Religious fundamentalism, "holy wars" and rule of law: the role of the international legal system

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Religious fundamentalism, «holy wars» and rule of law: the role of the international legal system

Vincenzo Pacillo



Пацілло В.

Релігійний фундаменталізм, «священні війни» та верховенство права: роль міжнародної правової системи

Анотація

institutional fundamentalism orthodox church

Фундаменталістський підхід до політичного життя передбачає явну відмову (або принаймні різку перебудову) вищого принципу, на якому засновані всі західні демократії, а саме принципу секуляризму держави. Релігійні фундаменталізми не лише пов'язані з вірою, їх можна знайти в багатьох досвідах пошуків священного. Феномен настільки складний і різноманітний, що виявляється -- не тільки в результаті міграційних процесів, але й через певну радикалізацію релігійного досвіду, який зіткнувся з стрімкою секуляризацією, що потрясає Європу, -- в організованій і добре структурованій формі також поза геополітичним контекстом, в якому фундаменталістські рухи народилися або розвивалися більш ефективно. Так сталося в Росії напередодні війни проти України: і в даному випадку ми спостерігаємо «інституційний фундаментализм» на чолі з керівництвом Російської православної церкви.

Ключові слова: релігійний фундаментализм, секуляризм, релігія і політика.



Pacillo Vincenzo

Religious fundamentalism, «holy wars» and rule of law: the role of the international legal system

Abstract

The fundamentalist approach to political scene involves a clear rejection (or at least a sharp reshaping) of a supreme principle on which all western democracies are founded, namely the principle of State's secularism structured by three pillars, which form its fundamental skeleton: the neutrality and impartiality of the State towards all religious beliefs in the area; reasonableness, i.e. the capacity of the judicial and regulatory action to respond to systematic and logical criteria aimed to ensure the effective capacity of the act to achieve the desired objectives and at the same time, the responsiveness of the act itself to the principles and rules set out within the fundamental Charter; ethical, religious and cultural pluralism. Religious fundamentalisms are not only linked to a belief, but it is possible to find them in many experiences of the sacred quest.

In fact, the phenomenon is so complex and diverse to show up - not only as result of migration processes - but also by virtue of a certain radicalization of the religious experiences faced to impetuous secularization shaking Europe - in an organized and well structured form also out of the geopolitical context in which fundamentalist movements were born or developed more effectively.

That is what happened in Russia in front of the wars against Ukraine: and, in this case, we are in front of an «institutional fundamentalism» led by the supreme authority of the Russian Orthodox Church. It seems necessary that the international legal system encourages - also by the mean of sanctions, as extrema ratio - interreligious and intercultural dialogue in order to develop peaceful coexistence between religions and discourage the spread of aggressive or intolerant fundamentalist ideas in respect of plurality and diversity.

Key words: religious fundamentalism, secularism, religion and politics.

1. Religious Fundamentalism and Secularism

With the expression «religious fundamentalism» Enzo Pace [1] refers to that trend - typical of some experiences of research for meaning and for the sacred - characterized by four fundamental elements:

«principle of inerrancy, related to the content of the holy book»: the holy text on which a particular religion is based on (meaning that it constitutes its fundamental and theological element), cannot be freely interpreted by man. In fact, this book expresses some truths that must be regarded as absolute, insusceptible of subjection to a human hermeneutical act able of leading them to an explanatory systematic paradigm;

The holy book's interpretative process leaves so few liberties to rational speculation and it is tightly controlled by authoritatively imposed rules;

«the a-historicity principle of both the truth and the Book that preserves it»; human reason can not place the message upon which the sacred text is based on from a historical perspective, or try to adapt it to the social reality's changing in which the faithful operates;

«principle of the superiority of Divine Law upon the Earthly one». This is an absolute principle, according to which the human legal order can never be in conflict with the divine rules, and the task of the faithful is that one to undertake the reconduction of the earthly political reality to religious principles;

«primacy of myth of foundation»: the founding process of the beliefs' system absolutizes itself and creates an irrepressible fraternity between all who believe and recognize themselves in it. This fraternity must lead - in a millenarian perspective - to the reconduction of earthly contemporary reality to «lost paradise» represented by the social reality which existed at the time of the origin of the myth.

Sociological studies have shown that the fundamentalist trend may be a characteristic of all religious experiences [2; 3], and therefore there are no beliefs' systems linked to the sacred which are intrinsically and ontologically characterized by the necessary coexistence of the four above listed elements: there is evidence that what can vary - in time and space - is the weight that one or more fundamentalist groups may have within the internal affairs of a certain religious community and - consequently - the role of fundamentalist trends within the management processes of the power in the same community [4; 5; 6; 7].

It should be observed - however - that fundamentalism is a tendency deeply different from conservatism [8]. The conservatism, in fact, is essentially linked to the fidelity to a certain ideological tradition connected to the fear of the loss of social influence of religion and of the balance that the religion guarantees, without necessarily assume the primacy of the foundation myth, the creation of a society modelled on divine law, inerrancy of sacred text or a-historicity of the latter: in other words, conservatism simply aims to preserve the historical continuity of a certain political set and its role in civil and religious society in which it concretely works, whereas fundamentalism makes a sort of «selection» of the traditional elements of a certain belief in order to emphasize their importance and centrality in the pursuit of its religious and political plan.

It is also worth highlighting the difference between fundamentalism and religious integrism. The latter, in fact, expresses the promotion of a unitary system capable of abolishing the plurality of ideologies and programs, both by smoothing contrasts and divergences between opposing groups and by reconciling different ideological tendencies, or, on the contrary, rejecting aside ideological and programmatic diversities and thus refusing cooperation and alliances or compromises with other forces and currents. The integrism aims at creating an ideological unity in a certain religious group or even in the civil life, but not necessarily through a a-historicizing of the sacred text or through the building of the myth of a lost paradise to conquer again [9; 10].

Finally, fundamentalism should not to be confused with religious radicalism: this is indeed an attitude mostly characterized by the need of regaining the central role of religion in the private life, and lies in the perspective of creating a way of life entirety modelled on the rules of a certain experience of faith without any kind of compromise. Therefore, if on one hand it enhances that fundamentalist vision of the primacy of the law of God upon the law of man, it does not necessarily imply the impossibility of a hermeneutical human work on the sacred text and the necessity to rebuild the entire society on the basis of a certain religious message [11].

The definition of fundamentalism that we have proposed above deserves attention of each of the elements that composes it.

When it comes to the principle of inerrancy of the holy book and to its a-historicity, it is quite clear that religious fundamentalism can hardly take root in confessional experiences providing a form of hermeneutical mediation between the text and the social and temporal context in which it exerts its role of the faithful's guide. The more - within a specific denominational experience - the capacity of the institutional mediation to systematically interpret the writing and to adapt it to the daily life of the faithful in the historical moment in which he/she lives and works is authoritative and strong, the more it is complex to imagine that possible movements that have arisen within that experience are able to direct the knowledge of the sacred text to an uncritical and purely literal analysis of its content that is free from any readings according to the frameworks of logic and rationality [12].

Accordingly, it is of course very important - in order to identify the risk of fundamentalist tendencies that a particular group could take - to understand how much and particularly qualified hermeneutic power is provided by the legal religious system of that group to certain subjects (subjects that will be therefore equipped with a certain capacity of institutional mediation) and how this power could be effectively and usefully exercised within the group itself [13; 14].

As for the superiority of divine law on that earthly one, there are several considerations that must be developed.

Generally, the monotheistic religions identify human normative experience as a necessary reflection of divine law. Divine law is at the same time source, inspiration and limit of the capacity of human being to establish mandatory legal provisions that are valid erga omnes. This is because a contrary command to that of God is inherently unreasonable within the soteriological perspective that leads the group [15].

This does not prevent, however, the existence of religious experiences able of accepting the separation between the earthly and spiritual field: according to these experiences, the latter field requires a specific interrelation between human law and divine law consistently and inalienably in the sense of the superiority of the second to the first, while the earthly field can be characterized by a legal system not necessarily modelled on divine law without losing, for the faithful, the obligation to be faithful to it - or at least to obey to the majority of norms in which it articulates itself without postulating a necessary subversion [16].

Conversely, the fundamentalist religious experiences do not admit the autonomy of the earthly field on the spiritual one and, accordingly, the law placed by man to regulate inter-subjectives relations in the earthly city should be compliant to (or inspired by) the divine law: every legal order in which there is a hiatus between divine law and earthly law must be amended through a real commitment of every individual faithful, which has the task to bring the exercise of sovereignty within the roots of the norm issued by God [17].

It must be emphasised that the effort required to the faithful by fundamentalist groups to their proper faithful in order to bring the law of the city of man within the roots of jus divinum varies in time and space, and can take many different forms. Beside a violent fundamentalism, which requires for/to the faithful a restoration of deviant legal orders implemented through the use of force and terror [18], there is a fundamentalism included within democratic processes of consensus building: this religious fundamentalism presupposes a massive use of the political scene and an effort - direct or indirect - in electoral competition in order to introduce its own instances within the normative production process [19].

We can also highlight how this fundamentalist approach to political scene involves a clear rejection (or at least a sharp reshaping) of a supreme principle on which all western democracies are founded, namely the principle of State's secularism [20; 12].

It is well known that secularism is structured by three pillars, which form its fundamental skeleton [21].

The first is the neutrality and impartiality of the State towards all religious beliefs in the area: fundamentalisms, assuming the task of spreading an indisputable truth that is capable of changing human life in the deep, generally refuse both impartiality and neutrality of the State. They rather ask public authorities to commit to recognize the true religion, the privileged position able to give it the centrality and peak of the administrative and judicial legislative action of the public apparatus.

The second pillar on which the principle of secularism is based on is reasonableness, i.e. the capacity of the judicial and regulatory action to respond to systematic and logical criteria aimed to ensure the effective capacity of the act to achieve the desired objectives and at the same time, the responsiveness of the act itself to the principles and rules set out within the fundamental Charter.

Fundamentalisms are ready to subvert this principle both as regards the compliance of the act to the canon of rationality or the compatibility with the constitutional principles.

In the first case fundamentalisms lead back the need to impose or to punish a certain behaviour on the basis of considerations exclusively related to the divine law: which is why the boundary between lawful and unlawful is not determined as a result of a logical analysis performed on the basis of the relationship between costs and benefits of the adopted measure, but only on the relation that exists between the same measure and the will of the divine legislator.

The direct tracing back of justification of the regulatory act to a higher will can not be accepted as a logical argument of debate within western democracies even if it is discussed and sometimes allowed the opportunity to attempt a «translation» of such instances in a politically acceptable language.

It should be recalled that in the democratic tradition of Western Europe, the sacrifices to the exercise of moral freedom may be required by the legislator only when they are justified on the basis of ensuring compliance with legal interests (goods no) with a generally shared value and only within the modes strictly necessary to pursue the aim that the legislator sets himself to protect those interests (goods).

When it comes to the respect of constitutional values, it should be noted that - out of the case of fundamental charters reproducing religious norms - the constitutional process is always characterised by the attempt to crystallise in legal rules some axiological canons considered as common heritage of the different ideologies within the society. The Constitutions therefore can never be expressions of a single view of the world - even if this latter is largely dominant in society - but they should rather seek a common denominator among the different souls of a particular political community, so that they are perceived as an inclusive document for almost all associated and they legitimise the idea of a state perceived as the common house of all associated and not just of one part of them [22].

In this perspective, Western democracies' Constitutions can not but be based on the equal dignity of every human being, from which both the principle of equality regardless of religion and the guarantee of fundamental rights of freedom including freedom of religion and freedom of expression descend.

Instead, the fundamentalist approach to the political action stands in radical contrast both to the principle of equality (in the sense that only those who profess the true religion shall be the owner of full liberty to propagate it) and from the point of view of the rights of freedom (and because the profession of a «false» religion might alienate the associated from reaching the good and because it is not permissible a manifestation of thought that might harm to what is asserted as truth).

The third pillar of secularism is represented by ethical, religious and cultural pluralism. The legal order of the democratic State does not have its own truth, legitimizing a diversity of opinions, lifestyles, ethical choice. The current morality, albeit dominant, can in no way be an excuse to make illegal those conducts that are incapable of affecting people's legal interests (goods no); the affixing of bans for acts and deliberately chosen behaviours by those concerned of age and capable of consent can eventually sometimes be legitimised - and only in clearly defined circumstances - when the mentioned concerned of age can adversely affect the life, health, property or the personal dignity.

Again, fundamentalism denies this principle. It is quite clear that the construction of a society founded on the inerrancy of the religious message can not tolerate, other than in exceptional cases, deviations from the moral generally required to the faithful to attain salvation.

Any heterodox ethics in respect to that one imposed by the divine rule in soteriological or simply eudaimonological perspective can not be tolerated since it would propose an ethical deviant model, which might alienate the community from that canonically proposed as generally binding.

Certainly, there may be a situation in which a fundamentalist legal system admits within itself the «deviant» minorities' existence legitimising them to live according to the heterodox models than to the reference religious canon.

However even in this case, one can not speak of genuine pluralism: that concept presupposes, in fact, the equal dignity of the different ethical models in the area and the legitimacy of the minorities' law to pursue a life project that could be different from the one of the majority. Conversely, a fundamentalist legal system will simply marginalize minorities by giving them a number of rights only if they are unable to reverberate on the general ethical setting flowing within society and thus putting in danger the axiological cornerstones on which the state- community has been founded.

2. Which fundamentalisms?

Once the essential characteristics of religious fundamentalism have been outlined, it is necessary to clarify historically and sociologically which are the concrete experiences that can be traced back to this phenomenon in the modern and contemporary State.

The experiences which can be defined as fundamentalisms are to be isolated as opposed to organized fanaticism or to spiritual millenarianism generic situations.

It is well known that the sociological sciences lead back the actual experience of religious fundamentalism to the protestant world, and in particular to what happened at the Theological Conference in Niagara Falls in 1895 [12, p. 485].

On that occasion, a group of US conservative theologians elaborated a document against the historical-critical interpretation of the biblical text affirming the principle of absolute inerrancy of the sacred text: the principles of Niagara Falls bill were resumed within the volumes entitled The Fundamentals, which gave name to a movement of opinion that reworked and concretized the content.

The link between American Protestantism and fundamentalism has been also stressed by a project of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences (i.e. the Fundamentalism Project) which, despite several suffered critics, reiterated the connection between the US conservative right-wing and several movements belonging to Protestantism [24].

That link is built on a literal reading of the biblical text from which a set of political implications follows: therefore, the legal system of the State will have to repeat its reference values from the Christian tradition's values, which in turn, are directly drawn from a literal exegesis (and not a historical-critical one) of the sacred text in which all creativities and all ethical constructions of pluralistic character are banned.

This existing short circuit between religious text, its literal interpretation and political action has contributed significantly to the construction of an exclusive and foreclosing identity of the United States of America, which has been long dominant during the administration of President George W. Bush, which was characterized by what has been defined a zealot patriotism. A patriotism in which there has been a strong line of demarcation between friends and enemies, between good and evil (bad), between the right ethical canon (that one of the American way of life) and deviant canon (the dominant one in the rogue states) or simply out of the project of Enduring Freedom at the base of military operations in the Middle East or the special prison at Guantanamo [25].

Beyond the link with institutional power, two great organisations born in 1979 must be remembered for their contribution to spread the Christian fundamentalism within the social body of the United States of America. It must be mainly emphasised the role of the «Moral Majority» and of the «Christian Coalition» [26, p. 76] which - after social revolutions generated by the movements of liberation in 1968- have been perceived as a major reservoir of traditional values, and therefore strongly supported by the most conservative fringes of the population.

Staying within the field of Christianity, one might wonder if there is eventually a catholic fundamentalism alongside the protestant fundamentalism. The traditional doctrine offers a negative answer to this question, based on the correct observation that in Catholicism cannot exist a fundamentalist approach to the sacred text by virtue of the hermeneutic mediation imposed by the magisterium.

This consideration must however be combined with the significant effort in the political and economic field of some ecclesial movements also characterized by a radical reference to the interpretation of the sacred texts given by its founder albeit in substantial harmony with the statements made by the magisterium.

The idea of militant catholic movements, which are able of understanding the political action as a radical inclusion of Christ's message in the activity of public authorities, together with a constant hermeneutic reference to an exegesis of a charismatic reference leader, appear to be the symptoms of the possibility of tracing a catholic fundamentalism within the current social reality, whose implications of medium and long-term are, however, uncertain.

We should so far only point out that movements of this type start to appear with increasing scale. These movements, while continuing to call themselves Catholics, are in direct conflict with the exegesis of the sacred text given by the magisterium of the Pope, because it is defined too progressive and open to modernity, thus creating a kind of submerged schism that is for now of still negligible size but whose consequences could take on different connotations with the passing of time.

The most widely known fundamentalism within the current discourse is undoubtedly Islamic fundamentalism. In fact, the term fundamentalism - which as mentioned originates in a Christian environment - does not exist in the Arabic language, in which we find - instead- the expression Islamyyiun (Islamists) [26, p. 77]: this term indicates those who not only refuse any separation between religion and politics but they go so far as to consider Islam an ideology primarily aimed at creating a real form of state (Islamic State).

Islamist movements, as we know them today, arise with the «Islamic awakening» in the twenties of the twentieth century [27]: the historical moment when, after the fall of the Ottoman Empire, part of the Islamic world reflects on the necessary path to return to a religious purity that was perceived as called into question by the secularization of some nation states and by the secularization of the society. In this perspective, Islamism can be seen as a kind of opposition to the transformations of modernity and as the recovery of a «golden age» of religion: a new space-time dimension where the koranic text must be recovered in its integrity and radical perspective in order to avoid the cultural and spiritual decay of the Umma (community of believers).

It is also undeniable that the tensions in the Middle East and colonialism of Western Countries have strengthened the identitymaking character of Islamic fundamentalism: the purity of religion, as expressed in the Koran, has gradually become a more and more pronounced character of politically militarily and culturally oppressed populations, which saw in their newfound identity their freedom and dignity.

One important divide of Islamic fundamentalist experience is undoubtedly connected to the Iranian revolution and to the conquest of power by the shiite religious elite, which - inaugurating the experience of the theocratic republic - have effectively completely implemented the fusion between religion and politics. From the second half of the twentieth century, however, other forms of revolution have not been insignificant and were realized for the purpose of creating an Islamic State in different geopolitical contexts.

In this regard it is very important to recall the concept of Jihad. In Arabic, this concept simply indicates the effort of the believer to improve her/his spiritual condition, but it has gradually expanded itself to identify a real armed war against those who oppose the complete fusion between religion and politics.

The jihadist groups represent the more militant evolution of fundamentalism, since they base their desire for a state reform in order to adapt it to the religion's precepts in a subversive manner and through the use of organized and institutionalized violence. Once again, however, it should be reported a certain involvement of Post-colonialism in the development of this phenomenon. We should not forget that the fundamentalist experience of Al Qaeda raises as a reaction to the invasion of Afghanistan by the soviet troops and that the growing power of Isis, that not by chance defines itself as an Islamic State (although this identification is widely criticized by the Muslim world), mainly in the territories of Syria and Iraq. This is also due to the climate of political vacuum generated by the recent military interventions.

In fact, in many ways Isis represents a point of no return of the Islamist ideology: in the sense that it is a reality in which religion becomes a mere pretext for a will's exercise of power exerted by subversive and armed groups managing to subdue the population using, partly, Islam as instrumentum regni, and partly terrorizing it with an exercise of cruel and merciless power [28, p. 50-61].

In this situation, violent anti-Western sentiments and a clear and evident social poverty are not lacking so that this subversive power disguised as Islamic theocracy becomes, for a part of the population, the only way out of misery and desolation.

Fundamentalism, however, concerns also other religious experiences.

It must be pointed out the existence of ultra-Orthodox movements in Israel, which live the belonging to the Jewish religion as an expression of their identity to be preserved in its integrity without compromises. In this case - especially as regards to the so-called Haredim - textual and uncritical reading of the sacred text is accompanied by a strong tendency to political commitment to safeguarding the land of Israel and therefore to an extreme hostility towards those who are perceived as subjects able to endanger the very existence of Israel. Together with this tendency - that someone defines ultra Zionist - there is another Jewish fundamentalism, coming from the anti-Zionist theology, that challenges the secularism of the state of Israel supporting, in the current constitutional settlement, the opposition to God's messianic plan [29; 30].

Even Hinduism and Buddhism know fundamentalist movements: here it will be sufficient to recall the re-sacralisation of the policy proposed by Hindutva: the nationalist ideology based on the idea of Hinduism as a fundamental element for the building of Indian national identity that has significantly contributed to the redefinition of relations between (ethnic, cultural and religious) majorities and minorities in different areas of the Indian subcontinent.

The Hindutva will put rather firm roots in Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, a paramilitary group that has been involved in violent episodes first occurred in the Gujarat region and subsequently in the Orissa one [31].

We are therefore faced with a religious ethno-fundamentalism, a definition that can certainly apply equally also to Buddhist nationalisms that are starting to have a more widening follow-up in South-east Asia: such nationalisms mainly born in anti-Islamic key, materialize themselves in a faith-based political action determined to defend the Buddhist culture even (also) with violent means.

As a matter of fact, the movements in which the Buddhist nationalism organizes itself seem closer to a more militant religious fanaticism than to a fundamentalism that has been defined in the first part of this essay: however, it is worth highlighting how strong is- in their ideological heritage - the idea of a «lost paradise» as a result of the religious plurality and the need for an (also military) action directed to recover the essence.

3. Religious Fundamentalism and the role of the international legal system: intolerance against violence?

This overview - of course, briefly sketched aiming to only constitute an attempt to summarise in few lines a much more complex phenomenon that certainly deserves further study - shows some elements to think about. As we have mentioned several times, religious fundamentalisms are not only linked to a belief, but it is possible to find them in many experiences of the sacred quest.

It is therefore uncorrected to circumscribe the phenomenon just to Islam, or even to give it an unified and precise geopolitical connotation.

This is also because the fundamentalist experiences, while characterized by a general core of elements that we have tried to summarize in the first part of this paper, are inevitably linked to the peculiarities of the place and time in which they occur, as well as to the theological peculiarities characterizing the religious experience of reference. On the other hand it would also be wrong to identify a certain religious experience tout-court with the declination of this proposal by fundamentalist movements.

Islam can not be identified with Islamic fundamentalism as it would be absurd to identify Protestantism with American protestant fundamentalism.

If in some cases the boundaries between fundamentalist expression and non-fundamentalist expression of a certain religion are fleeting, this would essentially due to the lack of knowledge we have of that religious expression and it requires therefore a commitment so that the prejudice- resulting from ignorance - can be sublimated by a critical knowledge able to discern the differences of thought and expression existing within a given belief.

It is wrong to image the religious beliefs as monolithic, homogeneous, uniform and undifferentiated realities: even if the language of the media, and sometimes even that one of politics have accustomed us to a certain standardization, it is quite evident that a clear decoding of the reality is characterized by discernment and distinction. From this perspective, there is no denying that fundamentalist groups exist and operate within our Western democracies.

In fact, the phenomenon is so complex and diverse to show up - not only as result of migration processes - but also by virtue of a certain radicalization of the religious experiences faced to impetuous secularization shaking Europe - in an organized and well structured form also out of the geopolitical context in which fundamentalist movements were born or developed more effectively.

That is what happened in Russia in front of the wars against Ukraine: and, in this case, we are in front of an «institutional fundamentalism» led by the supreme authority of the Russian Orthodox Church.

In his sermon of March 6, 2022, Kirill stated that the war in Ukraine is a «metaphysical» battle against the degenerate and immoral values represented by the West: «We are talking about something very different and more important than politics, we are talking about salvation of humanity». The Patriarch of Moscow (emphasising apocalyptic tones widely used by self-styled Catholic sedevacantist and ultra-conservative sites which operate against Pope Francis) openly spoke about the conflict in Ukraine as a struggle against a «world order». «Today there is a test for the loyalty to this new world order, a kind of pass to that `happy' world, the world of excess consumption, the world of false `freedom,'» he said. «Do you know what this test is? The test is very simple and at the same time terrible - it is the gay pride parade [32]. Moreover, in a letter to the Ecumenical Council of Churches, Kirill wrote that «this tragic conflict has become part of the large-scale geopolitical strategy aimed, in the first place, at weakening Russia».

On other occasions Kirill has blessed the Russian armed forces, supporting the basic idea that Russians and Ukrainians are one people, which must be united under the hegemony of Russia: «Someone must defend the divine truth that we are one people, » he said.

Kirill's support for the Russian invasion has caused huge divisions in the Orthodox Church. There have been criticisms and protests against Kirill in various other countries of the world, often expressed by parishes that depend on the Moscow Patriarchate [33].

Kirill's words have even opened the hypothesis of sanctions against personam by the European Commission (according to the estimates of the magazine Novaya Gazeta, the Patriarch would have between 4 and 8 billion dollars), as «responsible for supporting or implementing of actions or policies that undermine or threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, as well as stability and security in Ukraine».

These kinds of sanctions appear to be completely reasonable and compatible with the main points of international law.

The starting point is linked to the mandatory status of certain fundamental legal values (goods) in the international legal system.

The rules of customary international humanitarian law and the treaty sources of IHL, such as the fourth Geneva Conventions (GCs) (1949), Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property, Additional Protocol I, Lieber Code and Hague regulations define the perimeter of a «core content» of FoRB that must be absolutely guaranteed even during the armed conflicts. In particular, the Geneva Conventions require respect for religion and religious practices in a series of detailed rules (burial rites and cremation of the dead, religious activities of prisoners of war and interned persons, the education of orphaned children or children separated from their parents), while a general respect for convictions and religious practices is recognized in Additional Protocols I and II as a fundamental guarantee for civilians and persons hors de combat.

In particular, articles 27 and 58 of the fourth Geneva Convention states that «protected persons are entitled, in all circumstances, to respect for their persons, their honour, their family rights, their religious convictions and practices», and that «the Occupying Power shall permit ministers of religion to give spiritual assistance to the members of their religious communities».

In order to specify the content of the respect for convictions and religious practices it is necessary to recall the General Comment 22, 30.7.1993, The Right of freedom of thought, conscience and religion, drafted by the Human Rights Committee in order to develop a basic hermeneutic of the highest authorities that may constitute a fundamental starting point for any interpretive activity that focuses on Article 18 of the Covenant on civil and political rights.

The Comment 22 mentions, among the behaviours protected by art. 18 of the Covenant, (and only as an example) the ceremonies, the ritual acts, the building of places of worship, the observance of public holidays and rest, food requirements, the adoption of a particular clothing and also the participation in rituals associated with the various stages of life and the adoption of a particular language used by a group.

The choice of teachers, priests, religious publications and the establishment of religious schools complete the picture.

Moreover, the Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property, Additional Protocol I, provides for the specific protection of cultural objects and places of worship, which supplements the general protection given to civilian objects. Buildings dedicated to religion, science or charitable purposes, and historic monuments, are given immunity from attack as far as possible, so long as they are not being used for military purposes.

It should also be remembered that the GCs state a peculiar protection of religious personnel and provide legal issues of religious tolerance in armed conflicts. Religious personnel shall not be the object of discrimination by the adversary with regard to their particular religion.

Moreover, religious personnel must not be hindered in pursuing their religious duties, even if the national regulations of the state in which they are working prohibit it. This duty carries with itself - according to Nilendra Kumar - the corollary that «religious personnel have a particular responsibility to act with sensitivity and tolerance for other religions and denominations», for example avoiding to preach for hatred and fostering peace.

Beyond this important and wide set of rules, the recent Report of the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief, tithed «Rights of persons belonging to religious or belief minorities in situations of conflict or insecurity» (march 2022), tries to build a bridge between this corecontent protection towards a new set of guarantees for people belonging to religious minorities involved in armed conflicts, with the goal to involve «religious leaders, influencers and other civil society actors» to «promote reconciliation, peacebuilding and conflict prevention through constructive discourse and other interfaith initiatives: moreover, the Universal Code of Conduct on Holy Sites encourages engagement with faith leaders and communities to improve the protection of holy sites and reduce inter-community tensions.

From this perspective, it seems necessary that the international legal system encourages - also by the mean of sanctions, as extrema ratio - interreligious and intercultural dialogue in order to develop peaceful coexistence between religions and discourage the spread of aggressive or intolerant fundamentalist ideas in respect of plurality and diversity. It should not be forgotten that the United Nations General Assembly Resolution No. A/RES/65/5 of October 20th, 2010 encourages discussion between representatives of various religious groups aimed at building peace, understanding and tolerance.

From this perspective it is also quite interesting to focus on the role of the Council of Europe in enhancing the political dialogue on peace and security through the dismantling of the religious factors linked to the conflicts and the role of CSOs in this process. It must be emphasized the juridical dimension of the Council of Europe convention on prevention of terrorism (art. 3.3.: Each Party shall promote tolerance by encouraging inter-religious and cross-cultural dialogue involving, where appropriate, non-governmental organisations and other elements of civil society with a view to preventing tensions that might contribute to the commission of terrorist offences) and of the Resolution 1928 (2013): Safeguarding human rights in relation to religion and belief, and protecting religious communities from violence.

All these norms have to be interpreted in the perspective of the Report of the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief, Heiner Bielefeldt, «Violence committed in the name of religion» (2014, nn. 105, 106): the state should - in addition to giving up laws that prevent or hinder conversions and give privileges to some religious denominations - encourage an interreligious communication capable of overcoming «competition» between religions but instead - with incentives of a legal nature - strengthened initiatives aimed at improving the relationship between the various religious communities present on the territory.

The European future should be marked by a renewed awareness - by religious confessions - of the absolute necessity of supporting, in any case, non-violence, and by a clear knowledge of their historical, legal, and theological position facing violence. In this perspective, the legitimacy (and the opportunity) of the intervention of the international legal system must be traced back to what was called the «second mile» of interreligious dialogue [34], characterised by a proposed (and no longer merely desired) critical reflection (historical, legal and theological) within every religious tradition (on what was - and what is currently) the relationship with the violence: and then the pacification of conversion dynamics may no longer be a utopia.



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