Polish-Napoleonic soldiers towards Spanish ambushes laid in the Peninsular war (1808-1813) - history and selected reception threads

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University of Warsaw

Fons, sierra morena and others. Polish-napoleonic soldiers towards spanish ambushes laid in the peninsular war (1808-1813) - history and selected reception threads

Dominik Szczsny-Kostanecki

Ph.D. Student (History)

Warsaw, Poland

Abstract

The objective of this article is above all - on the example of two events involving Polish soldiers at Fons (May 1809) and in the Sierra Morena mountains (January 1810), howbeit not exclusively - to draw attention to the fact that when approaching the Peninsular War, the historian cannot underestimate the role of ambushes or minor skirmishes - contrary to the major open space battles (e.g. Arapiles 1812) or sieges (e.g. Saragossa 1808--09) being less scientifically accessible or intelligible due to the relative shortage of sources, which, combined with the usual lack of decisiveness, makes them an unrewarding object of examination. This underestimation lies primarily in the adoption of too broad or, paradoxically enough, too narrow a perspective - as if they could be a subject of detailed treatises only.

Meanwhile, as the record shows, these guerrilla-style ambushes are a phenomenon to be considered both in detail and in general, not only for understanding individual vicissitudes but also for better explaining Napoleon's ultimate defeat in Spain, which is too often attributed overwhelmingly to Wellington's military genius. They also played an important role in Polish memoirs and military theory, which is to be discussed in a separate section.

The choice of the above-mentioned ambushes is by no means random. First, mutually explaining and lightening each other up, Fons, Sierra Morena, and others occurred in a similar and representative period of time: neither when the Peninsular War was just developing, nor drawing to its end during and after the disastrous Russian campaign, but when it was in full swing. Secondly, despite what has been said about the majority of such clashes, and thanks to a number of sources, the historian is able to have a certain insight into those specific ambushes. Thirdly, we are about to see that their consequences cover nearly the maximum range of war occurrences that could be experienced by the Polish-Napoleonic soldiers. Fourthly, we shall learn that this type of guerilla warfare had a certain influence on the Polish national liberation movement.

Keywords: Peninsular War, guerrilla, ambushes, Polish troops, Fons, Sierra Morena, reception.

Анотація

Домінік Щенсни-Костанецкі,

аспірант,

Варшавський університет, Варшава, Польща

ФОНС, СЬЄРРА МОРЕНА ТА ІН. ПОЛЬСЬКІ СОЛДАТИ У ВІЙСЬКУ НАПОЛЕОНА ПРОТИ ІСПАНСЬКИХ ЗАСІДОК ПІД ЧАС ВІЙНИ НА ПІРЕНЕЙСЬКОМУ ПІВОСТРОВІ (1808-1813) - ІСТОРІЯ ТА ОКРЕМІ ТЕМИ РЕЦЕПЦІЇ

Метою цієї статті є передусім привернути увагу на прикладі двох подій за участю польських солдатів у Фонсі (травень 1809 р.) та на горах Сьєрра-Морена (січень 1810 р.), (але не лише) до того факту, що, розглядаючи тему Війна на Піренейському півострові, історик не може недооцінювати важливість засідок або незначних зіткнень - які, на відміну від відкритих битв (наприклад, під Арапіламі в 1812 році) або облоги (наприклад, Сарагоса 1808--1809), є менш науковими для сприйняття чи розуміння. У свою чергу, брак джерел у поєднанні з фактом, що вони не мали вирішального характеру, робить це невдячним предметом дослідження. Така недооцінка полягає насамперед у прийнятті надто широкої або, як це не парадоксально, надто вузької перспективи ніби вони можуть бути лише предметом детальних досліджень.

Тим часом докази свідчать про те, що ці партизанські засідки є феноменом, який необхідно досліджувати як детально, так і в цілому, не лише для розуміння окремих перипетій людських доль, але й для того, щоб краще пояснити остаточну поразку Наполеона в Іспанії, яку занадто часто і занадто багато приписують військовому генію Веллінгтона. Вони відіграли важливу роль у польській мемуаристиці та в військовій теорії, про що йтиметься в окремій частині.

Вибір вищезгаданих засідок аж ніяк не випадковий. По-перше, з'ясовуючи та висвітлюючи один одного, Фонс, Сьєрра-Морена та інші відбувалися в схожий і репрезентативний період часу: ані тоді, коли війна на Піренейському півострові лише починалася, ані коли вона наближалася до кінця під час та після катастрофічної експедиції до Москви, а саме в період її цілковитого розквіту. По-друге, незважаючи на те, що було написано про більшість цих зіткнень, і завдяки низці джерел, історик має можливість отримати уявлення про ці конкретні засідки. По-третє, ми побачимо, що їхні наслідки охоплюють майже весь спектр воєнних ситуацій, які могли статися із польськими солдатами у війську Наполеона. По-четверте, ми побачимо, що цей вид партизанської війни залишив відбиток на польському національно-визвольному русі.

Ключові слова: війна на Піренейському півострові, партизан, засідки, польські війська, Фонс, Сьєрра-Морена, рецепція.

Introduction

The victor of Napoleon in 1815, Arthur Wellesley, the future Duke of Wellington and - the commander of the British forces in the Spanish War (in this case, it is better to say: «Peninsular») over several years, in one of his letters expressed the following opinion: «The history of a battle is not unlike the history of a ball. Some individuals may recollect all the little events of which the great result is the battle won or lost, but no individual can recollect the order in which, or the exact moment at which, they occurred, which makes all the difference as to their value or importance» [16, p. 556]. He was making reference to the famous battle of Waterloo, in a broader sense - to all military clashes, but there is still more to it than that because his idea can be creatively developed.

For if, by this logic, a single battle is as difficult to describe as a ball, then a «typical» Napoleonic campaign before the tragic expedition to Russia w ill pose this many problems as a carnival, while the Spanish War of 1808-1813 - due to its length, area and the dispersion of the fighting troops would have to be compared to the whole life of the court, for example, Napoleon's brother Joseph in the days when he held the crown of the Catholic kings (one shouldn't go so far as to draw parallels with the imperial court). A task requiring almost Benedictine diligence, which for more than 200 years after the events in question was undertaken by a few: the British William Napier, Charles Oman; Spaniards - Jose Maria Queipo de Llano Ruiz de Saravia, Count of Toreno, a little later Jose Gomez de Arteche y Moro; from the French - Dominique Balagny (in part), Alphonse Grasset; In Poland, the subject has not been satisfactorily implemented by anyone, Walery Przyborowski and Krzysztof Mazowski have attempted to tackle it with moderate success. The most comprehensive publication in the Polish language was written in the 1980s by Stanislaw Krikor - but it refers to the Spanish trail of a single (albeit numerous) Polish detachment, i.e. the Vistula Legion, which did, after all, have the merit of giving space to those less-known ambushes and skirmishes in which the Legion was involved.

Arguably, however, the book that has produced the greatest amount of synthesized knowledge about the problem from which this text is a direct derivative relatively recently is Charles J. Esdaile's «Fighting Napoleon: Guerrillas, Bandits, and Adventurers in Spain, 1808-1814», published 19 years ago. The great merit of this author is that he convincingly and permanently changed the paradigm of thinking about the Spanish partisans, inherited from its romantic legend, cherished, as it is easy to guess, by the Spaniards themselves. The works on the Spanish War are different before and after 2002. «Pro Deo, Rege et Patria»? Only to a limited extent. One of the most important sentences of this publication is: «At the roots of the la guerilla popular lay not heroism but hunger, not daring but despair» [ 11, p. 120]. If we add that attempts to organize the guerrillas from the top came to nothing, the troops were the most numerous where the authorities had been unable to deal with the bandits for centuries, and the Spaniards themselves fell victim to the attacks of the «heroes of freedom», we will get an image of a powerful force - that's a fact - but at the service of chaos.

Moving on to the opposite party, Napoleon's Spanish war - and thus the guerilla warfare - became the experience of a great deal of Poles, in such a density - much more than ever before. Among them, to mention the commander of the Vistula Legion, Jozef Chlopicki, born in the Vinnytsia region [2, p. 3] or Wincenty Krasinski originating from Boremel were those who came from Ukraine. An outstanding expert on the Napoleonic era in Poland, prof. Jaroslaw Czubaty estimates the Polish military effort, including the conflict, at 24,000 [9, s. 193], of which, as I was able to determine, 975 (+/-50) officers. As a rule, these soldiers came from 3 units: 1) the Guards cavalry regiment, 2) the Vistula Legion mentioned above, consisting of 3, later 4 infantry regiments and a cavalry regiment, 3) the so-called «Division of the Duchy of Warsaw», which constituted a selection of the best infantry regiments of the Polish, not fully independent state created by Napoleon in July 1807.

The ambushes set up in the Peninsula against Polish troops - perceived by Spaniards in the first place as Napoleon's servants or mercenaries - if successful, could result not only in death or injury but also in something which remains largely unknown, that is to say in Spanish captivity, whose terms remain one of the most embarrassing aspects of the conflict - both for the victims and perpetrators - which poses additional difficulties for the researcher.

An ambush - that is to say: what?

The use of the term «ambush», (French embuscade f., Spanish emboscada f., Polish zasadzka f.) - although the word sounds as if taken from an adventure book - is not a symptom of clumsy vocabulary. On the contrary, it appears in reliable scientific works. Alian Pigeard, the creator of the Dictionary of the «Dictionnaire de la Grande Armee» (2006) defines ambush as «Faction menee par un detachement qui, cache par un accident de terrain, emploie differentes ruses pour attirer l'ennemi dans son piege: il profite des avantages de sa position et de la surprise»1 [18, p. 237]. The surprise factor, let us be precise, doesn't have to consist in a sudden appearance of the belligerent but also in maneuvering the opponent into a trap - a no-win situation. In other words, the «trap» component is predominant here. We shall come across the latter possibility while examining the ambush laid at Fons.

It seems that in European languages, at least those whose speakers were present at the battle, an ambush is a neutral term. The word is used by both sides of the historical dispute. Let us compare two passages: «Aprovechando las ventajas ofrecidas por la topografia del pais, los guerilleros se convertiron en maestros de las emboscadas» “An action carried out by a detachment which, hidden by an uneven terrain, employs various tricks to lure the enemy into its trap: it [detachment] benefits from its position and the surprise” [trans. DSK]. “Taking advantage of the benefits offered by the country's topography, the guerrilla fighters became master of ambushes” [trans. idem]. [5, p. 258] and: «Mais la <<specialite>> de Mina [Francisco Espoz y Mina - one of the most famous guerrilleros], ce sont les embuscades et son lieu de predilection est Salinas» “But Mina's «speciality» are ambushes and his predilection is Salinas” [trans. idem]. [7, p. 182], the latter having been written by an author who, for instance, draws the reader's attention to the fact that guerrilla units were often composed of deserters [7, p. 178]. The term doesn't incommode anyone.

Fons - the first [captivity] disaster «L'Espagne et l'Angleterre detiennent la palme de l'ignomini e pour le traitement inflige aux prisonniers» “Spain and England hold the palm of shame for the treatment inflicted on the prisoners” [trans. idem].. [10, p.381]

The battle of Fons (Fonz), known in Spanish historiography as the battle of Cinca - derived from the name of a river in the Huesca province - fought in the second decade of May 1809, brought the Poles their first serious military defeat as a result of an ambush. The bitterness of defeat was complemented by the fact that it was sometimes connected with many months of captivity.

As we have mentioned, the issue of Polish officers taken prisoner during the Spanish Civil War is largely unknown. There are certain works - these are mainly reports of French officers such as R. M. Pillet or Louis-Fran5ois Gille [13, s. 16] during the stay in England - from which one can extrapolate on the fate of the Poles. The only monograph known to us is that of Stanislaw Kirkor «Polacy w niewoli angielskiej 1803-1814». The work is classified according to the regions from which the captive Poles came: Santo Domingo, Calabria etc. The Spanish case constitutes naturally the longest chapter, especially since the British captivity is inextricably linked to the Spanish captivity, due to the collaboration between the respective Juntas and the Transport Office. The list of Polish officers who pass through English prisons is absolutely priceless, but unfortunately not always possible to find because the names which are listed in the archives of London's Public Record Office are often so distorted that they cannot be associated with anyone - which by the way, should be signalized as a research postulate.

It seems that the fate of Poles captured on the Iberian Peninsula follows two scenarios. According to the first, the officers are taken prisoner directly by the Spaniards. This is how events unfolded at Fons in Aragon on May 20, 1809 [6, s. 35]. After the capitulation of Zaragoza in February 1809, the French army - the 3rd and 5th corps - practically occupied the whole province of Aragon. But the Spaniards did not lower their arms - the uprising took over in Catalonia. To envisage peace, the French had to seize Monzon, an important fortress on the right bank of the Cinca river. The Brigadier General Pierre Habert sent two companies of the 2nd Vistula Regiment there under the command of Captain Jozef Solnicki [1, s. 213 - 238]. The garrison resisted well but when the Spanish general Perena returned with a large detachment, Solnicki made the decision to evacuate this place. The two companies successfully crossed the river but general Junot ordered Monzon to be recaptured. As Monzon was in Spanish hands, Habert decided to march south, cross the Cinca out of sight of the Spanish, and attack them by marching north. war partisan liberation

But after torrential rains from the Pyrenees, the waters were abundant and murky. On May 16, two of the Polish voltigeur companies of the 2nd regiment managed to get to the right bank at the height of the Pomar village, followed by soldiers of the 14th and 116th line regiments, 8 companies and 50 cuirassiers [1, s. 213-238].

The state of the river made it impossible to cross. Thus, 1,000 men were abandoned on the right bank, but that was not yet the worst. This collection of different detachments marched according to orders on Monzon to join the rest of the army. But the waters are still turbulent. On May 20, the soldiers, exhausted and frustrated by the impossibility of crossing to the «French» bank, were taken prisoner by the partisan troops of Don Bajet. The situation became very pessimistic. According to Krikor [13, s. 153-157; 12, s. 85], 134 soldiers, non-commissioned officers as well six Polish officers were captured: second lieutenant Mikolaj Dobrzycki, second lieutenant Seweryn Grabinski, captain Ferdynand Laszewski, captain Andrzej Radkiewicz, lieutenant Ignacy Regulski lieutenant and lieutenant Jakub Sosnicki. They were sent to the Isle of Cabrera in the Balearic Islands. Cabrera means «goat» in the Spanish language. But the name, suggesting abundance in meat, would turn out to be a cruel joke... as, apart from naked rocks, there was hardly anything:

«It [the Cabrera island] is covered with mountains, rocks and precipices, which is why it is hardly inhabited. Next to a small bay to the north, there stands an old tower without any village[...] The number of men decreases or increases because these poor people must die there, or, at worst, let themselves be recruited by the English[...] From the Spanish government, these people had a fixed pay, but they receive none, and miserable food which consists of stockfish, broad bean, and a ration of bread is served to them. Every three days they are led like cattle to the water points to quench their thirst[.] These poor people sell their last clothes to the sailors, who come from Mallorca. Having been stripped of their clothes, they almost all walk around naked». [8, s. 118 - 119].

The passage of Sierra Morena

Thanks to the works of three soldiers-memoirists Stanislaw Broekere, Jozef Brandt (both of German origin) and Kajetan Woyciechowski the best known ambushes are those set by the Spaniards at Jovenes and Fons in 1809. We have just discussed the latter. As for the first, out of regard for its spectacular character, it has been well covered in the Polish historiography, so there is no need to repeat the story in detail. However, the ambush set up on March 24 at Jovenes against the Vistula lancers is a point of departure for reflection on the ambushes that did not end in victory for the attacking part. The Spaniards suffered a complete defeat on the occasion of the passage of General Sebastiani's 4th corps through the Sierra Morena range in January 1810. This maneuver was a logical consequence of the battle of Ocana which took place 2 months earlier, even if Napoleon instead of making peace with Andalusia opts for a march on Portugal. A formidable military group commanded by Soult marches south.

Schematic view of the passage through the Sierra Morena range. In January 1810 the chief of staff of the Napoleonic army in Spain, Jean-de-Dieu Soult takes the western route while Sebastiani with the Poles take the eastern one.

The main idea of the Spanish general in charge Castejon (Castichon) was to block the two defiles that cut the mountains with cannon batteries [12, s. 261]. This didn't work out for two reasons. First, because the left flank was manned by a «demoralized Spanish troop» [12, s. 259]. But the 4th Corps attack in the vicinity of Villa Manrique was so fierce that «In addition to 10 guns and several vans, we took an enemy general and 3,000 men prisoner. The next day we continued our march» [6, s. 56].

The number of guns is not determined exactly. The author of the service record of chef d'escadron Telesfor Kostanecki (1772-1813) who commanded the regiment mentions eight guns [4]: Woyciechowski does not mention it - nor Soult. All four nevertheless agree that the spear regiment is in the lead. Yet we do not believe in the number of prisoners taken by the regiment, given by Broekere (3000) nor by the state of service described by the conseil d'aministration - Rybaftowski, Huppe and alii (3,500). If a regiment whose strength is not complete captures 2000 people it is because they latter are asleep! But it is assumed that anyway the Polish officers behaved exemplarily in this matter and were distinguished by their bravery. The lancer officer-diarist (of limited credibility here) wrote the following:

«One road carved in the rock, but by the hand of nature, between two walls reaching the tops of the clouds, from the province of Mancia [Castilla - La Mancha - DSK] led to Andalusia, rightly called an earthly paradise. This road, fortified in places and with a drawbridge, was impassable. [...] Without being on this expedition, I cannot describe it; but my friends assured me that they rode horses in hand under grapeshot fire, and, forming themselves for battle, conquered sky-high rocks. The history of our regiment remained silent about this deed» [22, s. 251-252].

But despite these complaints the effort of the Polish soldier, as it were, did not go unnoticed: on May 29, 1810, the Emperor awarded 11 chevalier crosses of the Legion of Honor to Poles both for the passage of Sierra Morena and the prior battle of Ocana in November 1809. We can assume that at least three were awarded for the first exploit, namely to: Kazimierz Dziurkiewicz (lieutenant), Jozef Janiszewski (second lieutenant) and a certain non-commissioned officer Scholtz [15, s. 40, 46, 72; 3, p. 6-9].

(Creative) reception

Ambushes set by the Spaniards on Poles echoed in the native memoir literature, experiencing in the 19th century its «golden age». We have already come across a few names: Woyciechowski, Brandt or Broekere, because they perform not only the function of a «patient», but also a «co-doctor» - without them our knowledge of the described events would be significantly poorer. The three memoirists mentioned here served during Napoleon's Spanish War in the Vistula Legion (infantry and cavalry) and in the so-called Division of the Duchy of Warsaw, sometimes called the «Polish Division», composed of three infantry regiments.

However, if Polish historical memory has preserved the name of any native branch, it is the cavalry regiment of Emperor Napoleon's Guard. First, because on November 30, 1808, a subunit of that regiment - somewhere between a company and a squadron in size - did the seemingly impossible: in a mountain isthmus they forced through 4 batteries of Spanish cannons, defended by several thousand soldiers under the command of a certain Benito San Juan. Moreover, they did it in front of Napoleon, ensuring his immortality not only in Poland but also in France and Great Britain.

Thus, the regiment of light cavalry of the Napoleonic Guard cannot be omitted from these considerations, the more so that it too fell victim to the Spanish guerrillas. Jozef Zaluski, later the general of the November Uprising (1830-1831), then a lower- ranking officer called the “chronicler of the regiment”, published his memoirs nearly 50 years after the described events, but his notes are highly regarded by historians as probably the most reliable of all concerning the Spanish war [17, s. 93].

At the turn of 1808-1809, Zaluski witnessed an event that surpassed the ambushes at Fons, Sierra Morena or Jovenes in cruelty and deceit. It must be invoked here not so much to complete the testimonies from all the units as to show that the norms of warfare of the time - despite all that were characteristic of the above- mentioned attacks - were brutally violated. It was not without reason that an eminent French historian called then Spain a «wasp nest» [21, p. 335].

«Regimental adjutant Bogucki [Piotr] was sent with the quartermasters of ei ght companies to prepare quarters in Laguna. Having sent out the quartermasters, he himself stayed a while in Valladolid to shave his beard after so many days of hardship and bad weather. Having left the city, [...] it occurred to him to ask two Spanish peasants riding donkeys for directions. The peasant pretended not to hear. Bogucki, himself tall and riding on a large horse, leaned towards the Spaniard, and then the latter stabbed him in the side with a knife, another peasant caught up with him from the right side and began to throw him off his horse. In a word, these two Spanish peasants murdered a worthy officer who did not expect such a betrayal» [23, s. 147].

What do the above-mentioned diaries - and the vast majority of the others - have in common? First of all, the fact that their authors in the «Spanish» times were low-level officers and even non-commissioned officers - which on the one hand meant that they did not have the appropriate intellectual tools to understand the actions of both warring parties at the strategic or even only operational level. On the other hand, thanks to this somewhat «frog» perspective, they were receptive to everyday events - both Zaluski's words and the quotations above illustrate this fact well.

Meanwhile, there is one more branch of the reception of Spanish ambushes, or more broadly, methods of fighting. Reception, so to speak, creative. The Polish national liberation movement in the 19th century reached for these Spanish models. However, not, as one might suppose, in the November Uprising, in which many former Napoleonic soldiers fought. The war against Russia in 1830-1 was of a regular nature. But the closer it got to the end, the more desperate ideas of how to continue the fight became. For example, the Warsaw press on the eve of the decisive Russian attack on the capital (from the west) made allusions that the city should defend itself as fiercely and persistently - and thus also using the most insidious methods - as the heroic Zaragoza once did [20, s. 218].

It was only the defeat of the November Uprising, emigration, the need to understand the causes of the defeat and the need to develop methods of fighting for the future that made guerrilla warfare return, or rather: for the first time be treated seriously - in the circle of noble democrats. Visions of fighting on the basis of multimillion masses of people armed at the beginning with any tools: a scythe, a stick and even boiling water - which brought the victory over Napoleon in Spain - were spun among such military theoreticians as Jozef Bem, Karol Stoltzman, Ludwik Mieroslawski or Henryk Michal Kamienski, by the way, son of the commander of one of the squadrons of the cavalry regiment [14, s. 259-269]. For example, Karol Stolzman saw the future Polish uprising as the next stage on the path followed in the past by, inter alia, the Albanians under Scanderberg, the Dutch against Philip II, the Swiss in the thirteenth century, and finally the Spaniards, winning «over the genius and forces of Napoleon» [19, s. 11-12].

Attempts to move the masses of the people, to attract them to the cause of the uprising, were made in 1846 (the failed Krakow Uprising led by Edward Dembowski), during the Spring of Nations and finally - in the January Uprising. In Ukraine, noble democrats - including a group of students of the University of Kyiv led by Antoni Yuryevich went to the people, spreading the so-called Zlota Hramota, a document written in gold letters, in Polish and Ruthenian, which contained a fundamental decision of the insurgent government - to immediately grant land to the peasants. Of course, all the above-mentioned spurts failed. But also - although the support of this thesis requires further research - they all drew on the tactical level also from guerrilla warfare, from ambushes and skirmishes waged by Spanish guerrillas.

Comparison & conclusions

The first conclusion, which is basically self-evident: depending on how the ambush turned out, i.e. whether the Spaniards managed to carry it out or were themselves beaten on this occasion, the soldier in question was to - and this is the largest spectrum of described events - end up at an island where conditions were an affront to human dignity and the very presence wherein exhausts the definition of torture or, quite on the contrary, receive a Cross of the Legion of Honour, accompanying emoluments, prestige, as well a possible promotion.

Secondly, it is very clear that in the case of ambushes - it is the nature of the ambush as well as the response to it - common sense defies a simple numerical listing of the fighting troops. At Fons, the Spaniards managed to «snatch» a group of prisoners, while at Sierra Morena - in this case, we are not sure of the number of attackers, however, it couldn't have been inferior to 3,500 [4, no pagination], but we know that they had the advantage of surprise - the operation failed, despite their knowing the terrain.

Thirdly, it must be stated, although it goes somewhat beyond the framework of this paper that part from the ambushes whose outcome was unambiguous it also came to pass that the result should be classified as partial success for both parties. The skirmish at Jovenes on March 24, 1809, is a good example here. The Vistula lancers escaped an ambush set up in the mountains by 3,000 Spanish carabineros reales but due to the turmoil the regiment lost a van carrying the regimental flags, which according to the legend, were embroidered by Empress Josephine manu sua [22, s. 48].

Fourthly, it is worth pointing out that even unsuccessful, from the Spanish perspective, or semi-successful ambushes contributed to the final victory in 1813 which was the expulsion of Napoleonic troops from the Peninsula. According to the old Latin proverb «gutta cavat lapidem non vi, sed saepe cadendo», virtually every action undertaken by the guerilla fighters, caused some depletion of the invading armies. Their possibilities of replenishment were moderate and got moderated all the more as Napoleon was wearing out his soldiers, especially after having embarked on the catastrophic war against Russia. At the same time, taken into consideration, the mass resistance (including women and clergymen) the Spanish-Portuguese human resources were almost inexhaustible.

Last but not least, we could see that the Spanish ambushes, or more broadly: the partisan method of warfare, did not go unnoticed among Poles. They wrote about them in their memoirs - we have not met one where there was no mention of them. For posterity? To soothe the soul? For moral satisfaction? Probably a bit of everything. At the same time, we see that the techniques used in the so-called «little war» fertilized the imagination of noble democrats who wanted to make the national liberation movement truly massive. Intellectually, they could draw from many sources - even from Skanderberg. However, over 20,000 Poles have recently seen guerilla warfare nowhere else but in Spain.

List of sources and literature

1. Archiwum Chlopickiego w Krakowie (A Chi), sygn. A Chi 8.

2. Archives Nationales (AN), fond Legion d'Honneur. Dossiers personnels, cote AN LH/529/67.

3. AN, fond Legion d'Honneur. Annuaire des decores 1803-1815, cote AN LH.

4. Service Historique de l'Armee de Terre (SHAT), dossier personnel 2YE 2131.

5. Alonso M.M. Napoleon. La aventura de Espana / M.M. Alonso. - Madrid: Silex ediciones, 2004. - 320 p.

6. Brandt H. Moja sluzba w Legii Nadwislanskiej / H. Brandt. - Gdynia: Armagedon, 2002. 276 s.

7. Bregeon J.-N. Napoleon et la guerre d'Espagne 1808-1814 / J.-N. Bregeon. - Paris: Perrin, 2006. - 356 p.

8. Broekere S. Pami^tniki z wojny hiszpanskiej 1808-1814 / S. Broekere. - Gdynia: Armagedon, 2004. - 284 s.

9. Czubaty J. Ksi^stwo Warszawskie (1807-1815) / J. Czubaty. - Warszawa: WUW, 2011. 597 s.

10. Damamme J.-C. Les soldats de la Grande Armee / J.-C. Damamme. - Paris: Perrin, 2002. 381 p.

11. Esdaile C.J. Fighting Napoleon: Guerillas, Bandits and Adventurers in Spain, 1808-1814 / C.J. Esdaile. - London: Yale University Press, 2004. - 260 p.

12. Kirkor S. Legia Nadwislanska 1808-1814 / S. Kirkor. - Londyn: Oficyna Poetow i Malarzy, 1981. - 621 s.

13. Kirkor S. Polacy w niewoli angielskiej w latach 1803-1814 / S. Kirkor. - Krakow: Wydawnictwo Literackie, 1981. - 235 s.

14. Kozlowski E. Historia Or^za Polskiego 1795-1939 / E. Kozlowski, M. Wrzosek. - Warszawa: Wiedza Powszechna, 1984. - 777 s.

15. Loza S. Legja Honorowa w Polsce 1803-1923 / S. Loza. - Zamosc: Zygmunt Pomaranski i Spolka, 1923. - 90 s.

16. Maccaulay T. The History of England from the Ascension of James The Second / T. Maccaulay. - New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1879.

17. Morawski R. Wojsko polskie w sluzbie Napoleona. Gwardia: Szwolezerowie, Tatarzy, Eklererzy, Grenadierzy / R. Morawski, A. Nieuwazny. - Warszawa: Karabela, 2008. - 360 s.

18. Pigeard A. Dictionnaire de la Grande Armee / A. Pigeard. - Paris: Tallandier, 2002. - 814 p.

19. Stolzman K. Partyzantka, czyli wojna dla ludow powstaj^cych najwlasciwsza / K. Stoltzman. - Paryz-Lipsk: Brockhaus i Avenarius, 1844. - 239 s.

20. Szcz^sny-Kostanecki D. «Polakowi przystalo: uderzyl i przemogl» - recepcja szarzy pod Somosierr^ w kulturze polskiej i polskim zyciu publicznym w latach 1808-1831 / D. Szcz^sny- Kostanecki // Studia z dziejow polskiej historiografii wojskowej. - 2018. - T. 19. - S. 187-224.

21. Tulard J. Napoleon ou le mythe du saveur / J. Tular. - Paris: Fayard, 1987. - 512 p.

22. Woyciechowski K. Pami^tniki moje w Hiszpanii / K. Woyciechowski. - Warszawa: PAX, 1978. - 104 s.

23. Zaluski J. Wspomnienia / J. Zaluski. - Krakow: Wydawnictwo Literackie, 1976. - 429 s.

References

1. Archiwum Chlopickiego w Krakowie (A Chl), sygn. A Chl 8 [in Polish].

2. Archives Nationales (AN), fond Legion d'Honneur. Dossiers personnels, cote AN LH/529/67 [in French].

3. AN, fond Legion d'Honneur. Annuaire des decores 1803-1815, cote AN LH [in French].

4. Service Historique de l'Armee de Terre [SHAT], dossier personnel 2YE 2131 [in French].

5. Alonso, M.M. (2004). Napoledn. La aventura de Espana. Madrid: Silex ediciones [in Spanish].

6. Brandt, H. (2002). Moja stuzba w Legii Nadwislanskiej. Gdynia: Armagedon [in Polish].

7. Bregeon, J.-N. (2006). Napoleon et la guerre dEspagne 1808-1814. Paris: Perrin [in French].

8. Broekere, S. (2004). Pami^tniki z wojny hiszpanskiej 1808-1814. Gdynia: Armagedon [in Polish].

9. Czubaty, J. (2011). Ksi^stwo Warszawskie (1807-1815). Warszawa: Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego [in Polish].

10. Damamme, J.-C. (2002). Les soldats de la Grande Armee, Paris: Perrin [in French].

11. Esdaile, C.J. (2004). Fighting Napoleon: Guerillas, Bandits and Adventurers in Spain, 1808-1814. London: Yale University Press [in English].

12. Kirkor, S. (1981). Legia Nadwislanska 1808-1814. Londyn: Oficyna Poetow i Malarzy [in Polish].

13. Kirkor, S. (1981). Polacy w niewoli angielskiej w latach 1803-1814. Krakow: Wydawnictwo Literackie [in Polish].

14. Kozlowski, E., & Wrzosek, M. (1984). Historia Orqza Polskiego 1795-1939. Warszawa: Wiedza Powszechna [in Polish].

15. Loza, S. (1923). Legja Honorowa w Polsce 1803-1923. Zamosc: Zygmunt Pomaranski i Spolka [in Polish].

16. Macaulay, T. (1879). The History of England from the Ascension of James The Second. New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers [in English].

17. Morawski, R., & Nieuwazny, A. (2008). Wojskopolskie w stuzbie Napoleona. Gwardia: Szwolezerowie, Tatarzy, Eklererzy, Grenadierzy. Warszawa: Karabela [in Polish].

18. Pigeard, A. (2002). Dictionnaire de la Grande Armee. Paris: Tallandier [in French].

19. Stolzman, K. (1844). Partyzantka, czyli wojna dla ludow powstajqcych najwtasciwsza. Paryz-Lipsk: Brockhaus i Avenarius [in Polish].

20. Szcz^sny-Kostanecki, D. (2018). «Polakowi przystalo: uderzyl i przemogl» - recepcja szarzy pod Somosierr^ w kulturze polskiej i polskim zyciu publicznym w latach 1808-1831. Studia z dziejow polskiej historiografii wojskowej, 19, 187-224 [in Polish].

21. Tulard, J. (1987). Napoleon ou le mythe du saveur. Paris: Fayard [in French].

22. Woyciechowski, K. (1978). Pami^tniki moje w Hiszpanii. Warszawa: PAX [in Polish].

23. Zaluski, J. (1976). Wspomnienia. Krakow: Wydawnictwo Literackie [inPolish].

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