From the Yalta agreements to the refusal of involuntary repatriation: the evolution of the western vision on the soviet forced displacement (1944—1945)

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From the Yalta agreements to the refusal of involuntary repatriation: the evolution of the western vision on the soviet forced displacement (1944--1945)

Introduction

repatriation agreements soviet displaced persons

During 1939--1945, as a result of hostilities on the territory of the Third Reich and its satellites were more than 10 million people, most of whom were deported on racial, religious, or political reasons. That is why, at the end of the Second World War, a logical question arose about the return of these people. One of the important problems of the article is to identify and resolve contradictory points in international agreements on its execution and provision, taking appropriate decisions and their implementation. Studying the post-war experience of resolving the problem of DPs and refugees in general is important given the urgency of resolving the immigration crisis in today's world.

Presenting main material

During the initial stages of repatriation, American and British military leaders were surprised to note repatriation resistance among Soviet displaced persons. Obviously, the news of the Third Reich's capitulation was received with relief and elation by the Allies, but for many Soviet DPs, Germany's defeat primarily meant the victory for the bloody communist regime under whose rule they had suffered and hoped to avoid after the war. As of 1945, despite numerous meetings of the «Big Three» countries' leaders and decisions of international organizations regarding Soviet displaced persons from European camps, the flow of repatriates began to decline. This is primarily due to the fact that, according to Western leaders, by the beginning of June 1945, all those who wished returned to the USSR. As for the rest of the Soviet prisoners of war (POW's), the so-called repatriate deniers, the American and British military administrations and the public could not comprehend their negative reaction to the return, as they did not understand and certainly didn't know the Soviet system, which had been conducting an active pro-Soviet propaganda campaign for several years. In particular, in 1944--1945, the American press began to call the Soviet Union a «good neighbor» and a «faithful ally,» moreover, Mark Elliott, author of «Pawns of Yalta: Soviet Refugees and America's Role in Their Repatriation», describes how Stalin imagined Western society: «Uncle Joe was a bit eccentric, but still a nice man», because «Soviet economic planning and forced industrialization is the Russian version of Franklin Delano Roosevelt's New Deal» [1, p. 46]. Also, the American magazine «Life» in 1944 admired the Russians writing that they look, dress and think like Americans, and «compare the Soviet secret police by the Ministry of State Security with the Federal Bureau of Investigation» [1, p. 46]. It should be noted that against the background of numerous media publications about the USSR as a fairly democratic country, the American public gradually began to believe in it. It is not surprising, therefore, that they equated Soviet repatriation with the returning of their own citizens and could not understand the hesitation and reluctance of many DPs to return home.

The British public was also initially the victim of the same misconception, as evidenced in the memoirs of the British captain responsible for one of the first repatriation operations, Dennis Gill, who was skeptical of repatriate deniers. Leading the repatriation mission, he rejected their requests in every possible way, citing the fact that everything he read over the last four years about the USSR gave the impression that the country is run by people committed to overthrowing tyranny and protecting human rights and freedoms [2, p. 55]. However, the governments of the United States and Great Britain soon realized the ugly truth about the true motives and interests of the Soviet authorities, including the displaced persons. That is why, later, first local commanders in charge of repatriation, and later Western governments, began to provide various assistance to Soviet DPs to avoid forced return.

As of 1944, Field Marshal Harold Alexander, a participant in two world wars, was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Forces of the Mediterranean Region. On May 2, 1945, he accepted the surrender of German troops in Italy. Having gone through both wars and having vast military experience behind him, he was somewhat shocked by the stories spreaded among the soldiers about the bloody scenes of the repatriation of Soviet displaced persons and therefore decided that the violence should be stopped in the future. Within two weeks, the field marshal received message that 55 Soviet citizens, including 16 women and 11 children, were refusing to return to the Soviet Union; he immediately sent a telegram to the Foreign Office of the United Kingdom, stating:

1. «55 Soviet citizens, including 16 women and 11 children, most of them were declared to be political refugees and therefore may not return to the USSR under the Yalta agreements».

2. «Soviet representatives will demand their forced repatriation, and this requires the use of physical force, handcuffs and repatriation of these persons, accompanied by the British military in blocked train cars».

3. «We believe that the transfer of these citizens will be equated with death».

4. «We ask you to make a decision and provide additional instructions on how to decide the fate of Soviet displaced persons, as the Kremlin will demand their forced return» [2, p. 329].

Occasionally, the Commander-in-Chief in his appeal to the Foreign Office that, if it acknowledges the fact of their forced repatriation, it will be necessary in this case to use force to carry it out; their return is likely to lead to death and such an unjust decision would lead not only to these 55 people to a terrible fate, but also to all other Soviet DPs [2, p. 331]. The British government, without taking into account the position of Field Marshal Alexander, nevertheless proclaimed a policy of forced repatriation of Soviet displaced persons, officers and servicemen were obliged to ensure its continuous implementation. It is worth noting that the commander- in-chief tried several times to persuade the government, but his hopes for a positive solution to this issue were in vain -- the government insisted on the urgent forced repatriation of 55 of the above-mentioned Soviet citizens [2, p. 331--332]. The only problem that could arise in the future in the process of their return was that, since the Mediterranean region was under the joint control of the British and the Americans, it was necessary to coordinate this position with the US government, which wasn't so clear about Soviet DPs.

Note that British officers categorically opposed the return of these individuals. In particular, the Military Office at the Joint Forces Headquarters immediately informed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that «it may be difficult to persuade British soldiers to force Soviet displaced persons to board trains against their will» [3, p. 146]. In an effort to reassure the military, the Ministry, in turn, invited the USSR representatives on repatriation to help ensure the continuous protection of these DPs in order to avoid possible complications during their repatriation [3, p. 146--147]. While this issue was being resolved, about 500 Cossacks from the Don and Kuban were taken prisoner in Austria during a military operation in the Drava and Danube river valleys. In particular, Field Marshal G. Alexander immediately informed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs about this event and asked for detailed instructions on further action.

The Foreign Ministry has been silent on this issue for a long time, waiting for a decision from the White House. Thus, during a meeting on the repatriation of Cossacks, British diplomat Thomas Brimlov noted that «prison- ers of war (cossacks) and displaced persons (refugees) should be treated equally and not hesitate to hand over to the Soviet authorities, whether they want it or not» [3, p. 122]. In contrast, British Major General Alexander Vas Anderson appealed that «the Yalta Agreement was designed to ensure a functioning mechanism for the return of released Soviet citizens, not to ensure the forced repatriation of political refugees who did not cooperate with the Nazis» and «don't want to return to the USSR» [3, p. 122]. Later in the conversation, General Anderson asked whether a relevant government decision would be made on this category of persons; instead, the new Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin decided on his own that absolutely all Soviet DPs in British-controlled European camps for displaced persons were forced to return to the Soviet Union [3, p. 123--124]. In particular, Christopher Warner, head of the UK's Northern Department for Foreign Affairs, told Anderson that the decision was final. He concluded his letter to the general with the following words: «Given this ministerial decision, we assume that you will not transfer this issue to the competence of the heads of local staff, and will now be able to continue the transfer of these people yourself» [3, p. 124]. If the Ministry agreed to the forced repatriation of all Soviet citizens, the British officers had radically different opinions and intentions in this regard.

At the same time, Warner sent a letter to Anderson, the Assistant Commissioner for Repatriation to the Council of People's Ministers of the USSR, Major General Yakiv Basilov had a personal meeting with Field Marshal Alexander, at which he not only demanded the return of 500 Cossacks and 55 refugees but also insisted on the repatriation of ten thousand prisoners of war held in a camp in Cinecitta, Italy [2, p. 341]. It should be noted that the Soviet representatives were well informed that these DPs were Ukrainians, mostly with Polish citizenship. It is clear that the British commander- in-chief was not going to make concessions to the Kremlin, in particular, he told to Basilov that his demands had no legal basis, as they weren't citizens of the USSR as of 1939, and added that «he has no right to repatriate people against their will» [2, p. 342]. Immediately after the meeting with the Soviet representative, Alexander addressed the Chief of the Imperial Staff of the Allied Joint Forces, Alan Brook, noting that he would refuse to use force to repatriate Soviet citizens until he was ordered «from above» and sent another request to Military Department for instructions and explanations. He added a note to the request, part of which reads as follows: «Forcing Soviet citizens to accept their own repatriation would, of course, involve either the use of force or forcing them into railway cars with weapons, and then blocking and transporting them». «This attitude, combined with a clear awareness that these people are being sent to almost certain death, is completely inconsistent with the principles of democracy and justice that we adhere to and defend. In addition, it is unlikely that a British soldier, realizing what awaits Soviet displaced persons, will be a willing participant in the measures needed to force them to return. Given the circumstances, I recommend that every effort be made to process certain changes to the Yalta agreements that would allow us to treat these people as stateless persons» [2, p. 342]. In conclusion, at that time the situation was deadlocked: the Soviet government continued to put pressure on the British Foreign Office to continue mass forced repatriation, and the Ministry, in turn, constantly assured them that Yalta's policy wouldn't change and continue to do so.

Over time, British camp commanders for the DPs found it increasingly difficult to cooperate with Soviet representatives: strong hostility to the latter only strengthened the commanders' determination to prevent the return of Soviet citizens. For example, Colonel Alex Wilkinson, who ran several camps in Styria (Austria), was shocked when he was visited by NKVD officers who insisted that Wilkinson return 1500 prisoners of war from one of his camps [2, p. 342--343]. In particular, he recalled: «Soon NKVD officers from Vienna called me in Graz, drawing my attention to the Yalta Agreement and saying that I had to put them [Soviet displaced persons] on a train and send them to Vienna. The Yalta agreement did not affect me in any way, and I replied that I would comply with their request only if the DPs themselves wanted it. Then the two villains called back in about an hour and stressed that I should put the Soviet prisoners of war on the train. In response, they received the same answer. Then they said they would like to go talk to them, to which I agreed. I informed the Soviets about what was happening and said that the meeting would take place at 10 o'clock the next morning.

The meeting took place at 10 o'clock, but only 15 people came to it. The Soviet representatives returned to Graz and were not friendly, accusing me of disrupting the meeting. Only 15 people volunteered to return to the USSR» [2, p. 343].

Thus, British officers were well aware that their actions against Soviet repatriates wouldn't be particularly controlled in practice, and in reality this was the case: only one British officer was convicted by a military court for disobeying repatriation orders, but his punishment failed. restraining influence on the rest of the military [2, p. 334]. Some officers even allowed as many people as possible to flee or register as non-Soviet citizens with fake IDs. One of them was Colonel Lawrence Shadwell, who, as an officer in the 506th Military Government Aid Squadron in Kiel, Germany, was in charge of a number of large camps for DPs. A convinced Christian, he made it clear to the military leadership that he wouldn't allow the forced return of displaced persons to the USSR [2, p. 334]. It is worth noting that the higher military command leadership did not require him to do so, as he was not the only officer who deliberately did not obey orders from above at his own risk.

The US military has also increasingly resisted official public policy. In Germany in particular, 21 of the 25 American soldiers delegated to organize and conduct repatriation began writing petitions to the High Command to avoid appointment. Such appeals began to arrive from civilians, including John Gray, a Quaker, a member of the Religious Union of Friends who had worked with a civilian repatriation group. Soviet citizens, noting that in this case, these people threatened suicide [2, p. 334]. Gray also claimed that forced repatriation contradicts the «liberal English tradition of refugees for the purpose of forcible displacement of these people», and said that the governing bodies of leading international organizations (the UN, the Red Cross) opposed this position of Western countries [2, p. 334--335]. In turn, he called on Prime Minister E. Bevin «to investigate this issue and find a more humane, Christian solution to the problem of these people» [6, p. 98]. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs replied that there was a misunderstanding and that no decision would be made without inspections. Thus, at some point, the American government found itself at a crossroads -- what to do with officers who do not obey the orders of the senior government? If punished, how and by whom -- commanders or entire units? It is obvious that any punishment will lead to even more resistance and confrontation within the country. We should also not forget about the public opinion, which was constructed by the press and radio broadcasting. The fact that the public began to learn about the real situation around government decisions regarding Soviet DPs through the media caused great concern among Western governments. To continue repatriation operations, the United States and Great Britain had to incline society to their side.

It should be noted that during the repatriation of Cossacks from Austrian camps, British commanders often used propaganda among their military to convince them of the justice of forced repatriation. Subsequently, the commanders delivered a lengthy speech to the personnel of their units, part of which read as follows: «This will be an extremely difficult task, even because there are so many women and children; some of you will feel sympathy for these people, but you must remember that they took up arms and went to fight for the Germans, thus increasing the number of our enemies. There is no doubt that they sided with the Germans, because they hoped to overthrow the current government in the USSR. The Russians have assured that they intend to involve these people in the work of the land and educate them as worthy citizens. There are no signs or preconditions for a bloody massacre of these people. In fact, the USSR needs more people for its country, for its reconstruction. A very big and unpleasant task awaits you. Let's try to do it resolutely, without bloodshed, but if you need to use force, do it immediately and without fear. I will support you in any reasonable actions that you deem necessary» [2, p. 343]. This approach may have had some success during the first stage of repatriation, but by July 1945, officers, seeing all the hypocrisy and illegality of these actions, arbitrarily stopped the flow of repatriates to the Soviet Union. The assertion that the Soviet leadership didn't seek to exterminate newly arrived repatriates by mid-1945 had nothing to do with reality; sentences in Siberian camps. Thus, the Western leaders faced a new urgent question -- it was necessary to find other methods of involving soldiers in repatriation cooperation.

One of the most common methods applied was the use of so-called «green soldiers», the young people who were less likely to disobey orders, or at least they would need more time to muster the courage to disobey, no matter how unpleasant their mission was. One of these soldiers later explained how he had been recruited for repatriation work. He said that he and several other colleagues were sent for a rare at that time full military inspection, which, of course, under various circumstances, none of them passed. At the end, they all had to join the repatriation process as punishment. In an interview, almost forty years later, he recalled with insult: «Nobody knew anything. They simply deceived us» [2, p. 344]. It was only when this group of executed persons arrived at the railway station, as they learned ex post facto, that they were instructed with guarding the POW's train bound for Czechoslovakia. The soldiers wondered why the prisoners of war on their way home needed any protection. Eventually, in order to prevent a conflict situation, they were told that these prisoners of war had fought on the side of the Germans and had to answer for the crime against their own country. According to the same military, the scene on the train was rather gloomy and disturbing; the American authorities took all previous measures to prevent suicides among Soviet displaced persons. In addition, they were given shirts and pants, but shoes and belts were confiscated for their safety. Desperate to escape, «some of them tried to set fire to their cars, others bared their chests, begging the Americans to shoot them» [2, p. 344]. When the train arrived at the border with Czechoslovakia, several Red Army officers boarded each train car and began talking to their compatriots about their fate. The military man also recalls that the return of Soviet citizens dead or alive was a terrible spectacle, but he was young, inexperienced, and had completed military training the day before. He argued that in case of refusal to comply with the order, he could suffer such participation [2, p. 344].

Another advantage of attracting new servicemen to repatriation was that they did not spend much time with Soviet displaced persons, and therefore didn't have the opportunity to get to know them better, to hear their stories of persecution, to be filled with compassion and sympathy for them [1, p. 91--92]. Apparently, such soldiers treated the DPs rather coolly, as they were informed that the latter were traitors and deserters. Note that, according to such servicemen, the White House prepared special units for future repatriation operations, which served as a kind of invincible guard, which appeared quite suddenly, in large numbers and wasn't afraid to use force on any occasion. Mostly these units were used by the US government in final repatriation missions, in case of extreme necessity, and, quite obviously, the goal justified the means [4, p. 31].

During a long confrontation between local military commanders on the one hand and the US State Department on the other, the repatriation of prisoners of war from a camp near Kempten in Germany, which housed about 1000 Soviet citizens, including Cossacks who fought on the side of the Third Reich paused. Note that some of them were old emigrants and therefore could count on political asylum on the West; at the same time, several hundred DPs were still subject to forced repatriation, as they were citizens of the Soviet Union as of September 1, 1939. Thus, in order to define the criteria for determining the citizenship of these displaced persons, it was decided to establish a temporary Sovi- et-American repatriation commission. It is obvious that most POW's, not wanting to return to the USSR, did everything possible to hide their origins and show solidarity with American officers, but despite numerous controversies and discussions, the commission was able to compile a fairly accurate list of about 410 people [5, p. 172--173].

In particular, on June 22, 1945, all those who, according to the results of the commission's work, qualified as Soviet citizens as of 1939, were ordered to prepare for transfer to a camp near Munich (Germany). These people were in despair: they made it clear to the American soldiers that they should be shot on the spot rather than return to the USSR. Realizing the tragedy of this situation, the American Major General Michel Legrand, decided to stop the transportation of Soviet DPs [5, p. 172]. However, he was soon sent an official order from the Military Headquarters and told that according to the Yalta agreements, these people should return to the Soviet Union. After reading the order, the major decided to try to help the POW's, asking the military leadership to wait a while for their transportation. It was only on August 11, 1945 that the Soviet displaced persons were informed that they would still have to move to a camp near Munich, where they would be awaited by the Soviet repatriation commissioners [5, p. 172--173]. It should be noted that then at night about half of them escaped from the Kempten camp, while the American military guards calmly looked in the opposite direction. However, there were those who remained and resolutely opposed their own fate. On the morning of August 12, several hundred POW's went to the camp church, and when the liturgy was almost over, one of the Soviet captive generals entered the church with an American officer. They began to read the names of 410 people who would have to return to the USSR. Then they were ordered to leave the church and get into the trucks waiting outside. It would seem that everything is already lost for these people, but the captured general urged them not to obey the American order, which would involuntarily encourage the American guards to resort to violence [5, p. 173]. Later, the priests who ruled the church at the time described the horrific events: «The officer did not have time to finish reading the last name when the whole church burst into unspeakable tears. Everyone cried, old and young, men and women, and especially children, looking at their defenseless and inconsolable parents. He immediately left, ordering the guards to stay near the church and wait for further instructions, and he went to Major M. Legrand's office to report the situation. Calling the headquarters and receiving instructions, Legrand ordered the guards to release all Soviet people, which they did» [5, p. 173]. The church was left unguarded for about another thirty minutes and anyone could easily escape. However, all Soviet DPs remained, believing that the danger had passed and they had been saved. However, an hour later, a dozen trucks filled with American soldiers arrived at the camp. The newly arrived commander immediately demanded that all Soviet prisoners of war get into the trucks immediately, to which the latter refused. One of the priests recalled: «Soldiers pulled Russians by the arms and legs, by the hair and beard. Fists and rifle butts were used freely, shots were fired. Those who fell to the ground were kicked. The church was filled with wailing and cries of despair» [5, p. 174--175]. As soon as the Soviet prisoners of war found themselves outside, several of them tried to escape through the wall separating their camp from another camp housing displaced persons from the Baltic states, but the military rushed in and repulsed them from the walls with a rifle. Eyewitnesses later recalled that twelve prisoners were injured and two were shell shocked. Eventually, about 90 people were transported to Kempten train station, where they joined another group of Soviet citizens who were captured near other camps. The train remained at the station throughout the night; a warding was set up from among the camp guards. Later, one Soviet DPs who managed to escape explained that «from the very beginning [the guards] turned a blind eye to those who, after midnight, began to crawl one after the other under the train» [5, p. 175]. The train left the station the next morning, carrying only about fifty Soviet citizens who had returned to the USSR.

Thus, the «Kempten incident» once again convinced the top US military leadership that the officers were no longer ready to carry out government orders, thus immediately calling for a repatriation policy among the soldiers. In particular, military commanders accompanying displaced persons from Kempten sent a report to the Supreme Headquarters that less than 50 of the 410 personnel had been handed over to the Soviet commissioners, to which the headquarters did not respond. As early as August 25, 1945, the 7th US Army submitted a request to the Headquarters for further instructions on forced repatriation, later receiving an order in response to its temporary suspension [5, p. 176].

As of the end of August 1945, the British press began to actively discuss the issue of the forced repatriation of Soviet displaced persons, in particular one of the most popular newspapers, «The Manchester Guardian», published several scathing articles on the subject. It should be noted that the leitmotif of the last of them from August 31, 1945 was the condemnation of repatriation Yalta agreements, namely, the Soviet DPs once again emphasized the free choice of their place of residence and the use of force in their repatriation [6, p. 92--93]. Thus, observing the mood of British society and the mass refusal of British commanders to comply with the hated conditions of forced repatriation, on September 4, 1945, the Supreme Commander of Expeditionary Forces Dwight Eisenhower ordered American commanders to renounce the use of physical force to return Soviet citizens, although, from the very beginning he was quite sympathetic to the idea of forced repatriation [6, p. 92--93]. Over time, D. Eisenhower was struck by the consequences of this policy, in particular, like British Field Marshal G. Alexander, he decided that it was time for the US military to accept and recognize the human, moral and ethical issues caused by forced repatriation, and revise the policy to completely eliminate the coercion factor. Subsequently, he sent a formal request to the Joint Chiefs of Staff requesting an analysis of the policy as a whole and providing detailed instructions on whether American commanders should use force to forcibly collect, filter and repatriate Soviet citizens [6, p. 93]. This position of General D. Eisenhower received strong support from Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery in the British Occupation Zone and his controlled generals Lucius Clay, Walter Smith, Alexander Patch and many other commanders, who also hoped to put an end to forced rap. As early as September 7, 1945, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent an order to the Naval Coordinating Committee to investigate and report on repatriation policy, as well as to provide recommendations for necessary changes [6, p. 93]. It was a signal to Washington, the American public and the military that the situation could still be changed in favor of Soviet DPs.

Note that although the policy of forced repatriation was temporarily suspended, Soviet displaced persons still refused to believe that the danger was over, in particular, this mistrust led to another incident. As early as September 6, 1945, the US government attempted to transport 600 Ukrainians and 96 Armenians from Mannheim to Stuttgart, Germany -- they revolted against the American military [6, p. 94]. Thus, during the investigation, the Military Department found that the Soviet DPs, who incited their compatriots, were forcibly «tamed» by American soldiers, in turn -- the crowd attacked the soldiers and fired a shot to calm them down [6, p. 94]. As a result, repatriates weren't sent anywhere that day. Subsequently, the news of the incident, combined with media reports of past forced repatriation operations, prompted Congresswoman Claine Luce, a member of the House of Representatives from the State of Connecticut, to appeal to the U.S. military and government departments about the «obvious conflict between secret and a common understanding of the freedom and peace that American soldiers fought for» [6, p. 95].

In connection with the above events, on December 21, 1945, the State Coordinating Committee of the United States Navy issued a declaration on the repatriation of Soviet DPs. This slightly updated and revised program had to meet all Western standards and was based on respect for human rights. Announcing the principles of this document, the committee leaders stated that «the White House has long complied with the requirements of the USSR on forced repatriation, but at the same time must comply with the Yalta regulations and therefore proposes to forcibly repatriate only a small category of people» [5, p. 188]. Those displaced persons who should have been returned as a matter of priority «without their will and forcibly, if necessary» were «persons who were at the same time citizens of the Soviet Union as of September 1, 1939», and fell into the following categories:

1. Soviet DPs captured in German uniforms.

2. Those who were members of the Red Army on or after June 22, 1941, and who later deserted.

3. Collaborators who have tarnished themselves by cooperating with the enemy, provided that direct, reliable evidence is provided.

4. War criminals [7, p. 1106].

The American government considered this policy quite fair, but there was a misconception among the public that Soviet society was identical to Western society. They believed that those who had to be forced to return must be traitors or deserters. In December of that year, the «New York Herald Tribune» published an alarming article entitled «Renegade Reds Roam Balkans Spread Terror». In particular, the text of the article stated that the remnants of General Andriy Vlasov's army were wandering around Austria «in full armor and in great despair» [8, p. 95]. It is also reported that these thousands of Soviet collaborators traveled in train cars with the civilian population and were not ashamed to «kill the farmers from whom they stole food» [8, p. 95]. Thus, this information once again demonstrated the danger of Soviet citizens, who for some time managed to escape justice, and thus, set the Americans hostile to any Soviet displaced persons. How could they sympathize with the Soviet traitors and deserters who sowed death throughout Europe and posed a danger to American soldiers?

Subsequently, American society was shocked by the new government news -- General Dwight Eisenhower called on the White House to suspend forced repatriation. US Congresswoman K. Luce informed the press that one of the main reasons for the general's proposal was the alleged presence of weapons in Soviet DPs [6, p. 1108]. In particular, she also explained that Washington does not «seek to risk the lives of American soldiers who will try to repatriate them by force» [6, p. 1108]. We must state that this proposal wasn't fully implemented, because, despite all the warnings, the United States actually led the mission of forcible return of Soviet enemies, who threatened the security of postwar Europe. In addition, they defended the rights to emigration and asylum for civilians from the USSR, who decided to start a new life in the West after World War II.

The American public was generally satisfied with the review of repatriation decisions, which cannot be said of the Soviet and British governments, which continued to insist on the full repatriation of all citizens. The White House still hoped that the existing unpublished part of the so-called «New post-Yalta repatriation policy» will reassure allies. In particular, it stated that «consider- able efforts should be made to facilitate the repatriation of persons who had Soviet citizenship», but didn't fall into the category of forced repatriates. For a detailed explanation of how to achieve this, it is stated:

1. Soviet repatriation commissioners are granted free access to their DPs upon special request in order to persuade the latter to return voluntarily.

2. Implementing active measures to «minimize the development of organized resistance to repatriation, namely, to divide Soviet displaced persons into smaller groups, thereby separating leaders of any resistance from others».

3. To continue «vigorous efforts to prevent the spread of propaganda of any kind among prisoners of war, which could cast doubt on the expediency of their repatriation» [6, p. 1115--1116].

Of course, this situation did not suit either the British or the Russians, who claimed that the new American decisions were a clear violation of previous international agreements and demanded the return of all Soviet citizens. Despite numerous allegations, the US government continued to adhere to the updated principles of repatriation policy. It is obvious that the military responsible for the implementation of these decisions offered some resistance, as they feared future responsibility and revenge for the sometimes unjust, illegal, cruel decisions. The document was later called the «McNar- ney-Clark Directive» after Generals Joseph McNarney and Mark Clark, who were the first to receive it for practical implementation.

Conclusions

Thus, as part of the first phase of forced repatriation, Western governments eventually realized that they were, in fact, supporting the Soviet Union's inhumane and cynical plan in relation to its own citizens. The first attempts to radically change this situation were made by local commanders, who were directly responsible for repatriation and saw in this his military and moral duty. Later on, the top military leadership, realizing that no orders to comply with previous agreements with the USSR no longer made any impression on the military, moreover they were simply openly ignored, decided to reconsider its vision of the repatriation problem and allow some groups of Soviet DPs to avoid return and emigrate to the West.

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