, otherwise it will have a negative impact on coordination within hub and spoke system and, just as important, it will hinder the elaboration of a common approach toward North Korea and security direction in East Asia.

The next administration, which is about to come to power after May elections, should make a final decision about THAAD deployment. If government accepts it, it must be prepared to continued rocky relations with China, which is attracting more allies in its camp. Thus, China involved Russia in elaborating retaliatory measures against South Korea. In fact, Russia is concerned in enhancing coordination in the technological sphere with South Korea and it may be renewed in case if THAAD deal is canceled.

All in all, the objectives precised at the beginning of the thesis were thoroughly examined and fully accomplished. Thus the phenomenon of the developmental state was analyzed and its application toward East Asian economies is justifies and supported with the list of arguments. International experience of East Asian modernization was outlined which entailed the specification of its influence on South Korean way of development. It was estimated that Asian and Confucian in particular values contributed to South Korean modernization which affected the modern-day political, economic and cultural practices of the country. Under those conditions, it seems logical to draw a conclusion that during the period of modernization and the openness of its domestic market South Korea aimed its state policy at development and thus managed to achieve rapid industrialization and technological advancement. It allows us to say that this country is a canonic developmental state. Nowadays, however, the challenges in the external political agenda followed by policy of the toppled president, decreased South Korean capacities of exporting the model of developmental state and projecting its soft power tools on the regional scale. In keeping with these assumptions, the hypothesis formulated at the beginning was confirmed.

There are though several prospects of further studies on the given issue. In our opinion they imply strategic foreign policies for Seoul to choose after the elections. The first one includes rapprochement with Beijing while weakening its ties with the USA. Such a policy lies on a fact that China will maintain its presence in East Asia. However, China's economic growth is not that fast as it used to be at the outset of the 21^st century. China is advancing some initiatives, but it also has numerous internal problems to deal with, especially the economic gap between its provinces. In East Asia China is facing competition with other regional and non-regional players and it is not clear what will be China's role in the region. Besides, China does not share common liberal democratic values with South Korea and Beijing is highly unlikely to help Seoul in the case of a North Korean attack, or respect South Korean interests. Ibid Despite current crisis in Sino-South Korean relations, if new administration decides to follow Chinese line, it will strengthen its positions in East Asia and even in Southeast Asia due to the strong Chinese presence in there. What is more, South Korea is likely to get new supporters, those who are already emphasizing ties with China, such as Russia. Coordination with Moscow opens new Eurasian space for Seoul, the one Park's initiative was dedicated to. We can assume enhancing military and technological cooperation with Russia as well, considering the fact that both countries already have experience in trade in those spheres. All in all, benefits of choosing such strategy abound, but for South Korean government rejecting completely its connections with the USA and its allies seems inconceivable. Partnership with China cannot cover all the expenses of breaking US-Korean relations or in case of possible conflict between China and the USA.